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Synopsis 
The foreign policy of the United States in the interwar period, 
traditionally described as isolationist, is now being re-evaluated. 
New Left historians portray American diplomacy of the 1920s and 
1930s as part of a continuum during which United States policymakers 
followed a conscious and orchestrated policy of economic expansion, 
through the mechanism of equal economic opportunity and the open door. 
The open door principle was to be of particular importance in 
the attempt by American oil companies to obtain petroleum concessions 
abroad. Despite the desperate British need for a secure supply of 
fuel oil for her navy, which resulted in Great Britain's attempt to 
monopolize Middle Eastern oil resources, the United States Government 
was able to force the door open for Americans throughout the Middle 
East. By 1939 American oil companies controlled the entire Saudi 
Arabian and Bahrain oilfields, fifty per cent of the Kuwait con-
cession and, by virtue of their membership in the Iraq Petroleum 
Company consortium, nearly a quarter of the Iraq and Qatar resources. 
That the United States was able to secure such a dominating 
position was due almost entirely to the reluctant acceptance by the 
British Government of American participation in nearly all the 
major Middle Eastern oilfields. Although the British willingness 
to open the door to American companies was in part due to the 
march of events in the turbulent Middle East, it also reflected an 
explicit desire to cultivate Anglo-American friendship, and to 
terminate United States obstruction of the mandates for Iraq and 
Palestine. This submission by the country which until 1914 had 
been the world's greatest Power, in an area which Great Britain 
regarded as being within her sphere of influence, clearly demonstrates 
the power of the United States, even in an era of 'isolationism', 
to accomplish her international objectives. 
Explanatory Note 
Transliteration 
Transliteration poses a continual problem for all writers in 
Middle Eastern studies, especially for those not acquainted 
with Middle Eastern languages. Throughout the thesis, the 
modern accepted English version of the spelling has been 
adopted where that can be ascertained, e.g. Iraq rather than 
Irak. The following spellings, in common use during the 
1920s and 1930s, are employed in the case of direct quotation 
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In view of recent events, which have so dramatically 
affected traditional Western attitudes towards such fundamental 
issues as energy policy and dependence upon the reserves of the 
Middle Eastern oilfields, it might seem unnecessary to explain 
why this study of interwar oil policy was undertaken. However, 
the history of Middle Eastern oil in the 1920s and 1930s bears 
little relationship to the events of the 1960s and 1970s. Since 
the formation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 
the problem has become one of the politics of scarcity, in which 
the resource rich developing nations are in conflict with the 
comparatively resource poor industrialized nations. In the 
interwar period, on the other hand, at issue was a struggle 
amongst the Western powers for control of the strategically and 
economically critical oil resources of the world. The leading 
rivals were the two greatest naval powers of the period - Great 
Britain and the United States. This thesis examines the contest 
between the two countries for control of the Middle Eastern 
oilfields, and the extent to which considerations of Anglo-
American relations affected the outcome of that contest. 
United States foreign policy in the interwar years has been 
described by contemporaries and historians alike as isolationist. 
More recently, however, New Left historians, led by William 
Appleman Williams, have referred to the 'legend of isolationism',1 
and portrayed the 1920s and 1930s as part of a diplomatic continuum, 
during which United States policy makers followed a conscious and 
1. William Appleman Williams, 'The Legend of Isolationism in 
the 1920s', Science and Society 18 (1954), pp.1-20. 
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orchestrated policy of economic expansion, through the mechanism 
of the 'open door'. It is probably more accurate to say that in 
the interwar period United states diplomacy combined both economic 
interest and ideological commitment. The refusal to participate 
in schemes for international co-operation such as the League of 
Nations should not be allowed to shield the fact that the United 
states Government pursued an active, and deliberate, policy of 
intervention and involvement, in order to protect and extend her 
interests. Examples are the Washington settlement of 1921-2, 
intervention in South America and, in particular, aggressive use 
of diplomatic pressure and the 'open door' doctrine to protect 
the interests of American citizens. This was to be particularly 
true in the case of those citizens engaged in the petroleum 
industry. 
It has been demonstrated in many studies1 that the United 
states Government did not hesitate to broach its isolationism 
to advance economic expansion. What also needs to be examined, 
however, is the other side of the coin. American isolationism 
can also be interpreted as implying that the United States, in 
the interwar years, ceased to be a factor in the diplomacy of 
other nations. Yet, if the United States was to be successful 
in utilizing diplomatic pressure to secure an 'open door' it 
was necessary for the other governments involved to be conscious 
of the latent political and economic power of the United States. 
1. For example, Lloyd C. Gardner, Economic Aspects of New Deal 
Diplomacy (Madison, Wisconsin, 1964); Carl P. Parrini, 
Heir to Empire: United States Economic Diplomacy 1916-1923 
(Pittsburgh, 1969), (hereafter Parrini); William Appleman 
Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (2nd edn., New 
York, 1972); and Joan Hoff Wilson, American Business and 




If concessions were made to American citizens explicitly to 
placate the United states Government, it can surely be argued 
that isolationism, albeit a convenient facade for United states 
unwillingness to participate in collective security, was in 
fact little more than a 'legend'. 
It is in the interwar period that one can discern the 
transference of world supremacy from Great Britain to the 
United states - a transference that became clearly apparent 
after the Second World War. It is, therefore, Singularly 
appropriate to examine the extent to which Great Britain modified 
her policies in order to promote AnglO-American friendship. Of 
particular significance was the struggle in the 1920s and 1930s 
for control of Middle Eastern oil resources. This wasan interest 
which Great Britain was determined not to surrender easily. Her 
need for petroleum resources under her own control was much 
greater than that of the United States, which was, of course, a 
major oil producer and exporter. Moreover, the Middle East was 
a region in which the United States had few interests and less 
influence, whilst Great Britain had long established interests 
there, and by 1918 appeared to be politically pre-eminent in 
the region. This contrasts strongly with the position pertaining 
in the Western Hemisphere, scene of Great Britain's rapprochement 
with the United States at the turn of the century. 
Yet, the outcome of the struggle for control of the Middle 
Eastern oil concessions is well known;1 despite Great Britain's 
pre-eminent position, American oil companies were to obtain a 
substantial stake in the oilfields of the Middle East - a stake 
1. For example, G.W. Stocking, Middle East Oil: A Study in 
Political and Economic Controversy (London, 1971); and 
B. Shwadran, The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers 1973 
(3rd edn., New York, 1973). 
increased yet further by the 1951-2 Abadan crisis. What this 
thesis seeks to examine is, firstly, whether the United states 
consciously sought to employ diplomatic pressure at times and 
in ways to which she knew Great Britain was likely to succumb; 
and secondly, and more importantly, to examine the process of 
decision making within the British Government, in order to 
discover whether and to what extent decisions taken in the 
sphere of Middle Eastern oil were influenced by the current 
state of Anglo-American relations and the desire to retain the 
friendship of the United states. 
One of the major characteristics of the decision-making 
process in Whitehall was the very large number of government 
departments directly or indirectly involved in the evolution 
of an oil policy which had to take into account such complex 
issues as Anglo-American relations, imperial defence in the 
event of a major war, the internal development of the Middle 
Eastern mandated territories, and British Government relations 
with, and policy towards, the Middle East as a whole. This 
necessitated a considerable volume of interdepartmental corres-
pondence between the interested departments. In this correspon-
dence, a clear distinction can be drawn between those departments 
whose primary interest was not so much in the development of 
the oil resources themselves, but the associated issues outlined 
above; and those to whom British control of Middle Eastern oil 
was of paramount importance. The former group comprised the 
Foreign Office, contending with international demands for a share 
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in the expected oil wealth of the Middle East; the India Office, 
concerned at the possible implications of a sizeable American 
commercial presence in the Persian Gulf; and the Colonial 
Office, anxious to establish viable and financially sound 
administrations in the areas under its direct responsibility. 
In the following examination of Middle Eastern oil and 
Anglo-American relations, attention has been concentrated upon 
the two departments actually responsible for the decision to 
admit United States interests into the Middle Eastern oilfields _ 
the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office - and the evolution 
and implementation of policy within those departments. In 
seeking to open the door to American oil companies, the Foreign 
and Colonial Offices not only had to contend with the opposition 
of the India Office and the Government of India, but that of the 
Service Departments, to whom the oil resources themselves were 
paramount, other questions of international relations and internal 
Middle Eastern development being only secondary in importance. 
The Admiralty was especially vociferous concerning its needs: 
it was accustomed to its dependence upon fuel oil being given 
special consideration by the Colonial Office in the formulation 
of regulations to govern the West Indian oil industry. To a 
lesser extent, the views of the British administrators in the 
Middle East, and the quasi-independent rulers such as King Faisal 
of Iraq, and the Persian Gulf shaikhs, had also to be taken into 
consideration. It was rare, however, for such views significantly 
to modify existing policy_ 
The ques tion of American invol vemen t in the exploitation of 
Middle Eastern oilfields was largely decided by correspondence 
between the higher civil servants of the Whitehall Departments, 
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with occasional reference to the Cabinet. On virtually every 
occasion, that reference was a purely formal request for 
Cabinet sanction of a policy already decided upon by permanent 
officials: ministers rarely initiated discussion. The papers 
of most value for a discussion of Middle Eastern oil and Anglo-
American relations were, therefore, the department records 
deposited in the Public Record Office. Virtually none of the 
permanent officials most involved have left private papers. 
In the United states the process of decision-making was 
far less complex, with fewer aspects of government policy to 
be considered. Moreover, only two departments - state and 
Commerce - showed a continuing interest in the oil resources 
of the Middle East. However, in evolving its policy, especially 
during the 1920s, the Department of state had also to take into 
account the opinions of several leading senators, whilst Cabinet 
officers, such as Herbert Hoover and Albert Fall, also expressed 
an interest in the Mesopotamian controversy. Unfortunately, it 
is more difficult to ascertain the evolution and modification of 
United states Government policy from the department records on 
file in the National Archives. The filing and minuting systems 
of both the state and Commerce Departments in the 1920s and 1930s 
left much to be desired, whilst Herbert Hoover removed many 
official records along with his personal papers when he resigned 
as Secretary of Commerce in 1928. It was therefore necessary 
to supplement the official records of the government offices 
with the private papers of politicians, permanent officials, and 
Embassy staff, wherever these were available. 
vii -
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It was not until the interwar period that the struggle for 
control of the oil resources of the Middle East began to affect the 
course of Anglo-American relations. However, in order fully to 
comprehend the significance of Great Britain's concessions to the 
United states, it is first necessary to appreciate the widely 
divergent positions of the two nations in the Middle East after the 
First World War. It is thus proposed to examine in this introduction, 
firstly, the development and extent of their interests in the region 
prior to 1914, with particular concentration upon the extent and 
nature of American involvement, and, secondly, how each power 
responded to the upheaval in the Middle East resulting from the 
1914-18 war. It is only in the light of the very limited involvement 
of the United states in the Middle East, particularly in political as 
opposed to commercial and cultural affairs, that the magnitude of her 
achievement, in securing the oil concessions for Bahrain and Saudi 
Arabia, and a substantial interest in the Iraq and Kuwait concessions, 
can be fully appreciated. American involvement and influence, already 
slight before 1914, were to be weakened still further by the events 
of the First World War, and their impact upon the Middle East. 
For Great Britain, on the other hand, the Middle East was an 
area of vast strategic, political and economic importance, and long 
before the United States even began to develop links with the region, 
British interests there were already well established. These 
interests were all the greater because of the international signifi-
cance of the Near and Middle East. By 1830 - the year in which 
diplomatic relations were officially established between the United 
:a and the Sublime Porte (the Turkish Court and 
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Government) - the future of the ottoman Empire was already the 
subject of much concern in European diplomacy. During the rest 
of the nineteenth century, the so-called Eastern Question, intensified 
by the Empire's steady decline in power, became of even greater 
importance. The ultimate fate of the 'sick man of Europe' and his 
rich possessions was of interest to all the European Great Powers 
who assiduously endeavoured to improve their own positions, at the 
expense of Turkey, and each other. Of greatest significance was the 
struggle between Russia and Great Britain for pre-eminence in Central 
Asia. However, other countries also had interests and ambitions, 
which they were determined to preserve at all costs, and, if possible, 
extend: Austria-Hungary in the Balkans, Germany in European Turkey 
1 and Mesopotamia, and France in Syria and the Lebanon. 
Great Britain's objectives had been defined early in the 
nineteenth century. Her interest in the Middle East, and especially 
the Arabian Peninsula, dated from the acquisition of India, and 
intensified after the French occupation of Egypt in 1798, when she 
realized that a threat to the Middle East was a threat to her Indian 
possessions. Under Lord Palmerston in the 1830s, the policy was 
formulated that was to remain the consistent British guideline until 
the First World War; to safeguard the integrity of the Ottoman 
1. The introductory paragraphs are based upon a large selection of 
secondary works, of which the most useful were M.S. Anderson, 
The Eastern Question 1774-1923: A Study in International 
Relations (London, 1966); R.L. Greaves, Persia and the Defence 
of India 1884-1892: A Study in the Foreign Policy of the Third 
Marquis of Salisbury (London, 1959), (hereafter Greaves, Persia 
and the Defence of India); F. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain 
in Persia 1864-1914: A Study in Imperialism (New Haven, 1968), 
(hereafter Kazemzadeh); and E. Kedourie, England and the Middle 
East: The Destruction of the ottoman Empire 1914-21 (London, 
1956), (hereafter Kedourie), pp.9-28. 
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Empire as a bulwark against foreign dominance in the area, whilst 
maintaining British predominance in the Persian Gulf. In the later 
part of the nineteenth century, this latter policy took the form of 
ensuring that the small fringe states of the Gulf came under Great 
1 Britain's unofficial tutelage. With the completion of the Suez 
Canal in 1869, British interest in the Middle East increased, as 
she sought to safeguard her new route to India, if need be by 
. . 2 lnvaSlon. 
The main threat against which she directed her defensive policy, 
and in particular against which she created a buffer zone around 
India, of Persia, Afghanistan and Baluchistan, was the steady advance 
of Russia into Central Asia. 3 The Tsarist state not only sought 
free access to the Mediterranean through the Straits, but seemed to 
aim towards India, whilst also seeking a route to the Persian Gulf. 
In the face of Russia's advance, intensified after 1905 by the need 
to compensate for humiliating defeat by Japan, Great Britain found 
it necessary to reshape her policy. In 1903, her position in the 
Persian Gulf had been reaffirmed in a manner brooking no interference. 4 
1. J.B. Kelly, 'The Legal and Historical Basis of the British position 
in the Persian Gulf', st. Antony's Papers 4, pp.120-37; and 
R.G. Landen, Oman Since 1856: Disruptive Modernization in a 
Traditional Arab Society (Princeton, 1967), pp.163-233. Whilst 
Great Britain's interests in the area were primarily maritime, in 
the 1880s and 1890s the Trucial Shaikhs and the Shaikh of Kuwait 
in effect gave her permission to conduct their foreign relations. 
2. In 1882 Great Britain occupied Egypt, ostensibly to restore order, 
thus herself infringing the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. 
Although initially it was intended to withdraw within a few months, 
it became apparent that efficient administration and reform were 
needed, and Great Britain undertook to provide them, thus creating 
a virtual protectorate over Egypt. 
3. Greaves, Persia and the Defence of India; Kazemzadeh, pp.3-20 and 
62-98. 
4. On 5 May 1903 Lord Lansdowne stated in the House of Lords that whilst 
Great Britain did not intend to exclude the legitimate trade of 
other nations, 'we should regard the establishment of a naval base 
or a fortified port in the Persian Gulf by any other power as a very 
grave menace to British interests, and we should certainly resist 
it with all the means at our disposal', Kazemzadeh, p.443. France, 
"G~t1I1allj ~ Russia had all been trying to improve their posi lion in 
the Persia~Gulf. Landen, op.cit., pp.240-67. 
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In 1907, however, a radical step was taken in reversing the 
traditional policy of maintaining a buffer zone to withhold Russia. 
The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, whilst largely the product of 
European politics, had profound implications for the Middle East. 
In it Great Britain, faced with the result of her weak policy in 
Persia, admitted that a divided Persia, with the South under 
recognized British influence, was better than an independent but 
weak Persia prone to fall victim to Russia. 1 
Whilst Russia and Great Britain were also the main rivals for 
influence over the ottoman Empire, here they faced challenges from 
other powers. Undoubtedly the most significant was that from the 
newly unified Germany. Denied by Bismarck's policy the richest 
pickings of colonial empire, Kaiser Wilhelm II saw in the moribund 
Turkey an opportunity for commercial gain and possible political 
predominance. The Kaiser himself promoted Germany's interests by 
his two visits to Constantinople in 1889 and 1898; by 1908, the 
last year of Sultan Abdul Hamid II's reign, Germany had become by 
far the most influential nation at the Sublime Porte, a position it 
was able to regain even after the Young Turk revolution of 1909. 2 
Whilst Austria-Hungary's main preoccupation was with the European 
Balkan provinces, both Italy and France claimed a share for them-
selves in the sick man's estate. Although France had been forced to 
withdraw her military mission from Turkey and Egypt in 1870, and 
hence had lost much of her political influence, she was anxious to 
1. The text of the agreement is in G.P. Gooch and H.W.V. Temperley, 
eds., British Documents on the Origin of the War: 1898-1914 
10 vols. (London, 1927-1938), (hereafter Gooch and Temperley, 
Documents), IV, pp.618-21; Kazemzadeh, pp.497-509; and Viscount 
Grey of Fallodon, Twenty-Five Years: 1892-1916 2 vols. (London, 
1926), I, pp.152-171. 
2. E.M. Earle, Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Baghdad Railway: 
A Study in Imperialism (New York, 1924), pp.31-45; and W.O. 
Henderson, 'German Economic Penetration in the Middle East, 
1870-1914', Economic History Review XVIII (1948), pp.54-64. 
~ 
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defend both her heavy financial stake in the ottoman Empire 
(especially Egypt), and her traditional claim to influence in Syria. 
It is only wi thin the context of European diplomacy in the 
ottoman Empire and Persia that the real weakness of the United States 
position before 19l8 can be appreciated. In the struggle for the 
possessions and riches of the old ottoman Empire after the First 
World War, Great Britain and France started with vast advantages, 
including already articulated desiderata, as outlined in the Sykes-
Picot agreement of 19l6, and long established and powerful interests; 
even Soviet Russia, crippled by internecine strife, could wield more 
influence in Persia than could the United States. Before President 
Woodrow Wilson's intervention in the Middle Eastern settlement at 
Versailles, the United States had played absolutely no part in the 
international Eastern Question. She had clearly outlined her 
intended sphere of influence, by the promulgation and elaboration of 
the Monroe Doctrine. Whilst the powerful use of the vast potential 
markets of China and Japan had resulted in the formulation of an 
American Far Eastern policy, in the affairs of Europe, Africa and 
most of the vast regions of Asia, the United States role was solely 
that of a disinterested observer. l 
This does not imply, however, that the United States was 
entirely without interests in the ottoman Empire and Persia, although 
those that she did have were mostly commercial and cultural. As early 
as l785, the New Englanders had begun trade with Smyrna, the largest 
commercial centre in the Sultan's domain, and by the l820s their 
annual trade amounted to one million dollars or more. 2 In 181l, the 
l. See Appendix II, Section A, for a discussion of the creation of 
a Near Eastern Division in the Department of State, and its 
limited personnel. 
2. Leland J. Gordon, American Relations with Turkey, 1830-1930: An 
Economic Interpretation (Philadelphia, 1932), (hereafter Gor'~:~lr1", 
pp.41-42; and Nasim Sousa, The Capitulatory Re~ime of Turkey: 
Its Histo Ori in and Nature (Baltimore, 1933 , (>10'1-':';:::1' ~-"'-
"tulator Re ime) , p.129, Note 4. 
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first American trading house was established in the port, Messrs. 
Woodmas and Offley, the latter of whom was to serve unofficially 
as United states consul from 1824. It was largely because of 
unfavourable customs duties imposed upon American cargoes that the 
United states became anxious to negotiate a treaty with the Sublime 
Porte. However, American trade with the Middle East was never to 
exceed 1-2% of total American exports and imports,1 even though 
trade increased steadily in the early part of the twentieth century. 
This was largely due to the many similarities between the economies 
of the United States and the ottoman Empire, especially during the 
nineteenth century. Both were largely exporters of raw materials 
and foodstuffs, and importers of manufactured goods, with a 
comprehensive range of domestic produce. Moreover, both produced 
very similar cash crops,2 America's cotton, tobacco and grain being 
paralleled by the cotton of Egypt, the tobacco of Turkey, and the 
grain of the Anatolian plains. The main American purchases were, 
therefore, rugs, carpets and, especially after 1902, tobacco, with 
the ottoman Empire taking in exchange firearms, kerosene and, to a 
lesser extent, manufactured goods. 3 United States trade with the 
Arabian peninsula and Persia was minimal. 4 
1. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 
(Washington D.C., annual) gives detailed figures for United 
States trade. 
2. So much so that the American Civil War resulted in a boom in 
Egyptian cotton and Turkish tobacco. David D. Landes, Bankers 
and Pashas: International Finance and Economic Imperialism in 
Egypt (London, 1958), pp.55-56 and passim. Whereas in 1861 the 
cotton crop in Egypt yielded 60 million lb., by 1864 it was 
yielding 173 million. D.R. Serpell, 'American consular activities 
in Egypt, 1849-63', Journal of Modern History X (1938), p.349. 
3. Gordon, Table 3, p.49; Table 4, p.51; Table 8, p.65 and Table 9,p.66 
4. Charles Issawi, The Economic History of the Middle East 1800-1914 
(Chicago, 1966); J. Bharier, Economic Development in Iran 1900-1970 
(London, 1971), Table 3, p.108 and Table 5, p.113; and Charles 
Issawi, The Economic History of Iran 1800-1914 (Chicago, 1971), 
DD.148-9. 
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European nations secured economic power in the Middle East, 
not only because of the extent of their trade, but also because 
of their investment there. However, very little American capital 
made its way to the Middle East. Before 1918 the United states 
was on balance a debtor nation, and her domestic capital was 
mostly invested in her own dramatic industrialization, apart from 
small sums diverted to Latin America and, to a lesser extent, Canada. 
The Middle East offered neither the security nor the facilities to 
encourage American investment which, like American commerce, was 
hindered by the lack of a direct foreign exchange between Cons tan-
tinople and New York for the payment of accounts; moreover, no 
American bank opened a branch in the ottoman Empire until 1920. 1 
Even as late as November 1914, it has been estimated that the 
United states provided only 1.8% of the total capital investment 
in the ottoman Empire (less, for example, than Belgium) ,2 almost all 
invested in trade, or the agencies of such companies as the Singer 
Sewing Machine Company, the American Tobacco Company and the Standard 
Oil Company of New York (socony).3 This lack of investment meant 
that the chronic financial embarrassment of Near Eastern governments 
affected only a few AmeriCans,4 and therefore the United States 
Government was represented on neither the Ottoman Public Debt 
Administration (1881) nor the Egyptian Caisse de la Dette (1876). 
1. Gordon, pp.143-9. 
2. Charles Issawi, The Economic History of the Middle East 1800-1914 
(Chicago, 1966), pp.94-5. 
3. J.A. DeNovo, American Interests and Policies in the Middle East 
1900-39 (Minneapolis, 1963), (hereafter DeNovo, American Interests), 
p.40. 
4. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations 
of the United States 1880 (Washington, 1881), (hereafter For. ReI. 
and year), p.1003. 
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In view of later events, it might seem that the most 
significant area of economic development in the Near and Middle 
East before 1914 was the granting of concessions for the 
exploitation of petroleum. However, although throughout the Near 
East surface oil deposits had been worked since antiquity, the 
large international oil companies did not express an interest in 
the region until the early twentieth century. Whilst this may 
seem surprising, oil seepages alone were not thought to prove the 
existence of economically viable oilfields; the full potential 
of the Middle Eastern oil riches was not in fact to be appreciated 
until after the Second World War. Exploration and drilling in the 
interior of the ottoman Empire and Persia was hazardous, with no 
adequate protection provided by either government against local 
tribesmen. Moreover, the notorious corruption and dilatoriness of 
both the Shah and his ministers, and the Sublime Porte, would 
undoubtedly have deterred the major oil companies. American 
companies in particular, and to a lesser extent Royal Dutch and 
Shell, had access to large sources of readily available supplies 
in the United States, Russia, Roumania, and the Dutch East Indies. 1 
2 In 1901, however, with the full backing of British diplomats, 
the Shah of Persia granted to Knox D'Arcy, a British subject, the 
right to exploit oil for 60 years throughout Persia, excepting only 
1. See Appendix III. 
2. An earlier concession had been granted in 1872, the de Reuter 
concession, which included mineral rights. However, in 1873 
Russian pressure forced the Shah to cancel the concession. 
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the five northern provinces.1 D'Arcy was not connected with a 
large oil company, but following the successful discovery of oil 
in commercial quantities in 1908, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company 
was formed in the following year to take over the concession. Keen 
interest was shown in the company by the British governments of 
the day, which supported to the utmost attempts by D'Arcy to gain 
an entree into the oil bearing regions of Mesopotamia, where 
German interests were already strongly entrenched. After a pro-
longed period of commercial and diplomatic negotiations, an agreement 
was signed in March 1914 at the British Foreign Office, between the 
Deutsche Bank, the Anglo-Saxon Oil Company (a subsidiary of Royal 
Dutch-Shell), and the British and German Governments, by which a 
new Anglo-German syndicate was set up, the Turkish Petroleum Company 
(TPC)2, which was to have the diplomatic backing of both the German 
and British Governments, and which was to incorporate the mineral 
claims granted as part of the Baghdad Railway concession. 3 On 
1. The text of the concession is in J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in 
the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record 1914-1956 2 vols. 
(New York, 1972), (hereafter Hurewitz), I, pp.249-251. For 
accounts of the negotiations, see G.W. Stocking, Middle East Oil: 
A Study in Political and Economic Controversy (London, 1971), 
(hereafter Stocking), pp.3-11; Z. Mikdashi, A Financial Analysis 
of Middle Eastern Oil Concessions 1901-65 (New York, 1966), 
(hereafter Mikdashi), pp.9-15; S.H. Longrigg, Oil in the Middle 
East: Its Discovery and Development (London, 1954), (hereafter 
Longrigg, Oil), pp.14-18; H. Longhurst, Adventure in Oil: The 
Story of BrItish Petroleum (London, 1959), (hereafter Longhurst), 
pp.17-20; and B. Shwadran, The Middle East, Oil and the Great 
Powers 1973 (3rd edn., New York, 1973), (hereafter Shwadran), 
pp.13-17. 
2. The usual abbreviation for the Turkish Petroleum Company, which 
will be used throughout this thesis, is TPC (rather than T.P.C.). 
See Appendix I. 
3. For an account of the negotiations for the Mesopotamian concession, 
see Marian Kent, Oil and Empire: British Policy and Mesopotamian 
Oil 1900-1920 (London, 1976), (hereafter Kent, Oil and Empire); 
and Helmut Mejcher, Imperial Quest for Oil: Iraq 1910-1928 (London, 
1976), (hereafter Mejcher, Imperial Quest), ch. 1. The text of the 
Foreign Office Agreement of March 1914 is in Hurewitz, I, pp.276-8. 
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28 June 1914, after prolonged diplomatic pressure from both 
governments, the Turkish Grand Vizier wrote identical letters to 
the German and British Ambassadors, promising that an oil con-
cession for the vilayets of Baghdad and Mosul would be granted 
to the TPC, on terms to be negotiated at a later date. 1 By now, 
Anglo-Persian was in a unique position, since the British Treasury 
2 had purchased a controlling interest in the company. Also at 
this time, the British Government obtained commitments from the 
Shaikhs of Bahrain and Kuwait that they would not allow the 
exploitation of oil in their territory except with the express 
approval of the British Government. 3 
In contrast to this vigorous British policy, American companies 
showed little interest in the Middle East in the early years of the 
twentieth century. Whilst to Great Britain the Middle East offered 
the incentive of providing, in Southern Persia, a petroliferous area 
which, if not actually in the Empire, was under her influence,4 to 
American companies it could not compare with the security of the 
newly discovered oilfields in the Monroe Doctrine area of Latin 
America. Only the Standard Oil Company of New York (Socony) ventured 
1. Kent, Oil and Empire, pp.103-112. 
2. Marion Jack, 'The Purchase of the British Government's Shares in 
the British Petroleum Company, 1912-14', Past and Present 39 
(1968), pp.139-168; W.S. Churchill, The World Crisis 5 vols. 
(London, 1923-1929), I, pp.130-5; Longhurst, pp.20-52; Shwadran, 
pp.18-19. The debate on the purchase is in Parliamentary Debates 
5th Series, XLIII, 1914, cols.1131-1250. The text of the agree-
ment between the Treasury, the Admiralty and the Anglo-Persian 
Oil Company is in Hurewitz, I, pp.278-91. 
3. Agreements with the Shaikh of Kuwait, 27 October 1913, and the 
Shaikh of Bahrain, 14 May 1914, Hurewitz, I, pp.272-3. 
4. This was not, however, the main reason for the purchase of the 
Government shares in Anglo-Persian; the intention was to ensure 
that the Admiralty was not at the mercy of a price monopoly. 
Marian Jack, op.cit. 
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to seek a concession in the ottoman Empire. Socony was, however, 
unusual amongst American companies, in that it had large markets 
for kerosene in the Near and Far East, but no domestic American 
1 production with which to supply them. It therefore decided, in 
1913-14, to send exploration parties to the ottoman Empire; this 
initiative was to lead to the company obtaining several licences 
for mineral prospecting in Palestine. However, exploratory work 
on the licences, although begun, was halted by the outbreak of 
the First World War.2 
Thus American economic activity in the Middle East before 
1914, although showing signs of steady growth, was of minor 
significance in comparison with that of the major European nations. 
Above all, American businessmen were disadvantaged by the lack of 
consistent and efficacious pressure from United states diplomatic 
and consular officials, to obtain concessions and favours for 
American nationals. Moreover, they could not utilize the wide 
range of facilities, such as banks, agencies and chambers of commerce, 
which their competitors, with large investments already at stake in 
Turkey, had at their disposal. It was not, however, for their trade 
and investment that the Americans were noted before 1914. The work 
for which they are most remembered, and which figures prominently 
in accounts of American involvement in Turkey,3 was that of the 
1. In 1911 the Standard Oil Company was dissolved, in accordance 
with the 1890 Sherman Anti-Trust Law, into its various component 
companies of which the Standard Oil Company of New York (Socony) 
was one. Since it had been the exporting and marketing company 
for the trust, it was left with very little production capacity 
of its own. 
2. Longrigg, Oil, p.25; Shwadran, p.449; and W. Yale, The Near East 
(Ann Arbor, 1958), pp.369-70. 
3. See, for example, A.L.P. Dennis, Adventures in American Diplomacy 
1896-1906 (New York, 1918), pp.447-468; Sousa, Capitulatory 
Regime, pp.139-50; and DeNovo, American Interests, chs. 1 and 2. 
- 12 -
Protestant missionaries who from the early nineteenth century 
flocked to all parts of Asia, including the Near East. 
The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, 
founded in 1810, was from its inauguration to show a strong 
fascination with the Holy Land - in cornmon with other similar 
societies. In 1820 its first missionaries landed in Smyrna, 
their ultimate destination Jerusalem, their ultimate mission the 
conversion of the Jews, and the regeneration from within of the 
ottoman Christian churches. In cornmon with later missions, to 
Armenia and European Turkey (1831), to the Nestorians in Persia 
(1829), to Egypt (1854) and to the Persian Gulf area of Arabia 
(1890s), the success of the missionaries in Syria, if judged by 
their original aims, was minimal. Language problems abounded, 
ottoman laws prevented preaching to, and conversion of, Muslims, 
and conversions of even existing Christians to Protestantism were 
1 
small in relation to the effort expended. The most lasting 
achievements of the American missionaries, therefore, were less 
in proselytism than in education, originally intended as a 
strictly ancillary operation. The Americans' work in establishing 
a large number of primary and secondary schools throughout the 
Near and Middle East, albeit schools of very mixed quality, and 
printing textbooks in Arabic for their use, was a tremendous 
achievement. 2 Upon this pyramid of preparatory schools rested a 
number of colleges, some of which were independent of missionary 
1. A.L. Tibawi, American Interests in Syria 1800-1901: A Study 
of Educational, Literary and Religious Work (Oxford, 1966), 
(hereafter Tibawi), pp.12-29; and E.M. Earle, 'American 
Missions in the Near East', Foreign Affairs VII (1928-9), 
(hereafter Earle, 'American Missions'), pp.398-417. 
2. Tibawi, passim, gives an extremely detailed account of how 
the American educational system was built up in Syria, and 
its weaknesses. Great care should be taken when reading the 
account in G. Antonius, The Arab Awakening: The story of the 
Arab Nationalist Movement (London, 1938). 
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control but owing much to their inspiration,1 such as the Syrian 
2 Protestant College (1866) and Robert College (1863). However, 
the colleges, like the schools, drew their students primarily 
from the religious and ethnic minorities. If the missionaries 
and colleges did not foster the Arab nationalist movement to the 
extent that Antonius maintained, they undoubtedly provided sorely 
needed Western learning and technological knowledge. In addition, 
medical missionaries were frequently attached to missionary stations, 
where they opened hospitals available to all regardless of religion. 
Medical missionaries in the Arabian stations were in the post-war 
era to act as unofficial reporters for United States government 
officials. 
However, despite the great achievements of the missionaries 
in the educational and medical spheres, they were by no means 
popular amongst the ottoman and Persian peoples. Accusations by 
the Sublime Porte that the missionaries were fostering the national-
ism which was to lead indirectly to the horrific American massacres 
of 1895-6, if not founded in truth, exacerbated still further the 
strained relationship between the Muslim state and the foreign 
Protestants who openly worked against the state religion. 3 In the 
absence of effective protection from the ottoman and Persian 
Governments, it became the task of the United States Department of 
State to protect the lives, property and rights of American 
missionaries. Since the missionaries, whilst insisting upon their 
4 
right to travel freely throughout the Middle East, were also 
1. For a list of the colleges, see DeNovo, American Interests, p.13. 
2. Better known by its later (1920) name of the American University 
of Beirut. 
3. Tibawi, pp.151-70. 
4. The missionary stations were widely scattered, and frequently 
in areas that were virtually inaccessible. A list of all the 
missions in the ottoman Empire can be found in For. ReI. 1907, 
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vociferous in demanding their government's support and protection, 
this was to provide the United states Government with some of its 
most difficult diplomatic problems in the Middle East before the 
First World War. The missionaries' need for protection was of 
significance in the creation of several consulates and, in 1883, 
was to lead to the accrediting of the first American minister to 
Persia. Despite the very real difficulties they faced, United 
states diplomats attempted on several occasions to obtain compen-
1 
sation for the loss of American lives or property; whilst, 
following the Armenian massacres, United states gunboats were sent 
to Turkish waters in an effort to obtain an indemnity for damaged 
2 property. 
The problem of protecting the lives, property and freedom of 
action of intrepid American missionaries was probably the most 
serious with which the consular and diplomatic representatives of 
the United states had to contend. Undoubtedly, the problem was 
compounded by a lack of understanding on the part of the state 
Department of local conditions, and the varied abilities of its 
representatives. The United states did not intend its ministers 
to take any-part in the lnternational Eastern Question, and thus 
1. For typical examples of such incidents, see Gordon, pp.237-8. 
The most notorious case was the Laboree murder in 1904. See 
A.Yeselson, United states-Persian Diplomatic Relations 1883-1921 
(New Jersey, 1956), (hereafter Yeselson) , pp.68-84; For. ReI. 1904 
pp.657-677; For. ReI. 1905 pp.722-34; For. ReI. 1906 pp.1205-8; 
and For. ReI. 1907 pp.941-8. 
2. Sousa, Capitulatory Regime, pp.146-8; A.L.P. Dennis, Adventures 
in American Diplomacy (New York, 1928), pp.451-65; Gordon, 
pp.25-7; For ReI. 1895, pp.1237-1245 and 1318-1470; For. ReI. 
1896, pp.848-900; For. ReI. 1899, pp.765-75; For. ReI. 1900, 
pp.906-909; and For. ReI. 1901, pp.514-21. 
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their task was the extremely routine one of safeguarding the 
interests of American merchants and United states citizens resident 
in the area, including the missionaries. Even this task was compli-
cated by the inferior power and prestige of the United states, when 
compared to that of the other Great Powers. 
Officially, American rights under Ottoman law were no different 
from those of other nations. The treaties signed with the Sublime 
Porte in 1830 and 1862 not only provided for fixed customs duties 
and freedom of commerce, on a 'most favoured nation' basis, but 
also extended to United States citizens the judicial status of 
extraterritoriality, through the ~apitulations.1 The United States 
was also one of the first nations to sign a Treaty of Commerce 
with the ruler of Muscat and Oman, 2 sovereign over the entrepots 
of Muscat and Zanzibar, which handled between them much of the 
trade of Arabia, the Persian Gulf, and East Africa. 
The treaties with both the Sublime Porte and the ruler of 
Muscat represented no more than the securing of privileges needed 
to give American citizens parity with those of other nations. The 
1856 Treaty with Persia, however, departed from this pattern. Not 
only did the United States have little trade, or potential trade, 
with Persia, but the initiative was taken, not by the United 
states, but by the Persian Government, which hoped to use the United 
states for its own political ends. An attempt was made by Persia 
to incorporate an article providing for the use of American naval 
1. For the text of the Treaty of 1830, see Hurewitz, I, pp.102-5. 
The nature and growth of the capitulations are discussed in 
Sousa, Capitulatory Regime. 
2. Treaty between the United States of America and Muscat, 
21 September 1833, Hurewitz, I, pp.108-9. This Treaty was to 
assume a new significance in the 1930s, when the question of 
oil concessions in the Arabian peninsula arose. See Chapter 6. 
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forces to protect the Persian merchant marine and certain islands 
from the preponderance of an unnamed power; the United States, 
however, reduced the Treaty to the formal limits of friendship 
1 
and commerce. 
More important, perhaps, than the formal acquisition of 
rights and privileges, was the maintenance of officials able to 
uphold them. From 1831, there was an officially accredited 
American mission in Constantinople, and whilst the United States 
never developed the extensive net of consulates that Great 
Britain, for example, retained, consular offices were slowly created 
in the locations of most necessity, particularly the major trade 
centres and missionary stations. Nonetheless, American citizens 
were frequently dependent upon British protection, particularly in 
Persia, where American interests were minimal, whilst many of the 
minor consular offices were held by foreigners. The consular 
service in the Middle East was of hybrid growth, determined as 
much by the need to protect Americans already in residence, as to 
2 promote trade, although after 1900 some United States consuls 
began to associate themselves directly in various trade promotion 
projects, thus furthering American interests and encouraging their 
expansion, instead of merely protecting those already there. More-
over, several men of distinction were sent as ambassadors to 
Constantinople, including William Rockhill, the famous 'Open Door' 
3 diplomat, Oscar Straus, and Hans Morgenthau Snr. 
1. For the text of the Treaty, Hurewitz, I, pp.158-161; and see 
also Yeselson, pp.20-2. 
2. By 1895, the United States consular representation in the Ottoman 
Empire consisted of: 2 consulate generals (Constantinople and 
Cairo), 7 consulates, and 23 consular agencies. 22 of the 
consular agents were non-American. 
3. A.L.P. Dennis, Adventures in American Diplomacy (New York, 1928), 
pp.456-63. 
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Nothing, however, could be achieved in either the ottoman 
Empire or Persia without resort to bribery, threats or force, 
a lesson the Great Powers had quickly learnt. Yet alth h th , oug e 
United states had a permanent squadron stationed in the Mediter-
ranean from 1815, it was not until the end of the nineteenth 
century, despite appeals from its men on the spot, that the 
Department of state used this very convenient force in attempts 
to circumvent the traditional ottoman delay and evasion. From 
1895 to 1904, however, American vessels did visit Turkish waters 
on several occasions, to protect American citizens, and to persuade 
th S It t . d . t 1 e u an 0 pay an In emnl y. Nonetheless, such incidents were 
infrequent and low-key. The unwillingness throughout the nineteenth 
century to use this accessible, if small, force would seem to 
reinforce the conclusion, both that the United states was anxious 
to avoid any action that could lead to international and trouble-
some complications, and that there were insufficient American 
interests in the area to justify the use of naval force. 
The United states therefore almost totally lacked the tools 
with which to conduct an aggressive diplomacy in the Near and 
Middle East, even had she so wished. She made no loans to the 
Sublime Porte, the Khedive or the Shah; had no major private 
investment in the area; operated no banks nor public utili ties; 
had no major garrisons nearby; and had neither the political nor 
the military strength to frighten the Eastern rulers into abiding 
by her wishes. She did not even use the important position of her 
missionaries to secure for herself the role of protector of the 
1. DeNovo, American Interests, p.56; and H. and M. Sprout, 
The Rise of American Naval Power 1776-1918 (Princeton, 1939), 
pp.27-29, 56, and 94-5. 
- ---------
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ottoman Protestants; whilst, although United states consent was 
needed before the ottoman Empire could raise its customs duties, 
it was never made conditional upon political or commercial 
. 1 th 
concesSlons. Because of is disinterest, relations between 
the United states and the ottoman Empire were traditionally 
friendly, the main causes of dispute being caused by the pro-
tection of missionaries, and the status of ex-ottoman subjects 
who became naturalized American citizens. 2 
The policy followed towards the ottoman Empire by the United 
states, of concentrating its efforts solely on the task of 
preserving American interests and playing no part whatsoever in 
international controversy and diplomacy, extended throughout the 
Near and Middle East. The United states was not involved in such 
events as the Crimean War, the Druze-Maronite struggle in Syria 
in 1860, or the debate over the future of Egypt after 1876. Nor 
did she interfere in the Anglo-Russian struggle over the ultimate 
fate of Persia, despite a strong attempt by the Persian Government 
to enlist American help, which culminated in the 1911 Shuster 
mission. 3 The Department of State even resisted any attempts by 
its diplomats to encourage the participation of American firms and 
1. Except for one occasion, in 1910, when an attempt was made to 
link the giving of United States assent to the granting of the 
Chester concession. See below. 
2. The problem was acute because, as American citizens, they could 
demand the privileged status of extraterritoriality; however, 
the ottoman Empire did not admit of the right of any subject 
to adopt the citizenship of another country without first 
obtaining permission from the ottoman authorities. Gordon, 
pp.295-305, and 326-336; For. ReI. 1895, pp.1295-1317; 
For. ReI. 1896, pp.924-33; For. ReI. 1897, pp.584-90; 
For. ReI. 1898, pp.1108-9; For. ReI. 1900, pp.934-40; 
For. ReI. 1904, pp.844-8; and For. ReI. 1907, pp.3-5. 
3. See below. 
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merchants in Persian commerce, ministers being clearly instructed 
tha t their primary task was to protect American citizens, who 
consisted almost entirely of missionaries. 1 
Official diplomatic relations with the governments of the 
Near and Middle East, however, are not the only means by which the 
function of the United States Government in the Middle East before 
1914 can be evaluated. The interest of the other Great Powers in 
the politics and future of the vast domains of the Sultan was not 
dictated solely by the European balance of power. For the Middle 
East, once one of the great trade routes of the medieval world, 
in the nineteenth century still retained much of its economic 
importance. Its value as a communications link, by virtue of its 
posi tion at the junction of three continents, was enhanced by the 
completion of the Suez Canal in 1869, and the plans for a railway 
across Asiatic Turkey, which culminated in the great German Baghdad 
2 Railway scheme of 1903. By the late nineteenth century, the 
European Powers had still further reason to be concerned at the 
instability and indebtedness of the Shah of Persia, the Khedive of 
Egypt, and the Ottoman SuI tan. Most of the loans to these govern-
ments, and capital for the development and modernization of their 
countries, came from foreign investors, who looked to their own 
governments for protection and security. Partly because of the 
power that this vast investment by their subjects gave them, partly 
as a means of safeguarding that investment, the European nations 
came to play a major role in much of the financial administration 
1. Yeselson, pp.53-61. 
2. Details of the history, politics and development of the 
Baghdad Railway can be found in E.M. Earle, Turkey, the Great 
Powers, and the Baghdad Railway: A Study in Imperialism 
(New York, 1924); and Stuart A. Cohen, British Policy in 
Mesopotamia 1903-1914 (London, 1976), (hereafter Cohen). 
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of the Middle East, with the administration of the public debts of 
both the Ottoman Empire and Egypt assumed by Europeans in the 
interests of the foreign bondholders. Egypt's finances were run 
from 1876 by a dual control of France and Britain, and after 1882 
by Britain alone. 
This contrasted strongly with the United States Government's 
unwillingness to participate in such international control of the 
Near East. As stated earlier, the United States was not a member 
of the Caisse de la Dette or the Ottoman Public Debt Administration; 
she did not join the international commission on Suez Canal tolls 
in 1873, nor accede to the Constantinople Convention of 29 October 
1888,1 which provided for free use of the Canal in peace or war 
(probably because American use of the Canal was so Slight2). The 
only international body of which the United States was a member, 
was the Mixed Courts of Egypt, which administered the capitulations. 
As a consequence, the other Great Powers had little reason to come 
into conflict with the United States over their Middle Eastern 
diplomacy. The United States did have to be consulted on those 
occasions on which the Sublime Porte wished to raise its customs 
duties, but such occurrences were sporadic. Since the only United 
States interests in the area were those of its individual citizens, 
it had little reason for intervention in the politics of the Great 
Powers. In short, it was not a factor to be considered in the 
diplomacy of the Eastern Question and its various ramifications. 
1. The text of the convention is in Hurewitz, I, pp.202-5. 
2. Trade through the Suez Canal under the United States flag was 
extremely light, accounting for well under one percent of the 
total tonnage until 1919. A Wilson, The Suez Canal (London, 
1933), Table IV, pp.135-6. Nor was American trade through the 
Canal under other flags significant. D.A. Farnie, East and 
West of Suez: The Suez Canal in History 1854-1956 (Oxford, 
1969), p .514. 
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This continued to be the case, even when the United states 
adopted after 1898 a more dynamic and aggressive foreign policy.1 
This imperialist era saw a gradual, but important, change in the 
traditional United states alignment with regard to the other world 
powers. Hitherto friendly to Russia and wary of Great Britain, 
her relationship with the former, already strained by Tsarist 
autocracy and repression, was fractured by the crash of interests 
in the Far East. Meanwhile Great Britain, aware of her dangerous 
isolation, was attempting to move closer to the United states and 
2 
a cautious friendship grew up between them. However, this friend-
ship did not extend to co-operation in the Middle and Near East, 
where the only sign of American imperialism was a new belligerence 
in pursuing the old aims of the protection of American life, 
property and interests. 
It was, in fact, in the era of 'dollar diplomacy' that American 
diplomacy impinged most upon events in the Near and Middle East. 
President Taft (1909-13) and his secretary of state Philander C. 
Knox made a conscious and sustained attempt to use diplomacy to 
further commercial gain abroad; and whilst this policy was most 
1. This is well covered in a range of secondary works. See, in 
particular, F.R. Dulles, America's Rise to World Power 1898-1954 
(New York, 1963), chs. 2 and 3; R.W. Leopold, The Growth of 
American Foreign Policy: A History (New York, 1962), pp.119-238; 
Ernest R. May, Imperial Democracy: The Emergence of America 
as a Great Power (New York, 1961); and William Appleman Williams, 
The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (2nd edn., New York, 1972), 
Introduction and Chapter 1. 
2. T.A. Bailey, America Faces Russia (New York, 1950), pp.108-184; 
A.E. Campbell, Great Britain and the United states 1895-1903 
(London, 1960); and H.C. Allen, Great Britain and the United 
states: A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952) 
(New York, 1958), pp.549-629. 
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significant in the Far East and Latin America, it also had reper-
cussions in the Near East, especially during 1910-11. The two 
incidents most indicative of this new trend are, firstly, the 
attempt to use diplomatic pressure to secure a railway concession 
for Admiral Colby Chester, and, secondly - and contrary to all 
established policy - Taft's promotion of an American financial 
mission to Persia. 
1 The 'Chester Concession', so-called, was an attempt by a 
syndicate originally formed by Admiral Colby Chester, and later 
joined by financial interests, 2 to obtain a railway concession in 
the ottoman Empire, passing through the Mosul and Kirkuk areas and 
including exclusive mineral rights twenty kilometres each side of 
'3 
the line. In March 1910 a detailed preliminary agreement was 
signed. state Department assistance to the company extended to 
tentative promises that, in return for the grant of the concession, 
American assent would be given to the raising of the ottoman customs 
duties, whilst the possibility of countering any attempt by the 
German Government to protect the interests of the German Baghdad 
4 
Railway Company was also considered. Active state Department 
assistance continued throughout the next year, and in June 1911 
William W. Rockhill, one of the United States most prestigious 
diplomats, was sent to Constantinople, his instructions stressing 
1. The best account of this is in DeNovo, American Interests, 
Chapter 3; see also Gordon, pp.257-265; and Marian Kent, 
Oil and Empire. 
2. In November 1909, the Chester group had organized the Ottoman-
American Development Company, and apparently impressed the 
State Department with evidence of strong financial backing. 
DeNovo, American Interests, pp.64-8. 
3. The concession, applied for in the late summer of 1909, would 
have comprised at least 2,000 kilometres of railroad track. 
4. Ibid., pp.66-71; and Gordon, pp.259-261. 
-------, 
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the importance of securing the Chester concession. 1 Despite the 
growing financial instability of the company, the State Department 
continued to support it, but in October 1911, when it finally 
appeared that the bureaucratic obstacles had been surmounted, the 
company withdrew its 'caution money' before the project was voted 
upon by the Turkish Parliament. This serious embarrassment to the 
United States Government seems to have signed the death warrant 
of a more aggressive dollar diplomacy in the Near East, and avoided 
the possibility of a conflict of interests with Great Britain, which 
was already perturbed by the rapid advancement of German economic 
influence. 
Concurrently with the abortive Chester project, an American 
financial mission, led by W. Morgan Shuster, was employed by persia2 • 
In September 1910 the Persian Majlis (parliament), wishing to express 
some degree of independence from Anglo-Russian influence, decided to 
invite foreign advisers to remodel Persian finances and, with the 
agreement of the two Great Powers, approached the United States. 
The subsequent history of the mission belongs less in the realm of 
American dollar diplomacy than in Anglo-Russian and Russo-Persian 
relations. What is significant, however, apart from the choice by 
Persia of American financial advisers, is that had it not been for 
Taft's personal intervention, the State Department would have continued 
its traditional policy of non-involvement by refusing to nominate any 
1. DeNovo, American Interests, pp.73-9. 
2. Yeselson, Chapter 5; Kazemzadeh, pp.581-645; and Morgan Shuster, 
The Strangling of Persia: A Record of European Diplomacy and 
Oriental Intrigue (London, 1912). Gooch and Temperley, Documents, 
X, pp.746-901 contains many documents on the impact of the Shuster 
mission on Anglo-Russian relations. The State Department printed 
very few documents: see For. ReI. 1911, pp.679-87. 
- 24 -
Americans for the posts of advisers. 1 Shuster quickly aroused 
the hostility of Russia, which demanded his dismissal and invaded 
Persia; in response, the State Department totally abjured any 
responsibility or interest in the Shuster mission. 2 Nevertheless, 
despite its sudden ending, the mission, by its financial ability 
and political impartiality, created a great fund of goodwill in 
Persia, both for Americans in general, and Shuster in particular. 
Nor did Great Britain share Russia's hostility; indeed the British 
Minister at Teheran, Sir G. Barclay, expressed the opinion that 
' ••• Mr. Shuster's continuance here is of ••• immense importance if 
3 Persia is ever to emerge regenerate as an independent country'. 
Despite the era of 'dollar diplomacy', the United States had 
not significantly improved its weak political and economic standing 
in the Middle East by 1914. However, the American position was 
further weakened by the First World War, which was to revolutionize 
the Middle East, and emphasize more strongly than before the 
difference between the power of Great Britain in that region, and 
the weakness of the United States. With the entry of the ottoman 
1. Yeselson, pp.106-113. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State 
Huntington Wilson in fact suggested in a memorandum that, 
since 'our interests in Persia seem about as near nothing as 
our interests anywhere can be', the Department of State should 
suggest to Russia and Britain that, in return for the United 
States refusing to nominate American advisers to Persia, they 
should look favourably upon America's China policy and the 
Chester project in Turkey. Yeselson, pp.109-10. This idea 
failed when Great Britain persuaded Russia to accept American 
advisers. 
2. It should be noted, however, that there is no suggestion in 
Shuster's book that he expected the United States Government 
to exert diplomatic pressure on his behalf. 
3. Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, 3 December 1911, Gooch and 
Temperley, Documents, X, Part 1, p.865. 
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Empire into the war on the side of the Central Powers in 
November 1914, its eventual partition in the event of Allied 
victory became inevitable. The Near and Middle East rapidly 
became a theatre of war, engulfing even the nominally neutral 
Persia, whilst Imperial troops in Egypt were prepared to repulse 
any attempt to sever the lifeline of the British Empire, the 
Suez Canal. Great Britain was by far the most active of all the 
European states in the Middle Eastern theatre. Indian troops 
were quietly landed in the Persian Gulf area of Mesopotamia and 
Persia, at the Shatt aI-Arab, in part to safeguard British oil 
installations.1 In the latter part of the war, the Egyptian 
Expeditionary Force swept through Sinai, Palestine and Syria. 
By the end of 1915, Egypt, Syria, the Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan 
and Mesopotamia were all occupied by Allied troops, the vast 
majority of them British. Great Britain's war aims included the 
assumption of a considerable degree of political responsibility 
for the Middle East, as articulated by her support of Arab 
nationalism, through the Hussain-McMahon correspondence, and 
subsidies to leading Arab chieftains such as ibn Saud and ibn 
Rashid2; the series of secret agreements with her allies on the 
1. B.C. Busch, Britain, India and the Arabs 1914-21, (Los Angeles, 
1971), (hereafter Busch), pp.4-S and 14-15; Kent, Oil and 
Empire, p.11S; Cohen, pp.29S-314; Peter Sluglett, Britain 
in Iraq 1914-1932 (London, 1976), (hereafter Sluglett), pp.9-11. 
2. For the Hussain-McMahon correspondence and the Arab revolt, 
1915-16, see Hurewitz, II, pp.13-17; and G. Antonius, The Arab 
Awakening (London, 1935), pp.126-275; for British relationships 
with the Arab chieftains, and the 1915 Treaty between Great 
Britain and ibn Saud, see Hurewitz, II, pp.17-1S; Busch, 
pp.231-263; and Gary Troeller, The Birth of Saudi Arabia: 
Britain and the Rise of the House of Sa'ud (London, 1976), 
pp.73-90. 
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partition of the ottoman Empire1 ; and her support for Zionism, 
by the Balfour Declaration of 1917. 2 Admittedly, many of these 
commitments were inherently contradictory; the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement of 1916 gave the French a sUbstantial stake in the old 
'Turkey in ASia',3 and conflicted with promises made in the 
bewildering and ambiguous McMahon-Hussain correspondence, the 
vehicle by which the British had pledged support to the Sharifian 
family and the Arab revolt. This, in turn, appeared to be in 
conflict with the subsidies paid to Hussain's long-standing rival, 
ibn Saud. Meanwhile, the Cabinet's promise of support for Zionism 
merely compounded the sense of confusion surrounding the future 
status of Palestine. 
However, despite this confusing and contradictory policy _ 
or, more accurately, policies - Britain's position in the Middle 
East had been considerably strengthened by the war. It was assumed 
that large sections of the Middle East, including Egypt, the Basra 
vilayet, and possibly all of Mesopotamia would be, either directly 
4 
or indirectly, under British control, whilst Arabia would remain 
1. The series of agreements consisted of the 1915 Constantinople 
Agreement with Russia, Hurewitz, II, pp.7-11; the 1915 secret 
London Agreement between the Entente Powers and Italy, ibid., 
pp.11-12; the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 between Britain 
and France, ibid., pp.18-22; and the Saint-Jean Maurienne 
Agreement between Britain, France and Italy in 1917, ibid., pp.23-5. 
2. Leonard Stein, The Balfour Declaration (London, 1961); Isaiah 
Friedman, The Question of Palestine, 1914-1918: British-Jewish-
Arab Relations (London, 1973); and Mayir Verete, 'The Balfour 
Declaration and its Makers', Middle Eastern Studies 6 (1970), pp.48-76, 
3. Kedourie, pp.29-45. 
4. The Foreign Office expressed the view that Britain should control 
Mesopotamia, as the power who had 'for over two centuries ••• 
performed countless sacrifices, involving the sacrifice of many 
lives and the expenditure of much money'. Foreign Office, Peace 
Handbooks: No.92 Mesopotamia (London, 1919), p.44. For a useful 
discussion of the development of British interests in Mesopotamia 
in the early twentieth century, see Cohen, and Sluglett, pp.14-24. 
For the formation and policy of the Anglo-Indian administration 
in Basra, see Busch, pp.18-23, 49-52 and 136-163. 
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highly fragmented and backward, Great Britain continuing to 
maintain the status guo against internal disorder and foreign menace. 1 
In view of the strong links that India already had with Arabia, 
Mesopotamia and Persia, such assumptions were understandable; not 
least because of the virtual elimination of Germany and Russia as 
rivals by 1918, which strengthened Britain's hold on the fringe 
states of the Arabian peninsula. Moreover, the two main contenders 
for power in the interior, ibn Saud and Sharif Hussain, were both 
receiving a British subsidy; the son of the latter, Emir Faisal, 
was seen by the British as a possible king of an independent Syria. 
Britain's hold on Persia, which in 1907-14 had steadily been weakened 
in the face of aggressive Russian policy, and as a consequence of 
Lord Grey's preoccupation with Europe, seemed about to be streng-
thened once more with the collapse of the Tsarist regime. It seemed 
as though France would be Great Britain's only rival for dominance 
in the Middle East after 1918. 
With regard to the granting of oil concessions, Great Britain 
also appeared to be in a pre-eminent position. Anglo-Persian, with 
its government majority shareholding, controlled the South Persian 
oilfields, and seemed likely to gain any Northern concession with 
the disruption of Russian capitalism. In Mesopotamia, no concession 
actually existed, for the outbreak of war had halted negotiations 
as to the terms of the TPC's lease over the oilfields of Baghdad 
and Mosul, whilst the composition of the company was itself in 
doubt, since the Foreign Office Agreement was no longer regarded as 
1. Foreign Office, Peace Handbooks: No.90 Arabia (London, 1919), 
pp.45-6 and 118; and Foreign Office, Peace Handbooks: No.81 
Persian Gulf (London, 1919), pp.77-78. 
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possessing legal validity,1 and the Deutsche Bank's 25% share-
holding in the TPC had been confiscated during the course of the 
2 
war. However, with the elimination of the German interest, British 
control of the TPC was yet further increased, whilst it seemed 
certain that Great Britain would have political control over 
Mesopotamia - and, hence, presumably, influence on the granting 
of oil concessions - after the war. In short, Britain seemed set 
to dominate Middle Eastern oil resources. 
Whilst British troops and diplomats were carefully streng-
thening Great Britain's position with a view to the inevitable peace 
conference, that of the United States was being steadily weakened. 
Even after her entry into the European war in April 1917, the 
United States was never at war with Turkey; hence American troops 
were not employed in any part of the old ottoman Empire, whilst 
American involvement in the whole Mediterranean theatre of war was 
slight. However, American activity in the Near and Middle East 
during 1914-18 did not cease altogether. The American Legation in 
Constantinople, as representative of the only powerful neutral 
nation maintaining diplomatic relations with the Porte, looked 
after the interests of the Allied Powers until 1917. 3 The American 
colleges stayed open throughout the war, in the face of great 
difficulties, and a core of missionaries remained, even after the 
American embassy and consular officials had been withdrawn. The 
1. In Foreign Office, Peace Handbooks: No.92 Mesopotamia (London, 
1919), p.34, the Foreign Office made public the fact that in 
November 1915 the Anglo-Persian had been informed that the 
Foreign Office Agreement no longer possessed legal validity. 
2. Ibid., p.34; Kent, Oil and Empire, Chapter 6; and Mejcher, 
Imperial Quest, p.17. 
3. Gordon, pp.16-21. 
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carefully built network of their schools was disrupted and 
largely destroyed, but the missionaries continued to do much 
relief work in the buildings left to them,1 and tried to protect 
the Christian minorities. Meanwhile, in 1915, a group of American 
philanthropists, encouraged by Ambassador Hans Morgenthau, estab-
lished the American Committee for American and Syrian Relief, 
better known under its later (1919) name of Near East Relief. 
Funds poured in, to be distributed in the Near East by missionaries, 
diplomats and other American citizens in the area, and by the time 
of its demise in 1930 the Committee had raised more than $100 million, 
utilized both in emergency relief and permanent reconstruction work. 2 
The major Middle Eastern issue with which the United States 
Government was concerned was the question of a Jewish national 
home in Palestine. The British Government was anxious to issue 
some declaration of support for the Zionists, but wished first to 
secure President Wilson's approval. Despite pressure brought upon 
him by leading American Zionists such as Louis Brandeis, initially 
Wilson refused to give his support; and when eventually he con-
sented to the wording of the Balfour Declaration, he would not allow 
his approval to be made pUblic. 3 Hence, the United States was of 
little significance in the history of the Balfour Declaration. 
Indeed, the only American contribution to the wartime debate on 
the future of the ottoman Empire was Wilson's inclusion of Point 
Twelve in his famous 'Fourteen Points' speech of 8 January 1918: 
1. Earle, 'American Missions', p.413; and DeNovo, American 
Interests, pp.95-7. 
2. The raising of funds for Near East Relief became something of 
a national crusade in the United States. Ibid., pp.102-4. 
3. W. Laqueur, A History of Zionism (London, 1972), pp.108-60; 
L. Stein, The Balfour Declaration (London, 1961), pp.188-205, 
422-8, 503-10 and 528-532; and R.N. Lebow, 'Woodrow Wilson 
and the Balfour Declaration', Journal of Modern Histor 40 
(1968). pp.501-23. r:- ~ UHtvIRS., .. 
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The Turkish portion of the present ottoman 
Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, 
but the other nationalities which are now under 
Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted 
security of life and an absolutely unmolested 
opportunity of autonomous development, and the 
Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a 
free passage to the ships and commerce of all 
nations under international guarantees. 
This point and, of course, Wilson's advocacy of a mandate system, 
were to prove of significance in the Paris Peace Conference's 
debate on the future of the Middle East. 
Thus, by 1918, whilst British influence and power in the Middle 
East had increased dramatically, that of the United States, already 
weak in comparison, had declined substantially. Through the work 
of the Near East Relief Committee, the American tradition of 
philanthropic aid had continued, but better established interests 
were being eroded. Many American missionaries had fled, their 
property destroyed or occupied. United States commerce in the area 
had been totally disrupted. The United States even lacked official 
diplomatic representation in what had been the ottoman Empire until 
1927. Work on the one American oil concession in Palestine had 
been suspended by the war, and was afterwards greatly obstructed 
by the British Administration of Occupied Enemy Territory. The 
only positive achievement, if so it can be called, was Wilson's 
Twelfth Point, and the mandate system. Yet, even before 1914, 
American interests, though well established and reasonably 
protected, were, when compared with those of the other Great Powers, 
insubstantial. American economic interest in the Middle East, even 
before the disruption of 1914-1918, was small, whilst the United 
states was largely unconcerned with internal affairs in the ottoman 
Empire and Persia, or with the international significance of the 
Eastern Question. The American record in the Near and Middle East, 
if unexciting, was on the whole unSUllied, especially in the 
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religious, philanthropic and educational spheres. Nonetheless , 
the United States before 1918 was definitely an observer, not a 
participant, of Middle Eastern diplomacy. 
This stance was to be reinforced when the United States 
Government rejected all proposals that she should assume the 
mandates for areas such as Armenia, Constantinople, and possibly 
Palestine. Whilst Great Britain was actively pursuing a new, 
expanded role in the Middle East, the United States was apparently 
withdrawing into isolationism, ignoring events in all areas out-
side the Americas. This, coupled with Britain's already strong 
position vis-a-vis Middle Eastern oil concessions, and her growing 
awareness of the vital necessity of controlling sufficient oil 
resources for wartime use, would lead one to expect that British 
hegemony in the Middle East would extend to control of all or 
most major oil concessions. 
There was, however, one vital change in circumstances after 
1918 which was to permit United States penetration into Middle 
Eastern oilfields. The history of oil negotiations prior to 1918 
reveals very clearly the critical role that political influence 
over the Governments granting the concessions was to play. Indeed, 
the history of the TPC and the Mesopotamian oil negotiations before 
the First World War is almost entirely a history of diplomatic, 
rather than commercial, negotiations. In such a situation, the 
United States could not expect to bring sufficient influence to 
bear upon Middle Eastern governments to secure concessions for her 
nationals. In the one instance in which Americans came close to 
obtaining a major concession - the Chester concession - State 
Department influence was of far less significance than internal 
events in Turkey following the Young Turk Revolution. Moreover, 
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had the concession been finally ratified, it would still have had 
to withstand political pressure from European nations, particularly 
Germany, whose nationals had conflicting claims. In Palestine, 
the only area of the ottoman Empire in which an American company 
successfully applied for prospecting licences, there was no state 
Department involvement, and the oil potential of the region was 
not promising. In short, American companies would have found it 
difficult to obtain and operate major concessions in the Middle 
East prior to 1914, largely as a consequence of their Government's 
lack of political influence. 
After 1918, however, whilst the granting of Middle Eastern 
oil concessions still depended more upon political than commercial 
criteria, in virtually every case the real decision as to which 
company should obtain the concession rested, not with the Eastern 
government concerned, but with the British Government. In Palestine 
and Mesopotamia, Great Britain was the mandatory power; in the 
Persian Gulf states, she was the unofficial protector of the 
backward Shaikhs, as well as holding apparently unassailable Treaty 
rights over the granting of oil concessions. Only in Persia and 
the domains of ibn Saud did the real decision as to the concessionary 
rest with the local governments. Even here, the decision was still 
dictated by political rather than commercial criteria, as in both 
countries the nationality of the company holding the concession was 
seen as an important weapon in their attempts to break free of 
British dominance. Hence, American companies offered the only real 
alternative to the British government-controlled Anglo-Persian, as 
Royal Dutch-Shell was also seen as being under British influence; 
whilst in the other countries of the Middle East, in effect the 
government with which the United States had to deal was the British 
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Government, rather than the corrupt Sublime Porte, or the backward -
and British dominated - Gulf Shaikhs. Thus, Anglo-American, rather 
than Turco- or Perso-American relations became the deciding factor. 




The Anglo-American 'Oil War' in 
Mesopotamia, 1918-21 
One of the more remarkable aspects of oil history during 
the interwar period is that whereas the granting of concessions 
for the vast oil resources of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait passed 
almost unnoticed by the British press and Parliament, and all 
foreign governments except that of the United States, the less 
significant oilfields of Mesopotamia (Iraq) were the subject 
of almost continual international controversy during the first 
thirty years of the twentieth century. This must be attributed 
largely to a combination of comparative geological ignorance, 
and the timing of the negotiations themselves. Despite exten-
sive geological surveys, the oil riches of the Arabian peninsula 
were vastly under-rated even in the 1930s; whilst the oil 
springs and seepages in Mesopotamia, and later its proximity to 
proved territory in Persia, drew concession hunters from the 
late nineteenth century. Moreover, whereas the Bahrain and 
Kuwait negotiations took place during a time of world depression, 
within the context of an oil industry where production was 
rising and prices falling, the most intensive period of interest 
in the Mesopotamian oilfields (1904-24) coincided with growing 
demands for oil products and an increasing fear of shortage of 
supplies. This same period witnessed the growing appreciation 
of the strategic advantages of oil, which imposed upon Western 
governments, for the first time, a need for secure oil supplies 
I th . . 1 to fue elr naVles. Thus, the belief that the traces of 
petroleum known in Mesopotamia since biblical times indicated 
1. This background to the Mesopotamian oil concession is 
discussed more fully in Appendix III. 
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immense oil wealth, and the strategic value of the oilfields, 
located in the Eastern rather than the Western Hemisphere, 
combined to interest the Great Powers in the future of the 
Mesopotamian oilfields on a scale hitherto unequalled. 
That future was to become inextricably intertwined with 
the history of the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC) , an 
international undertaking whose shareholders, concessions and 
even commercial policy were to be dictated by diplomatic and 
political considerations. For thirty years the problem of 
its formation and composition, its claim to an exclusive 
concession in Iraq, and even its pipline outlet to the sea, 
were to exercise the British Government's ingenuity and 
diplomatic skill. At various times, the TPC was to influence 
Great Britain's relations with Germany, Turkey, France, the 
United states and Italy; it proved one of the main stumbling 
blocks at the Lausanne Conference; whilst virtually every 
major multinational oil company was anxious for, or in possession 
of, a shareholding in its potential resources. 
It will be recalled1 that on 28 June 1914, following ten 
years of protracted negotiations in which both the British and 
German governments had taken a prominent part, the Grand Vizier 
of the ottoman Empire had addressed a Note to the British and 
German Ambassadors, in which he promised that a lease for the 
oilfields of the vilayets of Mosul and Baghdad would be trans-
ferred from the Ministry of Finance to the TPC, then a British 
registered AnglO-German syndicate, on terms to be agreed at a 
later date. However, before the terms could be negotiated, the 
ottoman Empire and Germany were at war with Great Britain, thus 
radically altering the situation. In the course of the wac, 
1. See Chapter 1. 
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the 25% German share in the TPC, held oy the Deutsche Bank, 
was confiscated by the Public Trustee; and later purchased by 
1 His Majesty's Government. After the war, by the San Remo 
Oil Agreement of 24 April 1920,2 this 25%, despite a contractual 
undertaking that vacated shares should first be offered to the 
3 
other shareholders, was promised to the French Government in 
return for Mosul and guaranteed wayleave for pipelines across 
French mandated territories (Syria). By this time, the British 
Government had already made it plain that it regarded the 
letter of the Grand Vizier as a binding commitment which the 
new Mesopotamian state was bound to honour, and that therefore 
the TPC was entitled to the grant of a concession for the 
Mosul and Baghdad vilayets. The new Mesopotamian state was, 
of course, under the tutelage of Great Britain as mandatory 
power. This attitude was to be retained in the face of growing 
American pressure for an 'open door' policy in the mandated 
territories, i.e. equal economic opportunity for the nationals 
of all states. 
The Americans based their opposition to the TPC claim, 
and the San Remo Agreement, on two main contentions: firstly, 
that the TPC was in possession of not a concession, nor a 
diplomatic promise of a concession binding upon the Turkish 
Government's successor, but an undertaking so vague ·that even 
-.------~ 
1. The history of the TPC during the war is discussed in Kent, 
Oil and Empire, chs. 6 and 7. See also a Memorandum 
respecting oil concessions in Mesopotamia by Edmund Parkes, 
27 April 1918, A44/44/45, Foreign Office Records, Public 
Record Office, London (hereafter F.O.) 371/5638. 
2. This agreement is discussed in more detail later in the 
chapter. For the text of the agreement see Hurewitz, II, pp.75-7. 
3. i.e. Anglo-Saxon, a Royal Dutch-Shell subsidiary, aCld the 
D'Arcy Exploration Company, a subsidiary of Anglo-Persi0~. 
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had the war not intervened, there was no guarantee that an 
actual mining lease would have ever been issued; and, secondly, 
that the TPC's claim of exclusive rights Over the oil rights 
in the Mosul and Baghdad vilayets was monopolistic in character, 
and thus contrary both to the mandate and to the 'open door' 
policy. The San Remo Agreement was condemned as apparently 
incorporating both the TPC's clai~, and its exclusive character. 
The United States suggestion that the question should be 
referred to international arbitration found little favour with 
the British Government, well aware that the TPC's position was 
weak legally, resting almost entirely upon the contention that 
the Turkish Government, in return for concessions from the 
British and German governments, had made a diplomatic commit-
ment which must be observed. 
In a diplomatic correspondence extending over the three 
years 1919-21, the American and British Governments reiterated 
their different viewpoints, during which time the e~ploitation 
of Mesopotamian oil was effectively prevented. Moreover, 
American contentions that the United States Government's 
approval was necessary before the League of Nations could issue 
the Mesopotamian mandate considerably delayed its ratification, 
with serious repercussions for the British and Mesopotamian 
governments. During this period, the 'oil war', to which the 
TPC claim was a major contributory factor, exacerbated already 
strained Anglo-American relations. Thus stood the position 
wl1en, on 1 March 1921, the Colonial Office assumed the role of 
adviser and mentor to the Mesopotamian Government. Three days 
later, the new Republican administration of the United States 
was inaugurated. The impact of these two changes will be 
examined in a later chapter. 
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The Anglo-American debate on Mesopotamian oil can only 
be understood within the context of the slowly evolving British 
policy towards oil and, in particular, Mesopotamian oil. This 
policy has, however, been discussed adequately elsewhere,1 and 
it is therefore intended to concentrate upon the critical 
interplay between the evolving British oil policy, United 
states demands for participation in the oil riches of the Near 
and Middle East, and the steadily worsening state of Anglo-
American relations. It is, however, necessary, before examining 
the Anglo-American diplomatic controversy, first to appreciate 
the general attitudes of the British and American governments 
towards oil. 
Even before the First World War, the growing significance 
of oil as a motive fuel was becoming apparent. Although its 
civilian use was comparatively trivial until after 1918, its 
military advantages were appreciated very early in the twentieth 
century. An oil-burning ship had a critical speed advantage 
over the traditional coal-burning navies. 2 Thus, for the major 
naval powers of the world (such as the United states and Great 
Britain) control over adequate fuel supplies was to become a 
strategic necessity. However, whereas the United states was 
the leading producer of petroleum, Great Britain had no domestic 
production (contrasting vividly with her pre-eminent position 
in the era of coal-burning ships), nor did the Empire contain 
significant reserves of oil. From 1904 onwards, therefore, 
1. The factual outline may be obtained from Shwadran, pp.195-209; 
and Stocking, pp.40-65. A more sophisticated analysis is 
available in Kent, Oil and Empire; Mejcher, Imperial Quest; 
and Colin Davis, 'British Oil Policy in the Middle East, 
1919-1932', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Univ2t'si ty of Edinburgh, 
1973 (hereafter Davis, British oil Policy). 
2. This is discussed in greater detiil in Appendix III. 
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the Admiralty urged the British Government to secure adequate 
physical and political control over substantial sources of crude 
oil, which could then be refined to meet the rigorous Admiralty 
fuel oil specification. In 1914, Admiralty pressure, coupled 
with concern at the rising price of fuel, resulted in the British 
Government purchasing a majority shareholding in Anglo-Persian. 
The 1914-1918 war reinforced dramatically the strategic 
importance of oil. However, it also demonstrated that the highly 
localized production of AnglO-Persian was grossly inadequate for 
meeting Admiralty demands for fuel. It was therefore necessary 
for the British Government, as a critical part of its defence 
policy, to consider how best to secure adequate sources of oil 
for the navy. One alternative was to retain a strategic reserve 
above ground, and, indeed, steps were taken to create such a 
reserve, but this was envisaged as providing only sufficient oil 
to supply the fleet during the crucial first months of any war, 
until such time as regular supply lines were established. 1 The 
British Government began, therefore, during and after the war, 
to consider two additional lines of policy: i.e. physical, or 
political, control over more oil territory; and financial control 
over an oil company larger than the Anglo-Persian. 
The former alternative was one factor in the British decision 
to occupy Mosul, the third vilayet comprising Mesopotamia, after 
the Armistice of Mudros with the Turks had in fact been signed. 
In order to retain hold of this potentially promising oil region, 
concessions were made to the French in 1919. The second strategy 
was to lead to periodic negotiations during and after the war, 
in an attempt to secure British control over Royal Dutch-Shell, 
1. Davis, British Oil Policy, ch. 2. 
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the leading rival of the American Standard Oil companies, and 
already 40% British. The TPC, and its Mesopotamian concession, 
were seen as a possible incentive by which this British control 
could be secured. Thus, a suggestion by AnglO-Persian in 1918, 
that the TPC claim should be declared invalid, and a full 
concession for Mesopotamia be given to itself instead, was 
rejected. The significance of securing British control over 
adequate oil supplies was highlighted by the formation, during 
the war, of the Petroleum Imperial Policy Committee and the 
Petroleum Executive - the latter of which was to be incorporated 
after the war into the permanent bureaucratic structure. 
In order to secure Mosul, the British found it necessary 
to offer an inducement to the French, to whom the vilayet had 
been assigned by the Sykes-Picot Agreement. The French, also 
in dire need of secure sources of oil, demanded as their quid 
pro quo a share in the oil riches of Mesopotamia. Yet again, 
the TPC was envisaged as a possible vehicle to realize this. 
The need to accommodate the French complicated yet further the 
already complex - and somewhat incoherent - British oil pOlicy.1 
In addition to ensuring control over Mesopotamian oil, the 
British Government also took steps to secure that any petroleum 
deposits in the United Kingdom, or elsewhere in the Crown Colonies, 
2 
would be available for Admiralty use in time of war. However, 
in evolving her oil strategy, Great Britain clearly relied heavily 
upon both Mesopotamian oil, and the ubiquitous TPC. 
1. For a fuller discussion, see Kent, Oil and Empire, chs. 7 
and 8; Davis, British Oil Policy, pp.94-119; Mejcher, 
Imperial Quest, ch. 2; and Busch, pp.303-308. Additional 
information can be obtained from Stephen Roskill, ed., 
Hankey, Man of Secrets 2 vols. (London, 1972), I, pp.585-6, 
and II, p.45. 
2. See Appendices III and IV. 
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On the other side of the Atlantic, the United states, as a 
major oil producer, appeared in a singularly fortunate position. 
Not only was well over 60% of the world's oil actually produced 
in the United states, but American companies in addition con-
trolled much of the Mexican output. This was imported to the 
United states, enabling her to export large amounts of crude 
1 
and refined petroleum. The alliance between government and 
industry that developed in Great Britain, so strikingly demon-
strated by the Government's shareholding in Anglo-Persian, was 
thus apparently unnecessary in the United states; it would also 
have been virtually inconceivable, at least prior to 1914, for 
in the progressive era the American Government had been suspicious 
of, and hostile to, trusts in general, and oil trusts (such as 
standard Oil) in particular. 
However, in 1918-22, fear was growing in the United states 
that the rapid exploitation of her oilfields, accelerated in 
order to meet Allied needs during the war, was depleting her 
domestic oil resources at an unacceptable rate. Reports by 
official government bodies such as the Geological Survey suggested 
2 that American oil reserves were dangerously low. Meantime, the 
United States Government, as a growing naval power, was becoming 
increasingly conscious of the need for a secure - and long term -
source of oil fuel. 3 It was therefore urged, both by the public 
and by leading government officials such as Mark Requa, General 
1. See Table A, Appendix III. 
2. Ibid. 
3. John A. DeNovo, 'Movement for an Aggressive American Oil 
Policy Abroad, 1918-1920', American Historical Review 61 
(1956), pp.854-876 (hereafter DeNovo 'American Oil Policy 
Abroad'). This article proved extremely useful on compiling 
the following section on the formulation of an American oil 
policy. 
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Director of the Oil Division of the Bureau of Mines, that the 
close co-operation between the government and the oil industry, 
which had grown up during the war,1 should be continued. 
The growing belief in government and industry circles that 
America should adopt an aggressive approach to oil policy owed 
much to the conviction steadily gaining ground in the United 
states that Great Britain was deliberately attempting to control 
vital raw materials, including oil, throughout the Empire. 2 
Despite the argument presented by Secretary of Commerce William C. 
Redfield, that such a policy was surely legitimate given Great 
Britain's particular circumstances,3 the American Government was 
hardly likely to countenance this infringement of the traditional 
United States demand for the open door. Its policy of economic 
expansion through the open door had been given added force by 
1. Memorandum by Mark Requa, 23 January 1919, State Department 
Decimal file 811.6363/72, Record Group 59, National Archives 
(hereafter file reference, R.G.59, N.A.); Report to the Sub-
Committee on Mineral Raw Materials of the Economic Liaison 
Committee on the World Petroleum Situation, 22 April 1919, 
Tray 135, Special Files, Bureau of Mines, Record Group 70, 
National Archives (hereafter R.G.70, N.A.); Summary of Facts 
and Recommendations bearing upon the Petroleum Policy of the 
United States, prepared by the above Sub-Committee, 11 July 
1919, E91, Volume 1, Special Files, Bureau of Mines, R.G.70, 
N.A.; and Mark Requa to Frank Polk, Counsel, Department of 
State, 20 May 1919, 867.6363/5, R.G.59, N.A., Microcopy 353/ 
Roll 67 (hereafter M-/-). 
2. Herbert Hoover, U.S. Food Administration, to U.S. Secretary of 
Commerce, 10 May 1918, file 77270, General Correspondence, 
Department of Commerce, Record Group 40, National Archives 
(hereafter R.G.40, N.A.); B.S. Cutler, Chief of the Bureau of 
Foreign and Domestic Commerce, to the U.S. Secretary of Commerce, 
27 May 1918, file 77255, R.G.40, N.A.; and William Willert to 
William Wiseman, 15 November 1918, Folder 212, Box 5, Series I, 
Papers of William Willert, Yale University (hereafter Willert 
MSS, Yale University). 
3. William C. Redfield, U.S. Secretary of Commerce, to Cutler, 
27 May 1918, file 77255, R.G.40, N.A.; Redfield to Edward N. 
Hurley, 28 May 1918, Redfield to Bernard Baruch, 29 May 1918, 
and Redfield to Robert Lansing, 13 July 1918, all in file 
77270, R.G.40, N.A. 
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the evolution of Wilsonianism, with its commitment to equal 
1 economic opportunity in a free trade world. 
An additional factor contributing to American suspicion 
of British oil policy was the growing number of reports that 
the British Government, in addition to controlling Anglo-Persian, 
was attempting to gain control of Royal Dutch-Shell, planning to 
unite it with all the other powerful British oil interests into 
an aggressive combine. Initially, the response was to advocate 
the organization of American oil companies, in order to compete 
with the British, into a group that would have the active backing 
of the United States Government. 2 However, as 1919 progressed, 
the envisaged role of the Government changed, from one of actively 
assisting American firms to combine and compete abroad, to that 
of using its power to persuade, or even force, Great Britain into 
opening up its possessions (including the mandated territories) 
to American oil companies. In mid 1919, the State Department 
took occasion to inform all its diplomatic and consular offices 
that in view of 
The vital importance of securing adequate 
supplies of mineral oil both for present and 
future needs of the United States ••• You are ••• 
instructed to lend all legitimate aid to 
reliable and responsible United States citi-
zens or interests which are seeking mineral 
oil concessions or rights. 3 
1. See, for example, Parrini; Arno J. Mayer, Wilson vs. Lenin: 
Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917-1918 (Cleveland, 
1964); William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American 
Diplomacy (2nd edn., New York, 1972); and N. Gordon Levin, 
Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: Response to War and 
Revolution (New York, 1968). 
2. There is copious documentation on this. See, for example, 
Robert Skinner, U.S. Consul-General, London, 'Report on British 
Oil Interests', 28 April 1919, 841.6363, R.G.59, N.A., M580/145; 
various correspondence and reports in file 312 U.K. 1918-1925, 
Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Department of Commerce, 
Record Group 151, National Archives (hereafter BFDC, R.G.151, 
N.A.); and correspondence and reports, Tray 135, Special Files, 
Bureau of Mines, R.G.70, N.A. 
Circular by Alvey A. Adee, State Department, to all American 
,I-"';-.'I~-'-: ,'_" 
/ ~'i"F;',~ G<il"'0~',~, 
\r>B 
Consular Offices, 16 August 1919, 800.6363/16a, 
,v ..... ..,.,.oj"'· . :>enny, We Fight for Oil (New York, 1928), pp.19-20. 




Concurrently, and extending into the early part of 1920, an 
attempt was made in Washington to formulate an international policy 
on oil for the United states. Several alternatives were explored. 
There was a growing belief, particularly prevalent in the Interior 
and Commerce Departments and the Senate, but also shared by 
leading members of the State Department (such as Under Secretary 
H.P. Fletcher), that retaliatory legislation might be necessary 
within the United States, so as to restrict the exploitation of 
oil on public lands to American citizens, or nationals of countries 
11 ' 1 t . .. 1 a oW1ng equa access 0 Amerlcan cltizens. This was to result, 
on 25 February 1920, in the passing of a Mineral Leasing Law, 
which provided 
That citizens of another country, the laws, 
customs, or regulations of which, deny similar 
or like privileges to citizens or corporations 
of this country, shall not by stock ownership, 
stock holding, or stock control, own any 
interest in any lease acquired under the pro-
visions of this Act. 2 
However, this was insufficient to satisfy all the advocates of 
retaliatory action. The Senate's continuing concern was expressed 
in a resolution, passed on 10 March 1920, asking what restrictions 
were imposed in foreign countries on United States citizens, and 
what steps were being taken to ensure their removal. The State 
Department submitted a comprehensive - and, to some extent, 
inaccurate - report on 14 May 1920, 2 days after protesting to 
Great Britain at its policies in mandated territories. 3 Additional 
1. Memo by H.P. Fletcher, Under Secretary, to U.S. Secretary of 
State, 10 October 1919, 800.6363/87, R.G.59, N.A.; exchange 
of correspondence in October and November 1919, between 
Franklin Lane, Secretary of the Interior, and Robert Lansing, 
U.S. Secretary of State, 811.6363/4, R.G.59, N.A.; corres-
pondence on 800.6363/112 and 811.6363/35, R.G.59, N.A.; and 
Report on Foreign Laws and Regulations restricting investment 
in and development of foreign oil properties by U.S. companies, 
26 May 1919, Tray 293B, Special Files, Bureau of Mines, R.G.70, N.A. 
2. DeNovo, 'American Oil Policy Abroad', p.871. 
~ .. ®~D.6363/120, R.G.59, N.A. 
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measures were also considered, particularly within the Senate, 
but never actually implemented. These included the retaliatory 
closing of private as well as public lands; an embargo on oil 
shipments to all countries operating restrictive legislation; 
and the possibility of forming a State Oil Corporation to operate 
abroad. A leading figure in the attempt to extend retaliatory 
action was Senator Phelan, actively encouraged by members of the 
Commerce Department, who supplied him with information to use 
in his attacks on British oil policy.1 
The State Department was also considering additional, less 
dramatic measures, in particular the possibility of addressing 
a general oil note to the British Government. Such a note would 
state that the United States Government felt that there was a 
deliberate policy , ••• to obtain for the British Government or 
British nationals the control of petroleum supplies in the 
British Empire and in foreign countries ••• ' but would appeal for 
reciprocity, rather than threaten retaliation. 2 This suggestion 
the United States Ambassador in London, John W. Davis, supported, 
drawing particular attention to the policy which Great Britain 
appeared to be pursuing in the mandate areas, and linking this 
with what he saw as a general trend towards Imperial Preference 
3 
and colonial monopoly. By this period (April 1920), Davis had, 
of course, already conducted fruitless conversations with the 
British Foreign Office on the subject of American rights in 
1. R.S. MacElwee, Acting Director, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic 
Commerce, to James D. Phelan, U.S. Senate, 13 May 1920, 312 U.K., 
BFDC, R.G.151, N.A. 
2. Frank Polk, State Department, to Ambassador John W. Davis, 
13 March 1920, 841.6363/29A, R.G.59, N.A., M580/145. 
3. J. Davis to U.S. Secretary of state, 28 April 1920, 841.6363/ 
45, R.G.59, N.A., M580/145. 
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palestine. 1 Soon thereafter, the United States initiated a 
diplomatic correspondence on the subject of economic rights in 
mandated territories. 2 
Concurrently with these developments, the press on both 
sides of the Atlantic seized upon the growing Anglo-American 
rivalry for oil resources, not only in the Near East, but also 
Latin America and Russia. A spate of articles and books talked 
of an 'oil war',3 creating a widespread public interest in oil 
matters. At the core of the 'oil war' were reports current in 
the United States that Great Britain was trying to create an 
oil hegemony, by 'cornering' all the major sources of future 
supply, hence excluding the United States just as she depleted 
her own resources. These reports appeared to be substantiated 
by a number of speeches in which leading British figures (Hamar 
Greenwood, Minister in charge of Petroleum Affairs, Walter Long, 
First Lord of the Admiralty, and Sir E. Mackay Edgar, a prominent 
financier) boasted that Great Britain had secured for herself 
the major oilfields of the future. 
Many of these 'oil war' articles paid particular attention 
to Mesopotamia, a preoccupation shared by the State Department, 
which was becoming increasingly concerned that oil had played a 
significant part in shaping Great Britain's policy towards 
Mesopotamia. In deciding what action might appropriately be taken, 
State Department officials had to take into account pleas by 
leading American oil men ' ••• that measures may be taken to prevent 
the exclusion of American interests from [~e Mesopotamia~ field,.4 
1. This is discussed in Chapter 4. 
2. The diplomatic correspondence is examined in more detail below. 
3. See Appendix III. 
4. Thomas O'Donnell, President American Petroleum Institute, to 
Robert Lansing, 30 September 1919, and enclosed memo, 
800.6363/89, R.G.59, N.A. 
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Concern was also being shown by leading American diplomats such 
as Ambassador J.W. Davis, and Frank Polk, a member of the American 
Delegation to Negotiate Peace in Paris, that France and Great 
1 Britain were trying to avoid the 'open door' in the Near East. 
By April 1920, A.C. Millspaugh, the State Department's petroleum 
expert, was convinced that 'The British had a definite oil policy 
which apparently included the control of Near Eastern supplies by 
2 
themselves'. This was particularly serious, since the United 
states had by this point apparently withdrawn from world affairs, 
The Treaty of Versailles and the League Covenant it contained 
having been rejected by Senate. This considerably lessened 
opportunities for the United States Government to safeguard 
American interests in the mandated territories. The San Remo 
Agreements and the Near Eastern settlement proposed in the draft 
Treaty of Sevres seemed to confirm American suspicions that the 
British and French intended to take full advantage of United States 
'isolationism' to advance their own interests in the ex-ottoman 
mandates, particularly as regards oil. 3 On 12 May 1920, however, 
the United States took steps to demonstrate that she did not intend 
to neglect what she saw as her rights in the Near East, by addres-
sing a formal note to the British Government on the subject. 
1. Frank Polk to J. Davis, 19 October 1919, Box 4, Part 1, Series II, 
Alphabetical Correspondence, Personal, in Papers of John W. 
Davis, Yale University (hereafter Davis MSS, Yale University); 
J. Davis to U.S. Secretary of State, 6 November 1919, 867.6363/7, 
and same to same, 28 February 1920, 867.6363/9, both in R.G.59, 
N.A., M353/67; and J. Davis to R. Lansing, 23 December 1919, 
Volume 50, Papers of Robert Lansing, Library of Congress (here-
after Lansing MSS). 
2. Memorandum by A.C. Millspaugh on the Near Eastern Situation, 
9 April 1920, 800.6363/166, R.G.59, N.A. 
3. Leland Harrison to Polk, 30 April 1920, 'Leland Harrison', 
Folder 116, Drawer 77, Papers of Frank Polk, Yale University 
(hereafter Polk MSS). 
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The diplomatic controversy was thus opened, with the United 
states already suspicious of British intentions towards oil 
(especially Mesopotamian oil), and only too ready to detect 
British foul play. Those suspicions were heightened by the 
steadily worsening state of Anglo-American relations generally. 
Although, in view of the lessons of the Great War, the anxiety 
of both governments to obtain and control oil is understandable, 
the 'oil war' mentality would probably not have gained such pre-
eminence were it not for other causes of friction between Great 
Britain and the United states. Thus to the Americans, the 
struggle for control of the world's oil resources seemed just 
another part of Britain's old, imperialist diplomacy. To the 
British on the other hand, faced with rising nationalism through-
out the Near East, it appeared as though the United states were 
pursuing a policy of 'opportunity without responsibility'. This 
mutual suspicion was reflected in the sharp, even irritated, tone 
of the diplomatic correspondence, which apparently wrecked the 
possibility of a commercial compromise in NOVember/December 1920. 
Ever since the AnglO-American rapprochement at the turn of 
the century,1 relationships between the two countries had been 
friendly. There was a marked tendency to assume that war between 
the two leading AnglO-Saxon peoples was unthinkable; and an 
apparent identity of interests and principles that had been 
reflected even during the strained period of American neutrality 
in 1914-1917. However, some friction was inevitable, as the 
United States increasingly assumed a world, as opposed to a 
hemispheric role, whilst British power and prestige continued to 
wane. The clash between the United States as the representative 
1. A.E. Campbell, Great Britain and the United States 1895-1903 
(London, 1960). 
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of the fnew\diplomacy, and Great Britain as the leader of the 
old, became apparent in the debate on war aims in the course 
1 of the war, and was to develop thereafter. 
In November 1918, state Department Assistant Secretary 
William Phillips, in trying to find out what controversial 
questions existed between Great Britain and the United States 
(it was in itself revealing, that such an investigation could 
be thought necessary) was informed of several potential areas 
of conflict. 2 Increasingly, during 1919 and 1920, prominent 
observers of AnglO-American relations on both sides of the 
Atlantic were expressing concern at the worsening of those 
relations, and the growing ill feeling in both countries. 3 
By August 1919, the British Government was already so anxious 
to promote Anglo-American friendship, and encourage United States 
entry into the League, that it sent a special mission to Washington 
D.C. under Viscount Grey, an eX-Foreign Secretary. Despite its 
prestigious leader, the mission was to fail,4partially as a 
1. Arno J. Mayer, Wilson vs. Lenin: ~Qlit~al Origins of the 
New Diplomacy, 1917-1918 (Cleveland, 1964); and N. Gordon 
Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: Response to War 
and Revolution (New York, 1968). 
2. Such as the Anglo-Japanese alliance, commercial rivalry, and 
competition for oil concessions in Latin America. See the 
various memoranda on 711.41/22, R.G.59, N.A., M581/1. 
3. Colonel E. House to President Wilson, 30 July 1919, in Charles 
Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House 4 vols. (London, 
1926-28) IV, p.510; diary entry for 4 September 1919, p.32, 
Vol.16, The Diaries of Colonel E. House, in the Papers of 
Colonel E. House, Yale University (hereafter House Diaries, 
Yale); diary entry for 21 December 1919, p.86, Vol.16; House 
Diaries, Yale; J. Davis to Lansing, 1 February 1920, Box 4, 
Part 1, Series II, Alphabetical Correspondence Personal, Davis 
MSS; and Willert to William Tyrrell (Foreign Office), 7 March 
1920, Folder 194, Box 5, Series I, Willert MSS. 
4. Butler, Bury and Woodward, eds., Documents on British ForeiciD 
Policy 1919-39, (hereafter D.B.F.P.), 1st Series, Vol.V, 
discusses the mission. See also Douglas L. Smith, 'Viscount 
Grey's 'Special Mission' and Postwar Anglo-American Relations', 
Southern Quarterly 11 (1973), pp.257-274. 
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consequence of escalating hostility towards Great Britain, 
predominantly due to the serious illness of President Wilson, 
which was to bedevil American diplomacy.1 
By early 1920, relations had deteriorated yet further. On 
25 February 1920 a new Secretary of State, Bainbridge Colby, was 
appointed - a man thought by British Embassy officials to be 
anti-British. 2 An additional worry, one which was to persist 
throughout 1920, was the approaching Presidential and Congressional 
elections. The Republicans had traditionally relied upon 'twisting 
the lion's tail' as an election issue;3 in the growing anti-
British atmosphere, the Democrats might well follow suit. By 
May 1920 the British Ambassador in Washington, Sir Auckland Geddes, 
was informing Secretary of State Colby that he ' ••• viewed not 
wi thout alarm the effects which the violent expressions of anti-
British feeling now common form in this country might have upon 
4 the mind of the people of England'. The situation deteriorated 
as the election approached: 'At the moment there is an hysteria 
5 
of hatred against England and all her works'. It was in this 
atmosphere that most of the oil correspondence was conducted. 
1. The remlnlscences of John W. Davis reflect clearly his sense 
of isolation from Washington during his Ambassadorship. 'It 
would have been far more interesting, of course, if Washington 
had been functioning'. The Reminiscences of John W. Davis 
(1953-4), in The Oral History Collection of Columbia University 
(hereafter J. Davis, Reminiscences, Columbia), p.145. 
2. R.C. Lindsay, British Embassy, Washington D.C., to Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs, 26 February 1920 and 1 March 
1920, A932/A1342/712/45, F.O.371/4576 
3. Memo by Lord Curzon on Foreign Policy and Inter-Allied Debts, 
17 April 1920, C.P.1093, Cabinet Records, Public Record Office, 
London (hereafter CAB.) 24/103. 
4. Sir Auckland Geddes, British Ambassador, Washington D.C., to 
Foreign Office, 21 May 1920, A3493/3493/45, F.O.371/4601. 
5. Geddes to Foreign Office, 18 October 1920, A7615/7615/45, 
F.O.371/4612. 
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Why, then, were relationships so bad? They reflected 
uncertainty and inexperience on the part of the United states, 
resentment on that of Great Britain, at the changing balance 
of financial, commercial, political and military power as 
between the two countries, with Britain steadily losing ground 
to her youthful rival. Possibly the most significant issue 
was competitive navy building. 1 In 1916, as part of a pre-
paredness campaign, the United states had approved a massive 
navy building programme, which was not suspended when the war 
ended in 1918. Although Great Britain had never regarded the 
United states as a serious naval rival, looking rather to the 
balance of naval power in Europe, her attitude changed in the 
immediate post-war era, as she saw the United states emerge as 
a major commercial competitor. The Admiralty estimated that 
if the United states continued with her 1916 programme, by 1923 
Great Britain, traditional operator of the two power standard, 
would have only the second largest navy in the world - a situation 
which neither the Admiralty, nor such old style imperialists as 
2 the Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, were likely to tolerate. 
Issues also associated with naval rivalry were fears of a 
possible Anglo-American trade war, United States commerce having 
benefitted from her three years of neutrality;3 and, of greater 
import, American dislike of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, first 
signed in 1902, and due for renewal in 1922. Japan was now the 
1. J. Davis to Frank Polk, 4 January 1919, 'J.W. Davis', Folder 
118, Drawer 73, Polk MSS. 
2. Memo on Naval Policy by the First Lord of the Admiralty, 
22 November 1920, C.P.2176, CAB. 24/115. 
3. The State Department was apparently so concerned at the 
possibility of a ruthless Anglo-American trade war, that it 
was considering withdrawing acceptance of Sir A. Geddes as 
Ambassador because he was thought to be too active in trade. 
Entry for 4 March 1920, Polk's Confidential Diary, Folder 20, 
Drawer 88, Polk MSS. 
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main rival to the United states in the Pacific, meaning that, 
in American eyes, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance could only be 
aimed against them. The British Foreign Office was well aware 
f th O 0 0 1 o lS OplnlOn, even before Norman H. Davis, the Under Sec-
retary of state, in a conversation with Ambassador Geddes 
••• told him, to put it bluntly, England 
could not play United states against Japan, 
and vice versa; ••• if such a situation 
continued it would be necessary for 
England to decide whether or not she would 
work in harmony with Japan or the United 
states. 2 
This in itself would have been sufficient to cause friction 
between Great Britain and the United states. Coincident to the 
growing tension over naval and Pacific issues, however, other 
sources of friction also developed. One was that perpetual 
problem in Anglo-American relations - Ireland. 3 After the Easter 
rising of 1916, the secret trials and executions, deportations 
and repression provoked a wave of indignation in the United 
states, which was reciprocated by Great Britain, angered by the 
financial assistance given to Sinn Fein by the Irish-Americans. 
The latter also tried to use President Wilson's commitment to 
self determination to gain Irish independence. After 1919 what 
the Americans saw as a legitimate interest, and the British as 
interference in Irish matters continued, particularly amongst 
1. Foreign Office Memorandum on the Effect of the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance upon Foreign Relations, 28 February 1920, D.B.F.P., 
1st Series, Vol.VI, pp.1016-1023; Roberta Allbert Dayer, 
'The British War Debts to the United States and the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance, 1920-1923', Pacific Historical Review 45 
(1976), pp.569-595; and Ira Klein, 'Whitehall, Washington, 
and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1919-1921', Pacific 
Historical Review 41 (1972), pp.460-483. 
2. Memo by Norman H. Davis of a conversation with Sir Auckland 
Geddes, 20 August 1920, 711.41/125, R.G.59, N.A., M581/1. 
3. Alan J. Ward, Ireland and Anglo-American Relations 1899-1921 
(London, 1969). 
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Senators with Irish-American constituencies. 1 In retrospect 
Ambassador John W. Davis was to see the Irish question as 'the 
chief impediment to good feeling between Great Britain and the 
United States,.2 
The complex issue of inter-allied debts also bedevilled 
Anglo- American relations. Great Britain emerged from the war 
America's debtor to the sum of £978 million (although she herself 
was owed more by the Dominions and Allies). The United States 
insisted upon repayment of the entire capital, together with 
interest, and demanded the prompt funding of the debt. Nego-
tiations however reached deadlock in the spring of 1920, to the 
3 consequent annoyance of both governments. By early May, the 
British Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Austen Chamberlain, 
was so angry at the United States demands, that he spoke of 'the 
intolerable pretensions of the United States Government', and 
expressed the opinion that the United States Government wished 
to use the debts as a useful instrument for securing the acceptance 
4 
of its point of view in any controversy. In June 1920, the two 
Treasuries abandoned their discussion on the funding of the debt. 
Middle Eastern questions provided, therefore, just one 
additional grievance in a period of ever-increasing tension -
although one which the British were all the more likely to resent, 
given the almost total lack of United States interests in the 
region. A general Near Eastern settlement had to be postponed 
1. Viscount Grey to the Prime Minister, 17 October 1919, C.P.89, 
CAB. 24/92. 
2. J. Davis, Reminiscences, Columbia, p.136. 
3. Dayer, op.cit.; and Cabinet papers, April-May 1920, in 
CAB. 24/103-105. 
4. Memorandum by Sir Austen Chamberlain, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, 11 May 1920, C.P.1209, CAB.24/105. 
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pending the American decision as to whether to assume the mandates 
for Armenia and Constantinople, whilst United states criticisms 
of the Anglo-Persian Agreement fuelled Persian opposition to its 
1 
terms. But overriding this in importance was the question of 
oil, which by the spring of 1920 was seen as a significant factor 
in the growing anti-British feeling prevalent in the United 
2 
states. Lord Hardinge of the Foreign Office clearly saw oil 
as the motivating factor in America's Near Eastern policy, 
commenting 'They are only thinking of oil,.3 Indeed, by mid 
1920 the clamour against British oil policy in the United states 
had reached such proportions that Geddes was informed 'Should 
the oil question show signs of becoming acute, instead of being 
a passing phase of anti-British feeling, we can, if you wish, 
send out an expert to assist you in dealing with it,.4 In 
October 1920, Geddes placed the dispute over oil resources in 
context 
Again, this country has now awakened to the 
fact that it is no longer so economically 
independent of the rest of the world as it 
was in the past. The waste of raw materials 
such as timber and oil which has gone on for 
two generations has resulted in a situation 
which causes great apprehension as to the 
future, and this apprehension has been 
naturally directed by the parties interested 
into anti-British channels, since a great 
portion of the unexploited areas of the 5 
world are under British rule or influence. 
1. This is discussed in Chapter 3. 
2. Geddes to Foreign Office, 29 April 1920, D.B.F.P., 1st Series, 
Vol.XIII, p.66. 
3. Minute by Lord Hardinge, 30 April 1920, on E4005/56/44, 
F.O.371/5107. 
4. Foreign Office to Geddes, 7 May 1920, E4220/56/44, F.O.371/5108. 
5. Geddes to Foreign Office, 18 October 1920, A7615/7615/45, 
F.O.371/4612. 
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In virtually every area of dispute, friction was to 
escalate in late 1919 and early 1920. During this period, 
also, Senate debated, and finally refused to ratify, the Treaty 
of Versailles and the integral covenant of the League of Nations. 
In August 1920, in a comprehensive interview with Ambassador 
Geddes, Under Secretary of State Norman H. Davis expressed 
clearly American suspicion of, and irritation with Great Britain, 
on a number of issues - including oil. 1 It is in this context 
that one must examine the Anglo-American controversy over 
Mesopotamian oil of 1919-1921. 
In formulating its response to the American initiatives on 
oil, the British Government had to take into account, not only 
its relationships with the united States, but its position in 
Mesopotamia and its existing commitments with regard to Mesopotamian 
oil. As was discussed in the last chapter, by the Armistice of 
Mudros (or, in the case of Mosul, shortly after it) Great Britain 
was in possession of most of Mesopotamia. It had been assumed 
at an early stage in the war that the Basra vilayet, at least, 
would be incorporated into the British Empire; the plans for 
the Baghdad vilayet provided for an Arab government which would, 
however, be little more than a facade behind which the British 
2 
would hold the main power. As a consequence of these assumptions, 
the British wartime administration of occupied territory (Basra 
had been occupied in 1914 and Baghdad in 1915) under the Chief 
1. Memo by Norman H. Davis, U.S. Under Secretary of State, of 
a conversation with the British Ambassador, 20 August 1920, 
711.41/125, R.G.59, N.A., M581/1. 
2. This is discussed in a number of sources, but see, for example, 
Kedourie, pp.176-177; Sluglett, ch.1; Mejcher, Imperial Quest, 
ch.1; Kent, Oil and Empire, ch. 7; Busch, pp.3-55; and John 
Marlowe, Late Victorian: The Life of Sir Arnold Talbot Wilson 
(London, 1967), Part 2. On the significance of Mosul oil, see 
C.P.120, CAB.24/93. 
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Political Officer, Sir Percy Cox and his assistant Colonel A.T. 
Wilson had not hesitated to institute something more than the 
usual - minimal - degree of control. Instead, they had intro-
duced an Indian style administration, currency and judicial 
system in both vilayets. After the war, however, pending the 
grant of a mandate, the British Government hesitated to replace 
this temporary regimen with a more permanent, Arab-dominated 
government. Meantime, during the two year hiatus which preceded 
the creation in November 1920 of the first Arab Council of 
Ministers, resentment in Mesopotamia grew at what was virtually 
an alien superstructure of British officers, served by Indian 
1 
subordinates, which governed their country. In the spring and 
summer of 1920 this was to result in an outbreak of violence and 
revolution, 2 which led to the appointment of Sir Percy Cox as 
Civil Commissioner on 1 October 1920, and the rapid establishment 
of an Arab Council of State under the Naquib of Baghdad. The 
rebellion, and the post-war depression in Great Britain which 
coincided with it, led to vociferous cries amongst press, parlia-
ment and public for retrenchment and economy in the Middle East. 
In 1918 it had appeared as though Great Britain had a 
completely free hand to determine the future government of 
Mesopotamia; by October 1920 that hope had turned sour. The same 
1. On 1 August 1920, of 500 major civil administrative posts, 
473 were held by British, 7 by Indians, and only 20 by Arabs. 
Of 5,886 minor posts, 2,209 were held by Indians. 'Report by 
the High Commissioner on the Development of Iraq 1920-5', 
Confidential Print, M.E.No.11, Colonial Office Records, 
Public Record Office, London (hereafter C.O.) 935/1. 
2. Mejcher, Imperial Quest, ch.3; Busch, ch.8; and Aaron S. 
Klieman, Foundations of British Policy in the Arab World: 
The Cairo Conference of 1921 (Baltimore, 1971), (hereafter 
Klieman), ch.4. 
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was to be true of Mesopotamian oil. In 1918, all that seemed 
certain was that Britain would benefit from the oil riches of 
Mesopotamia; through which company (if any) was the only question 
to be decided. It seemed that Whitehall could formulate its 
policy free from any prior commitments. Anglo-Persian had been 
informed on 23 November 1915 that the Foreign Office Agreement 
of 1914 no longer possessed any legal validity, and in an imp or-
tant minute written in April 1918 it was argued that the British 
Government was free to deal with the oil question solely in the 
I · ht f t f tu . d ti 1 19 0 presen or u re conSl era ons. It seemed, therefore, 
as though the TPC had been abandoned, together with the joint 
Anglo-German initiative it represented. In early 1919, however, 
the British were beginning to reconsider their position. During 
the war, the Deutsche Bank's holding in the TPC had been sold to 
a government nominee in case His Majesty's Government found it 
convenient to maintain the validity of the oil concession granted 
to that company for Mosul and Baghdad. In February 1919, a leading 
Foreign Office official, Louis Mallet, concluded that 
••• although there are doubts whether it 
would be possible legally to maintain 
that a concession was formally granted 
••• yet our position is sufficiently 
strong, and our moral claim so good that 
it is recommended that we should proceed 
on the assumption that our right is 
unquestioned. 2 
In view of later developments, it is interesting to note that the 
Foreign Office was quite prepared to concede that the legal position 
3 of the TPC was shaky. Nonetheless, the decision was made to use 
1. Memo on the TPC by Edmund Parkes, 27 April 1918, A44/44/45, 
F.O.371/5638. 
2. Minute by L. Mallet, 3 February 1919, on 44/19165/21519, 
F.O. 371/4209. 
3. Ibid; and minutes and correspondence on 44/19165/42678, 
F.O.371/4209. 
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the TPC in order to incorporate Royal Dutch-Shell into the 
British oil strategy. It also offered a useful vehicle whereby 
the French could be compensated for the surrender of Mosul and 
hence - the Foreign Office hoped - prevented from allying them-
selves with the Americans: 'It was mentioned that the Americans, 
through Mr. Hurley, had been approaching the French on the 
t · f'l ,1 ft . ques lon 0 01 ,.... A er a serles of abortive agreements, 
the final result was the oil agreement signed on 24 April 1920 
as part of a comprehensive settlement of Near Eastern questions 
at San Remo. By this agreement, France and Great Britain were 
to co-operate, insofar as existing legislation permitted, in 
exploiting oil in Roumania, Asia Minor, Russia, Galicia, the 
French colonies and the British Crown Colonies. More specifically, 
in Mesopotamia, the French were to have 25% of the oil if it was 
developed by the Government, or a 25% shareholding in any private 
company, such company to be under permanent British control. 2 
However, whilst Great Britain was apparently committed to the TPC, 
Whitehall also had to abide by a Cabinet decision, taken on 
23 January 1920, that the oil resources of Mesopotamia should 
be used for the benefit of the state, not for the profits of 
. 1 . 3 commerCla companles a decision apparently in contradiction 
of the whole TPC s tra tegy • 
1. Notes of a meeting held in Paris, 1 February 1919, 44/19165/ 
62702, F.O.371/4209. This strategy, of negotiating an 
Anglo-French oil agreement to prevent the French turning to 
the United States continued to be regarded as important 
throughout 1919. See Memo by Sir Hamar Greenwood on the 
Anglo-French Agreement, 6 December 1919, C.P.259, CAB. 24/94; 
Cabinet conclusions, 10 December 1919, CAB.12(19), CAB. 23/18; 
and Mejcher, Imperial Quest, pp.110-112. 
2. The Oil Agreement is reproduced in Hurewitz, II, pp.75-77. 
For the San Remo Conference, see D.B.F.P., 1st Series, Vol. VIII. 
3. Cabinet Conclusions, 23 January 1920, Cab.8(20), CAB.23/20. 
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Whilst the decision-making process was in progress, no 
concession could be granted to the TPC; nor, indeed, could there 
be in Mesopotamia a government with the legal authority to issue 
such a concession until the Treaty of Sevres had been ratified, 
and a mandate issued by the League of Nations. In view of this, 
and the total lack of any legitimate competing claim held by 
American interests, it might be assumed that the United states 
would have no reason to make Mesopotamian oil the subject of 
diplomatic representations. However, initially the Mesopotamian 
issue was to be used as little more than a lever to assist 
American activities in another mandated territory. For whilst 
no American company held concessions in Mesopotamia, the Standard 
Oil Company of New York did have certain claims in Palestine. 
Early in 1919, at the instigation of Socony, the State Department 
raised the matter of the treatment of that company's claims with 
the Foreign Office, thus, in effect, opening up the whole question 
of the policy to be adopted by a power occupying ex-enemy terri-
tory in the Middle East toward the grant or confirmation of 
concessions, particularly those still incomplete in 1914. In 
response to American representations, the Foreign Office was 
forced to evolve a policy toward concessions, instead of leaving 
the whole question to be settled by the terms of the treaty of 
peace. By August 1919, it had decided that there should be no 
surveying, prospecting or drilling operations in occupied enemy 
territory, until such time as the treaty of peace with Turkey 
t . 1 was ratified, and the manda e In force. 
Unfortunately the War Office, in official charge of the 
military administration in Mesopotamia, had already infringed 
this policy by allowing Shell geologists, ostensibly working 
1. The evolution of this policy is discussed in Chapter 4. 
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for the military authorities, to survey the desert for a suitable 
pipeline route, and to operate a refinery. Although the Foreign 
Office had been informed of these developments, initially it 
had shown little concern. 1 However, once the state Department 
was aware of these activities, it instructed Ambassador Davis 
to request yet again that So cony be permitted to carry out the 
preliminary investigation of its Palestinian claims. This he 
did in October 1919, suggesting that a distinction might be 
drawn between the procuring and operation of new concessions, 
which could be forbidden, and the simple investigation of exist-
ing claims, which might legitimately be permitted to proceed. 2 
At this stage, therefore, events in Mesopotamia, where there 
were no American claims, were being used purely to advance the 
position of Socony in Palestine. The Foreign Office, however, 
was already concerned that the next step might be representations 
by the state Department to open the door in Mesopotamia, in 
which case 
We shall have to be careful that the various 
British firms on whose activities we have 
placed a ban are not left out in the cold in 
the rush which will then ensue. 3 
1 0 0 0 dl 4 It was, therefore, determined to maintain its po lCY rlgl y, 
despite the fact that the Shell geologists - and the Zionists in 
1 d o f 0 d °t 5 Palestine - had a rea y In rlnge l. Indeed, it even tried to 
1. For the lack of reaction in the Foreign Office, see corres-
pondence and minutes on 44/19165/103278 and 131829, F.O.371/4209. 
2. J.W. Davis to Lord CUrzon, 31 October 1919, 44/19165/148099, 
F.O.371/4209. 
3. Minute by G. Kidston, 1 October 1919, 44/19165/13829, 
F.O.371/4209. 
4. 44/19165/137277, 138843, 145183 and 151730, F.O.371/4209. 
5. Minute by Kidston, 8 November 1919, on 44/19165/148099, 
F.O.371/4209. 
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impose its total ban in areas of Mesopotamia where Anglo-Persian 
had a valid claim to operate, both on the grounds of military 
necessity, and because of the peculiar legal status of the 
'transferred territories,.1 India Office arguments that American 
protests could thus be adequately answered were brushed aside 
by the Foreign Office, which felt that such reasons would not 
satisfy the United states, but would ' ••• merely suggest an 
industrious but not too successful search for justification and 
a guilty conscience. Qui s'excuse so elaborately, s'accuse'. 2 
Not only was there a fear that the United states Government might 
seize upon any slight infringement of the declared concessions 
policy in Mesopotamia in an attempt to open the door for its oil 
companies, but the Foreign Office was also concerned at the 
possible actions Standard Oil might take on its own behalf. 
At best, it feared that the hated combine might take any oppor-
tunity, however slight, to obtain rights which it could later 
insist should be upheld;3 at worst, the Foreign Office was 
alarmed - and convinced - by the growing volume of reports that 
Standard Oil geologists stationed in Baghdad were giving 
financial aid to the nationalists. 4 Thus, even before the 
status of the TPC and British oil policy in Mesopotamia was raised 
1. See Chapter 5. 
2. Minute by D.G. Osborne, 3 February 1920, 44/19165/174314, 
F.O.371/4209. See also file 20/44, F.O.371/5084-5086. 
3. Minute by E. Weakley, 13 November 1919, on 44/19165/148099, 
F.O. 371/4209. 
4. The reports began in June 1920. See India Office to Foreign 
Office, 23 June 1920, E7127/20/44, F.O.371/5084; and 
periodic correspondence on the 20/44 file, F.O.371/5084-5086. 
Osborne commented that' They [the Standard Oil Company] are as 
powerful and far more efficient than the U.S. Govt. [sic] '. 
Minute by Osborne, 18 May 1920, on E4892/56/44, F.O.371/5107. 
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formally by the United states, the British Government was 
treading very carefully in order to avoid possible American 
repercussions of the kind it faced in Palestine. 
In doing so, however, it had to contend with the inherent 
complexities of a British oil policy that sought to use 
Mesopotamian oil as a secure source of Admiralty fuel oil; as 
a vehicle to bring the Royal Dutch-Shell group under British 
control; as part of a wider political bargain with France; 
and, in addition, according to a Cabinet decision of 23 January 
1920, as the ultimate solution to public pressure for a reduction 
in Middle Eastern expenditure: 'It was suggested that the oil 
resources of Mesopotamia were so extensive that sufficient revenue 
should be forthcoming from them to pay for the whole adminis-
tration of the country ••• '. With the last objective in mind, it 
was critical to commence development as rapidly as possible, 
regardless of whether the mandate had actually been ratified. 
This, however, was in direct contradiction with yet another 
policy: the stand-still on concessions imposed by the Foreign 
Office, essentially to keep the Americans at bay. That Office, 
therefore, protested strongly at the suggestion that the survey-
ing of the oilfields should continue, in order to ensure that 
once the mandate was issued, development could commence without 
further delay. It was decided, however, that the surveying 
should proceed nonetheless, officially on behalf of the state: 
It was pointed out that inasmuch as the 
country was in British occupation and 
the whole expense of the campaign had 
fallen on the British Government the 
Standard Oil Company had no locus standi 
and no reason for complaint. 1 
1. Cabinet Conclusions, 23 January 1920, Cab.8(20), CAB.23/20. 
- 63 -
The Foreign Office therefore took the precaution of insisting 
that the Shell experts working on behalf of the military 
authorities should be paid for out of Army fundS. 1 It would 
appear that the main pre-occupation of the British Government 
was to retain Mesopotamia, including Mosul, and to develop it 
fast 'since the oil-bearing regions of Mosul are essential to 
the revenues on which the future development of the whole 
2 country will depend'. 
Gradually, some coherence was emerging out of the con-
fusion, although Sir John Cadman, head of the Petroleum Executive, 
was probably accurate when he informed Ambassador Davis in mid-
May that the Government's policy was not yet settled. 3 One 
decision yet to be taken was whether the Mesopotamian oilfields 
were to be developed by state or private working. However, in 
April 1920, it must have appeared as though the United states 
was being kept at bay, with the controversy on Palestine apparently 
4 in abeyance, and a potential Franco-American alignment averted 
by the San Remo Agreement. The British, therefore, could afford 
a little quiet confidence: 'I do not think we need mind if the 
Americans succeed in obtaining some control of the Baku oilfields. 
5 We have plenty of oilfields to develop'. However, this con-
fidence was misplaced. Pressure had already been brought to bear 
upon the American State Department by leading representatives of 
-----------------------~~ ----------
1. Correspondence and minutes, February 1920, E680/20/44, 
F.O.371/5084. 
2. Cabinet Conclusion" 23 March 1920, Cab.16(20), CAB.23/20. 
3. J. Davis to U.S. Secretary of State, 18 May 1920, 800.6363/126, 
R.G.59, N.A. 
4. See Chapter 4. 
5. Minute by Lord Hardinge, 18 May 1920, on E4892/56/44, F.O.371/5107. 
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other government departments, Congress, and the oil industry to 
make representations to the British so as to secure the open 
door in Mesopotamia. This it found difficult to do, in view of 
the absence of any legitimate American claims it could uphold. 
However, the informal allocation of mandates at San Remo, 
coupled with the Anglo-French oil agreement, afforded the 
opportunity for the State Department to reopen its diplomatic 
correspondence on 12 May 1920 - this time employing the abstract 
principle of economic rights in mandated territories. 
The Foreign Office had, even prior to this, been consider-
ing the various facets of the 'oil question', in response to 
concerned despatches from Ambassador Geddes in Washington. At 
his request, the Petroleum Department had prepared a comprehensive 
memorandum on the world oil situation, in which particular 
emphasis had been placed upon the vast American production of 
petroleum. Yet, 
Notwithstanding the enormous predominance 
lin production] ••• the United States have 
taken the lead in endeavouring to prevent 
other countries acquiring oil concessions 
in other parts of the world, notably Latin 
America, and in passing legislation to 
restrict foreign companies working in the 
United States. The experience of the war 
has shown the danger of dependence on 
foreign supplies and the United States 
cannot well complain if His Majesty's 
Government should decide to follow their 
example. 1 
The Foreign Office had also given thought to a possible line of 
defence should the San Remo Oil Agreement be attacked. Not only 
did the French need a secure source of oil, but 'She is accepting 
1. Petroleum Department to Foreign Office, 5 May 1920, E4220/56/44, 
F.O.371/5108. 
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the responsibility of administering part of Asiatic Turkey and 
therefore not unreasonably claims a share in the development of 
°t °1 , 1 l S Ol resources •••• It was as well that the Foreign Office 
had already considered the issue, for on 12 May 1920 the United 
2 states Ambassador addressed a formal note to Lord Curzon, the 
Foreign Secretary, a note written in the knowledge of the - yet 
unpublished - San Remo Oil Agreement,3 but making no reference 
-to it. Instead, the United States took the opportunity of the 
allocation of mandates at San Remo, to raise issues of principle, 
relating to equal economic opportunity in mandated territo~, 
and the claim of the United States Government, although not a 
member of the League of Nations, to approve the draft mandates. 
However it was assumed - rightly - by the Foreign Office that 
these American protests related to the concrete example of the 
oilfields. 4 
The State Department had been pleased to be afforded an 
opportunity to reopen a diplomatic correspondence effectively 
closed by Great Britain's forceful assertion of her concessions 
policy, for it had become increasingly concerned that nonetheless 
the British intended to monopolize the Mesopotamian oilfields. 
1. Lord Curzon to Geddes, 7 May 1920, D.B.F.P., 1st Series, 
Vol.XIII, p.256. 
2. J.W. Davis to Lord Curzon, 12 May 1920, For. ReI. 1920 Vol.II, 
pp.651-5. The diplomatic correspondence that resulted is well 
covered in Shwa dr an , pp.195-209; Stocking, pp.40-65; DeNovo, 
American Interests, pp.162-184; and Davis, British Oil Policy, 
pp.121-127. 
3. H.C. Wallace, U.S. Ambassador, Paris, to 
State, 3 May 1920, 800.6363/108 and 109; 
7 May 1920, 800.6363/113, all in R.G.59, 
U.S. Secretary of 
and same to same, 
N.A. 
4. Minute by Weakley, 20 May 1920, on E4679/1331/44, F.O.371/5212. 
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Initially, despite the fears of the oil industry and the Commerce 
Department, most permanent officials in the state Department, 
such as Frank Polk, were not particularly concerned. Nor was 
Ambassador Davis, who expressed the apparently erroneous view 
that 
••• if representations are made to the 
British Foreign Office, some concessions 
may be made to American interests, par-
ticularly if these representations are 
made before Congress has ratified the 
Peace Treaty. 1 
However, by the end of 1919, negotiations on the Treaty of Sevres 
and the negotiation of an Anglo-French oil agreement caused many 
officials to change their mind. 2 John Davis felt that the British 
response to many of the questions in the Middle East was governed 
by oil,3 whilst even the pro-British Polk was convinced that the 
4 British Empire was following an exclusive policy towards petroleum. 
Nor was the United states completely satisfied by the Foreign 
Office explanations of the Shell geologists' activities. 
A month before formal representations were made to the 
Foreign Office, the State Department's petroleum expert, A.C. 
Millspaugh, summed up the position in an important memorandum. 
His ultimate goal was to suggest the possibility of a diplomatic 
agreement with the British Government: nonetheless, he was 
extremely critical of British policy. In view of the stance 
adopted by the State Department's later diplomatic notes", it is 
1. J. Davis to U.S. Secretary of State, 6 November 1919, 
867.6363/7, R.G.59, N.A., M353/67; and Frank Polk to 
J. Davis, 19 October 1919, Box 4, Part 1, Series II, 
Alphabetical Correspondence Personal, Davis MSS, Yale University. 
2. J. Davis to R. Lansing, 23 December 1919, Vol.50, Lansing MSS. 
3. J. Davis to U.S. Secretary of State, 28 February 1920, 867n.6363/9, 
R.G.59, N.A., M353/67. 
4. Polk to J. Davis, 13 March 1920, 841.6363/29A, R.G.59, N.A., 
M.580/145. 
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significant that Millspaugh commenced his argument with the 
statement that 'It is necessary that the United states have a 
share in the oil production in the Near East'. His primary 
objective was explicitly stated to be the need for oil and, in 
particular, a secure American source in the Mediterranean, Red 
Sea or Indian Ocean areas. In this region, he concluded, 
Palestine and Mesopotamia were the only areas not actually closed 
to American companies. Even here, however, there was evidence 
that the British were not carrying out the policy that they had 
announced would be in force during the period of military occu-
pation. Millspaugh therefore concluded that ' ••• unless the British 
agree to specific proposals for the period subsequent to the 
military occupation, United States interests will be excluded 
from these territories'. Those proposals, he made clear, should 
include the cancellation of the TPC concession. It was only after 
exploring the pragmatic American need for oil in the Near Eastern 
region, that Millspaugh then expanded upon the principle of 
equality of opportunity.1 
Thus, the State Department had begun to consider the desira-
bility of representations to Great Britain in order to keep 
American options open in Mesopotamia even before it received 
reports that the British and the French were planning to work 
th . t
2 
together in Mesopotamia and Syria to keep e Amerlcans ou -
reports apparently SUbstantiated by San Remo. The hardening 
suspicion of British duplicity was fuelled by reports from the 
1. Memo by A.C. Millspaugh on the Near Eastern Oil Situation, 
9 April 1920, 800.6363/166, R.G.59, N.A. 
2. U.S. Embassy, Paris, to State Department, 19 April 1920, 
890G.6363T84/-, R.G.59, N.A., M722/24. 
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consul-general in London, Robert Skinner,1 and finally, after 
Ambassador Davis' approval, formal representations were made to 
the Foreign Office. 2 
No reply was immediately forthcoming, however, and in the 
meantime evidence accumulated suggesting that additional repre-
sentations might be desirable. Further reports substantiated 
earlier statements that Anglo-Persian and Royal Dutch-Shell 
representatives were active in Mesopotamia. 3 Although it was 
strongly suspected that the British had not yet developed a 
coherent oil policy, and might therefore be swayed by American 
representations on this, and other points,4 there is no doubt 
that publication of the San Remo oil agreement made a very bad 
impression upon the American public in general, and Ambassador 
Davis in particular. 5 In addition, the State Department was 
receiving its first - somewhat distorted - reports of the TPC 
claim, W.C. Teagle of Jersey Standard informing the Secretary 
of State of a rumour he had heard. According to this, the 
British Government would argue that, whilst it would give the 
nationals of all other countries equal rights with British 
nationals, there were in fact no oil concessions available, 
1. Robert Skinner, London, to U.S. Secretary of State, 19 April 
1920, 841.6363/43; and same to same, 10 May 1920, 841.6363/57, 
both in R.G.59, N.A., M580/146. 
2. J. Davis to U.S. Secretary of State, 7 May 1920, 841.6363/44, 
R.G.59, N.A., M580/146; and J. Davis to Lord Curzon, 12 May 
1920, For. ReI. 1920 Vol.II, pp.651-5. 
3. Oscar S. Heizer, Consul, Baghdad, to U.S. Secretary of State, 
9 June 1920, 867.6363/37, R.G.59, N.A., M353/67. 
4. Memo by Millspaugh, 5 June 1920, 841.6363/70, and J. Davis 
to U.S. Secretary of State, 21 May 1920, 841.6363/67, both 
in R.G.59, N.A., M580/146. 
5. Entry for 23 July 1920, Vol.17, House Diaries, Yale; J. Davis 
to U.S. Secretary of State, 26 July 1920, 800.6363/157, R.G.59, 
N.A.; and J. Davis to Hugh Campbell Wallace (U.S. Ambassador, 
Paris), 3 August 1920, Box 4, Part 1, Series II, Alphabetical 
~.~ eonondAOCP Personal, Davis MSS, Yale. 
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because before the war they had been given to the D'Arcy group, 
which had transferred them to Anglo-Persian: 'It would seem 
clear from this that the British Government has no intention 
of giving anyone other than themselves the right to exploit 
for oil in Mesopotamia,.1 This opinion was supported by United 
states Consul Thomas Owens in Baghdad: 
I believe most of the English in this 
part of the world are imperialists of 
the worst sort, who seem to believe 
that this country has been won by force 
of British arms and, therefore, belongs 
to them to exploit. 2 
In view of this accumulation of reports, all tending to 
substantiate American doubts of British bad faith, the state 
Department therefore instructed Ambassador Davis to address 
another note to Lord Curzon, which he did on 28 July 1920. 
In this, he requested a reply to his last note, and, insisting 
that the treatment of the economic resources of regions under 
mandate was a matter of principle, protested at the San Remo Oil 
Agreement. For 
This Government desires to record its 
view that such an agreement, in light 
of the position the British Government 
appears to have assumed toward Mesopotamia 
and its economic resources, will as a 
practical matter result in a grave infringe-
ment of the mandate principle, •••• 3 
In view of this reiteration of the United States position, 
the British Foreign Office was faced with the task of formulating 
a reply at the earliest possible opportunity. It had, however, 
1. W.C. Teagle to Bainbridge Colby, 10 June 1920, 867.6363/20, 
M353/67. 
2. Thomas Owens, U.S. Consul, Baghdad, to U.S. Secretary of State, 
28 July 1920, 890G.OO/3, R.G.59, N.A., M722/18. To judge from 
the tone of his despatches, Owens was extremely anti-British. 
3. J. Davis to Lord Curzon, 28 July 1920, For. ReI. 1920, Vol.II, 
pp.658-9. 
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been hoped to delay any response, for two major reasons. Firstly, 
whilst the British had now decided that, in their eyes at least, 
the TPC claim to the oilfields of Mesopotamia was valid, they 
had still to decide whether the oil was to be exploited by state 
or private working, and, if the former, by which state _ 
Mesopotamia or Great Britain. If it were decided to reserve the 
oil for the new Mesopotamian state, this would provide a possible 
argument against United states representations: albeit a rather 
weak one, in view of the promise to France that she should have 
a 25% share. If, however, the oil was to be exploited by a 
private company, the United states Government could be informed 
that Great Britain intended to adhere to the spirit of the draft 
mandate (by implication putting the United states in a weak 
position as a non-member of the League), but that the TPC had a 
valid claim which the government was bound to honour. In such 
an argument, the TPC claim could be equated with the Socony 
.. I ti 1 clalm In Pa es nee 
An additional cause for concern was that the oil question 
was being used as part of the accelerating election campaign 
in the United states, particularly in view of the close relation-
ship, dating from the war, between Jersey Standard and the 
Democratic administration: 'This new orientation of the oil 
interest vis-a-vis the Administration cannot but increase to a 
sensible degree the dangers to Anglo-American relations inherent 
in the whole question,.2 The Foreign Office was particularly 
1. Minute by Sir John Tilley to Lord Hardinge, May 1920, on 
E4679/1331/44, F.O.371/5212. 
2. Geddes to Lord Curzon, 21 May 1920, D.B.F.P., 1st Series, 
Vol.XIII, pp.273-4. 
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concerned lest, if it allowed itself to be drawn into a diplomatic 
dispute during the anti-British atmosphere created in the run-up 
to the November election, ' ••• sooner or later something will be 
said which will handicap us in our Mesopotamian policy ••• ,.1 
Nonetheless, during June, consideration was being given to the 
terms of a possible reply. Having been assured by the Petroleum 
Department that no American citizens had valid claims in Meso-
potamia, whilst the United states already controlled the greatest 
proportion of the world's oil production, 2 Foreign Office officials 
felt that they could afford to 'carry out our policy regardless 
of clamour from aggrieved interests,.3 And consideration was 
also being given to the vexed question of private versus state 
exploitation, with Colonel A.T. Wilson and E. Weakley, the 
Foreign Office's petroleum expert, both strongly advocating private 
exploitation,4 although Weakley also expressed the opinion that 
such decisions should be left in abeyance pending the creation of 
a new Arab administration. 5 No decision had been taken, however, 
when the United states note arrived in July. 
Despite the steadily worsening state of AnglO-American 
relations, and the deteriorating position in Mesopotamia, there 
is no indication that Foreign Office officials even considered 
surrendering to American pressure. Rather, it would appear that 
1. Minute by R. Vansittart, 4 June 1920, on E5631/1331/44, 
F.O.371/5212. 
2. Petroleum Department to Foreign Office, 10 June 1920, 
E6265/1331/44, F.O.371/5212. 
3. Minute by R. Sperling, 5 June 1920, on E5631/1331/44, 
F.O.371/.3212. 
4. Correspondence and minutes on E8077/20/44, F.O.371/5085. 
5. Minute by Weakley, 29 July 1920, E8978/20/44, F.O.371/5085. 
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their opinion, that the Americans had no locus standi, hardened 
with this renewal of United states representations. This is 
certainly true of E. Weakley, the Office's petroleum expert, 
and R. Sperling of the American Department. The latter expressed 
the position concisely: ' ••• I believe that we intend if we can 
to exclude the Standard Oil Co. [SiC] from Mesopotamia. In that 
1 
case we had better say so at once'. He then proceeded to out-
line the British position, on the surface at least, a strong one. 
First and foremost, the United States was not a member of the 
League, and thus had no rights under the draft mandate. Although 
one possible weakness existed in the British case, the San Remo 
Agreement, Weakley had an answer for that: 'The point is that 
the French are in a position, in Syria, to give us something we 
want, i.e. access to the Mediterranean for oil, but there is no 
preferential treatment whatever, ••• ,.2 
In addition, Sperling suggested the possibility of moving 
from defence on to attack, in view of certain domestic measures 
adopted in the United States. He pointed to the preferential 
treatment given to her own shipping by the Jones Act, despite 
the terms of the Anglo-American commercial treaty; and the 
powers taken by the Minerals Leasing Act to exclude British 
companies from American oil lands. An additional reason for 
British obstinacy, though not actually mentioned in the minutes, 
was that Standard Oil was suspected of fomenting trouble in 
Mesopotamia. The Foreign Office was clearly determined to 
compose a hard hitting reply: 
1. Minute by Sperling, 31 July 1920, on E9082/1331/44, 
F.O.371/5212. 
2. Minute by Weakley, 30 July 1920, on ibid. 
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I suggest an answer on the above lines, 
because in matters of this kind the U.S. 
understand the lex talionis and no other. 
Also we shall earn their respect which is 
a better foundation for friendship in the 
long run than contempt. 1 
It is notable that the Foreign Office reply of 9 August 
1920, drafted by Weakley, and with very little redrafting by 
other officials, adopted an attacking tone, both on the subject 
of oil generally, and Mesopotamia in particular. Contending 
that British oil interests had not been given privileged rights 
in Mesopotamia, and that only the military authorities were 
permitted to exploit the oil deposits, the note then attempted 
to correct ' ••• the very mistaken impressions, which appear to 
be current in the United States in regard to the oil policy of 
His Majesty's Government'. The discrepancy between the British 
Empire's production of petroleum, at only ct% of the total world 
production (with Persia, 41%), and the United States, with 70% 
(or, if Mexico was included, over 80%) was emphasized: 
There is, in any case no justification 
for supposing that Great Britain, whose 
present oil resources are altogether 
insignificant in comparison, can seri-
ously threaten American supremacy ••• 
The nervousness of American opinion, 
concerning the alleged grasping activities 
of British oil interests, appears singu-
larly unfortunate in view of these facts. 
In an attacking stance, reference was made to the exclusion of 
British oil interests from Haiti and Costa Rica, apparently at 
the instigation of the United States. The weak position of the 
United States, as neither a belligerent power in the Near Eastern 
theatre of war, nor a member of the League of Nations, was 
obliquely emphasized, whilst the American request to be consulted 




on the terms of the mandates was rejected. American criticisms 
of San Remo were met by the practical justification suggested 
by Weakley, and the TPC claims were outlined, and equated with 
th f . I ti 1 ose 0 Socony In Pa es nee The tone of this Note, clearly 
resentful of American interference, and the attempt by the 
united States to have the spoils of victory in the Near East 
without the responsibility, was guaranteed to anger the State 
Department, in the current anti-British atmosphere. Nor was 
that Department likely, in view of the existing anxiety about 
oil, to accept British contentions that the United States was 
in a uniquely strong position vis-a-vis oil supplies; and (by 
implication) that if the United States intended to exclude the 
British from the Monroe Doctrine area, it should in turn allow 
the British to retain their hegemony in the Near East. 
In deciding upon the nature of its reply, the United States 
Government originally intended to reflect the heavy factual 
emphasis of the British Note. In an interdepartmental confer-
ence held to consider the American response, Van S. Merle-Smith 
of the State Department 'emphasized the importance of avoiding 
-
a discussion of principles and generalities in our reply and to 
stick to facts t • 2 It is unclear from the notes on the conference 
why it was felt important to avoid a discussion of principles, 
It might, however, have reflected American awareness that, by 
virtue of their non-belligerent status, and their failure to 
join the League, they were on weak ground in demanding equal 
1. Lord Curzon to Ambassador J.W. Davis, 9 August 1920, 
For. ReI. 1920, Vol.II, pp.663-7. 
2. Memo of a conference on Lord Curzon's note and preparation 
of a reply, 13 August 1920, 800.6363/237, R.G.59, N.A. 
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economic rights in mandated territories. However, government 
officials apparently felt confident that they could challenge 
many of the facts presented in the British Note. In addition, 
it was planned to emphasize the difference between present 
production of oil, and future reserves; and to challenge the 
validity of the TPC's claim, on which the state Department 
commenced to gather information. 1 
One serious weakness in the United states case was the 
lack of any valid American counter-claims to that of ~le TPC. 
During 1920, however, certain American oil companies, such as 
Socony, were attempting to acquire such rival rights by buying 
from the Deutsche Bank options ostensibly held by the Anatoliilll 
and Baghdad railroads for the construction of a railroad across 
Mesopotamia, such options also to cover the mineral rights over 
a 20 kilometre strip each side of the line. These options had, 
of course, never been converted into full concessions; and the 
legal division of the state Department therefore concluded that 
'The rights which these companies have ••• is tenuous and at best 
is probably only the right of preference, ••• '. Nonetheless, the 
acquisition of these options by American interests would not be 
entirely valueless for 
The alleged concession to the Turkish 
Petroleum Company probably has no 
validity as it appears, from papers at 
hand, to have been a mere naked promise 
from a Government official who, in and 
of himself, had no power to grant or to 
agree to such a concession. 2 
Foreign Office officials also viewed with alarm American nego-
tiations with the German interests, seeing them as clear evidence 
1. See correspondence on 800.6363T84/3 & 7, R.G.59, N.A., M722/24. 
2. Memo by F.M. Anderson, 18 November 1920, 890G.6363/25, R.G.59, 
N.A., M722/22. 
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that American oil companies were determined to obtain a share 
1 
of Mesopotamian oil by hook or by crook: 
It certainly looks as though the Americans 
mean trouble over all concessions in 
mandated territories, and it is difficult 
to see how they can be placated. I imagine 
that America is now so full of money that 
there is plenty to spare to utilise in 
concessions in Turkey, Persia, China and 
elsewhere. 2 
In an unusual reversal of attitudes, however, by early November 
that same year certain Foreign Office officials were considering 
the possibility of placating the Americans by admitting them to a 
minority interest in the TPC. No firm decision had yet been 
made on Mesopotamian oil policy and, indeed, in late November the 
Foreign Office resisted suggestions of a possible compromise in 
Palestine, in order to retain a completely free hand in Mesopotamia. 3 
The uncertainty in Whitehall as to what policy to follow towards 
Middle Eastern oil was intensified by two additional factors 
which had to be taken into account. TIle alignment of the new 
Republican administration in the United states vis-a-vis the 
standard Oil companies had yet to be determined; ~1ilst in 
Mesopotamia the new Arab Government might be expected to express 
an opinion on the future development of its most significant 
natural resource. Confidence that the British could dominate the 
oilfields of Mesopotamia in the face of American opposition was 
diminishing, therefore, and in early November Weakley and Sir John 
Tilley were apparently in agreement that the admittance of the 
Standard Oil Company into the TPC would benefit both Great Britain 
1. Minute by Weakley, 28 August 1920, E10012/1331/44, F.O.371/5212. 
2. Minute by Lord Hardinge, n.d., on ibid. 
3. Sir John Tilley, Foreign Office, to Sir John Cadman, Petroleum 
Department, 29 November 1920, E14341/131/44, F.O.371/5140. 
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and Mesopotamia. Yet again, therefore, the TPC was envisaged 
as the vehicle for accommodating British oil policy. Sir John 
Cadman objected to this suggestion, on the basis that Standard 
Oil would be unwilling to accept a minority shareholding. A 
possible alternative was presented, however, when Cadman voiced 
the opinion that the TPC could not expect an absolute monopoly 
in Mesopotamia, but would almost certainly have to choose a 
limited area for exploitation. Tilley therefore proposed to 
the Petroleum Department that the TPC concession should be changed 
to one of priority and choice only, rather than monopolistic 
control over the entire Mesopotamian oilfield, and that the 
United States Government should be so informed. 1 The Petroleum 
Department concurred, but pointed out that Cabinet sanction would 
have to be obtained. 2 Thus, the way seemed open for a compromise, 
which would validate the TPC claim, maintain tile 'open door', and, 
presumably, end United States obstruction of the British task 
in Mesopotamia. 
Although in fact no Cabinet sanction was actually sought, 
the State Department was soon aware of this development in 
British opinion. It is not clear how tilis information was obtained, 
although there might have been some connection with Sir John 
Cadman's trip to the United States in late 1920. Millspaugh 
commented that 
Recent unofficial information reaching 
the Department appears to indicate that 
the British Government might be willing 
to admit American interests to a joint 
participation in a company for the deve-
lopment of the Mesopotamian fields. 3 
1. Minute by Tilley, 3 November 1920, and Tilley to Petroleum 
Department, 16 November 1920, both on E13385/20/44, F.O.371/5086. 
2. Petroleum Department to Foreign Office, 20 November 1920, and 
Foreign Office minutes, E14471/20/44, F.O.371/5086. 
3. Memo by Millspaugh, 20 November 1920, 890G.6363/70, R.G.59, 
N.A., M722/23. 
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He was clearly struck by the possibility, which he envisaged in 
terms of a diplomatic agreement setting up an international 
syndicate, which would incorporate a representative group of 
American companies - a scenario which in mid December he 
presented to a Socony representative. 1 However, one aspect of 
the British plan which the Americans would be unlikely to accept 
was the use of the TPC to accommodate the inter~ational interests. 2 
state Department officials were to continue to advocate this 
scheme, whilst Millspaugh even suggested extending its scope, 
3 to encompass a world-wide petroleum agreement. However, in 
Great Britain enthusiasm for commercial co-operation was effec-
tively to die down, and the idea was not resuscitated until late 
1921; and then by another department, in face of opposition 
from the Foreign Office. This surprising volte-face was due 
largely to the note which, on 22 November 1920, Ambassador 
Davis forwarded to Lord Curzon. This note, dated 20 November 
1920, was, contrary to all precedent, signed by Secretary of 
state Colby (instead of Ambassador Davis), and was addressed to 
Lord Curzon by name, rather than by title. 4 On querying this 
unusual departure from precedent, Davis was informed that it 
was a deliberate step 'adopted with high approval for reasons 
deemed important'. Indeed, the note had been approved by 
1. Memo by Millspaugh, 29 November 1920, 800.6363/325, R.G.59, 
N.A.; and memo by Millspaugh of a conversation with L.I. 
Thomas, 13 December 1920, 867.6363/74, R.G.59, N.~., M353/67. 
2. Ibid; and Van S. Merle-Smith to A.C. Bedford, Jersey 
Standard, 3 February 1921, 867.6363/68, R.G.59, N.A., M353/67. 
3. See Chapters 4 and 5. 
4. Bainbridge Colby to Lord Curzon, 20 November 1920, For. R~l. 
1920 Vol.II, pp.669-673. 
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1 President Wilson personally. state Department officials were, 
however, extremely disturbed by this step - and by the almost 
immediate publication of the note, without first obtaining the 
2 Foreign Office's approval. 
It does not appear that the permanent officials of the 
state Department were consulted as to the content and the 
3 despatch of the note, which was drafted by Colby personally. 
It certainly did not reflect the growing opinion within the 
state Department that some kind of conciliation might be possible; 
nor did it reflect the bias of earlier interdepartmental dis-
cussions, its emphasis being on the general principle of mandates, 
rather than the particular issue of oil. Moreover, its tone and 
its content, in particular its insistence upon the observance of 
American principles (and American rights vis-a-vis the mandates), 
were hardly likely to please the Foreign Office - especially 
Lord Curzon. In his note, Colby reiterated the traditional 
united states insistence upon equal economic opportunity, and 
specifically stated that the United states should not be excluded 
simply because she was not a member of the League of Nations. 
Indeed, he requested that the United states should be consulted 
before the draft mandates were submitted to the League Council. 
Although the emphasis throughout the note was on the importance 
1. Colby to U.S. Embassy, London, 24 November 1920, 800.6363/197a, 
and correspondence on 800.6363/106 and 196a, R.G.59, N.A.; 
and Colby to President Woodrow Wilson, 19 November 1920, 
Box 2, General Correspondence 1919-1920, Bainbridge Colby 
Papers, Library of Congress. Woodrow Wilson had commented 
on this letter 'Admirable note I approve'. 
2. Norman Davis to John W. Davis, 7 December 1920, Box 4, Part 1, 
Series II, Alphabetical Correspondence General, Davis MSS, Yale. 
3. Ibid. 
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of the mandate principle, with Mesopotamian oil as no more than 
an illustration of the practical application of that principle, 
he nonetheless declared that the TPC did not have valid rights, 
and pointed out that the United states had only one twelfth of 
the world's oil reserves. Colby concluded by stating that the 
temporary dominion of the Allied and Associated Powers over 
the mandated areas ' ••• will be totally misconceived, not to 
say abused, if there is even the slightest deviation from the 
spirit and the exclusive purpose of a trusteeship as strict 
as it is comprehensive,.1 The hasty publication of the note, 
only 4 days after it was delivered to the Foreign Office, clearly 
demonstrated that it was also intended for the attention of the 
Council of the League of Nations - then in session. 
The Foreign Office was of course aware of the fact that 
the Government which had sent the note had been defeated in 
the November elections. Nonetheless, its anger was immediately 
aroused by Colby's communication, and the determination to 
uphold the position it had adopted in previous notes was 
strengthened. In a minute on the United states note, Weakley 
reiterated that the San Remo agreement was totally justified; 
that the TPC had an undoubted right in Mesopotamia, even if no 
definite concession; and that either the United States Government 
or the Standard Oil Company had prevented British companies from 
working concessions in Haiti and Costa Rica. 2 The Petroleum 
Department even exceeded Foreign Office hostility, pointing out 
that the United States Government apparently demanded the full 
1. 
2. 
Colby to Curzon, 20 November 1920, For. ReI. 1920 Vol.II, 
pp.669-673. 




rights of membership of the League of Nations, but rejected 
its responsibilities and obligations. It therefore urged the 
Foreign Office to maintain any British pre-war rights in the 
ex-Ottoman Empire, and not to give in to United states pressure, 
particularly in view of the fact that the Middle East could 
never be a natural source of oil supply for the United states. 1 
Clearly, in such an atmosphere, Cabinet sanction for a 
policy of conciliation and compromise would be exceedingly 
difficult to obtain; nor is there any evidence that the 
Foreign Office would have wished to pursue such a policy. Indeed, 
in December 1920, the draft mandates were sent to the League for 
ratification without first consulting or informing the United 
states: only to be blocked by American representations to the 
Council. Despite this, the state Department - or, at least, 
, 
certain permanent Officials within it - still adhered to the 
possibility of international co-operation. In an interesting 
memorandum, Millspaugh, the main advocate of an Anglo-American 
agreement on oil, argued that, whilst the United states should 
demand the right to approve the mandate as a matter of prestige, 
it was unnecessary then to persevere with opposition, for ' ••• 
the Mesopotamian mandate is in many respects favorable ~iC] to 
the fundamental position of the United States,.2 In February 
1921, with the impending inauguration of a new administration, 
the idea of a diplomatic Anglo-American oil agreement was gaining 
ground within the state Department. However, this was not the 
case in the Capitol, where Senators MaCKellar and Phelan were 
urging an embargo on the export of oil from the United States 
1. 
2. 
Petroleum Department to Foreign Office, 3 December 1920, 
E15201/1331/44, F.O.371/5213. 




except to countries granting reciprocal treatment to the 
United states. Nor was it the case in the British Foreign 
Office, still considering its reply to Colby's last note. 
There is no doubt that the introduction of Senator 
Phelan's bill, and the comments made during debates upon it 
in the Senate angered and embittered the Foreign Office, already 
scathing at the content of Colby's note, and the American 
publication of that note without first requesting British 
permission.1 At the same time, United States communications 
to the League of Nations on the subject of the Near Eastern 
2 mandates were delaying the ratification of those mandates, 
wi th frustrating consequences for the administrations of 
Palestine and Mesopotamia. In such an atmosphere, the Phelan 
bill, and the 'fight for oil' mentality it engendered, was the 
final straw. Sperling of the American Department was especially 
irritated. Commenting that 'OUr draft reply to Mr. Colby's 
last note about Mesopotamia will put a stop to bluff of this 
sort. 3 The sooner it goes off the better', he also suggested 
The real remedy is, of course, not to talk 
but to do things we are accused of doing, 
and to make it clear that we should not 
have thought of doing them but for the 
fact that we are getting the abuse and might 
as well get the advantages. Nothing would 
discourage anti-British cranks in the U.S. 
[siC] more effectually. ~_ 
1. Minutes on E643/576/93, F.O.371/6363. 
2. Correspondence and minutes, E2472/576/93, F.O.371/6363. 
See also C.P.3275, CAB. 24/127, and C.P.3365, CAB.24/128. 
3. Minute by Sperling, 25 February 1921, on A1287/44/45, 
F.O.371/5638. 
4. Minute by Sperling, 4 September 1921, on A745/44/45, 
F.O.371/5638 • 
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Thus, despite the fact that a new administration would 
take office in the United states on 4 March 1921, the Foreign 
Office decided that a formal reply to Colby's note should be 
prepared as rapidly as possible. In so deciding, it was 
probably influenced by information received from L.I. Thomas, 
a prominent American oilman, which, it was felt, made it 
'more clear than ever that the United states is going to 
1 fight this question pretty hard'. Despite the impending change 
of administration, the note as drafted was a severe one, and 
was only sent after considerable amendment, and with the direct 
concurrence of the Prime Minister, in marked contrast to the 
note of 9 August 1920. Thus, it was clearly regarded as a 
significant statement of British policy - one which might have 
a considerable effect on Anglo-American relations. However, 
it was also hoped that, by sending the note in the twilight of 
the old administration, neither the Wilson nor the Harding 
government would regard itself as obliged to reply: 'Of course 
the Democrats will take no action on it, but then we do not 
particularly wish that the Republicans will either'. In order 
not to sour unreasonably relationships with the new adminis-
tration, the draft note was amended by deleting the section on 
I d .. I 2 the genera man ate prlnclp e. 
Thus the note, which was finally despatched on 28 February 
1921, concentrated almost entirely on the claims of the TPC. 
In the lengthiest explanation to date of the background and 
1. 
2. 
J.C. Clarke, Petroleum Department, to Weakley, 17 February 
1921, E2177/382/93, F.0.371/6360. 
Draft note and minutes, especially minute by R.C. Lindsay, 
18 February 1921, E2611/675/93, F.0.371/6363. 
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nature of that company's claim, Curzon rehearsed its history, 
emphasized the - in British eyes - binding nature of the 
Grand Vizier's letter, and thus maintained that the question 
of oil rights in Mesopotamia could not be treated as an 
abstract principle, but should be equated with American 
rights in Palestine: 
Apart from the fact that these resources 
are as yet entirely~proved, I can 
discern nothing in [the mandate] principle 
which compels the mandatory power to dis-
criminate against its own nationals, who ••• 
secured certain rights ••• , in order to 
afford an equal opportunity to other groups 
which before the war were not actively 
concerned in the petroleum resources of 
Mesopotamia. 1 
The Foreign Office also continued with the battle of the 
statistics. Curzon, in his note, drew a distinction between 
present production (based on fact) and future reserves (based 
on hypothesis). Moreover, at the suggestion of Ambassador Geddes, 
a lengthy memorandum on the oil situation, prepared for his 
guidance by the Petroleum Department, was laid before Parliament 
as a white paper. 2 In this memorandum, world production was 
examined in great detail, whilst controversial issues such as 
restrictive policy in the British terri tories, and the rights 
of the TPC, were also discussed. If it was intended to convince 
the Americans, it failed in its purpose. 3 It revealed clearly, 
however, that whilst the Foreign Office would be relieved if 
the Americans abandoned their representations on Mesopotamian 
oil, it was certainly not intended to concede any part of the 
1. 
2. 
Curzon to Ambassador Davis, 28 February 1921, For. ReI. 1921 
Vol.II, pp.80-84. 
Despatch to H.M. Ambassador at Washington enclosing a 
memorandum on the petroleum situation. Crnd. 1351, 1921. 
The Commerce Department was particularly scathing in its 
comments all. the memorandum. See the annotated copy of the 
white pa~le 312:U.K., BFDC, R.G.151, N.A. 
.. 
- ~:, -
British case in order to attain that end. Earlier discussion 
on the possibility of a commercial compromise had apparently 
been abandoned completely. 
By March 1921 Great Britain's apparently unassailable 
position with regard to Mesopotamian oil had been considerably 
weakened. In order to induce the French to surrender Mosul, 
it had been necessary to promise them 25% of the oil, whilst 
American representations were delaying the ratification of the 
mandate, and the confirmation of the TPC concession. In view 
of the rising tide of Mesopotamian nationalism, apparently 
fuelled by Standard Oil, the possibility that such confirmation 
would be difficult to obtain had to be faced. It was becoming 
increasingly difficult to envisage a solution that would 
satisfy all the interested parties. A possible answec - t:le 
enlarging of t;1e TPC to incorpora-te yet another facet of British 
oil policy, the placating of the Americans, was wrecked by 
worsening Anglo-American relations and mutual suspicion, reflected 
in the acerbic diplomatic correspondence during the period 
August 1920 to February 1921. As a consequence, both govern-
ments had so committed their prestige to the maintenance of 
their respective posi t.i.ons tll.at compromise became virtually 
impossible. 
For Great Britain, the problem posed was a particularly 
difficult one, for she had to combine - or, more accurately, 
attempt to combine - several strands of policy in deciding 
her attitude towards Mesopotamian oil. The Admiralty's need 
for oil, Anglo-French relations in the Near and Middle East, 
and Great Britain's role as mandatory power for an increasingly 
turbulent Mesopotamia, had all to be taken into account in 
~ .... -. -. =---- ---.. ~ 
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responding to American initiatives. So, too, did the current 
deterioration in Anglo-Arnerican relations. By February 1921, 
despite a brief flirtation with the idea of incorporating yet 
another strand - American participation - into its increasingly 
complex, TPC-based, oil strategy, the decision had apparently 
been taken to oppose American demands. This decision was 
taken by the permanent officials of the Foreign Office, without 
consultation with the Cabinet, and largely as a consequence of 
extreme irritation with the United States note of 20 November 
1920. Clearly, at that point; control over the strategically 
significant Mesopotamian oil was seen as of more importance 
than placating the United States. 
For the United States, the formulation of policy was far 
simpler: it essentially reflected, at least for permanent 
officials, the need for a secure source of foreign oil. It 
should be emphasized that, in contradiction to many other 
instances that will be examined later, American representations 
were not made at the particular instigation of an interested 
oil company, but as a consequence of growing State Department 
concern that the Near Eastern oilfields would be closed to 
American enterprise. This reflects the unusual significance 
which t~le st'1 t8 Deparbnent placed upon Mesopotamian oil. It 
may also be surmised that it reflected a worry lest, following 
the United States rejection of the League, she might be regarded 
as of Ii tUe moment in world affairs, and would thus lose the 
ability to safeguard American opportunities abroad. The mandated 
territories offered possibly the best mechanism whereby the 
United States could assert its continued rights in the i~ter­
national scene, even though, in the Near East this right was 
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very weak. Toe United states had, of course, never been at 
war with Turkey, whilst the mandate system had been originally 
conceived as being very closely linked to the League of 
Nations, of which the United states was not a member. The 
initiation of the formal diplomatic correspondence, which 
came only one month after the Senate's final rejection of 
the League, was not in defence of a specific American claim, 
but an assertion of a general right ~f access to the oil 
resources of the mandated territories. Despite Colby's efforts 
to establish the dispute as one of principle, it related very 
closely to the concrete American need for new opportunities 
overseas for the economic expansion of its oil compfu"'lies. 
Both sides, having stated their position, seemed 
deter.mined i~ the spLi~g of 1921 to uphold their views at all 
costs. The situation, therefore, appeared to be one of dead-
lock, with neither government prepared to compromise, and 
wi th general :':md feeling over the oil question considerably 
exacerbating the strained state of Anglo-Amer.ican relations. 
Foreign Office determination not to surrender to what was 
regarded as unjustified American pressure had hardened, despite 
its awareness of the we,'lkrless legally of the TPC's claim. 
Yet, in late 1921 and early 1922, the British Government was 
ardeni::ly to PUt>;lle a ..:JJ1'L1':'/ of ~.::ompromise wi,th the Americans 
on Mesopotamian oil. This policy was due in part to the 
influence of the Colonial Office, now responsible for the 
administration of Mesopotamia, in part to changes in Anglo-
Amer.ican relations, both of whidl will be examined in. a 2.ater-
chapter. But it was also due to concurrent developments in 
two other areas of oil controversy in ~le Middle East, North 
Persia, and Palestine. 'fuese developments helped pave the way 
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to reconciliation, and even seemed to offer a possible solution 
which would avoid the necessitj of the Foreign Office publicly 
acknowledging that its stance on the TPC had been wrong. It 




The First Gesture Towards Co-operation: 
North Persian Oil 1919-1922 
Whilst, by virtue of the D'Arcy concession, granted on 
29 May 1901, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company enjoyed monopo-
listic rights over the South Persian oilfields, the five 
northern provinces of Persia were explicitly excluded from 
1 
the agreement, in order to avoid offending Russian suscep-
tibilities. However, the company was apparently granted a 
stranglehold over any Northern oilfield by a clause granting 
it the exclusive right to build and operate oil pipelines 
across Southern Persia - the only feasible route for the export 
of oil from the north. Nonetheless, on 9 March 1916, a concession 
was granted by the Persian Government to a Russian subject, 
A.M. Khoshtaria,2 although it was never ratified by the Majlis, 
nor did Khoshtaria commence work within five years, as the 
contract stipulated. The Russian also obtained additional 
rights, held since 1894 by a Persian subject, Sipah-Salar. 
In July 1918, however, following the Bolshevik Revolution, the 
Persian Government declared all Russian concessions - including, 
by implication, that of Khoshtaria - cancelled. Concurrently, 
it challenged the validity of the method by which Anglo-Persian 
calculated its royalties - a dispute not finally settled until 
1. D'Arcy concession, 29 May 1901, Hurewitz, I, pp.249-251. 
2. The text of the Khoshtaria concession is in For. ReI. 1920, 
Vol.III, pp.351-2. Information on the history of the North 
Persian concession in the 1920s can be obtained from: Memo 
by A.W. Ferrin on Persian Oil, September 1930, 891.6363/655; 
DeNovo, American Interests, pp.283-286; Davis, British Oil 
Policy, pp.165-198; Longrigg, Oil, pp.39-58; Shwadran, 
pp.71-78; Yeselson, ch.9; and Michael J. Hogan, 'Informal 
Entente: Public Policy and Private Management in Anglo-
American Petroleum Affairs, 1918-1924', Business History 
Review XLVIII (1974), pp.187-205. 
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the Armitage-Smith Agreement was signed in December 1920. 1 
Despite this conflict, on 8 May 1920 Anglo-Persian purchased 
the Khoshtaria claims and, after initial doubts, the Foreign 
Office finally decided to support the company in claiming 
that the transfer of the concession was legal. 2 However, by 
this period the British were losing their influence in Persia, 
in the face of rising Persian nationalism, and the need, 
enforced by economy, to withdraw most of their troops from 
North Persia. After the coup d'etat of February 1921, the 
new Persian Government renounced the - as yet unratified -
Anglo-Persian Agreement, and on 26 February 1921 signed an 
agreement with the Bolsheviks. 3 
By the terms of this Treaty all concessions obtained by 
Russian subjects before 1917 were returned to Persia. It was, 
however, stipUlated that no returned concession might be 
regranted to a foreign citizen or company without the consent 
of the Soviet Government. The Khoshtaria concession was, 
therefore, apparently cancelled; but a new concession could 
not be granted in its stead without Soviet consent. Despite 
this provision, on 22 November 1921 the Persian Majlis approved 
in principle a 50 year lease to an American company, Jersey 
Standard. The previous day in the United States, Morgan Shuster, 
acting on behalf of the Persian Government, had agreed the 
terms of a deal with Jersey Standard, whereby the company would 
lend 10 million dollars to the Persian Government if a con-
1. Davis, British Oil Policy, pp.175-178. 
2. Lord Curzon to H. Norman, British Minister, Teheran, 
30 August 1920, D.B.F.P., 1st Series, Vol.13, pp.600-1. 
3. Soviet-Persian Agreement, 26 February 1921, Hurewitz, II, 
pp.90-94. 
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cession were approved. The deal soon met with protests, 
however, both from the Russians because it infringed the 
Soviet-Persian Agreement; and from Anglo-Persian, which 
continued to insist that the Khoshtaria concession was valid. 
Negotiations were therefore opened between the two interested 
companies, which resulted in an agreement being reached in 
February 1922, whereby they agreed to work the concession -
and underwrite the loan - jointly. However, the Majlis now 
withdrew the concession because Standard Oil had assigned a 
share in the lease to another company unknown to them, and 
opened discussions with another American company, Sinclair 
Consolidated Oil Corporation. At this stage, with two American 
companies in direct competition, the State Department pro-
fessed its complete neutrality. In December 1923 the Persian 
Government concluded a preliminary agreement with the Sinclair 
group but, following the Teapot Dome scandal involving that 
company, the deal fell through. 
Thus, no concession was ever actually granted to any of 
the three contending companies during the 1920s: nor was it 
the subject of any prolonged diplomatic correspondence between 
the British and American Governments. To that extent, therefore, 
it would appear of minor significance in any discussion of 
Anglo-American controversy over Middle Eastern oil. It is, 
however, important for a number of reasons. Great Britain's 
historical pre-eminence in Persia1 was apparently strengthened 
by the collapse of T.sarist Russia, and in the years immediately 
following the First World War she attempted to advance her 
position yet further by the negotiation of a comprehensive 
1. See Chapter 1. 
- 92 -
1 Anglo-Persian Agreement, and by the appointment of British 
financial and military advisers to the Persian Government. 
Neither of these initiatives were to be ultimately successful. 
The reasons for their failure were manifold, and owed much to 
internal developments in Persia, the extremely rapid march of 
events in Asia, in the wake of the Bolshevik Revolution, and 
the need for military economy on Britain's part, necessitat-
ing the withdrawal of British troops from North Persia. In 
addition, however, United states opposition to the Anglo-
Persian Agreement was one factor in its destruction. Moreover, 
Persia saw in the United states a disinterested Great Power, 
which, she hoped, could be persuaded to lend her support, 
expertise - and money - in return for oil concessions. An 
American financial mission, led by A.C. Millspaugh (signi-
ficantly, the state Department oil expert) was in fact to 
take over control of Persian finances in october 1922: whilst, 
as was outlined above, two American oil companies, Sinclair 
and Jersey Standard, were to compete for the North Persian oil 
concession. Nonetheless, it was in Persia that the first 
steps were taken towards a policy of co-operation and com-
promise between British and American oil interests in the 
Middle East: co-operation that was supported by both governments, 
and which provided the first step towards conciliation in 
Mesopotamia. 
These steps must be regarded with some surprise, for Persia 
was a country in which Great Britain had been long accustomed 
to enjoying an unusual degree of power and influence. The 
1. Anglo-Persian Agreement, 9 August 1919, Hurewitz, II, 
pp.64-66. 
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oilfields in the South were regarded as of critical importance 
in Great Britain's strategic plans, and by virtue of its 
exclusive concession over them, and the contribution its 
royalties made to the Persian state's finances, AnglO-Persian 
appeared to be in a dominating position. Moreover, on the 
face of it, the British Foreign Office had no particular reason 
to court American participation in Persian affairs. Indeed, 
united States opposition to the AnglO-Persian Agreement had 
aroused bitter hostility within the British Foreign Office 
(as will be discussed briefly below): whilst negotiations 
for compromise between the oil companies coincided with dis-
cussions on the appointment of an American financial adviser 
to Persia, both of which developments threatened traditional 
British hegemony in Persia. It is, therefore, vital to 
comprehend why, despite this situation, the British Foreign 
Office came to welcome the possibility of co-operation between 
AnglO-Persian and Jersey Standard, and to use it as a vehicle 
to encourage similar co-operation in Mesopotamia. 
Although the United States showed as little desire to 
become involved in Persia as elsewhere in the Middle East, 
her status there was somewhat different, less as a consequence 
of her own efforts as those of Persia. American prestige in 
Persia was very high following the short-lived Shuster mission, 1 
and Persia soon renewed her attempts to use the United States 
against the Great Powers. During the war, the United States 
was apparently very popular in Persia,2 whilst it was assumed 
1. See Chapter 1. 
2. Report by W. Phillips to the U.S. Secretary o~ State on 
the Persian situation, 791.00/-, R.G.59, N.A., M717/1. 
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wi thin the state Department that it would probably support Persian 
independence and the open door against British attempts to tighten 
°t h f ° I 1 1 S sp ere 0 lnf uence. Insofar as the Persians received any 
assistance and sympathy at the Paris Peace Conference, it came 
from the United states Delegation. 2 It must be emphasized, 
however, that the United states had taken no steps to strengthen 
her influence as against that of Great Britain, although she was 
certainly aware of the potential opportunities available in Persia 
for American enterprise, when the terms of the Anglo-Persian 
Agreement were publicized. 
In the summer of 1919, Persia was in a chaotic state, 
political and economic instability being compounded by Bolshevik 
agitation, particularly in the North. 3 The British Minister in 
Teheran, Sir Percy Cox, at the instigation of Lord CUrzon, 
therefore negotiated with pro-British elements in the Persian 
Government an Anglo-Persian Agreement. By its terms, Great 
Britain was to supply Persia with officers, munitions and modern 
equipment for its army, expert financial advisers, loans, aid 
for railway construction, and a guarantee of independence. 4 In 
-----------------_._,------------------------- ~----
1. Division of Near Eastecn Affairs to Phillips, 29 November 1918, 
711.41/22, R.G.59, N.A., M581/1. 
2. Yeselson, ch. 6. 
3. Unless stated otherwise, the following secondary sources were 
used for background material on events in Persia during this 
period. D.B.F.P., 1st Series, Vol.XIII, ch. 3; Yeselson; 
DeNovo, American Interests, ch.9; Peter Avery, Modern Iran 
(London, 1965), pp.210-264; and Gordon Waterfield, Profes~~n.a.l_ 
Diplomat: Sir Percy Loraine of Kirkharle Bt. 1880-1961 (London, 
1973), chs. 6-12. 
4. Anglo-Persian 
Memorandum by 
to Cabinet, 9 
pp.1119-1122; 
Agreement, 9 August 1919, Hurewitz, II, pp.64-66; 
Earl CUrzon on the Persian Agreement circulated 
August 1919, D.B.F.P., 1st Series, Vol. IV, 
and Avery, op.cit., pp.202-209. 
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short, the British were proposing the establishment of a virtual 
protectorate over the whole of Persia, to replace that tradi-
tionally exercised over the South, in order to stabilize an area 
vital as a buffer to India, and as a major supplier of fuel oil 
to the British Navy. Lord Curzon, regarded by many (not least 
himself) as an expert on Persian affairs, saw the Agreement as 
a major personal achievement; its rejection by Persia offended 
him deeply, as did opposition to, or criticism of, that agreement 
by others. 
Curzon had, however, no reason to envisage the possibility 
of American opposition, for he had informed Colonel Ed~Nard House, 
President Wilson's right-hand man at Paris, that an agreement 
was being negotiated. 1 Indeed, so sure was Curzon of United 
states approval, that he specifically requested that Government 
to lend its support to the British, or at least not to support 
. 1 2 the French Minister in Teheran, suspected of fomenting troub e. 
American public opinion was, however, shocked at this blatant 
infringement of open diplomacy and Persian self-determination. 
The State Department, meanwhile, was informed by the American 
minister in Teheran that there was universal Persian resentment 
3 
at the terms of the Treaty, and therefore it refused to support 
------.------------------------------.------------
1. Entry fo):' 20 May :919, Vol.16, House Diaries, Yale. Later, 
House was to tell Ambassador Davis that whilst Curzon Yaj 
told him that negotiations were taking place, he had given 
no details. Entry for 27 August 1919, Vol.16, House Diaries, 
Yale. 
2. J.W. Davis to R. Lansing, 18 August 1919, For. ReI. 1919 
Part III, Vol.II, pp.699-70; and Curzon to R.C. Lindsay, 
British Embassy, Washington D.C., 18 August 1919, D.B.F.P., 
1st Series, Vol.IV, pp.1135-6. 
3. John C. Caldwell, U.S. Minister, Teheran, to U.S. Secretary 
of State, 13, 16 and 23 August 1919, For. ReI. 1919 Part III, 
Vol.II, pp.699-701; and U.S. Secretary of state to Caldwell, 
19 August 1919, 741.91/21, R.G.59, N.A., M582/10. 
( 
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the British. It was clearly felt that the agreement had been 
made secretly to gain 'at least economic control of Persia' ,1 
a suspicion increased when the Department learnt of the secret 
financial clauses in the Treaty.2 In an unusual departure from 
normal diplomatic practice, Secretary of State Lansing did not 
express his disapproval to the British Government, but instead 
assured the Persian Government of his dislike of the agreement, 
and expressed the hope that Persia would look to the United States 
for aid. 3 On his instructions, the United States Minister in 
Teheran published a communique in the local press on 9 September 
1919, conveying the above sentiments, and concluding by assuring 
the Persians that the United States had attempted to secure a 
4 hearing for their case at the Paris Peace Conference. Curzon 
protested strongly to Ambassador Davis at this infringement of 
diplomatic procedure, emphasizing that Colonel House had been 
informed of the agreement, and drawing parallels with the United 
States relationship with Liberia. 5 In a rejoinder the Wilson 
Government, by now in the throes of the debate on the League, 
and extremely self-conscious of its failures to abide by open 
diplomacy at Paris, refused to accept either of Curzon's con-
tentions. 6 Ambassador Davis, the vehicle through which this 
acrimonious correspondence was conducted, was clearly perplexed 
and embarrassed by the way in which the issue was magnified into 
-----.--.- -------------------------
1. U.S. Secretary of State to Ambassador Davis, 20 August 1919, 
For. ReI. 1919 Part III, Vol.II, p.700. 
2. Caldwell to U.S. Secretary of State, 18 October 1919, 
741.91/26, R.G.59, N.A., M582/10. 
3. u.s. Secretary of State to Caldwell, 4 September 1919, 
For. ReI. 1919, Part II, Vol.III, pp.707-8. 
4. Yeselson, pp.160-162. 
5. 
~. 
Curzon to U.S. Ambassador, London, 11 September 1919, 
D.B.F.P., 1st Series, Vol.IV, pp.1163-5. 
u. . to Curzon, 12 September 1919, D.B.F.P., 
1st Series, Vol. ,pp.1167-8. 
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a major diplomatic incident,1 not least because Curzon continually 
asserted that Davis had expressed his own support for the Treaty.2 
As events in Persia deteriorated, and uncertainty over 
United states entry into the League of Nations preoccupied the 
Wilson administration, Anglo-American friction over Persia 
increased. Secretary of State Lansing was soon convinced that 
the Anglo-Persian Agreement was a symbol of British greed, 
indifference to the rights of others, and determination to gain 
complete control over Persia, against the wishes of the population. 3 
Ambassador Davis was more realistic, given the current American 
atmosphere of withdrawal from international responsibilities: he 
concluded that, having expressed its displeasure, the United 
States Government should accept the situation, since it was unprepared 
4 to proffer the assistance that Persia so clearly needed. Ini-
tially, he was unable to sway Lansing,5 but gradually during 
October the State Department, and even the Secretary of State 
6 began to feel that they had overreacted. The eventual reply 
to Great Britain, however, whilst comparatively conciliatory in 
comparison with earlier Notes, nonetheless stated that the 
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1st Series, Vol.IV, pp.1135-6. 
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••• feel itself in a position at the 
present time to give its approval to 
the Anglo-Persian Agreement unless 
and until it is clear that the autho-
rities and people of Persia are united 
in their approval and support of that 
undertaking. 1 
At least part of the American hostility was due to the prevalent 
opinion that oil had been a major factor behind the negotiation 
of the agreement,2 Davis telling Curzon informally that 'there 
was a growing feeling, particularly among American oil interests 
that there was some design to discriminate against them in the 
3 Near East'. This statement seemed to imply a concerted British 
policy to secure control of Middle Eastern oil resources. However, 
American resentment continued to decline, and by December 1919 
Under Secretary W. Phillips was suggesting to R.C. Lindsay that, 
since the Senate was calling for the correspondence on Persia, 
it might be a good idea if Britain sent a sympathetic reply that 
would show 'that there was no real divergence of views on the 
4 
subject between the two governments'. 
5 This, howeVer, Curzon refused to do; clearly, his 
irritation at the Americans was such, that he was unprepared to 
countenance a 'sympathetic reply'. He had refused to accept 
1. U.S. Ambassador to Curzon, 7 October 1919, D.B.F.P., 1st 
Series, Vol.IV, pp.1193-5. 
2. Frank Polk to J.W. Davis, 9 October 1919, Folder 120, 
'J.W. Davis', Drawer 73, Polk MSS; and memorandum of a 
conversation between Prince Firoux, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of Persia with Polk, 9 October 1919, Folder 94 
'Persia', Drawer 78, POlk MSS. 
3. Private letter, J.W. Davis to Lansing, 21 October 1919, 
quoted Yeselson, p.165. 
4. W. Phillips to Mr. Whitehouse, 16 December 1919, 741.91/52, 
R.G.59, N.A., M582/10; and Lindsay to Cruzon, 13 January 
1920, D.B.F.P., 1st Series, Vol.XIII, p.433. 
5. Curzon to Lindsay, 20 January 1920, D.B.F.P., 1st Series, 
Vol.XIII, p.433. 
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the urging of Viscount Grey, during the latter's special mission 
to the United states, that Britain should adopt a policy of 
·1· t· 1 conCl la lone Grey even raised the possibility of American 
assistance in providing advisers and funds to the Persian 
Government 'to show that we are wholehearted in opening the 
door to American assistance to Persia ••• ,.2 Curzon however 
. t d th· t· 3 Ith h reJec e lS sugges lon, a oug Grey continued to emphasize 
that the United states saw the Agreement as intended to exclude 
American commerce or influence, and that this American sensi-
tivity should be taken into account in framing Britain's Persian 
1 . 4 po lCY. 5 This, of course, Curzon found totally unacceptable. 
The legacy of the whole incident was a bitterness against American 
interference amongst Foreign Office officials, and more especially 
Curzon, who commented that the United states Government had 'gone 
out of their way to be nasty. Perhaps on some future occasion 
they may find us less enthusiastic about some proposal of theirs 
than they would desire,.6 Moreover, the Persians were further 
convinced that the United states might profitably be used against 
1. Douglas L. Smith, 'Viscount Grey's "Special Mission" and 
Postwar Anglo-American Relations', Southern Quarterly 11 
(1973) pp.264-266; and Curzon-Grey correspondence, September 
and October 1919, D.B.F.P., 1st Series, Vol.IV, pp.1184-1215. 
2. Grey to Curzon, 28 September 1919, D.B.F.P., 1st Series, 
Vol.IV, pp.1184-5. 
3. Curzon to Grey, 1 October 1919, D.B.F.P., 1st Series, Vol.IV, 
p.1191. In this, he was supported by Sir Percy Cox, British 
Minister in Teheran. Cox to Curzon, 9 October 1919, ibid., 
pp.1198-9. 
4. Grey to Curzon, 10 October 1919, D.B.F.P., 1st Series, Vol.IV, 
p.1200; and Grey to Curzon, 17 October 1919, ibid., pp.1205-6. 
5. Grey to Curzon, 27 October 1919, and CUrzon minute, 30 October 
1919, D.B.F.P., 1st Series, Vol.IV, pp.1214-5. 
6. Minute by Curzon, 10 October 1919, D.B.F.P., 1st Series, Vol.IV, 
p.1195, note 5. 
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Great Britain, a conviction in which they were encouraged by 
st t t f o ° I 1 some a e Departmen of 1C1a s. 
This was to lead to a concerted attempt by the Persians to 
engage American assistance in order to involve the United states 
Government in their country. The most obvious opening for such 
involvement was through an oil concession, and in April 1920 the 
Persian Minister in London asked Curzon what would be the British 
reaction to the Persians employing American advisers, and involving 
American companies in financial schemes for the development of 
Persia's resources - including oil, 
I at once realized that he was referring 
to the American Standard Oil Company, and 
that that omnivorous organization was 
endeavouring to secure a foothold on 
Persian soil ••• I warned him very strongly 
against any attempt to introduce the 
Standard Oil Company in Persia, assuring 
him that this would mean a competition ••• 
which the British Government could not be 
expected to regard with any favour. 2 
Clearly, British hostility to American interference in Persia was 
still paramount. This makes it all the more surprising that, only 
a year later, the Foreign Office was advocating co-operation with 
American interests. To comprehend why this was so, it is necessary 
to turn to the question of North Persian oil and, more specifically, 
the Khoshtaria concessions. 3 
1. Memo by the Third Assistant Secretary of State, 23 December 
1919, For. ReI. 1919, Part III, Vol.II, pp.718-9; summary of 
an interview between Nadi Khan, Attache of the Persian 
Legation and A. Putney, 26 December 1919, 741.91/89, R.G.59, 
N.A., M582/10; and James G. Bailey, U.S. Charge, Berne, to 
U.S. Secretary of State, 23 January 1920, 891.63/2, R.G.59, 
N.A., M715/26. 
2. Curzon to Cox, 10 April 1920, D.B.F.P., 1st Series, Vol.XIII, 
pp.466-8. 
3. Yeselson and Davis, British oil Policy give good accounts 
from the American and British viewpoints respectively of the 
North Persian oil concession negotiations. This discussion 
therefore concentrates upon the genesis of a co-operative 
relationship between American and British oil companies, and 
the dLli~8es Q~their respective governments. 
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With the cancellation of all Russian concessions, the North 
Persian oilfields were again available, the most obvious contenders 
for a lease being the various American companies and Anglo-Persian. 
There were two alternative routes for concession seekers: to 
negotiate afresh with the Persian Government, or to purchase an 
existing claim in the hope of having its validity recognized. 
Russian concession holders made a concerted effort to persuade 
interested companies to follow the second course. The Foreign 
Office, however, felt that the best procedure would be to let 
existing concessions lapse, and then explore the possibility of 
a British group taking up new options, G.P. Churchill stating 
that 'I am inclined to think we would do better to leave the 
1 Khoshtaria concession severely alone'. Clearly at this stage 
the Office was prepared to accept the legality of the Persian 
Government's cancellation of the Russian claims. However, Anglo-
Persian was apparently less convinced, and in early 1920 com-
menced negotiations with Khoshtaria. In a cautious attempt to 
cover all options, therefore, the Foreign Office informed the 
company of its opinion that, if it did purchase the Khoshtaria 
concessions, it would prevent any future Russian Government 
from enforcing the annulment of the cancellation. It was still 
adamant, however, that whilst it would be prepared to support 
British applicants in seeking a ~ concession, the British 
Government could not accept any responsibility in connection 
ht . . 2 with the validity of the Khos arla conceSSlons. Additionally, 
1. Memo by G.P. Churchill, 10 November 1919, 34/3921/150229, 
F.O.371/3879. See also correspondence and minutes on 
34/3921/33588, 146277, 150229 and 158025, F.O.371/3879. 
2. Foreign Office to Anglo-Persian, 10 March 1920, 34/3921/180967, 
F.O.371/3879. 
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Sir C. Greenway, Managing Director of Anglo-Persian, was informed 
in an interview that, apart from the general cancellation of all 
Russian concessions, there was in fact some reason for believing 
that the Khoshtaria concession had lapsed because of the failure 
t t f "t t . t ti 1 o pu some 0 l S engagemen s In 0 opera on. 
Having stated its position so categorically, however, the 
Foreign Office was to steadily retreat from it. Its legal advisers 
concluded that the second argument could be successfully contra-
dicted, although it was made clear that this would still leave 
the first unanswered. 2 Nonetheless, in a critical step, the 
Foreign Office informed AnglO-Persian on 10 April 1920 that 
His Majestts Government are prepared to 
support your Company at Tehran with the 
object of obtaining the recognition by 
the Persian Government of the transfer 
, to your Company of the concessions in 
question. 3 
The wording was such that it did not necessarily imply the recog-
nition of the concession as valid - although it is difficult to 
tell from the records whether this was a deliberate move on the 
part of the Foreign Office. However, having taken the first step, 
the British Government went further. The Persian Government 
categorically informed it that the Khoshtaria concessions were 
now regarded as null and void; whilst the Foreign Office's legal 
advisers pointed out that, should the Persian Government's case 
be based upon the cancellation of all Russian concessions, they 
had yet to consider the legality of that particular argument. 
Nonetheless, the Foreign Office decided to refuse to accept this 
1. Memo of an interview between Oliphant and Sir C. Greenway, 
Managing Director, Anglo-Persian, 29 March 1920, 34/3921/188324, 
F.O.371/3879. 
2. Minute by Foreign Office Legal Department, 6 April 1920, on ibid. 
3. Foreign Office to Anglo-Persian, 10 April 1920, ibid. 
- 103 -
contention,1 and upheld its conviction that the Khoshtaria 
concessions were valid, despite the reiterated Persian insistence 
that they were not. 2 
From the British point of view, it was perhaps fortunate that 
Anglo-Persian had taken steps to establish for itself a claim on 
North Persian oil, for an interest in that area was also being 
demonstrated in the United states. Initially, as in the case of 
Mesopotamia, it was the state and Commerce Departments which 
attempted to interest oil companies in the potential of North 
Persia, rather than vice-versa, although this government initiative 
was largely at the instigation of the Persian Minister in Washington. 
Information was collected on the Anglo-Persian and Khoshtaria 
concessions,3 and conveyed to selected oil companies. Despite 
the fact that the Anglo-Persian concession would detract from the 
value of any future concession in North Persia, because of its 
exclusive pipeline rights, Jersey Standard stated that it would 
be willing to consider the possibility of applying for a con-
4 
cession in the North. Meantime, news of a possible American loan 
1. Minutes and correspondence on 34/3921/206179, F.O.371/3879. 
2. Correspondence and minutes on C1346/C3160/C5808/C8266/910/34, 
F. 0.371/4919. 
3. Frank Polk to American Legation, Teheran, 19 February 1920, 
891.63/2a; Caldwell to U.s. Secretary of State, 26 February 
1920, 891.6363/3; 'wilbur J. Carr, for U.S. Secretary of State 
to Robert Skinner, U.S. Consul-General, London, 4 March 1920, 
891.6363/12A; and Skinner to Carr, 23 March 1920, 891.6363/13, 
all in R.G.59, N.A., M715/26. 
4. E.J. Sadler, Jersey Standard, to V.S. Merle-Smith, State 
Department, 11 August 1920, 891.6363/17, R.G.59, N.A., M715/26; 
and V.S. Merle-Smith to Persian Minister, Abdul Ali Khan, 
12 August 1920, For. ReI. 1920, Vol.III, pp.352-3. 
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to Persia had already reached the Foreign Office,1leading it 
to consider its attitude towards American involvement in that 
state. In so doing, it had to take into account not only events 
in Persia, but also concurrent oil disputes with the United 
states over Mesopotamia and Palestine. This led Oliphant, 
head of the Eastern Department, to conclude -blat 'I do not 
believe it is the intention of the u.s. [Si~ to compete with 
us in Persia. But the matter will require most careful handling,.2 
The opinion of the Foreign Office was summed up by G.P. Churchill: 
'We should, I think, oppose the entry of the United states into 
competition with us in Persia if and when it is clear that this 
is their intention,.3 It was, however, decided to pre-empt a 
possible American concession by telling the Persian Government 
that the British Government believed Anglo-Persian's purchase 
to be legal, and would therefore afford them diplomatic support. 
On 30 August 1920, therefore, Norman was told that the Khoshtaria 
concessions were to be defended as valid. Although the matter 
was not raised formally with the United states, Ambassador Geddes 
in Washington was informed of the British position. 4 
At this stage, therefore, the Foreign Office was clearly 
prepared to resist American participation in the Persian oilfields, 
as well as in those of Mesopotamia. This did not deter the state 
1. H. Norman, British Minister, Teheran to Foreign Office, 
13 July 1920, C1234/1234/34, F.O.371/4919. 
2. Minute by Oliphant, 14 July 1920, on C1234/1234/34, F.O.371/4919. 
3. Minute by G.P. Churchill, 14 July 1920, on ibid. 
4. Minute by E. Ovey, 27 August 1920; Foreign Office to H.M. 
Minister, Teheran, 30 August 1920; and Foreign Office to 
H.M. Ambassador, Washington, 30 August 1920, all on 
C4871/1234/34, F.O.371/4920. Norman, in Teheran, reported 
in August that Americans were about to take over the Khoshtaria 
concession. Norman to Curzon, 18 August 1920, D.B.F.P., 
1st Series, Vol.XIII, pp.596-7. 
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Department, which instructed its minister in Teheran to express 
the United states Government's dislike of monopoly, and to suggest 
that it would be 
••• conducive to the best interests of 
Persia and desirable from the standpoint 
of international economic relations for 
the Persian Government to postpone any 
further grants of its oil resources until 
opportunity can be given to American 
companies to enter into negotiations 
regarding such grants. 1 
Although the only American company to express an interest, Jersey 
standard, was apparently far from enthusiastic, American officials, 
both in Washington and Teheran, continued to press home to the 
Persian Government that the Anglo-Persian Agreement did not prevent 
the grant of oil concessions in the North to American interests. 2 
In the face of government persuasion, Standard decided to send 
a representative to Teheran. 3 The Persians were clearly anxious 
to obtain American investment, to the extent that the Persian 
Minister in Washington asked the State Department whether it 
would approve a private loan to the Persian Government arranged 
by American banks. 4 
1. U.s. Secretary of State to Caldwell, 16 August 1920, For. ReI. 
1920, Vol.III, pp.353-4. 
2. Norman to Curzon, 26 October 1920, D.B.F.P., 1st Series, 
Vol.XIII, pp.621-2; U.S. Secretary of State to Caldwell, 
17 November 1920, For. ReI. 1920, Vol.III, p.355; and 
Van S. Merle-Smith to Mr. William Warfield, Jersey Standard, 
8 December 1920, 891.6363/33A, R.G.59, N.A., M715/26. 
3. Norman H. Davis, Acting Secretary of State, to Secretary of 
State for Commerce, 7 December 1920, 312 Persia, B.F.D.C., 
R.G.51, N.A. Apparently Jersey Standard was not very 
enthusiastic about prospects in Persia, not least because 
Anglo-Persian was assured of political backing. Memo by 
Copley Amory Jr. on an oil conference, 12 January 1921, 
800.6363/238, R.G.59, N.A. 
4. Memo by Millspaugh of a conversation with the Persian Minister 
and the Counselor of the Persian Legation on 16 December 1920, 
For. ReI. 1920, Vol.III, pp.356-7. 
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With the decision by the Foreign Office to support Anglo-
Persian's legally dubious Khoshtaria concession, and the state 
Department's enthusiastic promotion of American investment in 
the same North Persian oilfields, the way seemed open for another 
diplomatic controversy on the lines of that being conducted 
simultaneously over Mesopotamia. However, by the time that both 
Governments had reached the point at which outright conflict of 
interests seemed probable, the beginnings of an improvement in 
Anglo-American relations generally prompted them to pursue a 
conciliatory policy towards each other's oil interests. In the 
case of Persia, Britain was to find the thought of American 
co-operation and support particularly appealing, in view of the 
political upheaval in that troubled country. In late October 
1920 the British Minister in Teheran, Herbert Norman, reported 
on the bad impression apparently caused in the United states by 
the British refusal to allow American oil companies into 
Mesopotamia; and proceeded to suggest that the admission of 
Americans into North Persia might provide a useful buffer against 
Russian commercial penetration. 1 
Norman's suggestions and actions were not normally regarded 
with favour within the Foreign Office. However, although the 
immediate response to his despatch was a temporizing one, 2 its 
content met with some approval within the Eastern Department, which 
was already considering the possibility of admitting American 
interests into Mesopotamia. On the same date as he suggested 
Anglo-American co-operation in Mesopotamia, Sir William Tyrrell 
minuted on Norman's despatch: 
1. 
2. 
Norman to Curzon, 26 October 1920, D.B.F.P., 1st Series, 
Vol.XIII, pp.621-2. 
Curzon to Norman, 8 November 1920, D.B.F.P., 1st Series, 
VoI.XIII, pp.636-7. 
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I entirely agree with the view expressed 
by Mr. Engert as to the bad impression 
made by our refusal last year to allow 
Americans to prospect for oil in Mesopotamia, 
and I think we should move with great caution 
in the whole of this matter, as the Republican 
victory of yesterday will considerably 
strengthen the Standard Oil Company. 1 
Concurrently in the United States, petroleum expert Millspaugh 
was expressing the need for a certain amount of caution in regard 
to the Persian oil concessions: 
It seems to me that the question is one of 
great importance and that it involves the 
formulation of a comprehensive policy 
toward Persia ••• no doubt the matter would 
have to be handled with great care in view 
of British policy toward Persia. 1 
In suggesting a draft for his projected Anglo-American Oil 
Agreement, Millspaugh included a provision relating to North 
Persia. It seems unlikely, however, that the British would have 
accepted the stipulation that Anglo-Persian should not become 
involved in the North Persian oilfields, so as to avoid the creation 
3 
of an absolute monopoly. 
As was noted in the last chapter, the Foreign Office soon 
abandoned the proposal for Anglo-American co-operation in 
Mesopotamia. This was not, however, the case in Persia, probably 
due to the course of events in that country. The chronic political 
instability, culminating in the coup d'etat of February 1921, 
the Bolshevik advances into the North, and the gradual withdrawal 
of British troops, planned for completion by April 1921, all 
emphasized the weakening of the British hold on Persia. Meanwhile, 
1. Minute by Sir William Tyrrell, 3 November 1920, C9883/1234/34, 
F.O.371/4920. Mr. Engert was Secretary to the United States 
Legation in Teheran. 
2. Memo by Millspaugh, 17 December 1920, For. ReI. 1920, Vol.III, 
pp. 356-7. 
3. Memo by Millspaugh on the General Oil Situation, 19 February 
1921, 800.6363/325, R.G.59, N.A. 
~ .. !lft'!"'=~..,..,..........,... .... 
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political uncertainty was reflected in Persia's chaotic financial 
situation. Anglo-Persian was increasingly perturbed lest, in the 
absence of a British loan, the Americans might step in, lend 
money to the Persian Government, and hence secure the Northern 
concessions. The British company therefore contemplated the 
possibility of advancing a loan itself, although it would have 
preferred such a loan to have been guaranteed by the British 
Government. The Foreign Office, however, well aware of the 
instability and appalling financial management that characterized 
the Persian Government, strongly advised British concerns such as 
AnglO-Persian and the Imperial Bank of Persia, not to lend any 
money to Persia. Nor was the British Government likely to advance 
further sums to the impecunious Persian Treasury before acceptable 
arrangements had been made for the repayment of the four million 
pounds already owing. l Although in the Spring of 1921, Anglo-
Persian promised to advance £50,000 in the hope that the Persian 
Government would confirm the Khoshtaria concessions, the Foreign 
Office was far from sanguine, in view of the new Government's 
anti-British tendencies. 2 
Anglo-Persian was unprepared to give up hope of adding the 
North Persian oilfields to its lucrative Southern concession, 
however, and when, in June 1921, it became aware that American 
interests were negotiating for the Northern provinces, it appealed 
to the British Government to prevent this. 3 However, in consider-
ing this appeal, the Foreign Office showed clearly that it was 
thinking in terms of a commercial compromise. G.P. Churchill, 
1. File 75/34, F.O.371/6413, especially memo by Lindsay, 8 February 
1921, E1799/75/34, F.O.371/6413. 
2. Correspondence and minutes on E4138/76/34, F.O.371/6413. 
3. Sir C. Greenway to Oliphant, 2 June 1921, E636/76/34, 




who was to become a consistent advocate of company co-operation, 
first suggested the possibIlity of a joint American Anglo-Persian 
operation to exploit the Khoshtaria concessions, on the grounds 
tha t 'This course woul d avoid any conflict between ourselves and 
the Americans as to oil in Northern Persia and give good political 
1 
results'. Oliphant however felt that AnglO-Persian was unlikely 
to agree to this desirable course. 2 In a highly significant 
minute which is worth quoting in full, Lindsay tied in the North 
Persian issue with other oil controversies in the Middle East: 
I suppose America'S attitude over mandates 
is ~argely dictated by her desire to secure 
a share in our oil concessions around the 
Persian Gulf. Before we make any advance 
however tentative to the Standard Oil Co. 
[sic) about concessions even as remote as 
the Khoshtaria, we should decide whether 
we are prepared to face a discussion which 
may bring in the question of participation 
in such far greater concessions as the 
Darcy [sic] and the Turkish Petroleum Co. 
[SiC]. 
I rather think we may eventually have to 
accept American co-operation and partici-
pation in Persian Gulf oil, and that it 
may be beneficial to do so. But the first 
thing would be to consult the Petroleum 
Dept. [sic] and it might then become a 
matter of Cabinet importance. 3 
The Petroleum Department, having been duly consulted, was, like 
the Anglo-Persian, prepared to contemplate joint action on the 
Khoshtaria concession. However both were resolutely opposed to 
. 4 
any extension of co-operation to South Persia or Mesopotamla. 
Thus, their concept of the role of co-operation was apparently 
different from that of Lindsay. Whilst they almost certainly 
saw it as a way of evading an American challenge to a legally 
1. Minute by G.P. Churchill, 3 June 1921, on ibid. 
2. Minute by Oliphant, 4 June 1921, on ibid. 
3. Minute by R.C. Lindsay, 6 June 1921, on ibid. 
is mine. 
The emphasi s 
4. petLoieUffi ~p~ent to Foreign Office, 21 June 1921, 
E7134/76/34, F • • 371/6414. 
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dubious Anglo-Persian claim, and thus as a mechanism for 
extending British control over Middle Eastern oil, Lindsay clearly 
envisaged a more far-reaching settlement, one that would incorporate 
the United states firmly into the support of the status ~ in the 
Near and Middle East. He summed it up thus: 'I am inclined to 
think it would be to our advantage to have America interested in 
regions where a Russian menace exists or threatens'. CUrzon 
agreed, stating that 'I am not afraid accordingly of the Americans 
unless they make themselves disagreeable or dangerous to us over 
the oil,.1 It was, presumably, the South Persian oil, already 
so vital strategically to the British, to which Curzon referred. 
However, whilst the Foreign Office clearly envisaged that the 
Americans would be greatly interested in oil, the consensus 
2 opinion was that they were unlikely to lend Persia aid - or money. 
This was an opinion the Persians shared, for later that 
year they embarked upon a concerted attempt to gain American 
support for their country. Particularly active in this was the 
New Persian Minister to Washington D.C., Mirza Hussein Khan Alai. 3 
The oil companies had not to date been particularly enthusiastic 
about the North Persian concession, despite prompting by the 
4 State and Commerce Departments, but Standard had of course already 
opened negotiations, whilst by early November 1921 Sinclair's 
1. Minutes by Lindsay and Curzon, 29 July 1921, E8788/76/34, 
F.O.371/6415. 
2. Correspondence and minutes, E9538/76/34, F.O.371/6415. 
3. Memo by W. Robbins, Division of Near Eastern Affairs, to the 
Under Secretary, 30 August 1921, 711.91/3, R.G.59, N.A., 
M716/1; F.M. Dearing, State Department, to Secretary of 
Commerce, 22 October 1921, 312 Persia, Commerce BFDC, R.G.151, 
N.A.; and Dearing to Secretary of Commerce, 2 November 1921, 
891.63/3a, R.G.59, N.A., M715/26. 
4. Secretary of Commerce Hoover to U.S. Secretary of State, 
19 May 1921, 891.6363/40, R.G.59, N.A., M715/26. 
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discussions with the Persian Minister had resulted in definite 
proposals being made. 1 Thereafter, parallel negotiations with 
the two companies were carried on by the Persians and their 
American representatives, W. Morgan Shuster (ex-Financial 
Adviser to the Persian Government) and Robert Lansing (ex-United 
States Secretary of State).2 
Interestingly, the Persians also informed Great Britain of 
their negotiations with Sinclair,3 which led G.P. Churchill 
(in the erroneous belief that Sinclair was a subsidiary of 
Standard Oil) to refer yet again to the possibility of an Anglo-
. h' 4 Amerlcan partners lp. However, a different approach was adopted. 
On Curzon's authority, Minister Norman was instructed to make a 
formal protest to the Persian Government, at its conducting 
negotiations for a concession which, the British maintained, was 
already legally held by a British company.5 At Crowe's suggestion, 
and with Curzon's approval, Ambassador Geddes was instructed to 
inform the State Department that the Persian Government was 
offering to dispose of the Khoshtaria concessions to Americans, 
but that these had been acquired by a British firm, and the British 
Government had informed the Persian Government that it regarded 
the claim as valid. Geddes was told to make these representations 
1. A.C. Veatch, Sinclair, to H.C. Morris, 9 November 1921, 
312 Persia Commerce BFDC, R.G.151, N.A. 
2. W. Morgan Shuster to the Persian Minister, Washington, 
20 November 1921, Vol.38, Lansing MSS. 
3. Verbal communication from the Persian Minister, Washington, 
19 August 1921, E9538/76/34, F.O.371/6415. 
4. Minute by G.P. Churchill, 26 August 1921, E9826/76/34, 
F.O.371/6415. 
5. Curzon to Norman, Teheran, 29 August 1921, and Foreign Office 
minutes, E9826/76/34, F.O.371/6415. 
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in the friendliest manner, and make it plain that he simply desired 
to inform interested American companies of the real situation.1 
The state Department in its response, however, gave no indication 
of the growing opinion amongst its officials that compromise 
with the British was desirable. Instead, it hinted that the 
concessions might not be valid, particularly in view of the 
absence of any ratification by the Majlis, and referred to the 
complete exclusion of American interests if Anglo-Persian's claims 
. d 2 were recognlze • 
Although the Foreign Office was particularly scathing as 
to the American line of argument, nonetheless it was not suffi-
ciently irritated with the Americans to abandon the idea of 
compromise. This may well have reflected the bias towards Anglo-
American friendship prevalent in the Foreign Office in the late 
autumm of 1921. G.P. Churchill continued to advocate that it 
would be 'politically advantageous if we could so contrive to 
get an American group to join the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in 
taking up this concession,.3 When, therefore, Anglo-Persian 
informed the Foreign Office that it was contemplating co-operation 
with an American company in the hope of securing the ratification 
4 
of the Khoshtaria concessions, it was told to proceed. Thereafter 
1. Curzon to Geddes, 4 October 1921, and minutes by Crowe and 
Curzon, 30 September and 1 October 1921, E10873/76/34, 
F.O.371/6416. 
2. Geddes to Curzon, 20 October 1921, E11586/76/34, F.O.371/6416. 
3. Minute by G.P. Churchill, 5 November 1921, on E12010/76/34, 
F.O.371/6416. 
4. Sir C. Greenway to Oliphant, 9 November 1921; Oliphant to 
Greenway, 11 November 1921; and Foreign Office minutes, all 
on E12436/76/34, F.O.371/6417. 
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the Foreign Office continued to take a keen interest in, and 
attempt to promote, the commercial negotiations. Even before 
the North Persian negotiations were seen as a possible gateway 
to co-operation in Mesopotamia, the Foreign Office, in a reversal 
of its attitude, was prepared to envisage a more comprehensive 
agreement. Lindsay became so convinced that it was necessary to 
secure an agreement because of the hostility of the Persian 
Government and the uncertainty with regard to Russia, that he 
expressed a hope that 'the two [companiesJ will come to terms 
even if they involve matters going beyond the mere Khoshtaria 
concession', Curzon agreeing that it was a case of 'Better 
Americans than Bolsheviks,.1 This change of opinion in November 
1921 almost certainly accelerated Foreign Office acceptance of 
the proposed commercial settlement in Mesopotamia that same 
2 
month. It was enthusiastically endorsed by both the Petroleum 
Department and Abbassador Geddes in Washington, both of whom 
supported the extension of the commercial basis of settlement 
. t t . 3 In 0 Mesopo amla. 
Indeed, so anxious was the Foreign Office to involve the 
Americans in Persia, that it was willing - even eager - to support 
the Persian appointment of American financial advisers. In part 
this was in order to promote the oil settlement: in part, one 
may surmise, because in the cordial atmosphere created by the 
4 Washington Conference, the explicit opposition of Great Britain 
1. Minutes by Lindsay and Curzon, 23 November 1921, on 
E13568/76/34, F.O.371/6418. 
2. See Chapter 5. 
3. Petroleum Department to Foreign Office, 9 December 1921, 
E13568/76/34, F.O./6418; and Geddes to Foreign Office, 
23 December 1921, E329/7/34, F.O.371/7812. 
4. The Washington Conference is discussed in chapter 5. See 
also Thomas H. Buckley, The United States and the Washington 
Conference, 1921-1922 (Knoxville, Tennessee, 1970). 
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to the appointment of American advisers would have been misplaced. 
Thus, when the charge d'affaires in Teheran, R. Bridgeman, 
informed the Foreign Office that, on his own authority, he had told 
the Persian Prime Minister that His Majesty's Government would 
not welcome the appointment of an American financial adviser, 
Crowe was particularly angry, lest it affect the North Persian 
concession. 1 Curzon, however, was more circumspect, being 
unwilling, one suspects, to see the yet further undermining of 
British influence in Persia, although he had long since accepted 
the demise of the AnglO-Persian Agreement. 
I am entirely in favour of close co-operation 
between British and American oil interests 
and negotiations are now proceeding between 
them, I believe in a satisfactory manner. As 
to political co-operation and especially 
engagement of American advisers, I prefer to 
maintain a reserved attitude though I do not 2 
wish now definitely to pronounce against them. 
However, only a few weeks later Lindsay suggested that, in view 
of the fact that the appointment of a British adviser was highly 
unlikely, the British Government should accept American advisers 
and, indeed, urge the state Department to facilitate their 
appointment. 3 In the course of a critical four months therefore, 
from November 1921 to February 1922, the Foreign Office had 
reversed its position on American advisers in Persia, and had 
declared its willingness to see a commercial compromise extend 
beyond North Persia, into an area which hitherto it had regarded 
t . 4 as sacrosanct - Mesopo aIDla. Its coincidence with the Washington 
1. R. Bridgeman, British Charge d'Affaires, Teheran to Foreign 
Office, 14 December 1921, E13777/76/34, F.O.371/6418; and 
minute by Crowe, 16 December 1921, on ibid. 
2. Curzon to Sir P. Loraine, British Minister, Teheran, 17 January 
1922, E253/7/34, F.O.371/7812. 
3. Minute by R.C. Lindsay, 5 February 1922, E1383/7/34, F.O.371/7213; 
and Geddes to Foreign Office, 11 February 1922, E1577/7/34, 
F.O.371/7814. 
jl;. ~e Chapter 5. 
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Conference cannot be ignored, although as well as a general 
desire to placate the United states on outstanding controversies, 
it also reflects British concern at the march of events in 
Persia, and a desire to involve the United states in the main-
tenance of the status quo there. 
Whilst Britain was attempting to enlist American support 
by compromise on the oil issue, the astute Persian Minister 
in Washington D.C. was also attempting - with some degree of 
success - to embroil the United states in Persia's tangled 
financial affairs, and hence, by implication, in the support 
of the Persian Government. In addition to offering the Northern 
oil concession to American companies, the Persian Minister also 
attempted to persuade the state Department to appoint or nominate 
a financial adviser. As the months progressed, there was a 
tendency for the two questions - oil and adviser - to merge, 
along with a sizeable American loan, into a 'package deal', 
which would, of course, heavily commit United states prestige 
to the maintenance of Persian stability and independence. An 
ardent American advocate of this scheme was Robert Lansing, 
ex-Secretary of State, and now legal adviser to the Persian 
1 Government. As to the concession and loan, the State and 
Commerce Departments found it difficult to stimulate real 
enthusiasm for, as the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce 
freely admitted, given the chaotic state of Persia, 'any 
opportunity connected with Persia must be: an attractive one or 
American concerns will refuse to look at it,.2 However, as the 
1. Lansing to J.W. Davis, 4 October 1921, Vol.18, Lansing MSS. 
2. Julius Klein, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce to 
F.M. Dearing, 891.63/6, R.G.59, N.A., M715/26. 
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Persian Minister continued to treat the three issues as essen-
tially interlinked,1 the state Department began tofuink in 
terms of developing a comprehensive policy toward Persia, rather 
than simply treating each matter on its own merits. In developing 
that policy, it was very much influenced by the opinion of its 
Minister in Teheran, R. Engert, that it should follow a policy 
of Anglo-American amity.2 Millspaugh summed up the real dilemma 
which faced the Department: 
The aim of our policy should be the promotion 
of American interests in that region, the 
maintenance of American prestige, the further-
ance of Persian interest, the combatting of 
the vicious sphere of influence idea and the 
maintenance of the open door principle, and 
all of these, if possible, in friendly 
understanding with Great Britain which has, 
if not a special position, at least vital 
interests in that region which we do not have. 3 
Basically, therefore, the state Department was pursuing a 
policy which, whilst aimed at obtaining for American oil companies 
a share in the oil riches of Persia, sought to avoid the political 
responsibilities which the Persian Government attempted to impose 
upon the United states. Thus, it was unprepared seriously to 
challenge the traditional British hegemony in Persia, and resisted 
at all costs attempts to draw the United states into fulfilling 
the role that Britain and Russia had once held. It was therefore 
decided that, since the current atmosphere was one of frankness 
with, and conciliation towards, Great Britain,4 all instructions 
to Teheran should be carefully worded so as to avoid any suggestion 
1. Memo by Dearing to Millspaugh, 10 November 1921, 891.51A/9, 
R.G.59, N.A., M715/21. 
2. Engert to U.S. Secretary of State, 27 November 1921, 
891.6363/70, R.G.59, N.A., M715/26. 
3. Memo by Millspaugh, 19 November 1921, quoted Yeselson, p.213. 
4. Memo by H.G. Dwight to Millspaugh, 17 November 1921, 
891.51A/10, R.G.59, N.A., M715/21. 
e= 
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f t o d 0 to h 1 o an agonlsm towar s the Brl lS. Moreover, when drawing up 
a list of possible nominees for the post of Persian Financial 
Adviser, the name of William Coffin, the American consul general 
in Berlin, was rejected on the grounds that 'He has pronounced 
t o thO 0 t th B 0 to h ,2 an lpa les agalns e rl lS •••• 
It was in Persia that the state Department came closest 
to recognizing a possible British sphere of influence in the 
Middle East, although at the same time it was determined to 
extend limited aid to Persia if requested. This was, however, 
purely as a consequence of the fact that 'the interests of this 
country are bound up with the assertion of equal opportunity in 
the Near East and with the encouragement of foreign investment 
of American capital,.3 In other words, it would extend sufficient 
aid to suffice as a quid pro quo for .. the grant of an oil con-
cession, but would resist any attempts to draw the United states 
into a 'special relationship' with Persia, of the kind that had 
been read into the Shuster mission - although it was already 
too committed to withdraw from the nomination of a financial 
d . 4 a Vlser. Even in the heady days of 1919, there had been no 
serious suggestion that the United States should undertake political 
commitments in Persia. American protests had simply reflected a 
desire to prevent the British from so consolidating their special 
position as to secure total control of Persian oil. In the 
1. Memo by Millspaugh, 18 November 1921, 891.51A/10, R.G.59, 
N.A., M715/21. 
2. Memo by Millspaugh to Dearing, 25 November 1921, 891.51A/73, 
R.G.59, N.A., M715/21. 
3. Memo by Millspaugh to Dearing, 30 November 1921, 891.51A/10, 
R.G.59, N.A., M715/21. 
4. Memo by W. Robbins, Division of Near Eastern Affairs, 
6 December 1921, 891.51A/12; Millspaugh to Dearing, 10 December 
1921, 891. 51A/14, both on R.G.59, N.A., M715/21; and memo 
by Assistant Secretary of State to Secretary, 22 December 1921, 
·~~~~~~~n~tainer 176, Papers of Charles Evans Hughes, 
Library of Con ess (hereafter Hughes MSS). 
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changed atmosphere of late 1921, with talk of commercial co-
operation, and in view of the fact that 'substantial evidences 
of receptiveness have been shown by the British Government',1 
state Department officials were determined to let the British 
know 'in the frankest and friendliest manner that we will do 
nothing to disturb Anglo-American relations,.2 In such a 
climate, the British enthusiasm for American advisers was welcome; 
and neither then, nor later, did the state Department suggest 
that the British had, in practice, worked against the interests 
of the American Financial Mission. 3 
However, as a corollary of the American unwillingness to 
accept political responsibilities in Persia, which led to a more 
conciliatory attitude being demonstrated towards the special 
British role in that country, neither would the United states 
lend its political support to the proposed Jersey Standard/ 
Anglo-Persian consortium to work the North Persian oilfields. 
Following the visit of Sir John Cadman (now an employee of 
Anglo-Persian) to the United States in December 1921 and January 
1922, during which time a scheme for co-operation had been 
discussed,4 on 17 February 1922 a written agreement was signed 
between the two companies. By its terms, Standard Oil was to 
pay £100,000 to Anglo-Persian; the two companies were to make 
1. Memo by Millspaugh, 2 February 1922, 891.51A/42, R.G.59, 
N.A., M715/21. The Department was told of the proposed 
50/50 agreement on 15 December 1921. Memo by A.W. Ferrin 
on Persian oil, 28 May 1930, 891.6363/655, R.G.59, N.A. 
2. Memo by the Assistant Secretary to Fletcher and Millspaugh, 
5 February 1922, 891. 51A/42, R.G.59, N.A., M715/21. 
3. Memo of an interview between the Secretary of State and the 
British Ambassador, 11 February 1922, 20 April 1922, Folder 
76(b), Box 175, Hughes MSS. 
4. Memo by Dearing, 23 December 1921, 841.6363/188, R.G.59, 
N.A., M580/147. 
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a joint loan of one million dollars to the Persian Government; 
and the concession was to be run by an American company, jointly 
owned by Jersey Standard and Anglo-Persian. However, contern-
poraneously with negotiating a concession with Standard Oil, 
the Persian representative, Morgan Shuster, was also discussing 
t °th 0 I 0 1 0 errns Wl Slnc alr. In Vlew of the competi lion between two 
legitimate American companies, the State Department refused in 
January 1922 a request from the Standard Oil Company that it 
should join the British in a protest against the granting of 
the Northern concession to Sinclair, on the grounds that it 
was unprepared to protest against a concession to an American 
company in favour of a concession held in part by a foreign 
2 
company. Thereafter, it adopted a policy of strict neutrality, 
secure in the knowledge that either way, an American company was 
likely to have a share in the North Persian oilfields. Clearly, 
its promotion of Anglo-American co-operation was of very limited 
extent; having opened the door to American enterprise, the 
State Department could afford to rest upon its principles. The 
same, as will be shown below, was to be true in Mesopotamia. 
This clearly disturbed the Foreign Office, which had hoped 
for far more positive political support from the United States 
in a deeply troubled area. However, all that it could obtain 
from the State Department was a commitment - later partially 
retracted - that it would not take any definite step unless it 
consulted the British Government first: nor would it allow 
the Persian Government to playoff the United States against 
1. W. Morgan Shuster to Persian Minister, 20 November 1921, 
Vol.38, Lansing MSS. 
2. Memo by A.W. Ferrin on Persian Oil, 28 May 1930, 891.6363/655, 
R.G.59, N.A. 
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Great Britain. 1 In view of this equivocal position, and the 
appearance on the scene of Sinclair, the Foreign Office therefore 
decided, against the advice of its new Minister to Persia, 
Sir Percy Loraine, not to retract from its insistence that the 
Khoshtaria concessions were valid. 2 Nonetheless, the Foreign 
Office continued to support the Jersey Standard/Anglo-Persian 
combine, even - reluctantly - giving permission for Anglo-
Persian royalties to be used as security for a loan to the 
Persian Government. In a strange reversal, whereas in late 
1921 agreement in Persia had appeared so vital to the Foreign 
Office that it was prepared to accept the extension of a 
commercial settlement to Mesopotamia, in the first five months 
of 1922 it was in order to open up a path for co-operation in 
Mesopotamia that the Foreign Office continued to promote the 
North Persian scheme. 3 Additional problems were caused by the 
apathy of Jersey Standard, only involved in North Persia at 
4 the instigation of the State Department: Lindsay scornfully 
commented that 'The Americans, when venturing their money 
outside their own continent are as timid as hares,.5 Although 
1. Geddes to Foreign Office, 23 December 1921, E14093/76/34; 
Foreign Office minutes on E14086/76/34, both on F.O.371/6418; 
and memo of an interview at the Department of State between 
Embassy and Department officials, 17 December 1921, 
E253/7/34, F.O.371/7812. 
2. Loraine to Crowe, 23 December 1921; and Crowe to Loraine, 
29 December 1921, both on E14291/76/34, F.O.371/6419. 
3. The long drawn out history of the North Persian concession, 
1922-1925, is discussed in Davis, British Oil Policy, 
pp.185-196. See also minutes and correspondence on 
E590/7/34, F.O.371/7813. 
4. Correspondence and minutes on E798/E590/E799/E904/E905/ 
E9~1/E"lDI)5/) /3<l, F. J. 371/7813. 
5. Minute by Lindsay, 30 January 1922, on E1005/7/34, F.O.371/7813. 
~---
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the Foreign Office concurred in the terms of the Jersey Standard/ 
1 Anglo-Persian agreement, it was still deeply suspicious of the 
standard Oil Company, and especially its Managing Director, 
A.C. Bedford: 'I dont think we need be afraid to let Mr. Bedford 
come to the F.O. [sic] provided we dont forget that who sups with 
2 the devil needs the devil of a long spoon'. 
However, despite Foreign Office support, and the enthusi-
astic promotion of Sir Percy Loraine, who felt it was essential 
to involve the United States in the maintenance of stability and 
the status quO in persia,3 the binational syndicate ultimately 
failed, due to the inherent Persian hostility towards the British, 
and in June 1922 the Majlis voted for a concession to be offered 
to Sinclair. Yet again, the State Department refused to lend its 
political support to one American company in competition with 
4 
another. Unappreciative of this stance, G.P. Churchill commented 
that, since Sinclair was widely suspected of bribing Persian 
politicians freely, 'The only possible conclusion is that the 
State Department are deliberately favouring the Sinclair 
corporation,.5 This was probably a false impression, for the 
1. Correspondence and minutes, E1193/7/34, F.O.371/7813. 
2. Minute by Lindsay, 24 March 1921, on E3183/7/34, F.O.371/7815. 
3. Loraine to Foreign Office, 15 March 1922, E4744/7/34, F.O.371/7816. 
4. Foreign Office to Geddes, 15 June 1922, E5976/7/34, F.O.371/7816; 
Memo by G.P. Churchill, 12 June 1922, E6055/7/34, F.O.371/7817; 
and Geddes to Foreign Office, 20 June 1922, E6226/7/34, F.O.371/7817. 
5. Minute by G.P. Churchill, 21 June 1922, on ibid. There is no sign 
of this in State Department correspondence. Charles Hughes to 
Sinclair Exploration Company, 22 August 1921, 891.6363/282A; 
and Memo by A.W. Dulles, 29 August 1922, 891.6363/283, both on 
R.G.59, N.A., M715/26. The Persian Minister was also trying 
to elicit from the State Department which of the two companies 
it would prefer. L.H. Woolsey, (Lansing's law partner) to 
Robert Lansing, 15 August 1922, Vol. 60, Lansing MSS. 
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state Department continued to favour Anglo-American co-operation,1 
whilst Robert Lansing advised the Persian Government that Standard 
offered the better terms. 2 This opinion was shared by Engert, who 
probably spoke for officials of both governments in commenting 
The oil concession business has degenerated 
into an unseemly scramble by Sinclair to 
snatch it from the Standard ••• I think myself 
the Standard will after all, get the con-
cession, but I cannot imagine that Persia's 
negotiations with Sinclair after having 
spontaneously offered the concession to 
Standard, will enhance Persia's credit in 
U.S.A. [SiC] either moral or material. 3 
By June 1922, it was no longer necessary to promote Anglo-
American co-operation in Persia in order to contrive a settlement 
in Mesopotamia. Thus, since the Foreign Office resented the 
embarrassing situation whereby it was championing Standard Oil 
interests vis-a-vis Sinclair, it was felt that the most appropriate 
course of action was to abandon formal protests against the Sinclair 
negotiations. Should Sinclair obtain the concession, it was 
decided, the AnglO-Persian claim, by virtue of the Khoshtaria 
4 
concessions could be reasserted. Attempts to win State Department 
support for the AnglO-American syndicate, by arguing that the 
Sinclair proposal, with its provision reserving participation 
exclusively to Persians and Americans, was against the open door 
principle, were unsuccessful. 5 The Foreign Office, therefore, 
1. Memo by A.W. Dulles, 14 August 1922, 891.6363 st. Oil/237; 
and Phillips to Hughes, 18 August 1922, 891.6363 st. Oil/238, 
both on R.G.59, N.A., M715/27. 
2. Memo on Standard Oil draft concession, 2 September 1922, and 
Memo on Sinclair draft concession, 5 September 1922, by 
Lansing and Woolsey, Vol.60, Lansing MSS. 
3. Private letter, Engert to Loraine, 19 August 1922, 891.51A/88, 
R.G.59, N.A., M715/21. 
4. Correspondence and minutes, E6317/7/34, F.O.371/7817; and 
Foreign Office to Loraine, 28 June 1922, ibid. 
5. Correspondence and minutes on E6328/E6452/E6717/7/34, 
.~ F.-o-.971/7"17.~ 
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effectively lost interest. One of its ultimate goals, the 
involvement of the United states in Persian stability, was in 
any case partially achieved by the arrival in Persia in October 
1922 of an Amerlocan Flonancial ~n~ssloon led b A C ~n~ll h 1 lOw.. , y. • lOw.. spaug. 
The saga of North Persian oil was to prolong itself until 1925, 
but by June 1922 it had effectively ceased to be an issue in 
Anglo-American relations. The eventual (albeit temporary) 
success of Sinclair was certainly not regarded by the British 
as due to the underhand dealings of the State Department, but 
as a commercial failure on the part of Jersey Standard and 
Anglo-Persian: 'The two companies between them have already 
bungled and wasted a good bit of time by not outbidding the 
2 Sinclair group'. North Persia, though pointing the way to a 
more comprehensive oil settlement between Great Britain and the 
United States, was not to be worked by an Anglo-American syndicate. 
Certain clear features emerge from this study of the struggle 
for the North Persian oil concession. The State Department, in 
its dealings with Persia, was to demonstrate the same blend of 
idealistic principle, practical desire for economic expansion, 
and rigid determination to avoid political entanglements that 
characterized its attitude towards the entire Middle East. It was, 
however, prepared to offer more support to the Persian Government, 
in the form of nominating advisers, than to other Middle Eastern 
states, partly as the consequence of the historic Perso-American 
relationship (notably, the Shuster mission), partly due to the 
1. For an account of this mission, see A.C. Millspaugh, Americans 
in Persia (Washington D.C., 1946), ch.3; and Douglas L. Smith, 
'The Millspaugh Mission and American Corporate Diplomacy in 
Persia, 1922-1927', Southern Quarterly 14 (1976), pp.151-172. 
2. Minute by Oliphant, 14 January 1924, on E544/44/34, F.O.371/10125. 
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initiative and insistence of the Persians themselves. However, 
Ambassador Davis' assessment of the situation was unerringly 
accurate: American protests against infringements of Persian 
self-determination were somewhat specious unless the United 
states was prepared to offer concrete assistance. This, of 
course, she refused steadfastly to do, insisting that even the 
state Department's nomination of a Financial Adviser was without 
responsibility. In effect, therefore, despite her protests at 
the time of the Anglo-Persian Agreement, the United states had 
to concede to the British a special relationship with Persia, if 
only in order to encourage the stability within which Americ~) 
commerce could flourish. However the open door - or, more 
accurately, opportunity for American oil companies to penetrate 
Persia - was one principle that the United states was not prepared 
to compromise. Yet, having obtained for two American oil companies 
the opportunity to secure the North Persian oilfields, the state 
Department was unprepared to go further and actively to support 
those companies, fearful that it might be drawn into political 
entanglements in Persia. It is, however, interesting to note 
that, so anxious were Secretaries Hughes and Hoover of the Harding 
Administration to obtain oil resources abroad for American companies 
that they were prepared to push those companies into taking 
opportunities which they had not sought, and were not particularly 
anxious to exploit. 1 
As has clearly emerged from this discussion, although support-
ing the concept of Anglo-American commercial co-operation, the 
United States Government was not prepared actively to promote it 
1. The attitude of the Harding Administration will be discussed 
in greater detail in Chapter 5. 
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by political support. However, after initial hostility to 
American interference at the time of the abortive Anglo-Persian 
Agreement, Great Britain was to become so anxious to encourage 
Anglo-American co-operation, that she not only welcomed the 
appointment of an American Financial Mission, but contemplated 
extending an oil agreement beyond North Persia to Mesopotamia. 
This change of policy, as will be shown to be the case in 
Mesopotamia, carne at a critical point not only in Middle Eastern 
affairs, but also in Anglo-American relationships. In the case 
of Persia, it is difficult to be sure which most influenced the 
decision to welcome a policy of co-operation, although it is 
notable that the first suggestion carne from G.P. Churchill, a 
member of the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office deeply 
involved in Persian matters. E. Weakley, the Foreign Office's 
oil expert, was not involved until after the projected link with 
Mesopotamia. 
However, North Persia was, as Lindsay pointed out, 'remote'. 
Moreover, apart from the skirmish over the Anglo-Persian Agreement, 
there was no prolonged diplomatic correspondence between the 
United states and Great Britain on the issue, for Persia, as an 
independent country, was responsible for the issue of its own 
concessions. Anglo-American controversy was far more acute over 
the mandated territories for which the British bore ultimate 
political responsibility. Thus, although the projected commercial 
settlement in North Persia was to provide a model whereby the 
Mesopotamian controversy could be solved, other factors were also 
of significance. Of critical importance was the transfer of 
administrative responsibility for the mandated areas to the Colonial 
Office, as the following discussion of Palestine will demonstrate. 
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Chapter Four 
Conflict and Reconciliation in Palestine, 1919-1924 
Before the First World War, the Standard Oil Company of New 
York (Socony) had been the only major American oil company interested 
in the potential oil wealth of the Ottoman Empire. With its rich 
markets for kerosene in the Near and Far East, Socony desperately 
needed a regular source of production1 which, for reasons of 
economy, it chose to obtain near its market rather than on the 
American continent. In 1913-14, Socony sent exploration parties to 
Palestine, Anatolia, and Eastern Thrace, and eventually acquired 
several licences for mineral prospecting in Palestine. The company 
had commenced building roads and exporting machinery preparatory to 
commencing exploration proper, when work was halted by the outbreak 
of war in November 1914. 2 However, a Socony representative (William 
Yale) remained in Jerusalem until 1917, and during the course of the 
war, in 1916, Socony acquired another 60 prospecting licences. 3 It 
should be recalled that at this time the United States was still 
neutral and maintained full diplomatic relations with the Ottoman 
Empire. Following the Armistice of Mudros, in October 1918, it was 
inevitable that, in view of its established trading position in the 
1 t °1 4 East, together with the threatened wor d shor age of Ol, Socony 
would be anxious to recommence work on its claims. 
1. In 1911, the Standard Oil Company had been dissolved, in accord-
ance with the 1890 Sherman Anti-Trust Law, into its various 
component companies, of which Socony was one. Since it had been 
the exporting and marketing company for the trust, it was left 
with very little production capacity of its own. 
2. Shwadran, p.449; U.S. Vice-Consul, Jerusalem to U.S. Secretary 
of State, 3 November 1913, File 867.6363/1; and same to same, 
10 April 1914, File 867.6363/4, both in R.G.59, N.A., M353/67. 
3. L.I. Thomas (Socony) to U.S. Secretary of State, 1 March 1922, 
file 867n.6363/34; and same to same, 6 March 1922, file 
867n.6363/35, both in R.G.59, N.A. M.353/87. 
I 
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However, the situation in Palestine had altered radically 
since 1914. Formerly an integral part of the ottoman Empire, in 
october 1918 Palestine was no longer under Turkish rule, but 
Allied military occupation. It was already assumed, and by 
January 1919 it had been formally decided by the Versailles Peace 
Conference, that Palestine would become a new state, within the 
mandate system, under either international, or possibly British 
or American, trusteeship. Meanwhile, pending the formal renun-
ciation of sovereignty by Turkey and the choice of a mandatory 
power, the resumption of normal economic and commercial life in 
Palestine, and the creation of a civil administration to regulate 
it, was legally impossible. Moreover, other problems existed, 
which had to be solved before a new, permanent administration 
assumed power; for example, how far the obligations of the 
pre-war ottoman Empire, such as the recognition of concessions, 
and the repayment of international debts, had been transferred to 
the successor states; what were to be the boundaries of the new 
'Palestine', which did not correspond exactly to any of the ex-
ottoman vilayets; the precise terms of the mandate; and, over-
shadowing all these in political significance, the implications 
and implementation of the Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917, 
by which the British Government had committed itself to the creation 
1 
of a Jewish National Home. Amongst many connotations of this policy 
was the question of whether the Zionist organization would be given 
economic or commercial priority in Palestine. 2 
1. For documents relating to the decision to make this Declaration, 
and its text, see Doreen Ingrams, ed., Palestine Papers 1917-1922: 
Seeds of Conflict (London, 1972), (hereafter cited as Ingrams), 
pp.7-18; see also Leonard Stein, The Balfour Declaration (London, 
1961); and Isaiah Friedman, The Question of Palestine, 1914-1918: 
British-Jewish-Arab Relations (London, 1973), (hereafter cited as 
Friedman). 
2. Memorandum of a conversation between Chaim Weizmann and Arthur 
./~--~B~a~1+f~omU!~"~4~D~c~e~ 1918, Ingrams, p.46. 
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Thus, although Socony sought permission to resume its 
interrupted exploration, and maintained representatives in 
Jerusalem in case such permission was given, the British 
authorities administering Occupied Enemy Territory consistently 
refused the company's requests. This was to provoke a major 
diplomatic controversy between, on the one hand, the British 
Government, responsible for administering Palestine, and 
ultimately, for implementing the Balfour Declaration; and, on 
the other, the American company, Socony, strongly supported by 
the United states Department of state. 
At first sight, it may appear that Palestinian oil was of 
very little significance,1 for no substantial production was ever 
achieved. Moreover, neither of the two major oil companies involved 
during the 1920s, Socony and the Turkish Petroleum Company, 
exercised the option of converting their prospecting licences into 
mining concessions. However, the Palestine oil issue was important 
for two reasons; it contributed to Anglo-American friction con-
2 
cerning oil in the years 1919-22; and it was also one important 
factor in the rapprochement of 1921-2, which relieved so much of 
that tension. Moreover, the discussion which took place in the 
Foreign and Colonial Offices on the subject of the Socony claims 
frequently had implications for the more intense controversy over 
Mesopotamia and North Persia. To the United states Government, the 
issue provided a concrete case of direct infringement of American 
rights, which could legitimately be made the subject of diplomatic 
protest. It also contributed greatly to the evolution of state 
Department thinking on the intentions and nature of British Middle 
Eastern oil policy. 
1. This may explain why there is no discussion of Palestine in a 
recent thesis, Davis, British Oil Policy. In view of the wider 
significance of the Palestine issue, however, as this chapter 
will illustrate, such an omission would appear misguided. 
kl 
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There were definite similarities between the controversy 
over Socony claims in Palestine, and that surrounding the Turkish 
Petroleum Company's so-called 'concession' in Mesopotamia, in 
that what was at issue was the existence of a pre-war claim to 
certain rights, although it would appear that, in Palestine, the 
rights were considerably less ambiguous than in Mesopotamia. 
Negotiations and discussions on both questions were to be inter-
twined, and decisions on the Palestinian claims were frequently 
taken more to avoid possible repercussions in Mesopotamia, than 
strictly on the merits of the particular case. 
Essentially, the controversy centred around the policy to be 
adopted by the power occupying ex-enemy territory in the Middle 
East towards the grant or confirmation of concessions. To the 
United States it was to appear as though Great Britain, in adopting 
the policy she did, was motivated by a desire to monopolize the 
oil resources of the Middle East, by effectively denying access to 
them, except to British companies. In adhering to this belief, 
the United States failed to acknowledge the very real difficulties 
which the British faced in responding to American requests for a 
more flexible policy. For, pending the conclusion of a peace 
treaty with Turkey, Great Britain, albeit the occupying power, had 
no legal right to reorganize the ad hoc administrations of Mesopotamia 
and Palestine, so as to create permanent institutions of government. 
By the Laws and Usages of War, occupying forces could only exercise 
such powers as were necessary for the purpose of the war (while it 
lasted), the maintenance of order and safety, and the proper 
administration of the country. This did not include the confirmation 
of concessions or other rights acquired before the war from the 
ottoman Government, a task which in Palestine would have been made 
(/ 
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difficult in any event by the closing of the land registries. 1 
Thus, although the military administrations in the Middle East 
were under the day-to-day command of the War Office, the Foreign 
Office attempted to impose upon O.E.T.A. 2 a neutral policy on the 
question of mineral resources, i.e. of refusing to grant or 
confirm any concessions in occupied territory until the Treaty of 
Peace witry Turkey was ratified, and the mandates formally assigned. 
In Mesopotamia, as discussed above, the military administration 
had begun by 1919 to give way to a more permanent and highly 
organized government, since it was assumed that, in some guise or 
another, the vilayets of Basra and Baghdad, at least, would be 
incorporated into the British Empire. In Palestine, however, which 
was in any case occupied at a later stage of the war, (December 
1917 - September 1918), there was little incentive to institute a 
permanent government structure, since ultimate political control of 
the country was uncertain. The Sykes-Picot Agreement of 19163 had 
designated Palestine as an international protectorate, whilst during 
the war, and even at the Paris Peace Conference, suggestions were 
made that the United States might undertake mandates for the 
internationally sensitive areas of the ex-Ottoman Empire, including 






These were closed because of the chaotic state in which they had 
been left by the fleeing Turkish authorities. They were not 
reopened until September 1920, after a civil administration had 
been instituted. 
Occupied Enemy Territory Administration. 
The Sykes-Picot Agreement is in Hurewitz, II, pp.18-22. See also 
Kedourie, England and the Middle East, pp.29-45; Peter Mansfield, 
The Ottoman Empire and its Successors (London, 1973), pp.40-41; 
and Ann Williams, Britain and France in the Middle East and North 
Africa 1914-1967 (London, 1968), p.14. 
Ingrams, pp.38-9 and 48-51; and Friedman, pp.53-6. The 'Inquiry' 
had recommended to President Woodrow Wilson in January 1919 that 
Palestine should be under British tutelage, but even as late as 
August 1919, the King-Crane Commission recommended that Syria, 
including Palestine, should be a single mandate under U.S. control. 
HureWitz,~-45 and 66-74. 
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Despite these suggestions, opinion generally within the 
British Government was in favour of a British protectorate or 
mandate, a solution advocated in particular by Lloyd George and 
1 Lord Curzon. However, although as a consequence of this view-
point, the French were asked in February 1919 to agree that 
Palestine should come under British hegemony, the British could 
nonetheless legitimately emphasize the necessarily temporary 
nature of their administration in Palestine; at least until the 
San Remo Conference of April 1920, at which the Middle Eastern 
mandates were allocated between Britain and France, and the 
British area of responsibility delimited. Thereafter, the first 
British Civil Commissioner, Sir Herbert Samuel, was appointed, 
arriving in Jerusalem on 30 June 1920 to commence the task of 
establishing a civil government. The legal standing of that 
government was still subject to doubt, however, for the Treaty of 
Peace with Turkey, formally separating Palestine from Turkish 
sovereignty, had still not been signed, nor had the Middle Eastern 
mandates been ratified by the League of Nations, a ratification 
delayed by United States insistance that she be consulted before 
the mandates were approved. The Palestine mandate was not finally 
confirmed by the League of Nations until July 1922, and was not 
officially in operation until September 1923. 2 
The uncertainty engendered by this delay in ratification was 
exacerbated by a further anomaly. By the mandate principle, 
1. Friedman, pp.125-202. 
2. It was not until 1924 that the dispute with the United States 
over the Palestine mandate was finally settled by an Anglo-
American convention, whereby the United States secured the 
safeguards which it had insisted upon for American commercial 
and other rights in Palestine and, in return, formally 'con-
sented to the exercise of the Mandate by Great Britain. 
Convention between the United Kingdom and the United States of 
America, respecting the rights of the Governments of the two 
cOllutriesL and their respective Nationals in Palestine. 
erod. 2559, 19~5f Treaty Series No. 54. 
'. 
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Great Britain was bound to guide Palestine toward self-government 
and independence; yet, by the Balfour Declaration, which was 
incorporated into the mandate, Britain was committed to an 
unpopular policy, which a representative, Arab-dominated adminis-
tration would not implement. This commitment was to affect the 
evolution of a concessions policy in two ways. The endemic law 
and order problem, caused by continual tension between the two 
main religious communities, was to dominate and influence all 
other political decisions. Moreover, in the mandate there was 
provision for the Zionist Organization to be given economic and 
commercial priority so as to utilize the apparently large sums 
of Jewish capital available to develop Palestine. The only clear-
cut decision, imposed upon Great Britain by the terms of the 
projected mandate, was that in granting concessions she would avoid 
monopoly or discrimination, at least against the nationals of 
states which were members of the League of Nations. 1 
It is against this background of obscurity and conflicting 
commitments that the diplomatic controversy with the United states 
must be seen, and it is perhaps hardly surprising that the Foreign 
1. Since the palestinian oil controversy was in fact settled prior 
to the ultimate implementation of the mandate, the terms of 
that mandate might appear to be irrelevant. However, they did 
reveal the intentions of the British Government, and, in draft 
form, were to be the subject of diplomatic representations by 
the United states. The relevant articles were: 
Article 11. 'The Administration may arrange with the Jewish 
Agency ••• to construct or operate, upon fair and equitable terms, 
any public works, services and utilities, and to develop any of 
the natural resources of the country, in so far as these matters 
are not directly undertaken by the Administration.' 
Article 18. 'The Mandatory shall see that there is no discri-
mination in Palestine against the nationals of any state Member 
of the League of Nations (including companies incorporated under 
its laws) as compared with those of the Mandatory or of any 
foreign State in matters concerning taxation, commerce or 
navigation, the exercise of industries or professions, or in 
the treatment of merchant vessels or civil aircraft.' 
Draft Mandates for Mesopotamia and Palestine. Cmd.1176, 1921. 
- 133 -
Office's consistent policy was to refuse to verify Palestinian 
oil concessions until the political and legal situation was 
clarified. This policy, however, was unlikely to satisfy either 
Socony or the American state Department. 
The suspicions of the former as to British intentions had 
already been aroused when, in September 1918, O.E.T.A. had 
requested access to company maps and documents held in Jerusalem. 1 
Since Jerusalem was under military law, those responsible for 
Socony interests had complied with the request. It was as the 
result of a letter from Socony to the United States Secretary of 
State in March 1919, detailing this incident, and expressing 
concern that the British might attempt to prevent any American 
petroleum company from operating in territory under British control,2 
that the state Department took up the matter with the Foreign Office. 3 
Socony was strongly exercised over the British attitude, and without 
waiting for a response to this first diplomatic intercession, 
pressed the state Department to take the matter further, claiming 
to see the seizure of papers as possible 'only the forerunner of 
other more serious interferences with our proposed development of 
the oil fields of Syria and European Turkey', and urging the State 
Department to take steps 'to see that in any readjustment of 
territory that may take place in the Near East such American rights 
will be accorded full recognition and protection against possible 





Standard Oil Company (New York) to Acting Secretary of State, 
15 March 1919, For. ReI. 1919, Part III, Vol.II, pp.250-2. 
William Phillips, Acting U.S. Secretary of State, to the U.S. 
Ambassador in Great Britain, John W. Davis, 18 March 1919, 
For. ReI. 1919, Part III, Vol.II, p.252. For an account, 
from the United States' point of view, of the early stage of 
the controversy, see DeNovo, American Interests, pp.169-175~ 
apd Sbwadran, ~.449-452. 
H.E. Cole (SoconvJ to Frank Polk, Acting Secretary of State, 
S MHV 1919, fi~t67.11St. 25/11. R.G. 59, N.A. 
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After repeated requests for information from O.E.T.A. 1 the 
British Government in June 1919 assured the Americans that its 
examination of Socony's documents had been solely to determine 
what concessions had in fact been granted, and that it had been 
carried out after application to the Spanish consul, who repre-
sented American interests. 2 The careful wording of this reply _ 
for the Spanish consul had not in fact given his approval - was 
bound to arouse the suspicions of the State Department. It had 
already been alerted to possible British intentions by Socony; 
moreover, during the intervening three months the first mani-
festations of the AnglO-American 'oil war' had aroused both public 
and political sentiment in the united States. The equivocal 
nature of the British reply, therefore, gave scope for a State 
Department rejoinder, which, whilst raising the somewhat embarrassing 
issue of whether the Spanish consul had assented to the examination, 
also expanded the scope of the enquiry. Specifically asking for 
information as to whether any counter claims had been made covering 
the Socony licences, or whether holders of any concessions granted 
by the ottoman Government had been permitted by the British military 
authorities in Palestine to operate them,3 the State Department 
clearly felt that the British could not be relied upon to safeguard 
and respect established American rights. Although the United States 
Government had commenced the correspondence solely at the request 
of the interested American company, the impetus for continued 
1. Various correspondence on 44/57284/17115; 44/64451/17115, and 
44/80433/17115, F.O. 371/4208. 
2. British Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to U.S. 
Charge d'Affaires, London, 3 June 1919, For. ReI. 1919, Part III, 
Vol.II, pp.253-4. 
3. Acting U.S. Secretary of State to U.S. Ambassador in Great 
Britain, 7 July 1919, For. ReI. 1919, Part III, Vol.II, pp.254-5. 
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protest now came increasingly from within the state Department, 
the Foreign Trade Adviser expressing his opinion that 'I am 
quite certain that if Palestine is to fall under the sphere of 
British influence the Standard Oil Comp (sic) will encounter 
serious difficulties', and recommending that the United States 
Government should 'emphasize to the British authorities that 
they may expect a scrap if they attempt any freezing out process 
of American interests in Palestine hereafter,.1 
It was unfortunate, in view of this hardening attitude within 
the State Department, that the British Foreign Office was unable 
to reply promptly to the American note, since O.E.T.A. proved 
extremely dilatory in responding to requests for further informa-
tion. By September 1919, the patience of the State Department had 
worn thin, and it was therefore decided to make further formal -
and strong - representations to the British Government. 2 
Although the long delay exacerbated American suspicions of 
British intentions, it had however allowed time for the British 
to devise a consistent policy to be followed towards concessions 
in occupied territory in general, and towards Palestine in par-
ticular. Immediately after the Armistice of Mudros, and indeed 
until the spring of 1919, there had seemed little need for the 
Foreign Office to formulate any sort of concessions policy to be 
followed in the occupied territories, and those areas designated 
as future mandated regions. It was assumed that all such questions 
would be settled by the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, a treaty that 
1. Office of Foreign Trade Adviser to William Phillips, 3 July 
1919, file 467.11St.25/34, R.G. 59, N.A., quoted in DeNovo, 
American Interests, p.170. 
2. Acting U.S. Secretary of State to Commission to Negotiate 
Peace, 18 September 1919, and Commission to Negotiate Peace 
to Acting Secretary of State, 29 September 1919, For. ReI. 
1919, Part III, Vol.II, pp.255-6. 
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should originally have been drafted at versailles. 1 This does 
not imply that the Foreign Office had not considered the con-
cessions question. Several officials would have liked to have 
seen any concessions granted by the ottoman Empire in the 
successor states since the date of Turkey's entry into war 
declared null and void, and some would have liked to have seen 
the cancellation of all concessions and options held in Turkish 
territory in ~914.2 But in view of the international compli-
cations such policies would entail, it was obviously preferable 
that the settlement of the entire issue should be left for the 
peacemakers to decide. 
However, as the process of peacemaking extended into the 
summer, the problem ,of administration in occupied enemy territory 
and, with it, the need for some sort of unified policy on con-
cessions, became more acute, especially following the United 
States' diplomatic intervention. In default of any considered 
decision by either the Peace Conference or Whitehall, the policy 
in operation in Palestine was that dictated by General Allenby, 
that is, that no developments to oil bearing areas could be 
permitted until the provisional administration was superseded by 
the permanent administration of Palestine. 3 Such an ad hoc decision 
was, however, inadequate in view of the increasing pressure from 
the United States, and by July 1919, G. Kidston of the Foreign 
1. See various correspondence and minutes, April-May 1919, file 
33635, F.O. 371/4211. 
2. Sir Eyre Crowe (for A. Balfour) to Lord Curzon, 11 July 1919, 
and attached minutes, 44/101990/87018, F.O. 371/4229. 
3. General Allenby, Cairo, to Lord Curzon, 26 April 1919, 
44/70949/17115, F.O. 371/4208. 
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Office was expressing forcefully the hope that 'it may be 
possible to lay down some general principle with regard to them 
1 (concessions) without delay'. However, the Foreign Office 
was handicapped by the split in authority between London and 
Paris, which necessitated the referral of policy decisions to 
Balfour at Versailles. 2 Moreover, in Palestine especially, the 
problem was exacerbated by the need to take account of the 
. . t 3 ZlonlS s. 
It was the Zionists' desire, as part of an extensive 
programme of economic development, to foster public works, such 
as electricity, drainage, irrigation and afforestation, and to 
develop the natural resources and economic potential of Palestine, 
therefore necessitating the exercise of some control over the 
granting of concessions. In November 1918, when the Zionist 
Organization had submitted proposals to the Foreign Office for 
the attention of the Peace Conference, they had requested that 
' ••• no concessions should be granted until the Jewish Council 
has had an opportunity of expressing its views, and if so advised, 
offering to undertake any works of development that are desirable 
and practicable,.4 
The Foreign Secretary, Arthur Balfour, appeared willing to 
support the Zionist position, informing the Foreign Office that, 
1. Minute by G. Kidston, 18 July 1919, on 44/101990/87018, 
F.O. 371/4229; and minute by G. Kidston, 11 September 1919, 
44/126355/17115, F.O. 371/4208. 
2. Foreign Office to Balfour, 25 July 1919, 44/101990/87018, 
and other correspondence in same file, F.O. 371/4229. 
3. A complication of which the Foreign Office was well aware. 
Minute by General Clayton, 25 July 1919, 44/103809/17115, 
F.O. 371/4208; minutes by E. Weakley and G. Kidston, 
November 1919, 44/148099/19165, F.O. 371/4209. 
4. Ingrams, pp.52-4; See also Record of a Meeting between 
Weizmann and Clayton, July 1919, ibid., p.79. 
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since the best means of encouraging the non-Jewish inhabitants 
of Palestine to welcome the 'National Home' was by showing them 
the advantages accruing to them as a result of the economic 
influence of the Jews, 
••• as long as His Majesty's Government are 
in military occupation of the country, no 
policy should be adopted or steps taken 
which would enable commercial interests, 
however reputable, and whether British or 
foreign, to establish themselves in 
Palestine or obtain control over the land 
or the principal industries ••• 
at least until such time as the British Government could work out 
the full implications of their acceptance of the mandate, and the 
policy of establishing Palestine as a National Home for the Jews. 1 
This policy caused some consternation within the Foreign 
Office, 2 but, in the face of increasing demands from concessionaires 
for permission to recommence or commence exploitation, and Zionist 
protests at any possibility of concessions being given to non-
Zionists (such as Socony),3 the Foreign Office perforce evolved a 
policy of 'non-action'; that is, it was decided that, pending the 
signing and coming into force of the Peace Treaty, and the allocation 
and ratification of the mandates, no concessionaires would be allowed 
4 to commence or recommence work. Such a policy appeared eminently 
sensible, for it was presumed that the Peace Treaty would almost 
certainly give to the successor states the right to amend or cancel 
1. Mallet (for A. Balfour) to Lord Curzon, 7 May 1919, 44/70893/51705, 
F.O. 371/4215. 
2. Minute by G. Kidston, 11 September 1919, on 44/126355/17115, 
F.O. 371/4208. 
3. Correspondence and minutes, September 1919, 44/126355/17115, 
F.O. 371/4208. 
4. A policy first suggested in June 1919. Foreign Office to 
Petroleum Executive, 10 June 1919, 44/76864/17115, F.O. 371/4208. 
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existing concessions granted by the ottoman Empire if such action 
was in the public interest. 
So, despite the presence of American geologists in Jerusalem 
1 
anxious to resume work, the knowledge that 'the Americans are 
restive about oil',2 and even the recommendation of the local 
British authorities that permission be given to Socony to commence 
3 
work, it was decided by the Foreign Office that no exploration 
should take place in Palestine during the temporary administration. 4 
It would seem that, having arrived at a definite and apparently 
justified policy by August 1919, the Foreign Office was in a strong 
position to respond to the renewed United States protests the 
following month. 
Unfortunately, however, the British Government had already 
infringed its own principle, for in June 1919, at the instigation 
of Balfour, the Zionist Organization had been allowed to send a 
geological party, led by an American geologist, Julius Fohs, to 
investigate oil and mineral resources in Palestine. 5 This, and 
War Office operations in Mesopotamia,6 left the Foreign Office 
exposed, and angry at decisions being taken elsewhere which 
countered its policy. 7 There were to be severe repercussions, 
1. Colonel French, Cairo, to Lord Curzon, 13 August 1919, in 
D.B.F.P., 1st Series, Vol. 4, p.352. 
2. Minute by Ronald Lindsay, 18 August 1919, on 44/115952/17115, 
F.O. 371/4208. 
3. Colonel French, Cairo, to Lord Curzon, 13 August 1919, D.B.F.P., 
1st Series, Vol. 4, p.352. 
4. Lord Curzon to Colonel French, Cairo, 30 August 1919, ibid., 
p.366; and Minute by O.A. Scott, 15 August 1919, on 44/115952/ 
17115, F.O. 371/4208. 
5. A. Balfour to General Clayton, Cairo, 16 June 1919, and General 
Clayton to Lord Curzon, 19 June 1919, D.B.F.P., 1st Series, 




See Chapter 2 above. 
G. Kidston, For °gn Office, to Sir G. Clerk, Paris, 29 July 1919, 
D.B.F.P., 1st Ser es, Vol. 4, pp.1102-3. 
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since the state Department became aware of the operations of 
the Shell geologists in Mesopotamia, and attempted to use this 
to force the way open in Palestine for Socony, placing Lord 
Curzon in the somewhat embarrassing position of having to admit 
that the Foreign Office had known nothing of the activities of 
the War Office, and resisting American attempts to use this to 
their own advantage by arguing that 'the worst way of rectifying 
lOt ld b t t t °t tOtO 1 wou e 0 consen 0 1 S repe 1 lon'. 
His assertion that the Foreign Office were adopting exactly 
the same principle in dealing with British firms was, however, 
accurate. Although in early 1919 the Foreign Office had encouraged 
the AnglO-Persian Oil Company in trying to obtain options on 
concessions in the Dead Sea area,2 it steadfastly refused permission 
to S. Pearsons and Son Ltd. to send a geologist to Palestine to 
explore for oil,3 and was at pains to make plain to a proposed 
Anglo-French syndicate led by Lord Drogheda, which hoped to 
develop oilfields in Syria and Palestine, that nothing could be 
done until a settlement was finally reached. 4 However, this was 
unlikely to avert State Department protests at other infringements 
of declared Foreign Office policy, and even before the Americans 
had raised the issue of the Shell geologists, Kidston had begun 
1. Lord Curzon to J.W. Davis, U.S. Ambassador in Great Britain, 
21 November 1919, D.B.F.P., 1st Series, Vol. 4, pp.541-2. 
2. See nos. 17115, 28875, 31637, 39523, all in file 17115 of the 
Turkey (44) files, F.O. 371/4208. The Foreign Office later 
refused permission for Anglo-Persian to commence surveying 
the options it had acquired. Foreign Office to Petroleum 
Executive, 10 June 1919, 44/76864/17115, F.O. 371/4208. 
3. See various correspondence on E175/E1220/175/44, F.O. 371/5150. 
4. G. Kidston to Sir G. Clerk, 1 August 1919, and Minute by 
E. Weakley, 13 July 1919, D.B.F.P., 1st Series, Vol. 4, pp.1105-7. 
The Foreign Office was far from enthusiastic about this syndicate. 
See minutes on 44/148798/17115, and various documents in file 
17115, F.O. 371/4208. 
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to despair that the concessions policy could continue in operation, 
for 'the threatened representations by the U.S. [sic] Embassy on 
behalf of the Standard Oil Co. [sic] may knock the bottom out of 
it altogether,.1 Possibly as a consequence of the Zionist sponsored 
survey of Palestine, Socony was becoming concerned lest Zionist 
interests attempt to exclude outsiders, 2 a concern not necessarily 
relieved by Zionist assurances that they would raise no objection 
in respect to pre-war concessions granted to foreigners. 3 By now 
the company also professed to believe that the British intended to 
refuse all concessions as they wished to control all concessions 
4 
of any value themselves. 
In view of the uncertainty and confusion that seemed to 
prevail, the State Department decided in September 1919 to instruct 
the Ambassador in London to endeavour to secure the removal of 
restrictions on the movements of the three Socony geologists 
already in Jerusalem, and to send a note affirming the rights of 
American nationals under concessions not worked but duly consummated 
5 
after Turkey entered the war. In October 1919, therefore, John 
Davis made strenuous representations on behalf of Socony, on an 
1. Minute by G. Kidston, 13 September 1919, on 44/127178/17115, 
F.O. 371/4208. 
2. U.S. Acting Secretary of State to Commission to Negotiate 
Peace, 18 September 1919, For. ReI. 1919, Part III, Vol.II, pp.255-6. 
3. Commission to Negotiate Peace to Acting U.S. Secretary of State, 
29 September 1919, For. ReI. 1919, Part III, Vol.II, p.256. 
4. A. Southard, U.S. Consul, Jerusalem, to U.S. Secretary of State, 
30 September 1919, For. ReI. 1919, Part III, Vol.II, pp.256-7. 
5. Commission to Negotiate Peace to U.S. Secretary of State, 
29 September 1919, and J.W. Davis, U.S. Ambassador, London, to 
U.S. Secretary of State, 14 October 1919, For. ReI. 1919, 
Part III, Vol.II, pp.256-7. 
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informal basis, only to be met with a reiteration of established 
Foreign Office policy.1 
Neither side appears to have been convinced by the arguments 
of the other. The state Department felt that there had been 
serious interference with·the rights of American citizens, and 
that the British had offered insufficient justification for this. 
In presenting this argument Davis's case was strengthened by the 
activites of the Shell geologists in Mesopotamia, activities which 
he was not slow to bring to the attention of Lord Curzon. He 
therefore suggested that it was feasible for the British authorities 
to allow those with legal rights to continue their activities, and 
that in view of the already formulated mandatory principles guaran-
teeing equal opportunities, the question of the mandatory power 
2 
was not really relevant. 
Lord Curzon was clearly not convinced by these arguments; 
indeed, he expressed doubt as to whether Davis himself was really 
convinced by them. He both refuted Davis's claims that the mandate 
would necessarily go to Great Britain, and that the mandatory 
principle of equal opportunity was universally accepted, claiming 
that the French still regarded the entire question as open. In 
retort to the request that those with legal rights should be allowed 
to operate them, he argued that such would be the number of claims, 
that Palestine would be chaotic. On the same grounds, he refused 
1. J.W. Davis to U.S. Secretary of State, 14 October 1919, Acting 
Secretary of State to J.W. Davis, 24 October 1919, and Acting 
Secretary of State to J.W. Davis, 25 October 1919, For. ReI. 1919, 
Part III, Vol. II, pp.257-9; Lord Curzon to Viscount Grey, 
Washington D.C., 30 October 1919, D.B.F.P., 1st Series, Vol. 4, 
pp. 501-3; and J.W. Davis to Lord Curzon, 31 October 1919, 
44/148099/19165, F.O. 371/4209. 
2. U.S. Acting Secretary of State to J.W. Davis, 24 October 1919, 
and U.S. Acting Secretary of State to J.W. Davis, 25 October 
1919, For. ReI. 1919, Part III, Vol. II, pp.258-9. 
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to draw a line between the procuring and operation of concessions, 
which might well be forbidden, and simple investigation of existing 
claims, which might be allowed to proceed. 1 This complete hostility 
to the United states demands, and unwillingness to compromise, was 
apparently shared by others in the Foreign Office, which despite 
the sensitive state of Anglo-American relations showed no sign of 
~eing disposed to allow Socony some privileges to counteract those 
granted by the War Office to Shell in Mesopotamia. Weakley 
expressed the opinion that 
It seems most unreasonable that we should be 
asked to change our whole policy in regard to 
the question of surveys and researches in 
O.E.T. (sic), simply because the Standard Oil 
Co. (sic) are impatient to start work ••• This 
attitude of the Standard Oil Co. (sic) shows 
an utter disregard of the fact that a state 
of war still exists with Turkey, and that we 
are in military occupation of the country. 2 
Given this basic incompatibility of views, the rigidity of 
the Foreign Office, and Lord Curzon's own personality, it was 
apparent that accommodation was unlikely. This was particularly 
the case since enquiries of Cairo had brought the response that 
no British subjects had concessions in Palestine - in other words, 
a policy of easing the way of existing concession holders would 
benefit only foreigners. 3 
On 21 November 1919, the Foreign Office elaborated Lord 
Curzon's views as expressed in the earlier interview in a letter 




Lord Curzon to Viscount Grey, 30 October 1919, D.B.F.P., 
1st Series, Vol. 4, pp.501-3; John W. Davis to Frank Polk, 
1 November 1919, Box 4, Part 1, Series II, Alphabetical 
Correspondence: Personal , Davis MSS. 
Minute by E. Weakley, 6 November 1919, on 44/148099/19165, 
F.O. 371/4209. 
Lord Curzon to Colonel French, 9 August 1919, D.B.F.P., 1st 
Series, Vol. 4, p.337, and Colonel Meinertzhagen, Cairo, to 
Lord CU£zon, 1 November 1919, ibid., pp.504-5. 
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Office view that it felt the provisional character of the military 
occupation did not warrant the taking of decisions by the occupying 
power in matters concerning the future economic development of the 
country. It had hence decided that all such decisions should be 
left to the future mandatory power. Nor would it make an exception 
for cases of limited investigations or surveys, not only for the 
reasons cited above, but because it feared a rush of speculators, 
who would still aim at securing definite and exclusive rights. 1 
A month later, in December 1919, Lord Curzon was finally able 
to reply to the Ambassador's letter of 30 July 1919 concerning the 
Socony maps. In this reply, he confessed that the British authori-
ties had not obtained the Spanish consul's assent, but also stated 
that there were no counter claims to Socony's concessions, and that 
no holders of other concessions granted by the Ottoman Government 
2 had been permitted to operate. 
These two communications effectively deprived State Department 
officials of any further grounds on which to challenge Foreign 
Office policy - a fact which they recognized, but, with not only 
the interests of Socony in mind, but also the rights of United 
States citizens in other successor states, they decided to maintain 
informal diplomatic pressure, so as to ensure that the Foreign 
Office remained aware of the vital concern of the United States 
Government. It is difficult to say how far the Americans had in 
mind the importance of Palestine as a precedent for Mesopotamia, 
where the oil resources were likely to be much greater: for if 
the British were able to exclude or discriminate against American 
1. Lord Curzon to J.W. Davis, 21 November 1919, D.B.F.P., 1st 
Series, Vol. 4, pp.541-2. This note had been very carefully 
drafted and corrected. See 44/148099/19165, F.O. 371/4209. 
2. J.W. Davis to U.S. Secretary of State, 24 December 1919, 
For. ReI. 1919, Part III, Vol. II, pp.261-2. 
citizens in an instance where they had clear rights, then there 
would be little or no chance of American companies obtaining 
participation in Mesopotamia, where the only American claims in 
existence were so weak. If discrimination were to occur in 
Palestine, the state Department made plain, the bad feeling that 
would result would lead to a deterioration in relationships 
between the two countries and - perhaps more threateningly _ 
further complications concerning United states participation in 
the maintenance of the international settlement. 1 
The strength of feeling within the state Department did not, 
however, lead to a resumption of formal correspondence between 
the United states Embassy and the Foreign Office. To some extent, 
this may be due to the possibility that in return for the recog-
nition of Socony's claim, the British Government might demand that 
the TPC's claim in Mesopotamia should be similarly recognized, a 
demand the Americans would be unwilling to concede. There were 
no more formal notes on the subject of Palestinian oil until 
autumn 1921, by which time the context of the debate had changed, 
not least because Socony was already convinced that the Palestine 
concessions were of very limited value, and was contemplating the 
possibility of seeing them cancelled in return for fair partici-
. . 2 pation ln Mesopotaffila. 
Nonetheless, in the spring of 1920 the state Department 
continued to utilize informal pressure, in an attempt to bring 
1. U.S. Acting Secretary of State to Butler Wright, Charge 
d'Affaires, London, 17 March 1920, For. ReI. 1920, Vol. II, 
pp.650-1. 
2. Memorandum by A.C. Millspaugh of a conversation with L.I. 
Thomas, Socony, 18 January 1921, 811.6363/67, R.G. 59, N.A. 
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about a successful conclusion to the Palestine issue. To do so, 
it was prepared to be far more direct concerning the possible 
repercussions of the oil issue upon Anglo-American relations. 
Butler Wright, Charge of the United states Embassy in London, 
had several discussions with Sir John Tilley of the Foreign 
Office's Eastern Department, either alone, or accompanied by 
L.I. Thomas of Socony. Although the representative of a private 
oil company, Thomas had been granted a - somewhat vague - official 
status by the State Department, which he did not hesitate to 
exploit in these interviews. Claiming to be presenting State 
Department views, he was especially aggressive, pointing out 
that the United States had expended its oil resources during the 
war to assist the Allies, and stating that 'not only the temper 
of the trade in America but the "temper of the State Department" 
h o h' 1 was very 19 • His argument that, in view of the world shortage 
of oil, exploration should commence as quickly as possible, failed 
to impress Sir John Tilley, and was apparently not well supported 
by Butler Wright, who preferred the argument that since the Standard 
Oil geologists were already in Palestine, they might well be given 
preferential treatment. 2 This argument was rejected by the Foreign 
1. Minute by Sir J. Tilley, 1 April 1920, of a conversation with 
Butler Wright and Thomas, 29 March 1920, E3304/175/44 in 
F.O. 371/5150. The official backing given by the State 
Department to Mr. Thomas is indicative, both of the seriousness 
with which they viewed the oil question, and also their naivety, 
since they apparently accepted at face value Thomas' assertion 
that he had powerful contacts in Britain which he intended to 
utilize in order to convince the British authorities to adopt a 
more conciliatory policy towards American interests. See minute 
A.C. Millspaugh, Office of the Foreign Trade Adviser, 18 February 
1920, F. Polk to L.I. Thomas, 1 March 1920, and Minute by 
A.A. Adee to F. Polk, all on file 841.6363/21, R.G. 59, N.A. 
M580/145. 
2. Minute by Sir J. Tilley, 1 April 1920, E3304/175/44, F.O. 371/5150. 
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Office, in view of the fact that Socony was well aware of British 
concessions policy when choosing to retain their geologists in 
1 Jerusalem, but as Wright explained on a later visit, he had 
'thought we might be glad of an excuse for letting the company 
representatives in Jerusalem get to work if only in order to 
remove one cause of the friction which seemed to be assuming 
formidable proportions,.2 This specific reference to the rapidly 
worsening state of Anglo-American relations in the spring of 1920 
clearly reveals how important oil was as a contributory factor in 
this process, and the extent to which the United states was prepared 
to utilize this ill-feeling in order actively to promote the 
economic interests of her citizens. 
Apart from this veiled threat, by which Foreign Office 
officials were apparently not much moved, United states represen-
tations on the specific issue of Palestine oil concessions ceased. 
Hitherto, much of the diplomatic correspondence had related 
specifically to Palestine, since only there did an American company 
have pre-war rights, which were apparently being infringed, and 
which could be used to substantiate a demand that such pre-war 
rights should be recognized despite the declared Foreign Office 
policy on concessions. But such an argument was, of course, danger-
ous for, as the British were quick to argue, the Turkish Petroleum 
Company might be held to have similar rights. Moreover, having 
accepted as a bona fide policy the Foreign Office decision to 
1. Minute by E. Weakley, 1 April 1920, ibid. 
2. Minute by Sir J. Tilley, 14 April 1920, of a conversation with 
Butler Wright, E3222/175/44, F.O. 371/5150. In making this 
statement, Wright was expressing the opinion of the State 
Department. Frank Polk to J.W. Davis, 13 March 1920, 
841.6363/29A, R.G. 59, N.A. M580/145. 
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postpone any action on concessions until after the ratification 
of the mandates by the League of Nations, and the corning into 
force of the Peace Treaty with Turkey, the United states had 
little new ground on which to protest, until such time as a 
draft mandate for Palestine was issued, or unless that policy 
was again infringed. 
However, a new round of diplomatic correspondence was 
initiated by the San Remo Conference in April 1920,1 which pro-
visionally allocated mandates to France (for Syria) and Great 
Britain (for Palestine and Mesopotamia) thus rendering less 
believable British protestations that the eventual mandatory power 
had yet to be decided. Moreover, at that Conference an oil 
agreement was signed on 24 April 1920,2 which could be read as 
instituting an Anglo-French conspiracy to divide up the petroleum 
riches of the Middle East. Despite non-publication of the agree-
ment, the United States State Department was fully conversant with 
3 all the details by May 1920. 
After San Remo, the United States Government was therefore 
able to shift ground to the more abstract argument that she had, 
as a cO-belligerent in Europe, equal rights in mandated territory, 
which she wished to see safeguarded under the terms of the mandates. 
However, the draft mandates presented to the League of Nations made 
1. For proceedings of the Conference at San Remo, 18-26 April 1920, 
see D.B.F.P., 1st Series, Vol. 8. 
2. Oil Agreement: Great Britain and France, in Hurewitz, II, 
pp.75-7. The content of the oil agreement is discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 2. 
3. H.C. Wallace, U.S. Ambassador, Paris, to U.S. Secretary of State, 
3 May 1920, 800.6363/108, 3 May 1920, 800.6363/109, and 7 May 
1920, 800.6363/113, all in R.G. 59, N.A.; and J.W. Davis, 
Ambassador, London, to U.S. Secretary of State, 18 May 1920, 
800.6363/128, R.G. 59, N.A. 
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reference, firstly, to the equal treatment guaranteed to the 
nationals of states which were members of the League of Nations, 
and, secondly, to the authority vested by the defeat of Turkey _ 
both of which effectively excluded the United states. From 
state Department files, it is difficult to find evidence that 
the state Department took its stand on the mandates simply in 
order to see changes incorporated for the benefit of American 
.1 . 1 Ol companles. The Foreign Office, however, clearly believed 
this to be the case, Weakley cynically minuting that 
The assignment to Great Britain of Mandates 
for Palestine and Mesopotamia, has afforded 
the United states Govt. (sic) an opportunity 
of returning once more to the question of 
the development of the oi1fie1ds in these 
countries, and to claim for American citizens -
really the Standard Oil Co. (sic) ••• abso1ute 
equality of treatment. 2 
The diplomatic correspondence entered into between the two 
3 governments as a consequence of the San Remo Conference dealt 
in general with United States rights in the mandated territories, 
and therefore covered both Mesopotamia and Palestine. But the area 
of most concern to the United States was the alleged infringement 
of her rights in Mesopotamia,4 a fact which the Foreign Office 
recognized and resisted. 5 However, although the emphasis now 
moved away from Palestine, it was here that the first surrender 
to United States Pressure was to come. 
1. Memorandum by A.C. Millspaugh for U.s. Merle-Smith, 8 February 
1921, 890G.01/20, R.G. 59, N.A. M722/19. 
2. Minute by E. Weakley, 20 May 1920, on E.4974/1331/44, F.O. 371/5212. 
3. Most of which is printed in For. Re1.1920 and 1921. 
4. As a consequence, the correspondence has been discussed in 
Chapter 2. 
5. See Chapter 2 above, and also minute by R. Sperling, 31 July 
1920, on E9082/1331/44, F.O. 371/5212. 
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The Foreign Office was, in effect, torn two ways in its 
policy towards Palestine. On the one hand, it was conscious 
of the need to be cautious lest any infringement of its declared 
policy on concessions be seized upon by the United states Govern-
ment as evidence of bad faith. Thus, it was extremely reluctant 
to allow Sir Herbert Samuel, the High Commissioner in Palestine, 
to permit any new economic development which could be described 
. 1 . 
as a concesSlon slnce 
•••• attempts being made by American Oil 
Interests to begin prospecting in Palestine 
and Mesopotamia ••• and representations of 
United States Government in their support 
have hitherto been met by explanation of 
our general attitude of refusal of any 
concession including licences to prospect 
until coming into force of Turkish Treaty.2 
Discussion on various proposals for economic development, for 
example a desire by Zionists to exploit and develop waste land in 
palestine,3 and the Rutenberg scheme to develop hydro-electricity,4 
reveal this preoccupation clearly. Attempts by the Petroleum 
Department in the spring and again in the autumn of 1920 to persuade 
the Foreign Office to allow renewed prospecting for oil were firmly 
resisted, with a reiteration of the British policy of waiting until 
the Treaty of Peace was ratified and the mandate in operation. 5 
1. See correspondence and minutes on E12710/85/44, F.O. 371/5140. 
2. Foreign Office to Sir H. Samuel, High Commissioner, Palestine, 
8 December 1920, E14341/131/44, F.O. 371/5140. 
3. See correspondence and minutes on E14341/131/44, F.O. 371/5140. 
4. See correspondence and minutes on E2591/32/88, F.O. 371/6374. 
5. Petroleum Department to Foreign Office, 27 April 1920, and 
attached minutes, E3872/175/44, F.O. 371/5150; Petroleum 
Department to Foreign Office, 23 September 1920, Foreign Office 
to Petroleum Department, 29 September 1920, and attached minutes, 
E11823/175/44, F.O. 371/5150. 
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This policy of delay was probably formulated more with a 
view to Mesopotamian policy than Palestinian affairs; in other 
words, the Foreign Office was anxious not to make a mistake in 
its administration of Palestine which would rebound to its 
disadvantage in Mesopotamia. Sir John Tilley, in discussing 
the question of a concession for land exploitation in Palestine, 
stated that a policy of delay was largely due to 
••• the necessity for us of making up our 
minds regarding an oil policy in Mesopotamia 
and deciding just what we are to do regarding 
the Standard Oil's desire to participate. As 
long as we can say that we are granting no 
concessions we can keep the Americans compara-
tively quiet and give ourselves time to make 
our plans. 1 
Delay would allow the Foreign Office to formulate a Mesopotamian 
oil policy; it would also allow time for a change of administration 
in the United States in the November elections, for the Foreign 
Office was well aware that the close relationship between oil 
companies and the State Department was of recent origin, and that 
'it by no means follows that the Standard Oil Co. (sic) will always 
be in favour with the administration because such happens to be the 
2 
case at the present moment'. 
During the course of 1920 the Foreign Office was, in any event, 
clearly not disposed to be conciliatory towards the United States. 
In general terms, friction over issues such as naval rivalry, the 
1. Sir John Tilley, Foreign Office, to Sir John Cadman, Petroleum 
Executive, 29 November 1920, E14341/131/44, F.O. 371/5140 and 
various documents on E12710/85/44, F.O. 371/5140. 
2. Minute by R. Sperling, 5 June 1920, on E5631/1331/44, F.O. 371/5212. 
This document reveals clearly the Foreign Office's somewhat muddled 
thinking in the matter of the Standard Oil Company. It is apparent 
that the Foreign Office believed that (a) Standard Oil was effec-
tively one company and (b) the American administration favoured 
the company because of the wartime co-operation of Mr. Bedford. 
This ignored not only the strategic importance of oil, but also 
the fact that the Standard Oil Company had been split up in 1911. 
The Foreign Office was apparently unaware that Mr. Bedford had no 
~ .. ~~~~i~o~n~w~l~·th~ Socony, the company involved in Palestine, although 
both Socony, Mr. Bedford's company, Jersey Standard, were 
interested in Me otamia. 
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Allied war debt to the United states, and the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance continued,1 whilst United states failure to be involved 
in the post-war settlement created major problems for the British. 
The Eastern Department in particular had reason to be angered at 
United states vacillations on the role she was prepared to play 
in the Turkish settlement. The delays thus caused in the negotia-
tion of a peace treaty allowed a resurgence of Turkish nationalism 
under Mustapha Kemal. Because of the Turkish refusal to sign the 
Treaty of Sevres, it was necessary to renegotiate a settlement 
during 1922-3, meaning a further delay in the final settlement of 
the mandates. 2 
Nor was the Foreign Office inclined to be sympathetic to the 
United states specific arguments on oil. The question of world 
production, and control of the world reserves was much debated in 
the diplomatic correspondence between Colby and Lord Curzon, whilst 
there was little sympathy in the Foreign Office for American com-
plaints of their exclusion from mandated territory, R. Sperling 
of the American Department commenting in April 1920 that 
Consi dering the a tti tude of the U. S .. ·G. (sic) 
in such matters it is astonishing (or would 
be in any other country) that they should have 
the face to complain of the exclusion of the 
Standard Oil prospectors from territory under 
British control. For years past they have 
systematically opposed the acquisition of oil 
concessions in Latin America by British 
companies. 3 
1. This is discussed in Chapter 2 above. 
2. This hostility was apparent during the first Conference of 
London, 12 February to 10 April 1920, and was shared by all the 
Allies. They were angered at President Wilson's refusal to give 
a definite answer on the question of a U.S. mandate in Armenia 
and Cilicia, whilst insisting upon the proposed settlement with 
Turkey being in accordance with U.S. desiderata. Since the U.S. 
had not been at war with Turkey, and did not propose to be a 
signatory to the Treaty, the hostility expressed at the Con-
ference was perhaps justified. See D.B.F.P., 1st Series, Vol. 7. 
~ •• St MjQpJ;el;?Y R •.. s~rling, 16 April 1920, on E3222/175/44, F.O. 371/5150. 
_/ 
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and Sir John Tilley adding that 'The Americans are a brazen-
faced lot,.1 
Attempts by Butler Wright to suggest that a conciliatory 
policy in Palestine might help relieve the friction between the 
two countries, caused by a common belief amongst the United 
States public and even wi thin the Government that the British 
were evolving an exclusive oil policy left Sir John Tilley little 
2 
concerned. In other words, the current state of AnglO-American 
relations did not prompt the Foreign Office to be conciliatory; 
on the contrary, it seems to have hardened its resolve to resist 
all American attempts to safeguard the position of American oil 
companies in the Middle East, not only in Mesopotamia, where the 
oil deposits at stake were considerable, but also in Palestine, 
an area of little potential. 
On the other hand, internal events in Palestine posed their 
own problems. Great Britain was of course committed to following 
a policy designed to implement the Balfour Declaration, which 
necessitated finding employment for Jewish immigrants; moreover, 
the non-Jewish inhabitants had been presented with arguments that 
the economic development generated by Jewish capital would also 
be to their benefit. The importance of gaining the acceptance of 
the Arab population was accentuated in the spring and summer of 
1920 by religious disturbances on a large scale. Once the mandate 
had been allocated to Great Britain, and a civil administration 
inaugurated, it was inevitable that pressure would be exerted on 
the Foreign Office, by both the local administration and the 
Zionists, to allow certain economic enterprises to be initiated. 
1. Minute by Sir J. Tilley, 16 April 1920, ibid. 
2. Minute by Sir J. Tilley of a conversation with Butler Wright, 
14 April 1920, E3222/175/44, F.O. 371/5150. 
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This proved to be the case, and despite its strong policy, 
therefore, the Foreign Office was forced to give way on the land 
. 1 
lssue, and was tending that way in its discussions on the Rutenberg 
. 2 . 
concesslons. Moreover, Slr H. Samuel was encouraged to evolve a 
mining policy and initiate a mineral survey, so as to allow the 
rapid commencement of mineral development, and the examination of 
existing concessions, once the mandate and Turkish Treaty were 
in force. 3 
Nevertheless, it is impossible to be sure whether the policy 
towards concessions would have changed as rapidly as it was to do 
in the course of 1921, had it not been for one major change in 
Middle Eastern administration. On 1 March 1921, following pro-
4 longed discussion at Cabinet level, the Foreign Office handed 
over responsibility for much of the Middle East to the Colonial 
Office. The newly created Middle Eastern Department of the 
Colonial Office assumed administrative control over Mesopotamia 
and Palestine (which included the future state of Transjordan), 
and political control over Aden, the Arabian littoral of the 
Persian Gulf, and the rest of the Arabian peninsula excluding the 
independent kingdom of Hejaz. 5 
1. See the OplnlOn of E. Malkin, the Foreign Office legal adviser, 
19 November 1920, that it should be possible to make concessions 
in any area of economic development that did not involve con-
troversy. E14351/131/44, F.O. 371/5140. 
2. See various correspondence and minutes on E2591/32/88, F.O. 371/6374. 
3. See various documents in file 1331/44, F.O. 371/5213; 
E14867/E15153/E15701/E15737/E11823/E11940/.175/44 in F.O. 371/5150: 
E264/E808/E1194/E1414/E2262/E2517/264/88, F.O. 371/6385. 
4. See Section C of Appendix II. 
5. Memorandum by H.W. Young, outlining the present position in the 
Middle East and making suggestions for the future, 25 October 
1920, C.O. 732/8/52945 and Report of the Interdepartmental 
Committee on the Middle East Department, 1 February 1921, 
Appendix I in M.E. No.1, p.16, in c.o. 935/1. 
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This Middle Eastern Department was staffed in the first 
instance by personnel most of whom were seconded from other 
Departments. However, it was clear that such a move was likely 
to modify the British Government's policy towards her mandates, 
for the Colonial Office was bound to be more concerned with the 
immense difficulties of administering and developing a new nation, 
and especially with the need to create a secure and legal adminis-
tration under a ratified mandate, and to secure the financial 
viability of that administration. As to the particular question 
of the oil concessions, this transfer of power meant that ultimate 
responsibility for the policy to be followed passed from Lord 
Curzon, a man who regarded the Middle East as his special province, 
and had already committed himself to a policy of resistance to 
all American intervention therein, to the new Colonial Secretary, 
Winston Churchill, who had no such preconceived ideas on the 
correct British Middle Eastern policy, and who was, moreover, 
favourably disposed towards the United States and anxious to secure 
th t "t" 1 a rapprochement between at country and Grea Brl aln. 
Prior to the official transference of responsibility, dis-
cussion was already beginning amongst the personnel being drafted 
into the new Middle Eastern Department, as to the policies they 
should adopt. Wider questions of policy were not, in fact, decided 
2 
until the Cairo Conference, but much attention was paid,to the 
issue of concessions, especially the Rutenberg scheme for hydro-
electric installations in Jaffa, a scheme that had already considerably 
1. 
2. 
For Churchill's vlews, see Chapter 5 below, and also W.S. 
Churchill to his wife, 14 February 1921, quoted in M. Gilbert, 
Winston S. Churchill, Vol.IV (London, 1975), (hereafter Gilbert, 
Churchill), pp.529-30. 
For a discussion of the Cairo Conference and its, significance, 
see Aaron S. Klieman, Foundations of British Policy in the Arab 
World: The Cairo Conference of 1921 (Baltimore, 1971), (here-
after Klieman). 
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exercised the Foreign Office, with its conflicting desires both 
to promote economic development in Palestine, but at the same 
time retain a firm line on concessions. In an important minute 
on the Subject, J.E. Shuckburgh, on secondment from the India 
Office to the Colonial Office, showed an awareness of this dichotomy, 
but also signs of the more flexible policy in dealing with con-
cessions that was to typify the Colonial Office administration, and 
which was eventually to lead to reconciliation with the United 
states in both Palestine and Mesopotamia. Shuckburgh was well 
aware of the important links between Palestine and Mesopotamia, 
and that, 'so long as we maintain the policy of no concessions 
pending confirmation of Mandates we can keep them (the Americans) 
at arm's length, but once we begin to make concessions our diffi-
culties are likely to increase'. However, he still recommended 
allowing the Rutenberg scheme to continue, obviously hoping that 
the United states would not raise difficulties, since 'American 
attention in the matter of concessions seems to be concentrated on 
Mesopotamia rather than Palestine'. Clearly, for Shuckburgh 
economic development in Palestine was seen as of paramount importance. 
Indeed, although prepared to adhere to Foreign Office policy, he 
clearly had some doubts as to its wisdom: 'It seems clearly 
undesirable to throw open concessions generally at present (at 
any rate without Foreign Office concurrence) ••• ,1 Moreover, the 
Colonial Office generally was more likely to heed the opinion of 
the local administrators, who were anxious to initiate schemes to 
provide employment and stimulate the economy. 
As a consequence of this preliminary discussion, and at the 
instigation of Winston Churchill, on 1 March 1921 - the date on 
1. Minute by J.E. Shuck burgh , 23 February 1921, on E2591/32/88, 
F.O. 371/6374. 
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which the Colonial Office officially assumed responsibility for 
the Middle East - H.J. Read of that office sent a letter to the 
Foreign Office requesting it to relax its intransigent position 
on the granting of concessions. At this stage, however, no 
attempt was made by the Colonial Office to modify the British 
Government's stand on oil concessions, as it fully appreciated 
that the Foreign Office's chief consideration was a desire 
to ward off premature attempts by foreign, 
and particularly United states companies to 
obtain a footing in these countries and to 
begin prospecting and applying for concessions 
before the precise validity and scope of exis-
ting concessions, held in some cases by 
British companies, such as the Turkish Petroleum 
Company, have been examined and established. 1 
Its aim was to initiate schemes providing public utilities, and 
possible sources of employment, such as the Rutenberg hydro-electric 
sCheme,2 and the Caesarea railway concessions,3 which would help to 
stimUlate the arrested economic development of Palestine; contro-
versial concessions, and those involving international complications, 
including all those for minerals and oil, were to be postponed 
pending ratification of the mandate. On this strict understanding, 
4 the Foreign Office concurred in the proposal, which in fact 
represented its own recent practice in Palestine. 
1. Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 1 March 1921, C.O. 733/13/9568. 
2. Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner, 
Palestine, 14 March 1921, and minutes by J.E. Shuckburgh and 
Colonel Amery, 11 March 1921, attached to c.o. 733/9/11532; 
see also Gilbert, Churchill, IV, pp.584, 634 and 642-3. 
3. High Commissioner, Palestine, to Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, 28 February 1921, and minutes, c.o. 733/1/9888. 
4. Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 9 March 1921, E2742/32/88, 
F.O. 371/6374. The Foreign Office had apparently come to the 
conclusion that 'Economic activity in Palestine is from our 
point of view the cheapest and best counter to political 
disturbance ••• ' Minute by O.A. Scott, 3 March 1921, on 
E2742/32/88, F.O. 371/6374. 
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The Middle East Department and the Palestine administration 
also continued to prepare themselves for the inevitable con-
cession applications, by the eventual appointment of a geological 
expert to the Palestine Government,1 the drafting of a mining 
d o 2 or 1nance, and the gathering of existing information on the 
mineral resources of palestine. 3 
To both Americans and British alike, March 1921 would have 
appeared an auspicious moment to implement a rapprochement. In 
Great Britain, the transference of responsibility for the 
administration of Mesopotamia and Palestine to the Colonial Office 
heralded a more flexible policy. In the United states March 1921 
saw the entrance into office of a new Republican Administration, 
free of all the commitments and dogmatism of President Wilson's 
Democratic Government. Al though the new administration was 
committed to a policy of isolationism in foreign affairs, Great 
Britain had reason to believe that the new Government, and 
especially the new Secretary of State, Cherles Evans Hughes, would 
be anxious to promoteAnglo-American co-operation. 4 As part of the 
rethinking of policy associated with a change of government, 





High Commissioner, Palestine to Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, 2 November 1921, and attached papers, C.O. 733/7/56656. 
The decision was taken following the grant of informal per-
mission to Socony to make a geological survey of areas claimed 
by it. See papers on C.O. 733/1/16613, C.O. 733/2/17962 and 
C.O. 733/3/28350. 
N. Bentwich (Legal Assistant to the Palestine Government) to 
, 0 ° Colonial Office, enclosing copy of Palestine Draft Min1ng 
Ordinance, August 1921, C.O. 733/17A/43068. No immediate action 
was taken on the draft. 
The Colonial Office received from the Board of Trade reports 
prepared by a Major Brock during the latter part of 1918, on 
Dead Sea potash and the general mineral resources of Palestine. 
W. Carter (Board of Trade) to R.V. Vernon (Colonial Office), 
25 August 1921, C.O. 733/12/42798. 
Sir A. Geddes, British Ambassador, Wa~hington, to Llo~d George, 
17 March 1921 quoted in D.J. Danelsk1 and J.S. Tulchin, ed., 
The Autobio r~ hical Notes of Charles Evans Hu hes (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1973 , pp.215-6. 
--------------------..............  
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favour of international negotiations, and possibly a general 
AnglO-American oil agreement, so as to rationalize and organize 
the world oil situation. Prominent in this movement was A.C. 
Millspaugh, who on several occasions during the spring of 1921 
urged the wisdom of such an oil agreement,1 not least because 
of his belief that 'there have been many indications that the 
British desire to reach an understanding with the new Adminis-
tration on oil questions,.2 He was especially encouraged by 
(erroneous) reports that Sir John Cadman, head of the British 
Petroleum Department, was to visit the United States in March 
or April as an expert adviser to the British Ambassador. 
Millspaugh's views were shared (or accepted) by other members 
3 
of the State Department, and, more surprisingly, by influential 
4 
members of the Commerce Department. 
Given, then, the opinion in both countries that some sort of 
agreement was feasible, and the commencement of the grant of 
concessions in Palestine, on however innocuous a level, it was 
perhaps inevitable that what G.L.M. Clauson called the 'more or 
1. Memorandum by A.C. Millspaugh for the Secretary of State, 
29 March 1921, 890G.6363/69, R.G. 59, N.A.; Memorandum by 
A.C. Millspaugh to Cumberland and Dearing, 14 April 1921, 
890G.6363/66; minute by A.C. Millspaugh, 19 May 1921, attached 
to 800.6363/278, all in R.G. 59, N.A. M722/23; Memorandum by 
A.C. Millspaugh of a conversation with L.I. Thomas, 4 August 
1921, 841:6363/172, R.G. 59, N.A. M580/147; and Draft Agreement 
to Govern Anglo-American Oil Relations, prepared by Millspaugh, 
12 May 1921, 811.6363/72, R.G. 59, N.A. 
2. Memorandum by A.C. Millspaugh for the Secretary of State, 
29 March 1921, 890G.6363/69, R.G. 59, N.A. M722/23. 
3. Memorandum by Van. S. Merle-Smith to Secretary of State Hughes, 
11 March 1921, 800.6363/325, R.G. 59, N.A. 
4. T.E. Swigart to A.W. Ambrose, 14 April 1921, Bureau of ~tines, 
Special Files, E91, Vol. 1, R.G. 70, N.A.; Memorandum on the 
Mesopotamian Oil Controversy by Henry C. Morris, May 1921, 
Bureau of Mines, Special Files, Tray 128, R.G. 70, N.A. 
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less friendly controversy with the Standard Oil Co. (sic) 
[socon;] ,1 should recommence. 
Socony was not slow to draw the State Department's attention 
back to Palestine, and press it to make representations to the 
British Foreign Office in order that the company might resume its 
geological survey of petroleum concessions. 2 On the instructions 
of the Secretary of State, therefore, George Harvey, the Ambassador 
in Great Britain, made informal representations to the Foreign 
Office,3 asking for the go-ahead to be given to the geologists, 
on the grounds that war conditions no longer prevailed, and that 
such exploration was consistent with the principles which had been 
accepted by the British Government to govern the development of 
the economic resources of mandated regions, since it would not 
compromise any future authorities of Palestine, by leading to 
the acquisition of new claims, or the strengthening of old ones. 
Following on these representations, a conversation was held on 
9 September 1921 between the Colonial Office and Butler Wright, 
accompanied by L.I. Thomas of Socony, in which the latter were 
told that the only way of gaining a definitive reply was by making 
4 
a formal request. In this conversation, an attempt was made by 
1. G.L.M. Clauson (Colonial Office) to T.I. Lloyd (Colonial Office), 
19 August 1927, attached to c.o. 733/28/63371. This comment 
reveals clearly the difference in attitude between the Colonial 
Office and the Foreign Office. The latter would definitely not 
have viewed the controversy as in any way 'friendly'. 
2. L.I. Thomas, Socony to u.S. Secretary of State, 12 August 1921, 
For. ReI. 1921, Vol.II, pp.94-5; memorandum by A.C. Millspaugh 
of a conversation with L.I. Thomas, 4 August 1921, 841.6363/172, 
R.G. 59, N.A. M580/147. Thomas expressed the view that the 
British were being awkward in Palestine so as to allow them to 
use it for 'trading purposes' on the TPC issue. 
3. u.S. Secretary of State to U.S. Ambassador in Great Britain, 
22 August 1921, For. ReI. 1921, Vol.II, pp.95-6. 
4. U.S. Ambassador, London, George Harvey, to U.S. Secretary of 
state, 10 September 1921, For. ReI. 1921, Vol.II, p.96. 
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the Colonial Office to relate the issue of recognizing pre-war 
rights in Palestine to the position of the Turkish Petroleum 
Company in Mesopotamia, possibly in the hope that the Foreign 
Office would accept an alteration of the hitherto firm line on 
oil concessions in Palestine, in return for a cessation of the 
Mesopotamian controversy. The state Department was hardly likely 
to concede this, however, in view of its strongly expressed views 
th . 1 on e TPC lssue. 
The result of these informal negotiations was a formal note 
on the subject from the u.s. Ambassador to Lord Curzon. 2 In this 
note, Ambassador Harvey requested that the company be afforded 
permission to continue geological examination of the areas covered 
by their rights or concessions in Palestine, on the strict under-
standing that these investigations would not be conducted with a 
view to acquiring new claims or to strengthening old ones. 
Opinion within the Foreign Office was fundamentally split as 
to the wisdom of agreeing to the Ambassador's request. Weakley, 
the petroleum expert, was apparently in favour of allowing some 
latitude to Socony, despite his earlier insistence upon a firm 
line. Pointing out that the High Commissioner had already been 
granted certain discretionary powers in the matter of inaugurating 
works of public utility, Weakley argued that 'it be (sic) of 
advantage if we could meet the wishes of the u.s. Govt (sic) 
1. And in view of the belief expressed by Thomas that the British 
were using Palestine expressly for this purpose. An account 
of this conversation is given in L.I. Thomas to Socony, 
13 September 1921, enclosed in H.E. Cole, Socony to A.C. 
Millspaugh, 3 October 1921, 867n.6363/4, R.G. 59, N.A. M353/87. 
2. U.S. Ambassador, London, to the British Secretary of state for 
Foreign Affairs, 15 September 1921, For. ReI. 1921, Vol.II, pp.98-9. 
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even to allowing the Company to carry out operations if the 
Palestine administration saw no objection'. However, this did 
not represent a general softening of his opinion on Middle Eastern 
oil, a point that should be emphasized. On the contrary, he 
clearly saw the advantages of linking United states rights in 
Palestine with those of the TPC in Mesopotamia. He suggested 
that any reply to the American Ambassador, without explicitly 
recognizing Socony's pre-war claims, should stress that their 
possible existence had helped shape the Foreign Office attitude. 
A full recognition of Standard Oil Co. (sic) 
rights in Palestine would, I think, strengthen 
our position in regard to the oilfields in the 
Baghdad and Mosul vilayets and would show that 
we have no intention whatever of ignoring pre-
war rights when properly acquired. 1 
But although E.G. Forbes Adam agreed, and Lancelot Oliphant raised 
no objection, thus suggesting that opinion within the Eastern 
Department was fairly conciliatory, Office policy was shaped by 
Sir Eyre Crowe, who made plain his hostility to any surrender to 
United States pressure. Suggesting that the Foreign Office should 
first find out the views of the Colonial Office, he stated that 
It must be remembered that the U.S. govt (sic) 
are deliberately making our position in 
Palestine difficult by refusing to admit the 
grant of our mandate. The Colonial OffIce may 
possibly object to facilitating the objects of 
t~l.e Americans whilst they insist on putting 
spokes in our wheels. 2 
It was this opinion which was reflected in the Foreign Office 
letter of 20 September 1921 to the Colonial Office, forwarding the 
latest American note. Asking for Churchill's views on the united 
States request, it pointed out that the previous year it had refused 
1. Minute by E. Weakley, 16 September 1921, on E.10406/264/88, 
F.O. 371/6385. 
2. Minute by Sir E.A. Crowe, 17 September 1921, on E10406/264/88, 
F.O. 371/6385. 
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a similar request from the company, added that no decision on 
Socony's claims could be considered until the Peace Treaty with 
Turkey had been ratified, and stated that 
Mr. Churchill will doubtless take into account 
the fact that the United states Government are 
deliberately making the position of His Majesty's 
Government in Palestine somewhat difficult by 
delaying the issue of a mandate for that country 
and claiming to be consulted regarding its pro-
visions. 1 
This view was not, however, supported by other government 
departments. The Petroleum Department had, of course, been 
pressing the Foreign Office since spring 1920 to allow Socony to 
commence prospecting,2 and its head, Sir John Cadman, had 
apparently made his support plain to Socony.3 It is, of course, 
possible that he saw the possibility of tying in the question of 
Palestine to the verification of the more valuable TPC concession 
in Mesopotamia. The Colonial Office had already had opportunities 
to consider its attitude towards the Socony claim; it cannot have 
failed to have been aware that, following any relaxation of the 
policy on concessions, it was only a matter of time before the 
United States Government renewed its support for the American 
company. Moreover, in early September Colonial Office officials 
had discussed the question with Wright and Thomas, and it was 
at their instigation that the United States Government had 
approached the Foreign Office formally. Meanwhile, the Colonial 
Office had discussed the issue with the Foreign Office's petroleum 





Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 20 September 1921, E10406/264/88, 
F.O. 371/6385. 
Petroleum Department to Foreign Office, 27 April 1920, E3872/175/44, 
F.O. 371/5150. 
L.I. Thomas to Socony, 13 September 1921, enclosed in H.E. Cole, 
socony to A.C. Millspaugh, 3 October 1921, 867n.6363/4, R.G. 59, 
N.A. M353/87. 
Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 20 September 1921, 
c.o. 733/11/47206. 
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probable that it was the Colonial Office which convinced him of 
the wisdom of a more flexible attitude, rather than vice versa. 
In formulating its reply, the Middle East Department was not 
much concerned with the questl·on of the ol·l ·t If l se ,regarding 
the matter as of little importance, since 
the prospects of finding oil in any 
considerable quantities in this area which 
the Americans wish to explore are very 
dubious ••• I do not see that much harm will 
be done by letting the Standard Oil people 
carry out their investigations under the 
conditions laid down in the American Note. 1 
The improbability of discovering oil in large quantities differen-
tiated Palestine from Mesopotamia. The reasons behind the Colonial 
Office's attitude were clear. Whilst admitting that the United 
states Government were largely responsible for the continued 
uncertainty surrounding Britain's authority in Palestine, and 
that 'we should be on strong ground, from the dialectical point of 
view, in telling the Americans that they must abide by the con-
sequences of their own intransigence',2 Shuckburgh proceeded to 
argue in favour of rejecting such an attitude, not from local 
considerations, but from the international viewpoint. Pointing 
out that Sir Auckland Geddes, British Ambassador to the United 
states, was of the opinion that the United States Government 
strongly desired to come to an understanding with Great Britain 
on all issues, and that oil was one of many small factors affecting 
this, Shuck burgh based his plea for a conciliatory reply on the 
grounds that 
1. Minute by J.E. Shuckburgh, 23 September 1921, on C.O. 733/11/47206. 
2. ibid. 
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••• there is obvious advantage in removing 
a cause of friction between Great Britain 
and the U.S. (sic) ••• If this present case 
gives us an opportunity of contributing 
(however modestly) towards this happy 
development, I submit that we ought not 
to neglect it. 
This desire to minimize friction only went so far, however. 
Shuckburgh was anxious to 'so word our assent as not to afford 
a precedent for similar American demands elsewhere (eg in 
Mesopotamia) ••• ,.1 
On 29 September 1921, therefore, with the direct concurrence 
of Winston Churchill, Shuckburgh replied to the Foreign Office, 
stating that whilst Churchill did not overlook the attitude of 
the United States Government towards the mandate, 'he would be 
reluctant, merely on that account, to treat the present application 
in a needlessly obstructive spirit'. Stressing the importance 
of removing even the minor causes of friction between the two 
countries, Shuckburgh suggested that he should telegraph to the 
High Commissioner, asking him whether he would be agreeable to 
the representatives of the Standard Oil Company being given 
informal permission to conduct preliminary researches in the area 
over which they were known to claim concessions, with the object 
of discovering whether oil in payable quantities existed. Such 
permission would only be granted subject to the conditions mentioned 
in the Ambassador's note. To avoid American argument that this 
permission acted as a precedent in the case of Mesopotamia, it 
could be stated, Shuckburgh suggested, that whilst the validity 
of the Standard Oil claims remained undecided, the fact of their 
existence had influenced H.M. Government in allowing a survey to 
t " 2 con lnue. 
1. ibid. 
~~'~~;~1 n~~;ce to Foreign Office, 29 September 1921, attached 
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Faced with so unequivocal an expression of Colonial Office 
views, the Foreign Office probably saw no reason to demur. Crowe 
had no comments to add to Weakley's m;nute that 
.. ~ although 'we are 
aware, from confidential information, that even if the request of 
the Standard Oil Co (sic) be granted ••• this will not alter the 
attitude of the United States Govt (sic) in regard to their claim 
for equal economic opportunity ••• ', still, 'the grant of the 
permission desired would, as the Colonial Office point out tend 
in a measure to remove a cause of unnecessary friction. ,1 This 
reveals clearly how Foreign Office opinion had altered since the 
spring of 1920, when Sir John Tilley had been unmoved by Wright's 
talk of friction. 
Thus, the note finally sent to the u.S. Ambassador on 
26 October 2 was based on the Colonial Office suggestions, with 
the additions stipulated by High Commissioner Samuel, that the 
company should give a full report on their operations as required 
by the Palestine Government, and obey any instructions from that 
3 government. This note was described, somewhat lukewarmly, by a 
member of the Colonial Office as 'all right,.4 
One question, however, remained: how the United States 





Minute by E. Weakley, 30 September 1921, on E10849/264/88, 
F.O. 371/6385. Weakley had in fact already discussed this 
matter with the Colonial Office. See minute by J.E. Shuckburgh, 
23 September 1921, on C.O. 733/11/47206. 
Lord Curzon to the U.S. Ambassador, London, 26 October 1921, 
For. ReI. 1921, Vol.II, p.99. 
High Commissioner, Palestine, to Secretary of State for the 
Colonies 16 October 1921, C.O. 733/7/51726. It appears that 
the High'Commissioner in fact consulted the American consul on 
the matter. A. Southard, Consul, Jerusalem to U.S. Secretary 
of State, 28 October 1921, 867n.6363/13, R.G.59, N.A. M353/87; 
same to same, 20 October 1921, For. ReI. 1921, Vol.II, p.97. 
Minute by S.M. Campbell, 28 October 1921, on C.O. 733/11/53515. 
- 167 -
its reaction appears merely to mirror that of S ocony, which was 
sent a paraphrase of the Foreign Office note. Th e company was 
clearly antagonistic to certain of the conditions, particularly 
those stipulated by the High COmmissioner. It also objected to 
the fact that the development of its claims would be delayed 
until the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, 
and the final settlement of the terms of the Palestine mandate. 1 
As far as can be judged from state Department files, there seems 
to have been no overt response on the lines Shuck burgh desired. 
The American note to the Foreign Office, whilst showing appre-
ciation of the British Government's 'accommodating spirit', took 
exception to the conditions imposed by the Palestine Government. 2 
But, whilst state Department officials were prepared to continue 
to assist the company, it was apparent that they regarded the 
fight as won, and their part in the controversy as over, for they 
made it plain that further action was only contemplated if So cony 
3 so requested. 
This questioning of the imposed conditions effectively reopened 
the issue, but the same arguments were reiterated by the British 
Government Departments involved. The Petroleum Department con-





H.E. Cole, Socony, to U.S. Secretary of State, 17 November 1921, 
For. ReI. 1921, Vol.II, pp.100-1. 
U.s. Ambassador, London, to Lord Curzon, 1 December 1921, 
For. ReI. 1921, Vol.II, pp.102-3. 
F. Dearing (State Department) to H.E. Cole, Socony, 30 November 
1921, 867n.6363/10, R.G.59, N.A.~ M353/87 •. ~ther assistance 
was however given when the question of condltlons was referred 
back to the Palestine Government, and the American consul in 
Jerusalem was instructed to give discreet aid. Ambassador 
Harvey, London, to U.S. Secretary of State, 15 December 1921, 
and C.E. Hughes to the American consul, Jerusalem, 19 December 
1921, 867n.6363/20, R.G.59, N.A., M353/87. 
L.I. Thomas to A.C. Millspaugh, 13 December 1921, 867n.6363/19, 
R.G.59, N.A., M353/87. 
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also maintained a conciliatory attitude , possibly due to the 
fact that the Middle East Department had I p ayed no part in 
framing these conditions. The Palestine administration was 
also anxious to placate the United states, if we are to believe 
the American consul in Jerusalem, who was apparently informed 
by Sir Wyndham Deedes of the correspondence on the issue, and 
the reasons for the conditions, which Southard clearly found 
1 
acceptable. 
So, despite a somewhat sharp minute by Campbell, that the 
Colonial Office might with equal reason reply that it saw no 
f th 'b" t" 2 t reason or e company s 0 Jec lons, he reply to the Foreign 
Office was again conciliatory, not withdrawing the conditions, 
but explaining that financial stringency, which made the estab-
lishment of a Geological Survey of Palestine impossible, and 
public safety, not hostility to Socony, made these two conditions 
essential. 3 Since the Foreign Office found no reason to cavil at 
the proffered explanation,4 the British note to the United States 
Ambassador followed Colonial Office guidelines, and apologized 
for the fact that the conditions had not been expressed 'in 
sufficiently clear and unambiguous terms,.5 with this reply, 
the controversy was, in effect, ended, with the decision taken 
irrevocably that a conciliatory attitude was to be maintained 
1. A. Southard, U.S. Consul, Jerusalem, to U.S. Secretary of 
State, 20 January 1922, 867n.6363/31, R.G. 59, N.A. M353/87. 
2. Minute by S.M. Campbell, 14 December 1921, on c.o. 733/11/61625. 
3. Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 20 December 1921, attached 
to C.O. 733/11/61625. 
4. Minute by E. Weakley, 21 December 1921, on E13986/264/88, 
F.O. 371/6385. 
5. Lord Curzon to the U.S. Ambassador, London, 28 December 1921, 
For. ReI. 1921, Vol. II, pp .104-5. 
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towards American demands. I " f n Vlew 0 the innocuous nature of 
the explanations as to the reasons behl"nd th diti e con ons, they 
were in principle accepted,1 although the American consul in 
Jerusalem, whilst accepting that the conditions appeared 
reasonable, felt the requirement that a full report be furnished 
was 'inspired by the Zionists,.2 
The only issue that remained outstanding was the precise 
area which Socony was to be allowed to investigate, and whether 
such an area was to cover concessions and permits acquired during 
the war, as opposed to before it, in the settlement of which 
question Socony yet again enlisted the U.S. State Department's 
"t 3 aSSlS ance. This was, of course, a totally different issue, 
and one on which the Foreign Office, if not the Colonial Office, 
might have been expected to adopt a more intransigent line. But 
minutes following the presentation of a note from the United 
States Arnbassador4 show no such intention. Since the Foreign 
Office had not realized that Socony had acquired additional rights 
during the war, the original letter of permission had not been 
worded specifically so as to differentiate between the different 
kinds of claims. Moreover, since the United States had not been 
at war with the Ottoman Empire, her Government might not have 
1. L.I. Thomas, Socony, to U.S. Secretary of State, 18 January 
1922, 867n.6363/25, u.S. Secretary of State to American 
Embassy, London, 19 January 1922, 867n.6363/25, both in 
R.G. 59, N.A. M353/87; U.S. Charge d'Affaires, London, to 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 20 January 1922, 




A. Southard, U.S. 
State, 20 January 
No evidence could 
Consul, Jerusalem, to U.S. Secretary of 
1922 867n.6363/31, R.G. 59, N.A. M353/87. 
be f~und to substantiate this in British files. 
See various documents on this issue, dated March and April 1922, 
on 867n.6363/34,35,39,40,41,44 and 48, all in R.G.59, N.A. M353/87. 
Amb d London, to British Secretary of State for U.S. assa or, 
Foreign Affairs, 20 March 1922, E3155/132/65, F.O. 371/7783. 
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taken too kindly to having such a differentiation made. Even 
so, the Foreign Office proved amazingly conciliatory, arguing 
that 'there is of course the consideration that the geological 
examination of any areas in Palestine will be of service to 
the Palestine Govt (sic) as they will have copies of all reports 
made on the result of those examinations' , 1 and presenting this 
argument to the Colonial Office. 2 Since the High Commissioner 
in Palestine also favoured this approach,3 and following a 
meeting on 29 March 1922 between the Colonial Office, L.I. Thomas 
of Socony, and F. LeClerq of the U.S. Embassy, it was decided that 
the permission already granted would be deemed to cover all areas 
over which Socony possessed claims, including those for which 
permits were issued during the war. 4 In conveying this decision 
to Thomas, Shuckburgh expressed his opinion that 'I feel sure 
that our conversations will have had excellent results in clearing 
the air and placing matters in their right proportion,.5 
Thus, a potentially controversial issue had been averted by a 
display of co-operation and compromise by the British Government 
which drew from Millspaugh the comment that 'This seems to me to 






Minute by Sir C. Hirst, 21 March 1922, E3155/132/65, 
F.O. 371/7783. 
Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 25 March 1922, ibid. 
High Comm..-issioner Samuel to Colonial Office, 3 March 1922, 
C.O. 733/19/10622. 
Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 30 March 1922, and British 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to U.S. Ambassador, 
London, 4 April 1922, E3466/132/65, F.O. 371/7783. 
Mr. J.E. Shuckburgh to L.I. Thomas, Socony, 30 March 1922,. 
enclosed in L.I. Thomas to U.S. Secretary of State, 1~ Aprll 
867 6363/44 R G 59 N A M353/87; and Colonlal 1922, n. ,..,. • 5 
Office to Foreign Office, 30 March 1922, E3466/132/6 , 
F.O. 371/7783. 
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1 Government'. Socony was allowed to continue with its exploration, 
the results of which did not however encourage it to proceed with 
2 
an application for a mining lease, thus avoiding the vexatious 
issue of whether claims acquired during the war were valid. 3 
The only further involvement of the state Department arose because, 
following the geological survey, the Foreign Office began to press 
for a report to be submitted,4 a request which the company wished 
to delay meeting, since it had agreed to cede all Palestine 
holdings to the TPC as a part of the Mesopotamian negotiations, 
and was anxious not to reveal that these claims were of little 
5 
value. Finally, in February 1924, Socony sent to the state 
Department a report which made it plain that in most areas there 
was very little chance, if any, of oil in commercial quantities;6 
this report was forwarded to the British Embassy. Thomas was 
clearly very concerned at having to submit a report to a foreign 
government, 'especially as the British Government holds a con-
trolling interest in the Anglo-Persian Oil Co. (sic) Ltd., which 
7 is our competitor in nearby areas'. Clearly, although assured 
1. Memorandum by A.C. Millspaugh to Harrison, 7 April 1922, 
867n.6363/43, R.G. 59, N.A. M353/87. 
2. High Commissioner, Palestine, to Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, 31 May 1923, c.o. 733/45/29414. 
3. H.E. Cole to u.s. Secretary of State, 5 September 1924, 





Post Wheeler, U.S. Charge, London, to U.S. Secretary of 
State, 29 October 1923, 867n.6363/63, and other documents 
867n.6363/62, 63 and 64, all in R.G. 59, N.A. M353/87. 
on 
d b A W Dulles of a conversation with L.I. Thomas Memoran um y • • 
and Judge Speer of Socony, 28 November 1923, 867n.6363/~5, 
R.G. 59, N.A. M353/87. The State Department took the Vlew 
that the Company should submit the report. 
U.S. Secretary of State, 26 February L.I. Thomas, Socony, to 
1924, 867n.6363/68, R.G. 59, N.A. M353/87. 
L.I. Thomas to U.S. Secretary of State, 26 February 1924, 
867n.6363/69 , R.G. 59, N.A. M353/87. 
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that the report would remain confidential, Socony was too 
accustomed to the United states Government policy of making as 
much information as possible available to interested companies, 
to believe that the British Government, h .. muc more lntimately 
concerned with the Anglo-Persian, would forbear from following suit. 
A corollary of the granting of informal permission to Socony 
was that the Turkish Petroleum Company requested similar facilities 
for exploring its claims in Palestine, permission being granted 
subject to substantiation of its pre-war concessions, and to the 
other conditions imposed on the American company. This also failed 
t It . . 1 o resu ln a conceSSlon. 
In formulating its policy on Palestinian oil, the Colonial 
Office was probably motivated, at least in part, by its belief 
that Socony had some valid claim to the licences. 2 Thus, the 
policy not only appeared morally just, but allowed the British 
Government to draw parallels with the far more lucrative TPC 
concession in Mesopotamia. But this does not appear to have been 
the predominating factor, nor was the Colonial Office concerned 
to promote oil exploitation as a profitable source of revenue for 
the infant Palestine Government. The minute by Shuckburgh shows 
clearly that he believed the international viewpoint to be of far 
greater importance than arguments based on pragmatic local con-
siderations. However, although there is no specific proof in 
Colonial Office correspondence or minutes, the possibility that a 
conciliatory attitude on American oil demands might lead to the 
,--------
1. Petroleum Department to Colonial Office, 1 December 1921, 
Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 12 December 1921, and 
attached Colonial Office minutes, c.o. 733/15/59971; Foreign 
Office to Colonial Office, 22 December 1921, c.o. 733/11/63395; 
and W. Deedes to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 30 January 
1922, C.O. 733/18/6782. 
2. Minute by G.L.M. Clauson, 13 December 1921, c.o. 733/7/56656. 
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speedy acceptance by the United states of the mandates, and hence 
the termination of the uncertainty plaguing the Palestine adminis-
tration, may well have affected Shuckburgh's thinking. It should 
be borne in mind that during the summer of 1921 recurrent violence 
between Arabs and Jews had caused considerable problems for the 
local administration, and had led to the suspension of Jewish 
" " t" 1 lmmlgra lone Such unrest was exacerbated by the state of 
uncertainty as to when, and in what form, the mandates were to 
be issued, and whether American policy would support, or hinder, 
British efforts to restore peace. Although in fact Socony's 
geological researches did not encourage the company to apply for 
a concession, the granting of informal permission took the heat 
out of the situation, even though, as a result, similar permission, 
on precisely the same terms, had to be granted to the TPC for its 
Palestinian claims. It may also have been important in leading 
to the fairly rapid conclusion of an agreement with the United 
states on the Palestine mandate. (In the case of Iraq, there 
was no such agreement until 1930). 
From the British angle, the issue of Palestinian oil is 
important as showing the following points; that the Colonial 
Office, in discussing the question, thought in international 
rather than Palestinian terms, probably because oil was not an 
important asset in Palestine; that the impetus for a conciliatory 
attitude came from the Colonial Office, rather than the Foreign 
Office, insofar as can be judged from the records; and that in 
th I " I offl"ce was anxious not to commit itself late 1921, e Co onla 
" b" careful to stipulate that any concessions over Mesopotamla, elng 
in Palestine did not establish a precedent in the case of 
Mesopotamian oil. 
1. Klieman, pp.173-185; and Gilbert, Churchill, IV, pp.585-8. 
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Thus, one should be cautious of seel"ng l"n th"l t" e 01 ques lon, 
and its amicable solution in 1921-2 , part of a concerted attempt 
by the British Administration to placate the United states 
Government, as represented also by the solution of the naval and 
AnglO-Japanese Alliance questions at the WaShington Conference. 
The Foreign Office clearly showed no sign of such an attitude on 
Palestine, and the British Government Department that did, the 
Colonial Office, was extremely circumspect in its conciliatory 
attitude, being unprepared to extend it to Mesopotamia. None-
theless, it is significant that the Colonial Office was motivated 
by a desire to minimize friction between the two countries. 
Moreover, the attitude of the Foreign Office towards the United 
states had changed markedly from the spring of 1920, when tension 
between the two countries was at its height, to the autumn of 
1921, following the inauguration of the new Republican adminis-
tration, by which time the Foreign Office was prepared to meet 
the United states on some issues of mutual concern. However, it 
had clearly not concluded that, in order to improve AnglO-American 
relations, it was absolutely essential to sacrifice the strate-
gically significant Middle Eastern oil reserves, particularly 
those of Mesopotamia. Nonetheless, the Palestinian oil controversy 
does reveal that United states diplomatic pressure, and determination 
to safeguard American rights despite her absence from the League of 
Nations, was able to influence and alter British policy. 
The American aspect is a little more difficult to discern. 
In the case of Palestine, as in other issues, the tactics of 
to a large extent dictated by the diplomatic manoeuvre were 
state Department notes frequently being participating oil company, 
sent to the Foreign Office in response to specific company initiatives. 
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This pattern is also clearly apparent in Bahrain, Kuwait, and 
to a lesser extent North Persia. But, at the same time, the 
question of Socony claims in Palestine was bound up with 
weightier matters; the TPC claim in Mesopotamia and the securing 
for American nationals of equal rights under the terms of the 
mandate. The existence of concrete American claims in the case 
of Palestine allowed the United states Government to intervene 
more convincingly in these matters, although it was quick to 
expand the issue from the concrete to the abstract. It is 
noticeable that in order to achieve the desired ends, the United 
states was prepared overtly to use the weapon of friction between 
the two countries. 
Whilst undoubtedly the change of administration in March 
1921 was considerably to modify the earlier American hard line 
on Palestinian oil, the impetus for change, and the belief that 
the time was ripe for some kind of AnglO-American rapprochement 
on oil, appears to have come from the permanent officials within 
the state and Commerce Departments, convinced of the futility of 
conflict. Their belief that a peaceful and friendly solution to 
the 'oil war' was possible must have been accentuated by the 
comparatively rapid compromise in Palestine, although this is 
difficult to substantiate from state Department files. However, 
the granting of permission to Socony in october 1921, when taken 
with Cadman's trip to the United states in November 1921 (during 
which the possibility of Standard Oil/Anglo-Persian co-operation 
in North Persia was discussed) and, of course, the Washington 
Conference, all appeared to substantiate Millspaugh's belief that 
the British were ready for a general conciliation, and it is 
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perhaps significant that the idea of an international oil 
agreement, apparently in abeyance since April-May 1921, re-
appeared in December 1921.1 However, such an agreement would 
have to solve the controversy over Mesopotamian oil; and here, 
not only was British determination to retain supremacy firmer, 
but the international complications considerably greater, and 
hence the implications of any surrender to u.s. pressure 
correspondingly more serious. It is to the rapprochement in 
Mesopotamia and the implications for Anglo-American relations, 
that we now turn. 
1. 
. au h to Castle and U.S. Secretary of State, 
Memorandum by MiDsp g R G 59 N A In November 
1921 800 6363/333, •• , •• 10 December , • dm l· n the U S suggesting a S· John Ca an was •• , 
1921, of course, lr ti n See Memorandum by Millspaugh 
. f rom rcial co-opera o. . 
POllCy ~ co e mb 1921 890G.6363T84/24, R.G. 59, N.A. 




A Settlement in Iraq 1921-1928 
By the end of 1921, an amicable solution to the Palestinian 
and North Persian controversies seemed close. In the latter 
case it appeared that the two companies hitherto in contention 
for a concession in the five northern provinces would join 
forces in a joint Anglo-American enterprise. In the former 
instance there had been a compromise of the intransigent British 
policy towards oil concessions in occupied enemy territory in 
order to accommodate the Standard Oil Company of New York. 
However, if there was to be a full abatement of the 'oil war' 
between Great Britain and the United States, it was vital that 
some agreement should be reached regarding Mesopotamia. This 
was to prove more difficult to achieve. Both governments had 
heavily committed their prestige to the maintenance of their 
individual positions, in a prolonged and heated diplomatic 
exchange. Moreover, in view of the intense press interest in 
the controversy, any compromise by either government of its 
hitherto rigid line would be subject to the full glare of 
publicity, and subsequent public and political criticism. 
In view of the conciliatory policy adopted by the Colonial 
Office towards the Socony claims in Palestine, it might have 
been expected that the considerations of Anglo-American relations 
which prompted that compromise would also be applicable in the 
case of Mesopotamia. However, it should be recalled that, whilst 
the State Department was anxious to believe that the British 
Government was willing to co-operate and compromise on issues 
other than Palestine, opinion within both the Colonial Office 
, Off' was that any concession in Palestine should and the Forelgn lce 
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not imply a precedent for Mesopotamia; indeed, Weakley felt 
that the recognition of Socony's status in Palestine could only 
strengthen the claim of the TPC. 1 Moreover, one of the Foreign 
Office's main fears regarding the projected commercial settle-
ment in North Persia between Anglo-Persian and the Standard Oil 
Company was that it might spread outwards to Mesopotamia and 
South Persia. 2 Nevertheless, by January 1922 a decision had 
been taken to admit American interests into the Mesopotamian 
oilfields; a decision that, despite various trials and tribula-
tions (especially during the Lausanne Conference), and the 
unco-operative policy of the State Department, was eventually 
to result in the Americans obtaining a minority interest in 
the Turkish Petroleum Company. This chapter will examine why 
that decision was taken; why the State Department was so slow 
to accept the method of settlement proposed (a re-arrangement 
of shares in the TPC); and the impact of the Mesopotamian 
oil controversy on Anglo-American relations at the Lausanne 
Conference. 
It was demonstrated in the last chapter that March 1921 
marked an important turning point in the outcome of the Palestinian 
oil controversy, as a consequence of the transfer of administrative 
responsibility to the Colonial Office. However, whereas in 
Palestine formal representations by the United States Government 
had effectively lapsed in the Spring of 1920, in Mesopotamia the 
Colonial Office had to work within the context of a continuing 
1. 
2. 
This is discussed in Chapter 4. See in particular the minute 
b Shuck bur gh 23 September 1921, on C.O.733/11147206; and 
minute by We~ley, 16 September 1921, on E10406/264/88, 
F.O.371/6385. 
See Chapter 3. 
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diplomatic correspondence. On 28 February 1921 Lord Curzon had 
presented a formal note on the matter to the United States 
Ambassador, John Davis. Howev er, no reply could be expected for 
some considerable time, in view of the change of administration 
in the United States. This allowed time for the Colonial Office, 
which had just assumed responsibility for Iraq,1 to consider and 
determine its policy towards that country and Great Britain's 
mandatory responsibilities there. The evolution of an oil policy 
was to be of particular significance, since in Iraq (unlike 
Palestine) the indications were that the oil reserves were likely 
to be a major financial asset for any new Arab Government. 
The process of policy evolution began almost immediately 
within the Middle Eastern Department of the Colonial Office. 
Although initially little consideration was given to the specific 
issue of oil, the financial standing of the Iraq state was of 
paramount importance, with particular reference to the need to 
reduce British expenditure within the Middle East. Winston 
Churchill, the new Secretary of state for the Colonies, had as 
Secretary of State for War made plain his opinion that Great 
Britain's financial commitments in Iraq should be considerably 
reduced - views to which he adhered as Secretary of state for 
the Colonies. This opinion was shared by the Cabinet and the 
Middle Eastern Department, and was urged upon the Government by 
The Times newspaper, which had conducted a campaign for a 
substantial reduction in Middle Eastern military expenditure, 
and by many Members of Parliament. Thus, in drawing up the 
1. 1M tam' a' and 'Iraq' were used interchangeably throughout esopo 1 II' d 
this period. However, after March 1921, . ra~ was use 
. . 1 by Wh~tehall officials, and lt wlll be employed lncreaslng y ...1-
throughout this chapter. 
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agenda for the Cairo Conference, the most obvious priority was 
the need to implement drastic cuts in the cost to the British 
taxpayer of preserving law and order in Iraq. In summarizing 
his reasons for holding the conference , Churchill dwelt almost 
entirely upon the need for rigidly imposed financial stringency.1 
It was stressed in the agenda that 'No local interest can be 
allowed to stand in the way of an immediate programme for 
reducing the British Army of Occupation'. This was to be 
achieved by an immediate reduction in the forces stationed in 
Iraq, the formation of Arab levies under British officers, and 
extensive use of the Air Force. 2 
In addition to the partial withdrawal of British forces 
stationed in the Middle East, all other possible methods of 
reducing Iraq's deficit were also explored. In this cost-
conscious atmosphere, the vast potential income from oil 
royalties could not be ignored. By the development of Iraq's 
natural resources, not only could the new Arab Government's 
deficit be reduced, but it might even be possible to repay to 
the British Treasury some of the capital sums expended. However, 
in view of the strictly limited period of a mandate, if Great 
Britain were to receive any benefit from the oil riches of Iraq, 
it was critical that they should be exploited and developed at 




Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War, May 1920, 
C.P.1320, CAB. 24/106; Memorandum by R.V. Vernon on 
Financial Policy in Mesopotamia, 22 February 1~21,. 
C.O.732/3/8675; Winston Churchill to Sir.G. Ritch~e, . 
25 February 1921, C.O.732/3/10749; and Gllbert, Churchlll, 
pp.510-536. 
31 K1 4eman, ch.6; and confidential print, Ibid., ch.; .J- • d 
t th M·ddle East Conference held in Calro an 'Repor on e ~ 
Jerusalem', Middle East No.1, in C.O.935/1. 
Minute by H.W. Young, 7 September 1922, C.O.730/34/46340. 
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It was within this context f . 
o flnancial stringency that 
the Colonial Office had to evolve 
a policy for Iraqi oil. 
Moreover, it had also to consider the 
Foreign Office's diplomatic 
correspondence with the United states Government, 
wherein the 
British Government had insisted upon the validity of the TPC's 
claim to an oil concession over the two vilayets of Baghdad 
and Mosul. In addition, the Colonial Office found its hands 
tied in dealing with all concessions in mandated territory. 
In March 1921 the absence of a mandate for Iraq ratified by 
the League of Nations still theoretically precluded the grant 
of new concessions or the confirmation of old ones. Requests 
by the Middle Eastern Department for the adoption of the modified 
policy followed in Palestine (of granting concessions only in 
non-controversial cases of public utilities, subject to con-
firmation once the mandate had been issued) were rejected 
consistently by the Foreign Office until January 1922 - a sign 
1 of that Office's heightened sensitivity in the case of Iraq. 
The Foreign Office even hindered the perfectly legal Naft Khana 
operations2 until it was finally convinced that any American 
protests could be adequately answered. By that time - March 
1922 - the situation was in any case less sensitive, since it 
seemed as though a commercial settlement of the TPC controversy 




Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 31 May 1921, C.O.730/9/27093; 
Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 24 November 1921, C.O.730/ 
16/584; Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 25 January 1922, 
C.O.730/27/4149; and minutes, May 1921, on E5948/576/93, 
F.O.371/6363. 
Naft Khana was in one of the 'transferred territories', which, 
by the Turco-Persian frontier agreement of :913, had bee~ 
ceded to the Ottoman Empire, and were thus lncorporated lnto 
Iraq. It had been specifically provided. in ~e pro~col that 
the Anglo-Persian's rights in these.terrltorles by.vlrtu: of 
the D'Arcy concession in South PerSla were to remaln valld. 
See correspondence and minutes on C.O.730/1/18940, C.O.730/7/6020B, 
C.O.730/8/128 and 62227, C.O.730/9/20634, C.O.730/27/194B, 
C.O.730/2B/11031 and 22097; E2644/382/93, F.O.371/6360, 
E2290/132/65, F.O.371/7783 and E13349/9409/93, F.O.371/6368. 
I 
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Since there was no possibility of the immediate development 
of Iraq's oil resources, there was little incentive for a major 
interdepartmental discussion on Iraq oil during the hiatus 
between Lord Curzon' s note to the United States Government on 
28 February 1921 and the latter's reiteration of its demands 
for the 'open door' and the reference of TPC's claims to 
arbitration on 17 November 1921. However the Middle Eastern 
Department's attitude was slowly evolving during this period. 
Colonial Office officials were apparently neither so convinced 
by, nor determined to insist upon, the so-called pre-war 
1 
'concession' of the TPC, and were thus by no means as exercised 
by American demands as were the Foreign Office. They were not, 
however, prepared to reverse the policy of strong support for 
the TPC hitherto followed by the Foreign Office without a viable 
alternative, one which would neither represent a retreat from 
the British Government's previous attitude on the position of 
the TPC, nor involve imposing an unpopular solution upon the 
Iraq Government. 
Papers on the subject of Iraq oil and the TPC were only 
sporadic during the first nine months of 1921. However, whilst 
'no clear policy was definitely adopted by the Colonial Office, 
certain lines of thinking, to be important later, were already 
emerging. The transmission to the Middle Eastern Department 
by the Foreign Office of a print of correspondence with the 
2 United States Embassy to date met with little response, but by 
early May Major Young of the Political and Administrative Section 
1. 
2. 
This was particularly the view of R. V. Vernon. For a summary 
of his opinions, see his Memorandum on the ~C, 13 Dec~er 
1923, Confidential Print, Middle East No.5 ln C.O.935/1, 
and his minute of 13 December 1922 on C.O.730/34/61300. 
Off · and Colonial Office minutes Foreign Office to Colonial lce 
(or lack of them), 23 March 1921, C.O.732/l/14138. 
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was writing 
As a matter of fact we shall probably 
?ave to let in the Americans somehow, 
If we want to remove what we suspect 
to be one of the influences behind the 
aggression of the Angora Government in 
the neighbourhood of Mosul ••• But we 
should prefer to do it as an act of 
grace than by compulsion! 1 
Both the Colonial and the Foreign Off~ces ~ were convinced by 
military intelligence reports that the Standard Oil Company 
was financing Bolshevik and anti-British activities in Iraq, 
and, following the SUccess of the Nationalists in Turkey, 
Turkish aspirations to regain control of Mosul. 2 
Apart from the fear that the Standard Oil Company was one 
of the forces behind the anti-British activity in Iraq, the 
Middle Eastern Department was also concerned by the so-called 
'claims of the 22 heirs,.3 The crux of this controversy was 
the claim by the assor~ed heirs of the late Sultan Abdul Hamid 
that the oil properties in Mosul and Baghdad belonged, not to 
the Civil List, (thus reverting first to the Turkish and then 
to the Iraq state), but to the Sultan personally, and as such 
passed with the remainder of his personal property to his heirs. 
Had this claim been validated, the British Government could have 
been placed in an embarrassing position, for the claims had been 
assigned to a wholly British company, the Central Mining and 
Investment Corporation, thus creating the possibility of additional 
1. Minute by H.W. Young, 3 May 1921, on C.O.730/9/20161. This 
is quoted in Mejcher, Imperial Quest, p.119. 
2. See various papers on C.O.730/9/10195 and 21021; and 
C.O.730/12/12523. The Foreign Office also shared his OplnlOn. 
See correspondence and minutes on E2276/382/93, F.O.37l/6360. 
3. See papers on C.O.730/9/20161, 21021 and 30136; C.O.730/14j32248; 
C.O.730/15/34673 and 38940; file 38~93, F.O.37l/6360; and 
file 382/93, F.O.371/6360, 6361 and 6362. 
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international implications,- t ye , conversely, in the absence of 
effective Government backing the Corporation began to invite 
American backing, thus raising the t spec re of the claim passing 
into the hands of the Standard Oil Company. Despite the Colonial 
Office's scepticism on the claims of the heirs,1 and its belief 
that even in the event of their being validated, the Iraq 
Government could cancel the concession,2 the problem was to crop 
up recurrently throughout the next year, whilst the Colonial 
Office nevertheless did its utmost to prevent the Corporation 
from selling its alleged rights to the Standard. 3 The other 
American claim, by the Chester group's ottoman-American 
Exploration Company, was dismissed by the Middle Eastern Department 
as ' ••• only American "bluff" ••• ' possessing only nuisance value. 
Unfortunately, events in 1923 were to prove it to have an excess 
of the latter. 4 
Despite these rival claims, however, the main interest in 
Whitehall still centred upon the ambiguous position of the TPC. 
Two years of controversy on the many aspects of Iraq oil and the 





Mr. Nichols of Anglo-Persian believed he had found fairly 
conclusive proof to refute the heirs' claim. Foreign Office 
to Colonial Office and enclosures, 15 March 1922, C.O.730/28/12488. 
Minute by R. Bullard, 19 October 1921, on C.O.730/10/51413. 
Colonial Office to Sir L. Phillips, Central Mining and Investment 
Corporation, 18 June 1921, attached to C.O.730/9/30136. A sale 
to Standard Oil would inevitably provoke international con-
troversy. Agenda for the Interdepartmental Petroleum Committee 
meeting on 30 June 1921, enclosed in C.O.730/14/32248 and 
minutes of this meeting enclosed in C.O.730/15/34673. The 
claims of the corporati~n are briefly discussed in Mejcher, 
Imperial Quest, pp.116-117. 
Memo by Weakley on the American claim to. oil rights ~n Iraq! 
29 October 1921, enclosed in Foreign Off~ce to Colo~a1 Off~ce, 
7 November 1921, and minutes by Hall and Bullard, 8 November 
1921, C.O.730/10/55411. 
- 185 -
the interested Whitehall Departments. Although conditions in 
Iraq were rapidly changing, as was British policy therein, a 
Cabinet decision of 23 January 1920 that the oilfields should 
be developed directly by the British Government had not been 
changed or renounced, whilst confusion as to which government 
would claim royal ties on the oil prompted the Admiralty to 
suggest that they should be paid to His Majesty's Government 
in the form of Admiralty specification fuel oi11 _ a suggestion 
rapidly quashed by the Secretary of State for India, who was 
at pains to stress that the royalties would be payable to the 
2 new Arab Government of Iraq. 
It was thus essential that the Colonial Office should cut 
a way through this confusion, and on 20 June 1921 Churchill 
wrote a letter to Sir Maurice Hankey, Secretary to the Cabinet. 
This represents the first significant official statement of 
Colonial Office thinking on Iraqi oil, and was written within 
the context of a Cabinet discussion as to whether the oilfields 
. t tat t . 3 should be developed by prlva e or seen erprlse. The two 
important points to note were, firstly, that the Colonial Office 
for the first time stated definitely that it considered the 
British Government to be irrevocably committed to upholding 
the TPC's claim (and thus to private, rather than state, 
development of the oil); and, secondly, that the Colonial Office 




Memo by the First Lord of the Admiralty on Mesopotamian oil, 
18 March 1920, C.P.903, CAB. 24!101, and C.P.1554, 29 June 
1920, CAB.24/108. 
Memo by the Secretary of State for India on the Anglo-French 
Oil Agreement on Mesopotamia, 12 July 1920, C.P.1607, CAB.24/109. 
Various Cabinet memoranda of 1920, enclosed in C.O.730/14/30974. 
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to accelerate the issue of a mandate for Iraq by the League 
of Nations. Its suggestion was that an 'open door' formula 
should be incorporated into any TPC concession, whereby after 
a fixed number of years (15 was suggested) the Company should 
have to select a limited area for exploitation, having been 
permitted in the interim prospecting rights throughout Iraq. 
The land not chosen by the Company could then be thrown open 
for development by other oil interests. 1 The Petroleum 
2 Department had concurred in this formula, but at a later stage 
the Foreign Office was to oppose it, both because it confirmed 
the monopolistic character of the TPC's claim, and because the 
Iraq Government would be deterred for a considerable period 
from leasing the remainder of the country, thus militating 
3 against the creation of new and SUbstantial sources of revenue. 
In the event, this suggestion was put into abeyance until it was 
revived during the commercial negotiations as a feasible rejoinder 
to some of the state Department's objections. 
Although the Cabinet did not consider the 'open door' 
formula, a further step towards the evolution of a coherent 
British policy towards Iraq's oil was taken at an interdepart-





Winsbon Churchill to Sir M. Hankey, 20 June 1921, C.O.730/14/ 
30974. The suggested formula was eventually incorporated, 
in a much modified form, into the TPC concession, Articles 
5 and 6. Hurewitz, II, p.133. 
J. Cadman, Petroleum Department, to Shuckburgh, Colonial 
Office, 28 May 1921, attached to C.O.730/14/30974. 
Minutes by Weakley, 13 December 1921, and other Foreign Office 
minutes, E12708/576/93, F.O.371/6364. 
Minutes of the 6th Meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee 
on Petroleum, 30 June 1921, enclosed in Petroleum Department 
to Colonial Office, 13 July 1921, C.O.730/15/34673. 
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it was eventually decided that, although the Iraq Government 
was as yet unable to grant a concession , pending the ratifi-
cation of the mandate, an attempt should be made to proceed 
wi th nego tia tions wi th the TPC, on detail s of royal ties, 
conditions, etc., so that approval of the concession could 
be quickly given as soon as the legal authority was available. 
The Colonial Office urged this course of action upon the 
meeting so as to secure some return on Britain's enormous 
expenditure in Iraq at the earliest possible moment. This 
meeting represented a further avowal of the Colonial Office's 
willingness to accept, despite misgivings, the validity of the 
TPC's 'concession'. Negotiations with the Company were, however, 
felt to be impossible until the Cabinet decision of 23 January 
1920, that there should be state working of the oilfields, was 
rescinded. 1 A Cabinet memorandum was therefore drawn up, 
circulated and officially approved. In this, the Colonial 
Office again reiterated its belief that the diplomatic corres-
pondence with the United states had committed the British 
Government to the working of the Iraq oilfields by the TPC; 
and thus requested permission to open negotiations with the 
Company at an early date, on the basis of development through 
2 private enterprise, the royalties accruing to the Iraq Government. 
Although Colonial Office thinking on oil at this time was 
only a little more coherent than that of the British Government 
as a whole prior to 1921, it was in effect working on the 
1. Minute by H.W. Young, 10 August 1921, on C.O.730/15/38940. 
2. Memorandum on Mesopotamian oil and the TPC by the Secretary 
of state for the Colonies, 29 August 1921, C.P.3271, 
attached to C.O.730/15/42609. 
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following lines. Despi te serious misgivings as to the validity 
of the TPC's claim, the Middle Eastern Department was prepared 
to open negotiations with that company, in part because of 
Foreign Office correspondence with the United states Government , 
in part because the company offered a useful method whereby 
the Department's primary objective, early exploitation of the 
oil resources, could be attained. The Colonial Office still 
desired a British company at least to begin operations, and 
was ready to resist rival claims which might result in complete 
American control of Iraqi oil. However, it was prepared to 
limit the extent of the TPC's concession so as to allow other 
oil interests (possibly American) to share the oilfields. There 
would be strong reason to believe, therefore, that the Colonial 
Office would be favourable, or at least not hostile, to the 
possibility of an American minority share in the oilfields of 
Mosul and Baghdad, if this entailed a termination of the United 
states delaying tactics on the mandates, and the suspected 
standard Oil anti-British activity in Mosul. 
To enlist American participation, however, it would first 
be necessary to obtain Foreign Office approval, and prior to 
November 1921 there was no indication that that Office wished 
to adopt a conciliatory policy towards the United states. As 
late as September 1921, the Foreign Office had intended to 
continue its intransigent line towards the Socony claims in 
Palestine, only giving way when pressed by the Colonial Office. 
Moreover, although it would be difficult to know the policy of 
the new administration until some response was made to Lord 
Curzon's note of 28 February 1921, the Foreign Office apparently 
t d Ot to to ue the previous United states line on oil. expec e 1 con In 
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Indeed, the new Secretary of State, Charles Evans Hughes, had 
specifically stated to Ambassador Geddes that IC? On all) 
important points particularly oil and cables policy of former 
administration is approved and endorsed',1 and that the 
United States Government would not surrender the 'spoils of 
victory,.2 By mid 1921 it was assumed that the, new Republican 
Government fully intended to give vigorous backing to American 
companies seeking to exploit natural resources abroad. 3 As 
for the specific instance of oil, although Secretary of state 
Hughes was not thought to be heavily influenced by Standard 
Oil, Geddes had had occasion at a very early stage in the new 
administration to protest at a rash - and erroneous - statement 
by Secretary of the Interior Albert Fall. 4 
There was no reason, therefore, for the Foreign Office to 
expect any slackening of United States diplomatic pressure, 
and in the Spring of 1921 its determination to insist upon the 
validity of the TPC claim showed no signs of abating. 5 The 
1. Ambassador Geddes to Foreign Office, 14 March 1921, 
A1863/358/45, F.O.37l/5667. 
2. Geddes to Foreign Office, 5 April 1921, A2414/358/45, 
F.O.371/5667; and Geddes to Foreign Office, 7 May 1921, 
A3554/358/45, F.O.371/5667. 
3. Geddes to Foreign Office, 3 June 1921, A4208/358/45, 
F.O.37~5668. 
4. In a debate in the Senate on 12 April 1921 Senator Lodge 
5. 
had quoted from a letter addressed to him by Secretary of 
the Interior Fallon 21 March 1921, in which Fall had 
asserted that Great Britain was excluding the Americans 
from all British-controlled oilfields, that the British 
Government controlled the Royal Dutch-Shell group, and 
that the British Government was acting behind the back of 
the United States Government in Mexico. Geddes to Foreign 
Office, 14 and 16 April 1921, A2642/A2706/44/45, F.O.3?1/5639; 
and Geddes to United States Secretary of State, 20 Aprll 1921, 
For. Rel. 1921 Vol.II, pp.71-6. 
Minutes by R. 
F.O.37l/6360; 
18 June 1921, 
Sperling to Sir W. Tyrrell, on E2945/382/93, 
and minutes of an interdepartmental meeting, 
E7110/382/93, F.O.37l/6361. 
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attitude taken by the United States Government towards the 
Dutch on the DJ"ambi concession1 d to 
seeme suggest that it would 
only be a matter of time before Secretary Hughes returned to 
the charge that the TPC concession was invalid. Sperling, of 
the Foreign Office's American Department, was already thinking 
in terms of alliances by May 1921: 'we should find it useful 
to cooperate with the Dutch against the Americans in oil matters ••• ,2 
The Office was also taking a hard line against Italian attempts 
to force a share for themselves in Middle Eastern oil; whilst 
it was felt that 'It is, no doubt, ~talY'~ amiable intention 
to combine with the U.S. [SiC] in upsetting the San Remo agreement',3 
the conclusion was that 'This spectre does not seem very alarming. 
The United States can scarcely be sufficiently hard up to accept 
or relish Italian assistance in their oil schemes,.4 
In the late summer of 1921, the Foreign Office was given 
warning to expect a note on the oil controversy from the new 
administration. In a note on mandates, Ambassador Harvey 
explicitly stated that his Government would continue to refute 
the TPC claim, and would be addressing a separate note on this 





The Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) was prevented from 
holding the Djambi concession because all oil conc~s~ions 
in the Dutch East Indies were reserved for Dutch c~t~zens. 
The United states Government, in a series of notes, protested 
at this monopolistic policy. See Wilson, American Business, 
p.198; and G.S. Gibb and E.H. Knowlton, The Resurgent Years: 
The History of Standard Oil (New Jersey) 1911-27 (New York, 
1956), pp.391-394. 
Minute by Sperling, 6 May 1921, on A3990/44/45, F.O.371/5640. 
Minute by Sperling, 2 June 1921, on A3870/44/45, F.O.371/5640. 
E.G. Forbes Adam, Foreign Office, to J.C. Clarke, Petroleum 
Department, 17 August 1921, E8954/382/93, F.O.371/6361. 
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this note did not materialize untlol 17 November 1921, the 
Foreign and Colonial Offices were thus warned to commence active 
consideration of their TPC policy. In October, therefore, the 
Foreign Office sent the Colonial Office, presumably in preparation 
for interdepartmental discussions when the note arrived, an 
extensive memorandum on the history of the TPC up to 1918, and 
a recent Foreign Office minute on the Subject. 1 From these, 
and an additional minute by Weakley written at about the same 
time,2 Foreign Office thinking can be discerned. 
It was now becoming increasingly apparent that no one 
policy could encompass the promises made to the French Government 
by the San Remo agreement, the American insistence upon no 
monopolistic concessions being granted in Iraq, and the need, 
reluctantly conceded by the Foreign Office, for the new Arab 
Government in Iraq to consider all .pre-war claims to develop 
the nation's natural resources, and to decide upon the con-
ditions to be imposed. However, come what may, the Foreign 
Office was still determined to uphold the right of the TPC to 
a concession. The San Remo Agreement, framed within the context 
of the Cabinet decision on state working, was now represented 
as being based solely on the rights of the TPC (although that 
company was not mentioned in the agreement): whilst the Arab 
Government in Iraq was, in the eyes of the Foreign Office, 
legally bound to grant a concession to the TPC, although it was 
left free to negotiate the actual conditions. In attempting 
to reconcile all the different constraints, Weakley concluded 
1. Foreign Office to Colonial Office and enclosed memoranda, 
15 October 1921, C.O.730/10/51413. 
2. Minute by E. Weakley, 4 October 1921, E10717/382193 , 
F.O.371/6361. 
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We have_had no intention whatever of 
creating monopolies of any kind in 
man~ated territories but have simply 
c:almed f?r a British company, the 
rlghts WhlCh the Turkish Govt. [sic] 
agreed to cede to them under condi-
tions which were not defined at the 
time, but which it will be for the 
Iraq Government to determine. 1 
Hence, both the interested Departments in Whitehall were 
by the autumn of 1921 cOmmitted, albeit with differing degrees 
of conviction, to the maintenance and upholding of the TPC 
claim. However, in a formal note on 17 November 1921,2 the 
United states Government made plain that it would reject this 
claim, and if necessary would delay the grant of a mandate 
for Iraq until the British Government accepted its point of 
view. After considerable delay, the Republican administration 
had apparently adopted the attitude towards Iraq oil of its 
Democratic predecessor. 
The Republican administration which took office in March 
1921 had to formulate a new foreign policy which took account 
both of President Harding's commitment to isolationism during 
the election campaign, and of the bitter debates on the League 
of Nations. Nonetheless, many of the Democratic initiatives, 
especially in economic diplomacy, were continued by the 
Republican administrations during the 1920s: of particular 
significance was the expansion of the 'open door' philosophy. 
However, in view of the business orientation of the Harding 
Cabinet, it inevitably placed more emphasis than its prede-
cessor on practical assistance to American businessmen operating 
abroad. This new emphasis was reflected in many spheres, not 




Ambassador Harvey to Secretary of state for Foreign Affairs, 
17 November 1921, For. ReI. 1921, Vol.II, pp.89-93. 
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The diplomacy of the Harding administration 
, both in 
general terms
1 
and in the specific case of Middle Eastern oil,2 
has been well covered in secondary sources and will not be 
discussed in detail here. Th h 
ere are, owever, certain signi-
ficant aspects of its general policy which should be outlined 
before proceeding to a specific examination of how and why 
the note of 17 November 1921 was formulated. The two key 
figures in the evolution and direction of United States 
foreign policy during the Harding years were the Secretary of 
State, Charles Evans Hughes, and the Secretary of Commerce, 
Herbert Hoover. The former, as a prominent lawyer, was to 
take a particular interest in international law, including 
the American assertion and expansion of the 'open door'. 
Hoover, on the other hand, as a businessman himself, was to use 
his links with the business world to promote the practical side 
of economic diplomacy. One of his major concerns was opposition 
to the creation of monopolies controlling natural resources, 
not just in petroleum, but also other key commodities such as 
3 




Such as Wilson, American Business; Parrini; William 
Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy 
(2nd edn., New York, 1972); and Joseph Brandes, Herbert 
Hoover and Economic Diplomacy: Department of Commerce 
Policy 1921-1928 (Pittsburgh, 1962). 
Wilson American Business, ch.7; DeNovo, American Interests, 
chs. 6'and 7; and Michael J. Hogan, 'Informal Ent:nte: 
Public Policy and Private Management in Anglo-Amer~~an 
Petroleum Affairs 1918-1924', Business HiStory Rev~ew XLVIII 
(1974), pp.187-20S, (hereafter Hogan, 'Informal Entente'). 
This was demonstrated before Hoover entered the Commerce 
Department. Herbert Hoover, U.S. Food Administrator, to 
Secretary of Commerce, 10 May 1918, File 77270, R.G.40, .N.A. 
S 1 W"ll"am Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of Amerlcan ee a so 1 1 . Am" 
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controversy ,1 this was to place Hoover in direct conflict with 
British interests and British Government policies. Under his 
direction, the Commerce Department became far more efficient, 
and sought to play a greater part in the determination and 
direction of economic foreign policy} This was to result in 
more aggressive support by the government for American business-
men abroad, and a tendency to emphasize practical solutions 
above the maintenance of ideology. On occasion, the state 
Department proved jealous of Commerce Department interference 
in what it saw as its special sphere of influence, but the 
two were to combine in promoting an open door for oil companies, 
not only in the Middle East, but also Russia, the Dutch East 
Indies, Mexico and several South American countries. 3 
In March 1921, the permanent officials in the State Depart-
ment had two pressing reasons to evaluate and possibly revise 
existing policy towards Iraq oil and the TPC: the inauguration 
of the Harding administration, and the need to formulate a reply 
to Lord Curzon's note of 28 February 1921. Even before this 
note had been received, petroleum expert A.C. Millspaugh had 
begun to consider draft terms for a settlement, not just of 
the Iraq oil question, but also of several world-wide contro-
versies concerning petroleum, by means of an Anglo-American 
diplomatic agreement. 4 The desirability of this, in Millspaugh's 
1. 
2. 
Ibid., pp.84-128. As a consequence, the British Foreign 
Office came to the conclusion that Hoover was inherently 
anti-British, and would therefore make an undesirable 
President. See Chapter 6 below. 
Ibid., pp.3-21. 
. ch 7- and Hogan, 'Informal 3. Wilson, American Bus~ness, ., 
4. 
Entente'. 
Memorandum by Millspaugh on the General Petroleum Situation, 
19 February 1921, 800.6363/325, R.G.59, N.A. 
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opinion, was strengthened still further by the British note. 
Whilst criticizing the ' ••• weaknesses and absurdities of the 
British note ••• ' and commenting that the position of the British 
Government appeared ' ••• legally and morally t abl un en e ••• ' , 
Millspaugh nonetheless concluded that 
In my opinion, it is clearer now than 
formerly that a satisfactory adjustment 
of the petroleum question is absolutely 
bound up with the working out of a 
general understanding with the British. 
Unless this understanding can be reached 
it is apparent that the British will ' 
concede nothing to us and will take all 
they can get by any means in their power.1 
The changeover in administration seemed an ideal time to commence 
negotiations on such an Anglo-American petroleum agreement, not 
least because 'The recent notes from Britain have been parti-
cularly satisfactory and we have had other indications that they 
are conciliatory in their attitude,.2 Almost immediately upon 
taking office, Secretary Hughes was urged to adopt a conciliatory 
approach, and seek a compromise with Great Britain on not only 
oil issues, but also the shipping and armament questions. 3 The 
desirability of such an agreement was strongly advocated by 
Millspaugh throughout April and May, not least because of its 





Memo by Millspaugh on the British Note of 28 February 1921, 
3 March 1921, 890G.6363T84/23, M722/24. 
T.W. Swigart to A.W. Ambrose, 14 April 1921, Bureau of Mines, 
Special Files, E91, Vol.1, R.G.70, N.A.; and minute by 
Millspaugh, 19 May 1921, 800.6363/278, R.G.59, N.A. 
Minute by Van S. Merle-Smith to U.S. Secretary of State, 
11 March 1921, State 800.6363/325, R.G.59, N.A. 
See for example minute by Millspaugh to Dearing, 12 May 1921, 
800'6363/329- a~d memo by Millspaugh, 14 April 1921, 
890;.6363/66: both in R.G.59, N.A. M722/23. The possibility 
of such an agreement is discussed briefly in Hogan, 'Informal 
Entente' • 
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within the state Department that Great Britain was prepared 
to negotiate such an agreement, although this belief was based 
upon erroneous reports that John Cadman had been appointed as 
an expert adviser to Ambassador Geddes,1and that Anglo-Persian 
was willing to enter into a joint partnership with Standard 
Oil in Russia and Iraq, with the approval of the British 
Foreign Office. 2 
In early May 1921, however, the Secretary of State decided 
not to reply to the British note immediately, thus effectively 
preventing any initiative for an informal conference. The 
ostensible grounds were that the State Department was worried 
at ' ••• the feeling created at the British Foreign Office by 
the tone of certain notes sent in January and February last 
which were rather sharp in tone l • 3 Additional reasons can be 
surmised. Cadman had, of course, failed to arrive in Washington, 
thus implying that reports of a new conciliatory attitude wi thin 
the British Government were erroneous. In the meantime, alter-
native routes for American participation in the Iraq oilfields, 
other than by reaching an agreement with the British, had opened 
up: . 4 d in particular, the revival of the Chester cla~s, an 
the continued success of the Kemalists in Turkey. Information 
had already been received that, if the Turks regained Mosul, 
1. Butler Wright to u.S. Secretary of State, 23 March 1921, 
841.6363/133, R.G.59, N.A., M580/146; and various 




Memo by Millspaugh for the U.S. Secretary of State, 22 April 
1921, 811.6363/68, R.G.59, N.A. 
Unsigned minute to Millspaugh, 10 May 1921, 811.6363/72, 
R.G.59, N.A. 
Rear Admiral C.M. Chester to the Secretary of the Navy, 
30 March 1921, 'Oil', Commerce, Herbert Hoover Papers, 
Herbert Hoover Presidential Library (hereafter Hoover Papers). 
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they would probably wish to involve American interests in 
the exploitation of the oilfields. 1 
An additional factor was the concurrent development of an 
alternative, more pragmatic, policy, spearheaded by Secretary 
of Commerce Hoover. Hoover bel o d tr 1 1eve song y in a policy of 
'conservation at home, exploitation abroad'-, thus, for him, 
what was significant was not the solution of diplomatic con-
troversy, but actually securing for American oilmen a stake 
in the Iraqi oilfields. He therefore attempted to get ' ••• in 
touch with the petroleum industry in the country in an endeavour 
to organize something specific that we can get behind,.2 The 
result was the famous conference of 16 May 1921 with represen-
tatives of the oil industry,3 which helped consolidate the 
already existing possibility of a consortium of companies 
willing to exploit oil in Iraq.4 However within the State 
Department one prime cause for concern, to Millspaugh at least, 
was that his plans for a comprehensive, world-wide political 
agreement would become nothing more than a mechanism whereby 
o 01 0 d tr 1 f I 0 01 5 Amer1can 01 men ga1ne con 0 0 raq1 01 • For the remainder 
1. A.W. Dulles to u.S. Secretary of State, 24 March 1921, 
867.6363/75; and High Commissioner Bristol to U.S. 
Secretary of State, 29 March 1921, 867.6363/76, both in 
R.G.59, N.A., M353/67. 
2. Hoover to Henry P. Fletcher, 14 April 1921, 800.6363/272, 
R.G.59, N.A. See also Hoover to President Harding, 2 April 





See DeNovo, American Interests, pp.184-191. 
Memo by A.C. Millspaugh of a conference at the Bureau of 
Mines on 1 April 1921, 12 April 1921, 811.6363/46; memo by 
the Assistant Secretary to the Secretary and Millspaugh, 
6 May 1921, 811.6363/70; and memo by Millspaugh, 13 May 1921, 
811.6363/73 all in R.G.59, N.A.; Mark Requa to Secretary 
Hoover, 23 lpril 1921, and Hoover to various oil representatives, 
6 May 1921, Box 219, Commercial Official, Hoover Papers; and 
A.C. Bedford to Hughes, 21 May 1921, 890G.6363/28, R.G.59, 
N.A. M722/23. 
Minute by Millspaugh to Dearing, 12 May 1921, 800.6363/329, 
R.G.59, N.A. 
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of the summer, therefore, the concept of a political solution 
was put into abeyance, together with any discussion of a reply 
to the last British note, so as to allow time for American 
oilmen to organize a consortium of those companies interested 
in entering Iraq, and to establish links with British repre-
sentatives of the oil industry. 
By the end of September, renewed consideration was being 
given to the drafting of a note to the British Government. 
Despite assurances that the British were anxious to reach an 
agreement with the United States on oil,1 there was no sign of 
such an agreement materializing, whilst a solution of the 
mandate question also waited upon the United States giving its 
consent to the mandate terms - consent it was prepared to 
2 withhold, if necessary, until the TPC controversy was solved. 
This, however, could only postpone yet further the eventual 
grant of a concession for the oilfields of Iraq - a concession 
that might yet go to American interests if the State Department 
posture of rigid opposition to the ratification of the TPC 
claim, prevailed. An additional reason for the despatch of 
another note was the impending Washington Conference, at which 
it was hoped to discuss several outstanding sources of Anglo-
American friction, such as naval ratios, disarmament, and the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance. By making plain the United States 
continued insistence upon the open door, the State Department 
hoped to pave the way for a multilateral acceptance of that 
principle at the conference, whilst at the same time making it 
1. Memo by Millspaugh of a conversation with Mr. L.I. Thomas, 
President of Socony, 4 August 1921, 841.6363/172, R.G.59, 
N.A. M580/147. 
2. Various correspondence, 23 September 1921, on 890G.Ol/289, 
R.G.59, N.A. 
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impossible for the British to use economic concessions in 
mandated territories as a bargaining counter to secure their 
own desiderata. Throughout September and October, therefore, 
discussion took place within the Department on the arguments 
1 to be advanced in the proposed note. Although there was some 
dispute as to whether to object to the TPC's claim on legal 
grounds, or on the basis of its seeking to hold a monopolistic 
concession, it was clear that in any event the Department was 
totally unprepared to recognize or validate the TPC claim, and 
was inclined to press strongly for arbitration of that claim 
should the British prove obdurate. It was also determined to 
utilize the current atmosphere of AnglO-American rapprochement, 
in an attempt to force the door open for its citizens in Iraq: 
With the diplomatic support of France 
and Japan, the present British Government 
is not likely to recede from the position 
which it has taken, unless it is con-
vinced of the material value of our good 
will and that our good will will be 2 
affected by this particular question ••• 
Having been informed in early November that a consortium 
3 
of American oilmen stood ready to enter Iraq, a note was finally 
addressed by Ambassador Harvey to Lord Curzon on 17 November 
19214 at a time likely to be most effective (the Washington 





See various memoranda, September and October 1921, on 
890G.6363/49a, R.G.59, N.A., M722/23. 
Memo by Millspaugh, 20 October 1921, on ibid. 
W.C. Teagle et.al. to U.S. Secretary of State, 3 November 
1921, 890G.6363/49 , R.G.59, N.A., M722123. 
Ambassador Harvey to the Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, 17 November 1921, For. ReI. 1921, Vol.II, pp.89-93. 
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United states Government reasserted its demand that American 
citizens should be granted equal opportunity in mandated 
territories, questioned yet again the legality of the TPC 
claim, which it suggested should be referred to arbitration 
, 
and also hinted at possible objections on the grounds that 
the claimed concession was monopolistic. 
With the arrival of this note, it thus became necessary 
for the British Government to review its attitude towards 
American participation in the oil resources of Iraq, not least 
because of the decision already taken and conveyed to the 
United states authorities, to allow Socony to proceed with its 
investigations in Palestine; a decision taken in order to 
lessen Anglo-American friction. It was at the instigation of 
the Colonial Office that official policy towards Socony had 
been reversed; and it was also within that Office that the 
first steps were taken towards modifying the existing Whitehall 
a tti tude on the TPC - to which, hitherto, the Colonial Office 
had adhered. 
On the same date on which the latest United states note was 
received in the Foreign Office, but apparently unconnected with 
its arrival, Reader Bullard presented a very important memorandum 
to the Middle Eastern Department. 1 In this memorandum, he 
suggested that there might be a good case fgr throwing over the 
TPC and adopting a completely different policy. He justified 
this by a discussion of the legal basis of the TPC's claim, 
viz. the transference of the concession by Sultan Abdul Hamid 
to either his private account or to the Civil List, the trans-
ference of this concession back to the Turkish Government, and 
1. Minute by R. Bullard, 19 November 1921, C.O.730/16/58617. 
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the letter of the Grand Vizier, the legality of all of which 
could have been questioned with considerable justification. 
Pointing out that the Iraq Government could declare all 
concessions based upon Abdul Hamid's original transfer to be 
null and void, Bullard suggested that this should be done. 
As a result, the Colonial Office would not have to force the 
Iraq Government to accept the TPC as a concessionary whilst, 
as an alternative, it might prove possible to bring about 
some arrangement between the Iraq Government on the one hand, 
and British and American interests on the other, thus securing 
valuable political support from the United States. There is 
no indication that this suggestion was in any way prompted by 
consultation with other government departments; it appears 
to have been solely the consequence of Colonial Office opinion, 
evolved over a period which had seen delay and procrastination 
in the issue of the Iraq mandate, and hence in the development 
of that country's few financial assets. 
On 24 November 1921, Bullard's memorandum was discussed 
informally by Bullard himself, J.C. Clarke of the Petroleum 
Department, and Weakley of the Foreign Office. 1 The latter 
informed the meeting of the latest American note, and its 
strong demand for the reference of the TPC's claim to arbi-
tration. Bullard then put forward the somewhat heretical idea 
that the United states view could be strongly defended, since 
the concession was at best only one of many items in an agreement 
between the British, German and Turkish Governments in 1914. 
Since the agreement had never been signed, and ' ••• the war 
knocked the bottom out of it ••• ' there was, Bullard maintained, 
1. Minute by R. Bullard, 29 November 1921, on C.O.730/16/58617. 
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a strong case for arguing that the TPC concession was like-
wise no longer in effect. The other two participants in the 
meeting concurred with Bullard's view that it would be ' ••• a 
most valuable political asset ••• ' were Great Britain assured 
of the support of the United States instead of its hostility, 
particularly if the worst came to the worst, and the Turks 
regained Mosul (and with it part of the oil bearing territory). 
Clearly the Kemalist successes in Asia Minor, with their 
implications for the defence and stability of Iraq, had had 
an important effect on the attitude of the Colonial Office. 
At this meeting, a solution was suggested which would 
prevent the Foreign Office having to eat its words, a course 
of action which Lord Curzon at least would have found extremely 
distasteful. Clarke of the Petroleum Department suggested that, 
in view of the possible arrangement between the Anglo-Persian 
and Standard Oil Companies to work the North Persian oil 
concession jointly, Anglo-Persian might be inclined to reach 
a similar arrangement with the American company in Iraq if 
the British Government's position was fully explained. 
Within the Foreign Office, therefore, Weakley, the 
petroleum expert, was apparently convinced of the desirability 
of some kind of commercial settlement, as a way of solving 
Iraq's problems and averting further American pressure. It 
will be recalled that in the case of Palestine, Weakley's 
recommendation of a conciliatory policy was rejected by Sir 
Eyre Crowe. However, in this instance Crowe had already been 
impressed by Gulbenkian's expressed opinion that the best 
policy was to come to terms with Standard Oil. In view of the 
fact that the Foreign Qffice was already moving towards a 
commercial settlement in North Persia, whilst the Colonial Office 
was thought to be favourable towards letting the Americans into 
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Iraq, it was agreed by Lord Curzon that Weakley should discuss 
the possibility of an inter-company agreement with the 
Petroleum Department.1 On 30 November 1921, therefore, Weakley 
saw Clarke of that Department, who suggested that, since the 
situation was a difficult one J..°n vJ..°ew of the British diplomatic 
support for the TPC, it would probably be best J..°f any arrange-
ment was brought about by commercial negotiations between 
companies, rather than by diplomatic agency, for 
Mr. Clarke felt that the giving of an 
interest to Americans in Mesopotamia 
would go very far towards removing our 
difficulties with the U.S. Govt. [sic] , 
and would no doubt be of advantage to 
British interests •••• 2 
Thus, yet again the Colonial Office and the Petroleum Department 
were in effective alliance to urge upon the Foreign Office the 
advantages of a conciliatory policy. In evolving its own 
reaction to the United States Note, therefore, the Foreign 
Office was well aware of the fact that other departments in 
Whitehall would favour conciliation rather than confrontation. 
Moreover, the current state of Anglo-American relations also 
impelled it to a gesture of conciliation towards American interests. 
Following the acceptance by the British Cabinet in June 1921 of 
3 the fact that 'Britain cannot quarrel with the United States;, 
the American Government had in effect been manoeuvred into 
calling a disarmament conference, which met in Washington D.C. 
from November 1921 to February 1922. In the series of Treaties 




Minutes by Sir W. Tyrrell, 24 November 1921, and Sir E. 
Crowe, 25 November 1921, on E13144/382/93, F.O.37~6362. 
Minute by Weakley, 30 November 1921, on E13144/382193, 
F.O.371/6362. 
Cabinet Minutes, 56th Meeting, 30 June 1921, CAB.23. 
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her naval supremacy, and the twenty year old Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance, in order to placate the United States. 1 Coinci-
dentally, on 6 December 1921, a treaty was signed which 
achieved a settlement of the Irish question, for so long 
a running sore in Anglo-American relations. 2 Thus, the only 
two major sources of friction with the United States remaining 
unresolved were the war debts issue and the oil controversy. 
Sir Auckland Geddes, British Ambassador in the United States, 
and long time advocate of Anglo-American rapprochement and 
friendship, was to continue to urge upon the Foreign Office 
the settlement of these two outstanding differences. 
It is within this context that one must read the corres-
pondence concerning oil that was sent to the Foreign Office 
by Ambassador Geddes in December 1921 and January 1922. 
Although Geddes was primarily commenting upon the proposed 
commercial settlement in North Persia, the implication was 
that the conciliatory attitude adopted there might profitably 
be extended to Iraq. The Ambassador emphasized the beneficial 
effect that such a general settlement might have upon Anglo-
American relations; an agreement between Anglo-Persian and 
Standard Oil 
1. Thomas H. Buckley, The United States and the Washington 
Conference, 1921-1922 (Knoxville, Tennessee, 1970); 
Ira Klein, 'Whitehall, Washington and the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance 1919-21' Pacific Historical Review 41 (1972), pp.460-4~3; and R~berta Allbert Dayer, 'The British War 
Debts to the United States and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 
1920-1923', Pacific Historical Review 45 (1976), pp.569-595. 
2. Alan J. Ward, Ireland and Anglo-American Relations 1899-1921 
(London, 1969), ch.11. 
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••• might well give a new aspect to 
the whole oil situation, and remove 
one powerful factor from amongst the 
hostile influences to be reckoned with 
in the relations between the United 
states and the British Empire. 1 
an assertion to which Hoover was later to lend credence.2 
However, even before Geddes' representations, Foreign 
Office opinion was moving strongly towards support of the 
commercial settlement favoured by the Colonial Office and 
Petroleum Department. This opinion was summed up in a long, 
and powerfully argued memorandum by Weakley.3 Primarily a 
detailed, paragraph by paragraph, criticism of the latest 
United States note, Weakley also surmised that, since the 
United States Government clearly linked the TPC controversy 
with the general dispute over monopolies in 'A' mandated 
territories, further delay in the ratification of the Iraq 
mandate would possibly result unless a settlement was reached 
on the oil question. He then proceeded, in a lengthy con-
clusion, to discuss alternative future policies. Although he 
reiterated as firmly as ever the Foreign Office's complete 
belief that the TPC was in possession of a diplomatically 
binding promise of a concession, Weakley also admitted that 
there could be no guarantee that a court of arbitration would 
accept this view. Two other problems were also clearly exer-




Geddes to Foreign Office, 23 December 1921, E329/7/34, 
F.O.371/7812. Oliphant shared this opinion; see his 
minute, 11 January 1922, on ibid. 
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suggestion of a commercial settlement. 
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the concession was monopolistic; and the Colonial Office's 
insistence that the Iraq Government would have to be induced 
to recognize the validi ty of the Company's claim. The 
Foreign Office reluctantly admitted that this last might pose 
a sincere problem which would ' ••• require some consideration 
as Standard Oil influence, skilfully directed, might possibly 
be brought to bear on native members of the Arab adminis-
tration'. Also talking into consideration rival claims of 
other companies to the concession, particularly the 22 heirs, 
the Foreign Office stated that it might be a good idea to 
examine the possibility of adopting either the United States 
suggestion of arbitration, or ' ••• some other method of meeting 
the United States Government'. 
Weakley then proceeded to examine the various alternative 
methods of doing this. One was Churchill's suggestion that 
the area of the TPC's eventual mining lease should be restricted. 1 
This the Foreign Office did not really favour. A second course 
was that some understanding on commercial lines might be arrived 
a t with the Standard Oil on Iraq which ' ••• in the end might 
tend to dissipate our differences with the United States Govern-
ment'. Such a commercial bargain between the TPC and Standard 
could give the Americans a share, either of the TPC's shareholding, 
or the output of oil. If the former, the Americans would 
probably want at least parity with the French (25%), and, in 
view of the total British holding of 75%2 might hold out for more. 
1. 
2. 
w. Churchill to Sir M. Hankey, 20 June 1921, C.O.730/14/30974. 
This figure was not strictly accurate, being based upon the 
assumption that Anqlo-Saxon, a British registered subsidiary 
of Royal DutCh-Shell, was wholly British. In fact, 60% of 
the company was owned by Royal Dutch - a Dutch firm. 
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Clearly, it would have to be a condition that any commercial 
arrangement would be dependent Upon the Am . 
erlcan state Depart-
ment ceasing to dispute the validity of the TPC's claim. 
Weakley argued that the best Course would be for the TPC to 
negotiate with American and possibly Italian interests on the 
formation of a new company, which would then approach the 
Iraq Government for the grant of a new concession to develop 
all the oil resources found in Iraq, thus obviating the need 
to justify the rights of the TPC to the United States and Iraq 
Governments. Weakley's rendering of Bullard's argument was 
accepted by Forbes Adam, Crowe and Curzon,1 and, having been 
accepted as Foreign Office policy, the memorandum was sent to 
the Colonial Office on 20 December 1921, together with a 
request for that Office's opinion of the proposal that a 
settlement should be made on commercial lines. 2 
Discussion of the memorandum in the Colonial Office did 
not even embrace the actual principle of American and Italian 
participation which, as Hall pointed out, ' ••• emanated from 
3 this department'. He therefore immediately proceeded upon 
the assumption that it only remained to give careful consider-
ation to the steps necessary to implement foreign participation. 
A major preoccupation was to avoid the British Government having 
to recant its hitherto intransigent position; this effectively 
ruled out any official approach by the British to the American 
Government, since this would be seen by the United States 
1. Minutes by Forbes Adam, Crowe and Curzon, 16 and 17 December 
1921, on E12708/576/93, F.O.37~6364. 
2. Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 20 December 1921, 
E12708/576/93, F.O.37~6364. 
3. Minute by J.H. Hall, 30 December 1921, on C.O.730/10/63008. 
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, • • .as tantamount to an acknowledgment that the validity of 
the company's claim is open to doubt'. Even feelers by the 
Anglo-Persian would almost certainly be reported by the 
Standard Oil Company to the State Department as a weakening 
of the British line. Hall therefore suggested that they 
should instead press Anglo-Persian to encourage Standard Oil 
to take the initiative. The British Government could then 
postpone any reply to the Americans until the commercial 
negotiations reached an advanced stage. An official Note to 
the United States Government could consequently argue that, 
a settlement on commercial lines being so near, a referral to 
arbitration was unnecessary. An alternative would be to notify the 
United States Government immediately that the British Government 
was prepared to recommend to the TPC that it should admit 
American and Italian interests. Hall did not desire to adopt 
this latter course, although he did not elaborate upon the 
reasons. It is possible, however, that his attitude reflects 
the Colonial Office's primary concern with Iraqi policy, rather 
than Anglo-American relations, since by the former course, the 
British Government would retain complete freedom of action 
should negotiations break down. In any event, the Colonial 
Office's reply to the Foreign Office clearly accepted the 
principle of a commercial settlement, and suggested an informal 
conference to discuss the question of a reply to the American 
1 2 
note, a suggestion with which Weakley concurred. 
The Petroleum Department was in agreement with most of the 
Colonial Office's attitudes, except that it opposed Italian 
1. Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 3 January 1922, 
C.O.730/10/63008. 
2. Minute by Weakley, 5 January 1922, on E1321132/65, 
F.O.371/7782. 
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participation in Iraqi oil. It did, however, strongly favour 
American entry into the TPC and, in view of the negotiations 
in progress between Standard Oil and Sir John Cadman of 
Anglo-Persian concerning the North Persian concession, agreed 
with Hall that a reply to the American Note might wait on a 
commercial settlement.1 One primary consideration, in the 
eyes of the Petroleum Department, was the need to avoid if 
possible any reference of the TPC's claim to arbitration, 
the outcome was regarded as by no means certain. 
Besides the argument adduced in this correspondence in 
favour of American participation, there must also be taken 
into account the opinion expressed by two leading counsel, 
that whilst His Majesty's Government was undoubtedly within 
its rights in supporting the TPC's claims, such claims were 
diplomatic rather than legal, and were primarily based upon 
considerations of international right. The Petroleum Department 
found this reassuring, but the Colonial Office felt such argu-
ments would be of little significance in a Court of International 
A b · t t' 2 .. h d b th F . Off' 3 r 1 ra lon, an OplnlOn s are y e orelgn lce. The 
policy of encouraging a commercial settlement, and hence 
avoiding the necessity of an arbitration decision, thus appeared 
even more desirable. Meantime, the increased activity by the 
'22 heirs' heightened still further support for a commercial 
4 
settlement. 
1. Petroleum Department to Foreign Office, E156/132165, F.O.37l/7782. 
2. J.C. Clarke, Petroleum Department, to R.W. Bullard, Colonial 
Office, 9 January 1922, C.O.730/33/1856; and minute by 
J.H. Hall, 12 January 1922, on ibid. 
3. Petroleum Deparbnent to Foreign Office, 7 January 1922, 
E604/132/65; and minute by Weakley, 11 January 1922, 
E412/132/65 , F.O.371/7782. 
4. Sir H. Rumbold to Foreign Office, 7 January 1922, E604/132/65, 
and minutes on ibid, especially those by Weakley, 2 March 1922 
and Sir C. Hurst, 9 March 1921; and minutes on E634/132/65, 
both on F.O.371/7782. I 
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So, by the end of January 1922, the Foreign Office was 
completely in favour of co-operation between Standard Oil and 
Anglo-Persian in Iraq, a solution which, as D.G. Osborne minuted, 
••• seems eminently desirable. I suppose 
participation of the Standard Oil in the 
Turkish Petroleum Co.'s (sic] concession 
will still the doubts of~e U.S. Govt. 
[sic] as to the validity of that con-
cession? I wish we could give the Italians 
a share too. I suppose we should if they 
had as big a stick as the Americans. 1 
Events later that year were to substantiate Osborne's doubts as 
to whether American participation in the TPC would be sufficient 
to satisfy the United States Government. The opening of nego-
tiations did, however, help minimize the Foreign Office fear 
that Standard Oil might bring strong pressure to bear upon the 
Iraq Government, thus preventing the ratification of the TPC 
concession. 2 The Colonial Office had an additional suspicion 
that the Standard Oil Company might be backing the Turks, in the 
hope of securing a concession over Mosul if that district should 
revert to Turkey: 
It is not known how far the United States 
Government are aware of the Standard Oil 
negotiations with Angora, but their 
attitude regarding 'A' mandates generally, 
the North Persia oil concessions, railway 
enterprise in Persia, etc., leads to the 
belief that they would not regret the 
return of the Turks to Iraq if it gave 
United States oil interests a hold in the 
Iraq oil-fields. 3 
1. Minute by D.G. Osborne, 24 January 1922, on E782/132/65, 
F.O.371/7782. 
2. Minutes by Weakley, 4 February 1922, on ibid; and 27 February 
1922 on E2193/132/65, F.O.371/7783. 
3. Memo on Foreign Incitement of the Turks to attack Iraq, 
circulated by the Secretary of state for the Colonies, 
13 December 1921, C.P.3566, CAB. 24/131. See also Mejcher, 
Imperial Quest, pp.118-119. 
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Since all the interested departments were fully in agreement 
wi th the proposed policy, l· t l· S hardly 
surprising that an informal 
conference held at the Colonial Office on 16 January 1922 rapidly 
concluded that any reply to the United States Government should 
be postponed whilst commercial negotiations proceeded. 1 Responsi-
bility for the overseeing of further developments was surrendered 
by the Foreign Office, which now regarded the whole question as 
being the Colonial Office's 'pigeon,.2 It is interesting to note 
that the confere~ce proceeded on the assumption that the principle 
of American participation was already accepted by the British 
Government, although there was as yet no Cabinet sanction for this 
policy. After discussion, it was decided that arbitration should 
be avoided if possible, by a settlement on commercial lines, and 
that the sanction of the Cabinet should be obtained, both for the 
principle of American participation, and for the proposed method 
f .. t 3 o securlng l • 
On 13 March 1922, therefore, Churchill circulated a Cabinet 
memorandum requesting Cabinet approval for the decisions taken 
4 by the January conference. Stating that • The High Commissioner 
for Iraq is constantly pressing for a decision which will make 
it possible to proceed with the development of the oil resources 
of Iraq', Churchill emphasized the major financial and political 
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the United states Government to the ratification of the mandate 
as the major delaying factor. Since the abandonment of the TPC's 
claim would be a blow to the prestige of the British Government, 
this alternative was reJ"ected. So too th "b"l"t f 
, ,was e POSSl l l Y 0 
a reference to arbitration which might well go against the 
British Government, and, in any case, would leave unanswered 
charges of monopoly. Churchill therefore conceded that the British 
Government was 'driven back' on to the alternative of admitting 
American interests to a minority holding in the TPC, to be arranged, 
if possible, by commercial negotiations initiated by the Standard 
Oil Company. Cabinet sanction having been obtained, the question 
became one of commercial negotiations between the companies 
involved, in which the British Government officially played no part. 
Pending the outcome of the hoped-for commercial settlement, 
replies to the American Government's two notes on mandates and the 
TPC were postponed. The Foreign Office clearly hoped that such a 
settlement would also bring to an end United States objections to 
the Iraq mandate, Forbes-Adam of the Foreign Office explaining 
to the Cabinet Office that 
••• we hope that their objections to the 
concessions article in the mandate ••• may 
be diminished or indeed waived altogether, 
once the vexed question of the Turkish 
Petroleum Company's claim to oil concessions 
in Irak is decided so far as the United 
States are concerned. 1 
The Foreign Office had good reason to be optimistic on this point 
for, shortly after the Socony claim in Palestine had been settled, 
Secretary of State Hughes had informally expressed his willingness 
to negotiate a treaty between the United States and Great Britain, 
1. Forbes Adam to C. Tufton (Cabinet Office), 27 February 1922, 
E1992/78/65, F.O.371/7775. 
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whereby American citizens would be accorded the .. same prlvlleges 
in Palestine as were extended to members of the League of Nations. 
He expressly stated that the United States would not insist upon 
provisions being incorporated into such a treaty against the 
granting of monopolistic concessions, provided that the British 
Government gave assurances that American citizens would be granted 
1 
equal treatment. Only time could tell whether the United States 
would be prepared to show the same accommodating spirit in the 
case of Iraq. 
In effect, therefore, by January 1922, despite an earlier 
determination not to surrender to American pressure in Iraq, the 
British Government had accepted, as it had done in Palestine, the 
necessity of accommodating United States protests. In both cases, 
it was the Colonial Office which had initiated the conciliatory 
policy. As was examined in the last chapter, in deciding to allow 
Socony to proceed with work on its claims, the Colonial Office 
was motivated almost entirely by a desire to mitigate Anglo-American 
friction. Given the timing of the demarche in Iraq, coincident 
with the Washington Conference and the settlement of the Irish 
question, one might have expected that that, too, reflected a 
desire to accommodate the United States. Whilst it was undoubtedly 
this reasoning that prompted Ambassador Geddes to urge compromise 
upon the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office's reasons for agreeing 
to the admittance of American participation were somewhat complex, 
and influenced almost entirely by considerations of Iraqi policy. 
Shuckburgh once again summed up the essence of the Colonial Office 
attitude: 
1. Hughes to Balfour, 27 January 1922, E2469/78/65, F.O.371/7775. 
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The p:esent position is that everybody 
here 1S agreed that it is impracticable 
to insist on the exclusive rights of the 
Turkish Petroleum Company, or to keep 
American oil interests permanently out 
of Iraq. That being so, it behoves us 
to open the door to the Americans with 
the best grace that we can assume. 1 
Clearly the doubts felt by certain Colonial Office officials as 
to the validity of the TPC's claim, and their unwillingness to 
impose these claims upon the Iraq Government, were important in 
the evolution of policy.2 In the circumstances, the admittance 
of American interests was seen as a way of preventing the greater 
evil of a reference to arbitration or, as Young put it, of getting 
'some kind of white from two or three blacks,.3 Such a solution 
would also have an effect on more pressing problems, such as the 
ratification of the mandate, and possibly even the Kemalist 
threat, and bring with it 
••• the obvious advantages which would 
result from securing the active support 
of the American Government in the Middle 
East, a result which in my opinion could 
not be attained without satisfying in 
some measure American aspirations with 
regard to Iraq oil. 4 
Apart from the positive advantages of admitting American 
interests, there had also to be considered the problems that would 
inevitably result from continued resistance to American demands, 





Minute by Shuckburgh to Sir J. Masterton-Smith, 30 January 
1922, on C.O.730/33/3624. 
Minute by R. Bullard, 19 November 1921, C.O.730/16/58617; 
and memorandum by R.V. Vernon on the TPC, 13 December 1923, 
Confidential Print, Middle East No.5 in C.O.935/1. 
Minute by Young, 28 January 1922, on C.O.730/33/3624. 
Secretary of State for the Colonies to High Commissioner~ 
Iraq, 11 February 1922, attached to C.O.730/33/:1~4~ Th1S 
was - remarkably - the first time that the.poss1bl:lt~ of 
American involvement was broached to the Hlgh COmmlSSloner. 
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1 
understandable. The Colonial Office's pessimism is clearly 
demonstrated in a letter to the Foreign Offl·ceoo ' ••• so long as 
the Americans are excluded from participation in Iraq oil, we 
shall never see the end of our difficulties in the Middle East,.2 
These difficulties included, inter alia, the overwhelming need to 
correct the perpetual deficit on the Iraq revenues, Kemalist 
demands for Mosul which might well be backed by Standard Oil, and 
Iraqi discontent at the delay in exploiting what promised to be 
Iraq's greatest asset. 3 Overshadowing all these discussions was 
the possibility that a reference to the TPC's claim to arbitration 
might not be successful, whilst even a successful arbitration 
finding might be followed by a further American challenge, this 
time on the ground of monopoly, and hence yet further delay in 
the commencement of an Iraq oil industry. Acceptance of a 
minority American shareholding would be the lesser of two evils: 
It is time that H.M. Government are probably 
in a position to get from the Iraq Government 
a concession controlled by British subjects, 
but to do so would place H.M. Government in a 
most invidious position vis-a-vis the united 
States, while if they did not wish to use their 
influence in this direction, or if their efforts 
were frustrated by methods which are now known 
to be familiar to the Standard Oil Company, we 
might find ourselves forced to accept a situation 
which left the control of the oil resources in 
Iraq in the hands of non-British companies or 
individual s • 4 
1. 'I have never felt that our present attitude was one which you 
could expect the united States to put up with'. Churchill to 
Sir P. Lloyd-Graeme, Petroleum Department, 7 January 1922, 
C.O.730/27/3167. 
2. Churchill to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1 February 
1922, C.O.730/27/3167. This letter is also discussed in 
Mejcher, Imperial Quest, p.119. 
3. 
4. 
December 1924 relating to the 
Confidential Print, Middle East 
by Young, 10 August 1921, on 
'Correspondence March 1921 -
financial position in Iraq'. 
No.2, C.O.935/1; and minute 
C.O.730/15/38940. 
M dum 
on Iraq oil by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
emoran . 1· th t . t C.P.3832, CAB. 24/134. On the colonial Offlce be lef a l . 
could persuade the Iraq Government.to g:ant the TPC a concesslon , 
see also Memorandum on Oil Concesslons In Iraq by R. Bullard, 
1, C. and minute by H. Young, 
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Colonial Office thinking on American involvement in the 
TPC was in many ways as complex as the rapidly changing situation 
in Iraq itself. A number of motives prompted its alliance with 
the Petroleum Department to promote American entry into that 
company, but in essence its new attitude represented the 
realization that continued United states hostility and all it 
implied could only worsen Britain's already difficult position 
in Iraq; whilst American political support, however minimal, 
would assist Great Britain in coping with the difficulties 
engendered by the Kemalist successes in Asia Minor. Its desire 
for a commercial rather than a diplomatic settlement would not 
only allow the British Government to resume its support for an 
unreconstituted TPC should circumstances change, but it would 
also mean that 'we shall thus be spared the humiliation of having 
to eat our words with the American Government about the Turkish 
Petroleum Company's claims,.1 
It is more difficult to discern why the Foreign Office, 
hitherto so obdurate in its opposition to the American position, 
should readily have accepted the pragmatic solution suggested 
by the Colonial Office. Geddes undoubtedly urged his Government 
to adopt a more conciliatory approach towards the oil question, 
whilst the prevailing atmosphere of compromise engendered by the 
Washington Conference must have had an effect. However, minutes 
written at the time do not suggest that the reason for accepting 
what amounted to a volte-face was to contribute to better Anglo-
American understanding. (Although in the months that followed, 
the Foreign Office's anxiety to see the rapid conclusion of a 
1. Minute by Shuckburgh, 30 January 1922, on C.O.730/33/3624. 
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commercial agreement was prompted by the d· t I eSlre 0 so ve as 
soon as possible this continuing source of potential diplomatic 
friction).1 In summarizing the reasons for the change of policy 
at a later date, Weakley presented them thus: 
As to American participation, the suggestion 
to give American interests a share in the 
Company ••• was made entirely in the interests 
of the Company ••• and with a view to secure 
American acceptance of the mandate but more 
especially with the object of avoiding if 
possible the necessity of accepting the U.S. 
Govt. [sic] invi ta tion to submit the ques tion 
of the validity of the Company's claim to 
arbitration. Such a course, it was felt 
would, in all probability, go against the 
Company ••• '. 2 
Had it been possible to admit American interests with comparative 
ease in the early part of 1922, both the British Government and 
Iraq would probably have gained rather than lost, by the accession 
of vast capital and experience, and the cessation of American 
opposition in all international discussions on Iraq. 
Although the commercial negotiations which occupied the 
following year did not officially concern Whitehall, the Petroleum 
Department and the Colonial Office nevertheless continued, not 
only to take an anxious interest in the course of negotiations, 
3 but even at times to direct that course. The North Persian 
concession, in which Jersey Standard and AnglO-Persian anti-
cipated working together to avoid cut-throat rivalry (as well as 
legal and diplomatic controversies) was seen as a possible avenue 
to co-operation in Iraq. The Foreign Office's otherwise favourable 




Minute by Weakley, 24 April 1922, on A2680/177/45, F.O.371/7279. 
Minute by Weakley, 5 February 1923, on E1399J91/65, F.O.371/8994. 
The Foreign Office was informed, but showed very little interest. 
See file 132/65, F.O.371/7784. The ~ntric~c~es o~ the ?ommercial 
negotiations are well covered in Da:ls, Brltish Oll pollcy~ . 
pp.138-145. The discussion below WlII concentrate upon Brltlsh 
-- - __ .1- ~.s=.s=r"\""+~ to ensure that the Americans were granted a 
~reholding in the TPC. 
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if any negotiations were opened, however tentatively, it might 
be difficult to prevent the Americans from endeavouring to extend 
discussions to other oil-bearing areas of the Middle East. This 
possibility was now seen as eminently deSirable, and in December 
1921, since the conversations in New York on North Persia 
appeared to be progressing favourably, Sir John Cadman, as 
Anglo-Persian representative, was authorized to enter into pre-
liminary negotiations on Iraq, the details to be settled at a 
conference in London. 1 
Unfortunately, by the time it had been definitely decided in 
principle to admit Americans into Iraq, as part of a wider commercial 
bargain, negotiations on North Persia had been broken Off. 2 At 
first sight, this would not appear to have had adverse implications 
for discussions on Iraq. However, the British Government was so 
obsessed by the need for Standard to make the first move that keen 
interest continued to be taken in the North Persian negotiations, 
as a suitable vehicle for this. strong pressure was put upon the 
Foreign Office to relax its intransigent attitude towards the 
use of AnglO-Persian royalties as security for the American loan. 3 
This pressure was to result in the Foreign Office giving permission 
for the royalties to be used as security for a joint loan by the 
two companies. This provided a dignified line of retreat for the 




Lloyd-Graeme to Churchill, 12 January 1922, C.O.730/27/3167. 
Minute by Hall, 17 January 1922, C.O.730/27/1695. The nego-
tiations ended because no agreement could be reached as to a 
suitable financial security for the projected loan by Jersey 
Standard to the Persian Government. 
Amongst those urging a conciliatory attitude on the Foreign 
Office were Anglo-Persian, the Petroleum Department, and. 
Sir A. Geddes. The Foreign Office also came to share thlS 
view. See correspondence and minutes, January and February 
1922, E1195/132/65, F.O.371/7782. 
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and co-operation between Anglo-Persian and Jersey Standard 
which would facilitate similar arrangements in Iraq.1 
This, however, was insufficient to pave the way for American 
entry into the TPC. Although Anglo-Persian was the largest 
shareholder in that company, the Petroleum Department was clearly 
concerned at the possibility of opposition from the other major 
shareholders, Royal Dutch-Shell (in the guise of Anglo-Saxon), 
and the French Government; the admission of the Americans would 
necessitate a reduction in the shareholdings of the existing 
t o ° t 2 par lClpan s. On 19 January 1922 the first official approach 
was made to the TPC, previous conversations having been conducted 
with AnglO-Persian. The TPC representatives were informed of 
the problems facing the British Government, and told that it was 
felt to be invidious for Great Britain, the mandatory power, to 
have to uphold against strong opposition the interests of a 
British company whose case was neither legally inviolable nor 
complete - a strange reversal of the position upheld in the 
diplomatic correspondence. After some initial reluctance, the 
TPC representatives nonetheless agreed that it would be on the 
whole an advantage to gain American co-operation, and that they 
3 
were prepared to discuss the question with the Standard Oil Company. 
By 1 February 1922, therefore, the acquiescence of the TPC 
to American participation had been obtained, the Whitehall Depart-
ments concerned were all agreed on the policy to be followed, and 
the first tentative commercial approaches had been made. Never-




Minute by Hall, 21 February 1922, C.O.730/27/3167. 
Lloyd-Graeme to Churchill, 12 January 1922, C.O.730/27/3167. 
Petroleum Department to Colonial Office, 21 January 1922, 
C.O.730/33/3624; and Petroleum Department to Foreign Office, 
21 January 1922, E782/132/65, F.O.371/7782. 
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be regarded as at one with the tempestuous North Persian discussions. 
The Colonial Office urged the Foreign Office to make any concessions 
necessary to secure the success of the Khoshtaria Anglo-Persian! 
Standard negotiations; ' ••• the importance of reconciling American 
oil interests in the Middle East is so great that we may well pay 
a high price for l"t,.1 H owever, difficulties continued to plague 
the Persian discussions, and by May the need for any Iraq settlement 
to be linked with the now flagging North Persian concession appears 
to have been dropped, the British Government having succeeded in 
their primary purpose, to persuade Standard Oil to make the first 
move. (By this stage, of course, Standard Oil was simply the 
spokesman for a consortium of 7 American oil companies). 
The venue for discussions now moved to London, allowing the 
Petroleum Department and Colonial Office to play a larger role 
in directing the course of the supposedly commercial negotiations. 
Their participation in the discussion revealed at all times an 
overwhelming desire to facilitate and accelerate American admittance 
into the Company, and was probably largely responsible for per-
suading Anglo-Persian to accept the scheme proposed by Royal 
Dutch-Shell, whereby the entire American shareholding was surrendered 
by Anglo-Persian in return for a 10% royalty on all oil produced. 
That solution was only reached, however, after months of negotiation. 
. d 2 In July 1922 unofficial and informal negotiations op~~ed ln Lon on, 
the American representatives having permission from the State 
Department to discuss the practical basis of American participation, 
provided such discussions were without prejudice to existing con-
cessions or rights, and dependent upon the approval of the respective 
1. 
2. 
Churchill to Curzon, 1 February 1922, and attached Foreign 
Office minutes, E1195!132!65, F.O.371/7782. 
Memo on Iraq oil by the Middle Eastern Department, 19 July 1922; 
and minute by Hall, 26 July 1922, C.O.730/34/38009. 
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1 
governments. The companies had to decide upon two main questions, 
the percentage to be allotted to the Americans and, as a corollary, 
how this American share was to be contributed by the other share-
holders in the TPC. 2 The French Government was 
, somewhat naturally, 
reluctant to surrender any of its shares without concessions in 
return, but its disquiet was alleviated by a modification in 
Article 8 of the San Remo Agreement, thus cutting down the French 
contribution to any Iraqi interest in the TPC. 3 
After the preliminary negotiations, a memorandum was drawn 
up in which no figure for American participation was given, but 
it was suggested that the American shares should be provided by 
the original shareholders on a pro rata basis. The first requisite 
of the State Department, the 'open door', was to be safeguarded by 
a sublease system, by which the TPC would select, after 2 years, 
12 blocks of not more than 16 square miles each, for its own 
exploi tation, and offer similar blocks for auction, the royalty 
(in crude oil) from the sub-leases accruing to the TPC. However, 
despite this promising start to the negotiations, difficulties 
were encountered as soon as an attempt was made to determine the 
amount of American participation. To the American suggestion of 




A.C. Bedford to Anglo-Persian, 27 June 1922, C.O.730/33/31324. 
Although no government department was officially involved in 
these talks, the Petroleum Department and, through. Jt, the 
Colonial Office, was kept informed of developments. 
The shareholders and their holdings are normally given as 
Anglo-Persian - 50%; Anglo-Saxon - 25% (a Royal Dutch-Shell 
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proposal for 11-12%, and proved implacable. 1 Whilst his hostility 
to the former proposal was perhaps justifiable, since by this 
plan his company would have a smaller share than the latest comers, 
less understandable was Deterding's refusal to accept an otherwise 
unanimously approved plan whereby Anglo-Persian would hold 40% of 
the shares, and Anglo-Saxon, the French and the Americans 20% apiece. 
At this stage, despite the disavowal by the British Government 
of participation in these discussions, Colonial Office officials 
attempted to persuade influential Shell directors of the efficacy 
of this latest plan, emphasizing that vd thout American partici-
pation in the TPC, Great Britain would not secure United States 
assent to the mandate, without which the TPC concession could 
not get off the ground. Moreover, further delay might prompt the 
Iraq Government, already anxious to see the oil developed, to scrap 
the TPC and offer the oilfields to the highest bidder. 2 Despite 
this, Deterding maintained his OPPosition,3 even in the face of a 
4 direct appeal from Stanley Baldwin, President of the Board of Trade. 
However, hope of the admittance of American interest was still 
alive; when, in November 1922, the TPC recommenced negotiations 
on the details of a concession in Iraq, previously postponed due 
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By now, however, the rapid Successes of the Kemalists in 
September 1922 had altered the position considerably. The Turks 
were now claiming Mosul, one of the richest oil provinces of 
Iraq, meaning that the negotiations with the TPC were seen as 
1 
'mainly of an academic nature'. It was now apparent that a 
new peace conference would have to be held, to re-negotiate the 
now obsolete Treaty of Sevres. At this conference (convened in 
November 1922 in Lausanne) Turkey would no longer be a vanquished 
enemy willing to accept a dictated peace. In the circumstances, 
and particularly if Mosul should revert to the Turks (in which 
case Great Britain would have to press upon the Turkish Government 
the validity of the TPC's pre-war claims) the support of the 
United states Government would be crucial. 2 Howe\Ter, whilst the 
Lausanne Conference was in progress, the Standard Oil Company 
issued an ultimatum to the effect that if it did not receive an 
early guarantee of at least 20% participation in the TPC, it 
would call off negotiations, and assume freedom to act as it 
3 thought fit at Lausanne. 
Thereafter, British attempts to bring about a solution of 
the TPC controversy followed two paths. At Lausanne, Lord Olrzon, 
and, in the second phase, Sir Horace Rumbold, the British High 
Commissioner at Constantinople, sought firstly to ensure that 
Mosul remained within Iraq, and secondly to so word the Concessions 
Protocol of the draft Treaty as to ensure that by its terms the 





Minute by Hall, 9 November 1922, C.O.730/34/55041. 
Minute by Weakley, 15 November 1922, on E12597/132/65, 
F.O.371/7784. 
Minute by Hall,S December 1922, C.O.730/29/59902. 
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British Oil Policy, pp.197-217; and Mejcher, Imperial Quest, 
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Petroleum Department and the Colonial Office attempted to obtain 
for Standard Oil the assurance it sought, lOn th h f ° 0 0 ° 
e ope 0 IDlnlIDlZlng, 
or ending altogether, support by that company and the United states 
Government for the Turks at Lausanne. This essentially entailed 
persuading Royal Dutch-Shell to accept an equitable re-allocation 
of shares within the TPC. Such a re-allocation would, however, 
become yet more complex. Lord Curzon was considering the possi-
bility of ~l;etening Italloan and Turklosh ~~ opposition by offering 
them a share in the TPC; whilst any new arrangement had also to 
accommodate Gulbenkian's 5% and the Iraqi option on 20% of the 
TPC's shares, the last two conveniently ignored in the talks with 
the Americans. The confusion of the next few months was summed 
up by Vernon of the Colonial Office, when he commented that the 
besetting difficulty was that in adding up all the shares, the 
1 total always exceeded 100%. 
With a new urgency dictated by the Lausanne Conference, the 
British Government effectively abandoned its pretence of non-
interference, and brought heavy pressure to bear upon AnglO-Persian 
and Royal Dutch-Shell to ensure a settlement. The TPC was virtually 
blackmailed into accepting the Government's guidance on future 
shareholders, being informed that otherwise the British Government 
would end its resistance to the reference of the question to 
arbitration. 2 Frenetic attempts were then made to cajole or coerce 
Deterding into accepting the 40-20-20-20 settlement. The Foreign 
Office was, for the first time, directly involved in negotiations 
3 




Minute by Vernon, 6 December 1922, C.O.730/29/59902. 
Minute by Hall, 5 December 1922, on ibid. 
Despite the fact that he found the whole squabble 'intensely 
sordid and distasteful'. Minute by Lord Curzon, 6 December 
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1922 Royal Dutch-Shell representatives were informed of the 
' ••• absolute necessity of a settlement on the question of the 
admission of the Americans into the T.P.C. ~icJ', it being the 
definite intention of the Government that the Americans should 
be let in on a 20% basis, subject to the state Department's 
withdrawal of all opposition to the TPC's claim. 1 Deterding, 
however, still refused to accept any alternative to his 25% for 
all scheme, possibly hoping that negotiations would therefore 
break down, and his company could ally itself with the Turks or 
2 
the French. Faced with the possibility of also having to 
incorporate a Turkish and Italian sh arehol ding , the Colonial Office 
again advocated scrapping the entire TPC case,3 clearly feeling 
overwhelmed by the different claims: 
To put it crudely, we have already been 
successfully blackmailed by the Americans 
and we are now about to be blackmailed by 
the Italians ••• In point of fact we have 
placed ourselves in a most undignified and 
unenviable position. Even if we succeed 
in 'buying off' the Americans, the Italians 
and the Turks, there is still the matter of 
the unusual rights of the Baghdad Rys [sic] 
etc. 4 
The determination of the British Government to incorporate 
the Americans into the TPC and hence, it hoped, curtail American 
support for the Turks at Lausanne, was clearly demonstrated in 
the eventual settlement that was reached. Despite the clearly 





Minute by Vernon, 6 December 1922, C.O.730/29/59902; and memo 
from the Board of Trade to Anglo-Saxon, 5 December 1922, ibid. 
Minute by Vernon, 8 December 1922, C.O.730/29/59902; and 
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position was untenable, the arrangement finally agreed upon on 
12 December 1922 in fact incorporated that company's suggestion 
of four equal shareholdings, Anglo-Persian being compensated by 
one tenth of all crude oil produced. It is unclear how far 
this conclusion was the consequence of government pressure upon 
Anglo-Persian, which by virtue of its highly localized production 
would have been independently anxious for a settlement. 1 However, 
whilst American demands were clearly satisfied by this award, one 
condition of the agreement was that the state Department should 
accept this settlement as satisfying all American claims, and 
agree that it would no longer question the validity of the TPC's 
claims. In order to preserve the commercial facade, it was left 
to Jersey Standard to obtain such reassurances from the state 
Department. 
However, this State Department endorsement might not be so 
easily obtained. Despite the enthusiasm and keenness of the 




Position of State Department is that which 
it usually adopts when American interests 
are concerned namely, that while it will 
not pledge itself to support any particular 
American group it will continue to support -
if it can find an excuse - the objection of 
American oil interests to oil men of other 
countries developing any oil field without 
including American interests ••• I think United 
States Government will refrain from active 
diplomatic opposition to conf~rmation of 
Turkish petroleum company's ~icJ title by 
Iraq Government because all the most trouble-
some American oil men are in group now 
negotiating ••• with Anglo-Persian. 3 
Petroleum Department to Colonial Office, and enclosure, 
13 December 1922, C.O.730/31/61781; and Foreign Office to 
Colonial Office and enclosure,S January 1923, C.O.730/47/1100. 
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F.O.371/8994. It would appear, however, that Geddes obtalned 
his information in a conversation with Bedford and Wellman of 
Jersey Standard. 
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Foreign Office officials were far from sanguine in view of, 
not only developments in Turkey and at Lausanne, but also 
the American interests represented in the claims of Admiral 
Chester, and the 22 heirs. 1 
In the event, Weakley and Osborne were to prove closer 
to the mark in estimating the 'likely response of the United 
states Government. It was in formulating a response to the 
compromise reached in London that the dichotomy of the state 
Department's position became apparent. A clear conflict existed, 
between the ideological commitment to the open door, which had 
been so vigorously defended in trediplomatic correspondence, and 
the practical desire, emphasized by Hoover, to obtain for American 
oilmen a share in the Iraq oilfields. The route chosen by the 
British Government - of carefully avoiding any formal statement 
of its position - was closed to the state Department, because 
of the TPC's insistence that it should recognize the sub-lease 
formula as satisfying all American claims to the oil of Iraq, 
and that it should cease to question the validity of the TPC 
claim. It had, therefore, to be prepared to make a clear state-
ment of its views; if it recognized the TPC, this would be a 
direct negation of its hitherto firmly stated position, and 
would be seen as a diplomatic defeat. The problem was to be 
further complicated by the resuscitation of the Chester claims, 
which resulted, in April 1923, in the Turkish Government granting 
Admiral Chester's group a comprehensive railway and minerals 
concession. Whilst this enabled the state Department to shelter, 
as it had done in Persia, behind the policy of not discriminating 
1. Minute by Weakley, 15 January 1923, on ibid; and minute by 
Osborne, 30 December 1922, E14413/132/65, F.O.371/7785. 
~ 230 -
between competing legitimate interests, it was to cause major 
difficulties at the Conference of Lausanne. 
The state Department endeavoured throughout the commercial 
negotiations which occupied 1922 to ensure that any eventual 
arrangement would comply with the 'open door' and thus accord 
with the stand taken by it in diplomatic correspondence, in 
particular its opposition to the validity of the TPC concession. 
On the other hand, it did not wish to so hinder negotiations 
that American companies were effectively prevented from entering 
Iraq. The Department's attitude during the intercompany dis-
cussions has been well covered elsewhere. 1 It is, however, 
interesting to observe how the United states Government inter-
preted and reacted to British Government policy. 
There can be no doubt that the state Department was 
decidedly suspicious of British intentions, and was unprepared 
to accept at face value the assurances of Sir John Cadman2 that 
the policy Whitehall was now following was one of compromise and 
co-operation. In order to test the extent to which the British 
Government had embraced a conciliatory policy, Ambassador Harvey 
was instructed to make informal enquiries as to whether the 
restrictive regulations in India and Trinidad had been relaxed. 3 
Nor was it the intention of the State Department to relax its 
vigilance in Iraq where, as ever, it continued to be alert for 
possible British double dealing. Thus, it specifically requested 
1. 
2. 
See, for example, DeNovo, American Interests, pp.187-195; 
and Hogan, Informal Detente. 
Memoranda of conversations between Sir John Cadman and 
F.M. Dearing, 23 December 1921, and Cadman and Millspaugh, 
16 January 1922 841.6363/188 and 203, R.G.59, N.A., M580/147. 
Both conversati~ns took place during Cadman's visit to the 
United States to discuss with Jersey Standard the possibility 
of a joint enterprise in Persia. 
~'nhp~ to Harvey, 31 March 1922, 841.6363/209A, R.G.59, N.A. 
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permission of the Foreign Office for a party of American 
geologists to visit Iraq-, the e t d I 
xpec e rep y, that no surveying 
was permitted, whatever the nationality of the companies 
involved, was met by informal representations made on the basis 
of rumours that an AnglO-Persian geologist had been active in 
1 
parts of Iraq. The state Department was also disquietened by 
reports of prospecting in the tranSferred territories, even 
when the unusual legal status of that area was explained by the 
British. 2 Undoubtedly this, together with the British failure 
to reply to the American note of 17 November 1921,3 considerably 
worried the state Department, espeCially during the interval 
between Cadman's visit to the United states, and the opening of 
commercial negotiations in London in July 1922. 
Given the predisposition of the state Department to suspect 
British duplicity, it is hardly surprising that during the 
commercial negotiations the Department refused to depart from 
its expressed opinion on the open door and the invalidity of the 
TPC's 'concession'. Nonetheless, it was also anxious to avoid 
being placed in the invidious position of denying to American 
1. The activities of the AnglO-Persian geologist were apparently 
confined to the transferred territories. See Hughes to U.S. 
Embassy, London, 30 January 1922 and 14 March 1922, both on 
890G.6363/60; Harvey to U.S. Secretary of State, 4 April 1922, 
890G.6363/89; Memo by Millspaugh, 890G.6363/94; Hughes to 
U.S. Embassy, London, and U.S. Embassy, London, to U.S. 
Secretary of State, 13 April 1922, both on 890G.6363/89; 
Hughes to U.S. Embassy, London, 2 May 1922, 890G.6363/92; 
and U.S. Embassy, London, to U.S. Secretary of State, 
30 June 1922, 890G.6363/121, all on R.G.59, N.A., M722/23. 
2. Correspondence between Owens, U.S. Consul in Baghdad, and 
State Department, May 1922, on 890G.6363T84/37 and 38; Memo 
by Millspaugh, 9 May 1922, 890G.6363T84/57; and Hughes to 
U.S. Embassy, London, 24 May 1922, 890G.6363T84/37, all in 
R.G.59, N.A., M722/23. 
3. Hughes to U.S. Embassy, London, 2 May 1922, 890G.6363/92, 
R.G.59, N.A., M722/23. 
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companies the very participation in the Iraq oilfields that it 
had attempted to safeguard. Alth h oug as late as 24 October 1921, 
the state Department held the view that 
••• no American interests would seriously 
consider the acceptance of a minority 
share in the Turkish Petroleum Company or 
any dealing involving that company that 
would imply recognition of the validity 
of its monopolistic claim in Mesopotamia. 1 
a month later, by which time American companies were seriously 
contemplating negotiations with the TPC, Millspaugh in a con-
versation with company representatives 
••• stated that it was my opinion that if 
the American group were to arrive at an 
amicable arrangement with the Anglo-
Persian Oil Company so that American 
interests could apply for and receive a 
fair concession in Mesopotamia, say 
25 per cent, the Government would 
probably have no objection. 2 
He did, however, reiterate that the Government could not counte-
nance any arrangement that entailed the recognition of the TPC's 
claim. The state Department took, in fact, an equivocal stance. 
It insisted upon the preservation of the 'open door' and equal 
economic opportunity, yet was unprepared to prevent American 
companies seeking a compromise solution. It was also well aware 
of the weakness of the American position; Millspaugh rejected 
suggestions by Hoover that there should be an international 
conference on the subject of Iraq oil, arguing that 'It must be 
recognized that American interests have no actual claims in 
Mesopotamia which are threatened'; and pointing out that if such 
a conference were held, Italy and Japan would almost certainly 
1. F.M. Dearing to Ellis Loring Dreisel, u.s. Commission, Berlin, 
24 October 1921, 890G.6363/45, R.G.59, N.A., M722/23. 
2. Memorandum by Millspaugh, 26 November 1921, 890G.6363/76, 
R.G.59, N.A., M722/23. 
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demand a share of the oil, a demand that the United states could 
1 
not oppose. 
In essence, therefore, the state Department preserved a 
neutral attitude towards the . I commerCla negotiations, informing 
the companies that whilst it raised no objections to the idea 
of company co-operation, it would not commit itself in advance 
to any particular scheme. 2 The American Group continued to 
consult the Department at every step, however, and finally, in 
August 1922, Secretary of State Hughes informed W.C. Teagle of 
Jersey Standard: 
I desire to state that if, as you have 
indicated to me, all interested American 
oil companies have been invited to par-
ticipate ••• , if a fair and equitable 
share in this development is accorded to 
American interests, and if there is no 
attempt to establish a monopoly in favour 
of the Turkish Petroleum Company, or any 
other company or interests, the Department 
would not consider that the arrangement 
contemplated ••• is contrary to the spirit 
of the Open Door policy. 3 
This, however, was as far as the Department was prepared 
to go. In December 1922, the American Group approached the State 
Department to request its acquiescence in the commercial settle-
ment, only to be immediately rejected. 4 Earlier requests from 
the companies for the assistance of the United States Ambassador 
in London had also been turned down, on the grounds of non-
1. Memo by Millspaugh, 29 April 1922, 890G.6363/181; and Hughes 
to Hoover, 2 May 1922, 890G.6363/96, both in R.G.59, N.A., 
M722/23. Hoover was extremely enthusiastic to promote the 
proposed commercial settlement. Hoover to Hughes, 14 July 
1922, 890G.6363/125, R.G.59, N.A., M722/23; and same to 
same, 19 August 1922, 890G.6363T84/47, R.G.59, N.A., M722/24. 
2. Memo by Millspaugh of a conversation with Dearing and Wellman, 
10 March 1922, 890G.6363/175, R.G.59, N.A., M722/23. 
3. Hughes to Teagle, 22 August 1922, 890G.6363T84/41a, R.G.59, 
N .A., M722/24-
4. Teagle to U.S. Secretary of State, 13 December 1922, and U.S. 
Secretary of State to Teagle, 15 December 1922, 890G.6363T84/62, 
R.G. 59, N.A., M722/24; and U. S. Secretary of State to Tea';Jle, 
30 December 1922, 890G.6363/169, R.G.59, N.A., M722/23. 
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interference in commercial matters.1 
The state Department was, 
of course, hardly likely to renege its hitherto intransigent 
position on the TPC, a stand reinforced by the changing situation 
in Turkey and the conflicting Chester claims. In addition, 
however, the United states had reason to suspect that Great 
Britain was attempting to use the negotiations then in progress 
at Lausanne to reinforce the claims of the TPC. With the 
rejection by the United states of the projected commercial 
compromise, the subject of Iraq oil re-entered the diplomatic 
lists, and was to affect considerably relationships between 
the British and American delegations at Lausanne. 
The Lausanne Conference was in session from 20 November 
1922 until 24 July 1923, with a prolonged interruption in 
negotiations from 4 February 1923 until 23 April. 2 There has 
been considerable controversy as to the significance of oil in 
the Lausanne deliberations, the participants hotly denying that 
it played any part, whilst historians, notably Mejcher, have 
since demonstrated that its role was considerable. Tb a large 
extent, this was as a consequence of the fluid situation created 
by the state Department's refusal to countenance the TPC 
compromise, and the unbending insistence of its representatives 
at Lausanne upon the 'open door'. Meanwhile, the British 
delegation was anxious, firstly to ensure that the strategically 
significant vilayet of Mosul, and its potentially valuable oil-
fields, remained within Iraq; and secondly, to so draft the 
1. Teagle to U.S. Secretary of State, 29 November 1922, 
890G.6363T84/66, R.G.59, N.A., M722/24. 
2. The Lausanne Conference, and particularly the role that oil 
played in its deliberations, ~s.cove:ed in.a number of sources. 
See in particular Davis, Brltish Oll POllCY, pp.197-217; 
" . Mejcher, Imperial Quest, ch.5; and DeNovo, Amerlcan Interests, 
pp.128-165 and 191-196. Good collections of documents can be 
found in For. ReI. 1923 Vol.II, and D.B.F.P., 1st Series, Vol.18. 
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Treaty terms that the TPC concession would be confirmed no matter 
who held Mosul. Howev r hOI t G e , w l s reat Britain was successful in 
postponing consideration of the first question, on the second, 
the Americans and Turks in combination were able to thwart her. 
The United states had, of course, never been at war with 
the ottoman Empire, and hence, one might assume, had no reason 
to be represented at Lausanne. However, the new treaty, ostensibly 
a re-negotiation of the Treaty of Sevres, was also designed to 
settle Allied relations with the new, Nationalist, Turkey, and 
thus would tackle issues such as the capitulations, the pro-
tection of foreigners and internal minorities - and, of course, 
economic rights and concessions - which clearly affected American 
interests. Even before the convening of the Lausanne conference, 
the victories of Ataturk, the Nationalist leader, during 1922 
had demonstrated that a re-negotiation of the Treaty of Sevres 
was inevitable, and had alerted United states Government 
departments to the importance of safeguarding American interests. 1 
Wi~1 the reopening of the peace conference, the United states, 
though reiterating its unwillingness to assume any obligations 
in the Middle East, was determined to preserve its rights, both 
in the new Turkey and the successor states. On 30 October 1922, 
therefore,the American Government sent an aide-memoire to Britain, 
France and Italy, stating that whilst it did not desire to par-
ticipate in the peace negotiations, nor assume any responsibility 
for the decisions taken at Lausanne, it nonetheless insisted that 
its interests be considered equally with those of the Allies, and, 
in particular, it desired to see the maintenance of capitulations 
1. Hoover to Hughes, 20 February 1922, and Hughes to Hoover, 
15 March 1922, 449.0 Discrimination, B.F.D.C., R.G.151, N.A.~ 
d C on flole 449 0 Turkey General 1920-26, B.F.D.C., correspon en e· ° 
R.G.151, N.A.; and A.W. Dulles, u.s. Embassy, Constantlnople, 
to A.C. Millspaugh, 21 February 1922, 890G.6363T84/31, R.G.59, 
N.A., M722/24. 
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and equality for all in commercial enterprises. 1 In order to 
obtain these objectives, the United states proceeded to send a 
team of 'observers' to the conference. 
These observers were to prove particularly zealous in 
safeguarding freedom of access to oil concessions _ and with 
good reason. Whilst the state Department was well aware of the 
weakness of the single American claim to the oil resources of 
Iraq (that of the Chester group),2 it had nonetheless been 
informed by the Turks that they desired to see substantial 
American participation in the exploitation of Turkish mineral 
resources - inclUding Mosul, if that vilayet reverted to Turkey.3 
Meanwhile, the American observers at Lausanne were gaining the 
impression that the British, in their anxiety to retain the oil 
4 concession, might give up Mosul in exchange. On 25 November 
1922, therefore, Ambassador Richard Washburn Child, head of the 
American delegation, made a strong speech insisting upon the 
'open door', whilst on 27 November the state Department sent to 
its mission very detailed instructions on the TPC and oil 
questions. Above all, the United states Government wished to 
make it plain that it would demand the 'open door' and equal 
opportunity for Americans in Mosul, whoever obtained it, on the 
grounds of the American role in securing victory over the Central 






Hurewitz, II, pp.114-5. 
Memo from C. Van Engert, Division of Near Eastern Affairs to 
Harrison, 22 November 1922, 890G.6363/172, R.G.59, N.A., 
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DeNovo, American Interests, ch.7. 
American Mission, Lausanne, to U.S. Secretary of state, 
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Realising the delicate nature of oil 
questions and the fact that Turks may 
try to Use them to start dissension 
among the powers represented at Lausanne 
you should deal with openness and candor' 
[sic]. We have nothing to hide. We 
desire no secret arrangements for our-
selves and expect none on the part of 
others. 1 
It was, however, rapidly becoming apparent that, in order to 
retain physical control of the Mosul oilfields, Great Britain was 
prepared to make concessions to the Turks and, if need be, the 
Italians, possibly by the grant of a shareholding in the TPC. 2 
The Foreign Office was well aware that, if Mosul reverted to 
the Turks, the Turkish Government would almost certainly refuse 
to ratify concessions that were still incomplete, unless such a 
ratification was actually stipulated as one of the conditions 
to the reversion of Mosul - a condition the Turks were unlikely 
3 
to accept. A dual strategy was therefore adopted, of attempting 
to retain Mosul for Iraq, whilst at the same time trying to 'buy 
off' the Turks with shares in the TPC. In addition, an attempt 
was made to draft the economic clauses of the Treaty so that the 
4 
rights of the TPC would be confirmed, whoever held Mosul. This, 
together with rumours of an agreement between Great Britain and 





Hughes to American Mission, Lausanne, 27 November 1922, 
890G.6363/156, R.G.59, N.A., M722/23. 
Curzon to Foreign Office, 1 December 1922, D.B.F.P., 1st 
Series, Vol.18, pp.354-6. The anxiety of the Britis~ . 
Government to retain physical control of the Mosul ollflelds 
is discussed in Mejcher, Imperial Quest, ch.5. 
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See correspondence and memoranda in E1?8, R.G.43, N.A., 
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Folder 24, E108, R.G.43, N.A.; and Amerlcan Misslon, Lausanne, 
to U.S. Secretary of state, 9 January 1923, 890G.6363/196, 
R.G.59, N.A., M722/23. 
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for important oil and railway concessions, strengthened the 
state Department's determination to insist upon the open door.1 
Additionally, reports were being received from Baghdad that the 
Iraq Government, if free to choose, would favour American 
. . 2 
concesslonalres. At this pOint, however, the conference broke 
up in the face of Allied disunity and Turkish intransigence. 
On the whole, relationships between the British and American 
delegations during the first phase of the conference had been 
fairly amicable, although the United states had insisted rigidly 
upon the open door, and had, of course, evaded British attempts 
to secure its support in the preservation of Mosul and the TPC 
concession by rejecting the London commercial agreem~nt. However, 
that rejection came as no surprise to Foreign Office officials; 
and, despite the state Department's neutrality, the American 
Group still proceeded to tidy up loose ends during the spring 
of 1923, preparatory to taking up its minority shareholding in 
the TPC. The Foreign Office had, therefore, no particular reason 
to resent American activity during the first phase of the Lausanne 
COnference,3 although Curzon felt that there was no need for the 
United states to be represented when the Conference reopened in 
April 1923. 4 
However, there was to be a significant difference between 
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the Turkish Assembly had approved a new concession to the Chester 
group, now re-named the ottoman-American Development Corporation. 
This concession con£lcted with French claims and additionally 
covered the disputed area of Mosul, thus making it inevitable 
that international dissension would result. Whereas hitherto 
the state Department had concluded that Chester had no legally 
valid rights preceding the war - or, at least, none that were 
more convincing than those of the TPC - the 1923 concession 
would certainly be valid should Mosul revert to Turkey. The 
Department therefore decided to adopt a posture of strict 
neutrality as between the conflicting American interests. 1 
Although it rapidly became apparent, to both the state 
Department and the Turks, that the ottoman-American Development 
Corporation had severe internal difficulties,2 the American 
Mission at Lausanne was nevertheless instructed to ensure that 
~le economic clauses of the Treaty did not contradict the 
expressed United states position. This was all the more sig-
nificant in view of Great Britain's attempt during this second 
phase to incorporate into the Concessions Protocol a clause 
specifically validating the TPC claim. During June and July, 
as united states suspicions of British motives increased, the 
American representatives at Lausalme encouraged the Turks to 
reject the Concessions protocol. 3 Matters came to a head at a 
1. Memo by Dulles (Near Eastern Division) to U.S. Secretary 
2. 
3. 
of state, 14 April 1923, 890G.6363T84/100, R.G.59, N.A., M722/24. 
Correspondence and memoranda, Folder 126, E114, R.G.43, 
especially Hughes to American Mission, Lausanne, 16 May 1923, 
and American Mission, Lausanne, to Department of State, 
23 May 1923. 
Department of state to American Mission, Lausanne, 5 July 1923, 
Folder 24, E114, R.G.43; and memo by Grew of a conversation 
with Ismet Pasha, 8 July 1923, Folder 55, E114, R.G.43. 
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private meeting of British, French, Italian and Turkish delegates 
on 9 July 1922, and thereafter no draft could be unanimously 
approved, largely, the British suspected, because the Turks were 
supported by t~e United states, and were also concerned lest any 
recognition of the TPC's rights expose the Turkish Government 
to claims for compensation by the Chester group.1 
Certainly, it is clearly apparent that, not only did the 
American delegation make a formal - and firm - reservation on 
the concessions protocol (in particular the TPC validation), 2 
but the American representatives, especially Joseph Grew, 
informally encouraged the Turks to resist the Allies: 
During the last five days I have been 
repeatedly with Ismet no less than with 
the Allies in order to leave no shadow 
of doubt in their minds as to the force 
of our opposition to the objectionable 
features in the protocol on concessions. 3 
Eventually, in order to obtain the signature of the Treaty, the 
Allies agreed to the dropping of the objectionable clauses from 
the Concessions Protocol. This was despite Rumbold's confident 
opinion that 
If they [the Americans] show their hand 
by objecting to manner in which particular 
case of Turkish petroleum company [sic] 
is being dealt with we can say we had 
satisfied ourselves that no rival American 
interest is involved. We have, I hope, 
got well to windward of them. 4 
Although Rumbold, as head of the British delegation, made a 
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u.s. Secretary of State to American Mission, Lausanne, 
10 July 1923, 890G.6363T84/105, R.G.59, N.A., M722/24. 
American Mission, Lausanne, to Department of state, 16 July 
1923, Folder 24, E114, R.G.43, N.A. Ismet Pasha headed the 
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all the obligations undertaken by the ottoman Government before 
1914 as binding upon the Turkish Government in any territory 
remaining to Turkey, and would not recognize any conflicting 
rights alleged to have been granted by the Turkish Government 
to a third party,1 the Foreign Office, especially Lord Curzon, 
was furious at his surrender to Turkish pressure. Curzon acidly 
informed him that 'I object very strongly to additional validity 
given to Chester concession by our surrender,.2 
This blow to British hopes was largely due to United states 
opposition. The members of the American Mission were not slow 
to claim credit: 
No mention is made in treaty or attached 
documents regarding Turkish Petroleum 
Company nor is there a provision validat-
ing any pre-war inchoate concession or 
giving persons or companies claiming such 
concessions any priority rights on con-
cessions which Turkey may grant in the 
future. The elimination from the treaty 
of all objectionable provisions relating 3 
to concessions has thus been accomplished. 
The British, too, shared the opinion that the Americans were to 
blame. Foreign Office minutes are particularly bitter, hypo-
thesizing that the united states Government was convinced that 
Mosul would revert to Turkey. This would result in a conflict 
between the Chester rights and the TPC claims, unless the United 
4 
states had first eliminated the TPC. To the Foreign Office, 
more worrying still was the possibility that the Americans might 
endeavour to secure Mosul for the Turks: 
1.Rumbold to Foreign Office, 17 and 19 July 1923, D.B.F.P., 
1st Series, pp.955-969. 
2.Curzon to Rumbold, 18 July 1923, D.B.F.P., 1st Series, Vol.18, 
p.967. 
3.American Mission, Lausanne, to American Embassy, Paris, 18 July 
1923, Folder 7, E114, R.G.43, N.A. 
4.Minutes on E7399/E7478/1/44, F.O.371j9087. 
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••• the Americans are at least consistent 
over their 'open door' principle- it 
. , 
now remalns to be seen whether, having, 
as. they presumably suppose, secured the 
prlor Chester right to the Mosul oil-
fields in the event of their remaining 
Turkish, they would proceed to work for 
the latter consummation of their project. 1 
Lindsay probably expressed the opinion of most Foreign Office 
officials when, conceding that Rumbold could hardly have broken 
off negotiations over the oil issue, he nonetheless concluded that 
The important point is the final attri-
bution of Mosul, and so we had better 
concentrate our efforts on that point 
and defeating the American manoeuvres 
that will be set in play. 2 
Clearly, the Foreign Office was under no illusions concerning 
American adherence to the 'open door', and what it meant in 
practice when, as happened in this case, American interests held 
what amounted to a monopolistic concession. 3 HoweVer, although 
Foreign Office officials were - understandably - frustrated by 
American influence at Lausanne, and anxious lest the United 
states support the Turks in the forthcoming negotiations on Mosul, 
nonetheless they continued to work towards commercial co-operation 
between the companies, in the fond hope that, once American 
interests were admitted into the TPC, the state Department would 
. t 4 cease to oppose l • This continued desire to court American 
participation reveals clearly the extent to which the United 
states was able to influence events well outside its normal 
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By the Treaty of Lausanne, the question of the Iraqi-
Turkish boundary, if not mutually agreed upon by Great Britain 
and Turkey in nine months, was to be referred to the League of 
Nations for arbitration. Pending the resolution of this dispute, 
the grant and ratification of oil concessions was effectively 
in abeyance. American hopes of securing a stake in the Mosul 
oilfields, whatever its political disposition, were destroyed 
when the Chester group failed to begin work, as had been stipulated, 
in November 1923 - as a consequence of the lack of financial 
backing. The concession was therefore annulled by the Turkish 
National Assembly on 18 December 1923. Thereafter, the best 
hope for American exploitation of the Iraq oilfield was by 
participation in the TPC. Even before the Chester concession 
had been annulled, the state Department had decided to support 
the American Group seeking entry into the TPC, in view of the 
internal difficulties of the ottoman-American Development 
Corporation. 1 It was, however, to be five years before the 
myriad problems besetting the TPC were finally solved, and the 
American Group able to take its place in a reconstituted 
TPC (by then operating a valid concession in a proved oilfield). 
The delay had been caused by the long wait for the settlement of 
the Mosul boundary (finally adjudicated by the International 
Boundary Commission of the League of Nations in December 1925); 
the objections of Gulbenkian to the tenns of the commercial 
settlement; and the need for the TPC to negotiate with the Iraq 
Government for a new concession. 2 The United states Government 
1. 
2. 
Hughes to President Coolidge, 31 October 1923, 890G.6363T84/117A, 
R.G.59, N.A., M722/24. 
These are discussed in DeNovo, American Interests, pp.196-199; 
Davis, British Oil Policy, chs. 7-9; and Mejcher, Imperial 
Quest, ch. 6. 
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was particularly concerned by the fact that the TPC was nego-
tiating with Iraq for a new concession agreement before the 
final conclusion of its discussions with the American Group.1 
During the intervening five years one major change was 
that, although the state Department still stood firm on the 
non-validity of the TPC claim and the open door,2 when negotia-
tions between the companies reached a critical point as a 
consequence of Gulbenkian's obstructive tactics, it was 
sufficiently anxious to preserve co-operation that it encouraged 
the United states Embassy in London to intervene informally.3 
The delay in consummating American entry into the TPC also 
concerned the Colonial Office, aware of the Iraq Government's 
desire to assert its independence, and concerned lest the 
American Group might take advantage of any delay to apply for-
4 
and be granted - a concession on its own account. Thus, although 
the Foreign Office did not wish to see any concession actually 
issued until the Mosul question was settled (in part to retain 
its freedom of action to 'buy off' the Turks and Italians) ,5 
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there could be an initialling of a draft agreement, so long 
as Mosul was not mentioned, and there was no prospecting of 
disputed territory.1 Finally, on 14 March 1925, the Iraq 
Government signed an oil convention with the TPC, although it 
was not until three years later that the Americans finally 
joined the TPC - by which time oil had in fact been struck 
in Iraq. 
It was to take nearly seven years for the commercial 
settlement of the TPC controversy, first proposed in December 
1921, to materialize. During this time the United states 
Government remained comparatively consistent in its determination 
not to retract from its stated position on the TPC claim and 
the open door. Nonetheless, as Hughes explained to the American 
Group 
In its support of the Open Door policy it 
is not this Government's desire to set up 
impractical and theoretical principles or 
to place obstacles in the way of the par-
ticipation of American companies in foreign 
enterprises but rather to open to American 
companies the opportunity for such parti-
cipation if they desire it. 2 
The United states attempted - successfully - to combine two 
goals: the maintenance of her ideological stance on the one 
hand; and the entry of American oil companies into Iraq on 
the other. The state Department's refusal in December 1922 to 
endorse American participation in the TPC was probably inevi-
table, given the concurrent resuscitation of the Chester claim, 
and the rapidly changing events in Turkey. However, with the 
annullment of the Chester concession, the United states was 
prepared to sanction the TPC arrangement subject only to a 
confirmatory concession being granted by the Iraq Government. 
1. Correspondence and minutes in file 13/65, F.O.371/10082, 
10083 and 10084. 
2. Hughes to Teagle, 22 August 1922, 890G.6363T84/41A, R.G.59, 
N.A., M722/24. 
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Moreover, after it emerged that Mosul would remain within 
Iraq, the state Department was willing to give the informal 
ambassadorial support that it had refused in December 1922. 
What this incident demonstrates is the potential power 
of the United states to affect developments in the Middle East, 
an area far outside her usual sphere of influence. The state 
Department was able to delay the ratification of the Iraq 
mandate by the League of Nations, in an attempt to force the 
British Government to repudiate the TPC; whilst at Lausanne 
the American delegation was instrumental in securing the defeat 
of the concessions protocol. Thus, although the United states 
had never officially been at war with Turkey, and had rejected 
all suggestions that she might assume political responsibilities 
in internationally sensitive regions of the old ottoman Empire, 
she was nonetheless able to harvest 'the spoils of victory'. 
Within Whitehall, the transfer of administrative responsi-
bility for Iraq to the Colonial Office was, as in the case of 
Palestine, to prove critical. It was that department, rather 
than the Foreign Office which took the initiative in suggesting 
that the British should admit the American Group to the TPC. 
Never so committed to that company's claims as was the Foreign 
Office and faced with the difficulty of insisting that the , 
Iraq Government validate the company's concession, the Colonial 
Office was nonetheless forced by the British Government's 
diplomatic correspondence with the United states to accept the 
necessity of including the TPC's claim in any oil strategy. 
Nonetheless, it saw in an amicable settlement on commercial 
lines between the various interested parties an opportunity to 
evade the whole controversy, by persuading the Iraq Government 
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to give a new concession to a reconstituted TPC, whilst at the 
same time ensuring an abiding Amerl·can . lnterest in the peace 
and stability of the new Iraq. 
The decision to promote a commercial compromise was taken 
at a time of AnglO-American rapprochement, concurrent with the 
Washington Conference. It should also be remembered that 
So cony had been permitted to proceed with its investigations 
in Palestine mainly on the grounds of minimizing Anglo-American 
friction. With hindsight, a Foreign Office official was to 
commen t that 
In order to tranquillise the u.s. 
Government, we welcomed the suggestion 
that an American oil group should be 
given a participation in the Turkish 
Petroleum Co. [sic]. 1 
However, to the Colonial Office, developments in the 
Middle East were apparently more significant than an improvement 
in Anglo-American relations. Great Britain was anxious to 
establish an independent, friendly state of Iraq in what was, 
for her, a strategically important area. She also wished to 
ensure that a potentially significant oilfield would be 
developed by a company under effective British control. However, 
events in 1921/2 appeared to threaten both these goals, as the 
Kemalists swept towards Mosul, whilst internal disturbances in 
Iraq forced Great Britain effectively to replace the mandate 
by a negotiated Treaty of Alliance <eventually ratified 10 October 
1922), together with the abdication of all but ultimate power 
to the native Arab Government. In order to develop Iraq 
financially, and secure British oil desiderata, it was essential 
1. 
2. 
Minute by James Morgan, 30 March 1927, on E1~39/104/65, 
F.O.371/12263. 
British policy l·n Iraq l·S discussed in detail in Sluglett. 
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that the League of Nations should ratify the mandate, and that 
the Iraq Government should grant a concession to the TPC. The 
urgency of both these objectives was increased in the autumn 
of 1922 by the Kemalist successes 1 culminating in the Chanak 
crisis of September 1922, and by the accession to power a month 
later of a new government in Great Britain, pledged to the 
reduction of government expenditure and imperial commitments. 
Yet, even if the main preoccupation of the Colonial Office 
was to facilitate its task in Iraq rather than, as in Palestine, 
to alleviate AnglO-American friction, it is striking that the 
policy adopted in both cases was the same - a surrender to 
American demands on oil. The Colonial Office was well aware 
that a major source of its difficulties in Iraq was United 
States opposition to the mandate and the TPC concession, whilst 
both it and the Foreign Office were perturbed at the possibility 
of American support for anti-British agitation in Iraq, and 
Turkish demands for Mosul. As 1922 progressed, it became of 
even greater importance to secure United States support. The 
frenetic attempts to influence and conclude the commercial 
settlement during December 1922 was almost certainly due to 
fears of American opposition at Lausanne. Similarly, appre-
hension lest the United States intervene in the Mosul boundary 
dispute was probably significant in prompting the British 
Government to continue its promotion of commercial co-operation, 
despite the obstructive American behaviour during Lausanne. Toe 
Foreign Office, in supporting the Colonial Office's policy 
initiative, was almost certainly influenced by Geddes' appeals 
for compromise on the oil issue. It seems, however, to have 
been mainly swayed by a desire to accomplish the long-delayed 
British goals in Iraq, and to avoid the ignominy of an arbitration 
award declaring the TPC claim to be invalid. 
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Thus, the United states Government had sufficient influence, 
despite its apparent isolatiOnism, that it succeeded, yet again, 
in securing a reversal of British policy. This was despite the 
acknowledged strategic significance of Iraqi oil, and the 
determination throughout Whitehall to resist American demands 
for a share in its exploitation - a determination which had 
been explicitly expressed in official correspondence and minutes 
at the time of the Palestine compromise. This trend - of 
surrender to American demands in an area strategically and 
economically vital to Great Britain - was to continue into the 
period 1929-34, during which time concessions were granted for 
several of the British-dominated shaikhdoms in the Persian Gulf. 
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Chapter Six 
A Renewal of Controversy: 
The Persian Gulf Concessions, 1927 1934 
Although the potential of North Persian and Mesopotamian oil 
had been recognized even before the First World War, it was 
generally assumed that the chances of discovering commercially 
viable oilfields in the Arabian peninsula were slight. It was 
not until the 1930s and 1940s that what are now known to be the 
richest oil reserves in the Middle East were explored and exploited 
1 
on a large scale. The negotiations for the Persian Gulf and 
Saudi Arabian concessions therefore took place in the context of 
a radically changed oil business, whose main preoccupation was 
with the curtailment of world-wide overproduction, rather than 
safeguarding against a potential shortage of crude oil. This was 
to affect the attitudes of the several companies involved in the 
negotiations variously, the American companies being more anxious 
to obtain exclusive, long term concessions, than their British 
and Dutch competitors. 2 
By the late 1920s and early 1930s, the period of the most 
intensive negotiations for the Arabian oil concessions, the state 
of Anglo-American relations, and the attitude of the British 
Government towards the maintenance of a friendly relationship with 
1. Brief accounts of the granting of the Arabian oil concessions 
can be found in several secondary sources. See, for example, 
Longrigg, pp.98-115; Shwadran, pp.301-323, 389-397, 407-424, 
and 431-433" and Davis, British Oil Policy, pp.395-417. 
The most detailed account is to be found in A.H.T. Chisholm, 
The First Kuwait Oil Concession: A Record of the Negotiations 
for the 1934 Agreement (London, 1975), (hereafter ~isholm). 
Most of this book comprises reproduced documents, Wlth under 
90 pages of text. Chisholm was the Anglo-Persian neg?tiator 
in Kuwait and his book concentrates upon the commerclal negotiati~ns taking place in Kuwait, which this thesis does 
not cover. 
2. See Appendix III. 
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the United states, had also changed somewhat since the 'era of 
good feeling' in 1921-2. The apparent improvement in Anglo-
American relations after 1922,1 follOwing the resolution of the 
Irish question, the funding of the war debt, the solution of the 
Mesopotamian oil controversy, at least in principle, and the 
Washington Conference, which defused the two major controversies 
over naval rivalry and the Anglo-Japanese alliance, was to be 
short-lived. The British soon began to realize that the United 
states intended to continue her traditional policy of being 
vociferous in protest, yet unwilling to participate positively 
in international diplomacy, and resentment began to develop amongst 
the British intelligentsia and Foreign Office officials who felt 
that the United states appeared to want things both ways. 2 
Thus, by 1927-9, in the closing years of the Coolidge 
administration, relationships between the two countries were 
again strained, as certain long-standing sources of friction 
resurfaced. To a large extent, this friction tended to centre 
1. 
2. 
This was reflected in the later stages of the Iraq negotiations, 
apart from the Lausanne Conference, as discussed in Chapter 5 
above. For more general expressions of this improvement in 
relations, see, for example, Frank Kellogg, U.S. Ambassador, 
London, to Charles Hughes, U.S. Secretary of State, 10 June 
1924, Box 61, 'Kellogg', Hughes Papers; Frederick Hibbard, 
London Embassy, to W.R. Castle, 10 December 1924, Box 2, 
Castle Papers, H.H.P.L.; Memorandum by Austen Chamberlain 
of a conversation with the American Ambassador on Rubber 
Restriction Regulations, 12 July 1925, C.P. 364(25), CAB 24/174; 
and statement made by Sir A. Chamberlain to the Imperial 
Conference, 20 October 1926, D.B.F.P., Series 1A, Vol.2, 
pp.919-958, especially p.955. 
Ray Atherton, U.S. Charge, London, was particularly ~truck 
by the fact that the British were apparently less frlendly 
towards the United states than hitherto. Ray Atherton to 
U.S. Secretary of State, 13 December 1927, 711.41/170, R.G.59, 
N.A.; and same to same, 30 January 1928, 841.00 P.R·/5, 
R.G.59, N.A., M580/28. 
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around the sensitive issue of naval power. Great Britain had 
traditionally followed a policy of retaining world naval hegemony, 
through the operation of her two power standard. To the British, 
therefore, the acceptance of naval parity with the United states 
in the Washington Treaties1 had been a major concession. The 
United states, however, had the undoubted financial capacity to 
build a navy second to none, should she so decide, and as her 
international trade grew in significance and geographical scope, 
the motive to do so seemed strong. 2 It is no coincidence, therefore, 
that when relationships between the two countries began to deteri-
orate, as they did from 1927 onwards, the dispute centred around 
naval issues. On the one hand, there was the failure of the 
Geneva naval disarmament conference, and the subsequent activities 
of the 'Big Navy' party in the United states, which sought to whip 
up fears of a possible AnglO-American war in order to promote the 
construction of a large American navy. 3 On the other hand, there 
was the vexed issue of belligerent rights at sea in the event of 
another war, which Sir Austen Chamberlain regarded as the only 
issue which made war between the United States and Great Britain 





See Chapters 2 and 5 above. 
Note by Lord Cecil on a visit to America, 12 January 1925, 
C.P.14(25), CAB 24/171. 
Foreign Office memorandum by G. Thompson, 17 November 1927, 
A6768/133/45, F.O.371/12041; and file 36/45 of 1928, 
F.O.371/12809 and 12810, in particular the minutes in May 1928 
on A3195/A3438/36/45, F.O.371/12810. George Thompson of the 
American Department expressed the opi~on that 'f~r. our own 
self-preservation, we must pit our bralns and poll~lcal sense 
against the bullying brawn of America - and step Wlth extreme 
care'. Minute by Thompson, 29 March 1928, on.A2127/36/45, 
F.O.371/12810. On the failure of the Naval Dlsarrnarnent Con-
ference, see correspondence and minutes in August 1927, on 
A4794/A4935/133/45, F.O.371/12040. 
N t b S · A Chamberlain on Belligerent Rights at Sea and o e y lr • . t . 
the Relations between the United states and Great Brl aln, 
26 October 1927, C.P.258(27), CAB. 24/189. 
253 -
insisting upon 'high' belligerent rights: that is, the retention 
by belligerent nations of the greatest possible powers of blockade 
d - 1 -I an selzure; whl st the United states, as a long-standing neutral 
in European conflicts, took her stand on the principle of 'freedom 
of the seas'. The possibility of some kind of agreement on 
belligerent rights, perhaps as part of a wider arbitration agreement 
between the two powers, was considered in 1927 and 1928,2 but came 
to nothing. In that year, too, the conclusion of the secret Anglo-
French naval agreement angered the Americans still further. 3 
The Foreign Office was, by 1928-9, deeply concerned at the 
escalation of bad relationships between the two countries, and in a 
powerfully argued memorandum prepared by R.C. Craigie, the head of 
the American Department, urged upon the Cabinet the need for a 
policy of conciliation towards the United States. 4 It was at this 
time that the first major potential oil controversy with the United 
states - the transfer of the Bahrain concession to an American 
company - came to the attention of the Foreign Office. Obviously 
with the 1919-21 'oil war' in mind, that Office moved quickly to 
defuse the sitUation, thus setting a precedent which was to continue 





For the view of the Admiralty, see memorandum on Belligerent 
Rights prepared at the Admiralty, 14 January 1928, C.P.309(28), 
CAB. 24/198. 
See various documents in file 133/45, 1927, in F.O.371/12040 
and 12041. R. Craigie was especially anxious to see some kind 
of agreement. See also C.P.112(28), CAB. 24/194, C.P.179(28), 
CAB. 24/195 and C.P.309(28), CAB.24/198. 
d to U.S. Secretary of State, 29 October Ray Atherton, Lon on, 
1928, 841.00 P.R./45, R.G.59, N.A., M580/28. 
Memorandum by R. Craigie, 12 Nov~er 1928; C.P.344(28~, _ 
CAB. 24/198. This memorandum is dlscussed In more detall In 
Chapter 7 below. See also C.P.358(28) and C.P.364(28), both 
in CAB.24/199; and C.P.10(29), CAB.24/201. 
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This was largely due to the continued importance, in the 
eyes of the Foreign Office, and especially Robert Vansittart, the 
Permanent Under Secretary of state1 , of keeping on good terms with 
the Americans. The new administrations which took office in both 
countries in 1929 did much to foster the improvement in relations, 
so much so that in retrospect the years 1929-33 were to be seen 
as a halcyon era of Anglo-American friendship.2 Despite the fears 
of the Foreign Office,3 Hoover's administration did not adopt an 
anti-British line; indeed, Hoover's Secretary of State, Henry 
Stimson, was an Anglophile,4 and the United States Ambassador in 
London from February 1932, Andrew Mellon, was also regarded as 
being inherently pro-British,5 although he was to demonstrate a 
tendency to use - some would say, abuse - his official position 
in order to safeguard the Gulf Oil Company, one of his many 






Ian Colvin, Vansittart in Office: An Historical Survey of the 
Origins of the Second World War based on the papers of Sir 
Robert Vansittart Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs 1930-38 (London, 1965), pp.23-27. 
Briefing Book, state Department, Western Europe (G.B.), 
25 February 1933, Folder 7, Series No.VI, Box 239, Group No.465, 
Stimson papers, Yale; and Memorandum by Sir John Simon, 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, on Imperial Defence 
Policy, 16 March 1934, C.P.80(34), CAB.24/248. 
During the 1920s, Hoover's policies as Secretary of State for 
Commerce had earned him a reputation for being anti-British. 
Minutes by R.L. Campbell and R. Vansittart, February 1925, on 
A795/128/45, F.O.371/12038; Minute by R. Craigie, 9 May ~927, 
on A2617/128/45, F.O.371/12038; and correspondence and IDlnutes, 
August 1927, A4793/128/45, F.O.371/12039 • Sir E~me H?~rd, 
British Ambassador, Washington, did not share thlS OplnlOn. 
Sir E. Howard, Washington, to R. Craigie, 14 September 1927, 
A5583/128/45, F.O.371/12039. 
Stimson Diaries, entries for 10 April 1931, Vol.15, p.234,.and 
9 June 1931, Vol.16, p.139, Stimson papers, Yale; and varlOUS 
documents on 711.41 file, especially documents 253 and 255, 
R.G.59, N.A. 
Vansittart minuted that Mellon was 'a very ~harming gentle 
(and pro-British) old man'. Minute by Vanslttart, 16 February 
1927, on A936/128/45, F.O.371/12038. 
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especially its Prime Minister and ForelOgn S t ecre ary, Ramsay 
MacDonald, was also much more inclined to encourage and work for 
the friendship of the United states than had been its predecessor,1 
not least because its foreign policy did t ° 1 no lnc ude the rigid 
defence of high belligerent rights. 2 So, despite the thorny issues 
of war debts, exacerbated by world-wide economic depression,3 and 
the Far Eastern crisis,4 both of which threatened the continuance 
of Anglo-American friendship, the relationship on the whole remained 
good. To a large extent, however, this was as a result of the 
determined attempt by Foreign Office officials to minimize potential 
sources of friction which, in their eyes at least, made the avoidance 
of any new 'oil war' vital. 
This atmosphere of conciliation was to change rapidly with the 
arrival in office in March 1933 of President Roosevelt's Democratic 
1. J. Ramsay MacDonald to Sir John Simon, 3 June 1932, Simon 
papers, F.O.800/287. 
2. Memorandum by Lord Parmoor, Lord President of the Council, on 
Belligerent Rights, 6 November 1929, C.P.310(29), CAB.24/206. 
3. Benjamin D. Rhodes, 'Herbert Hoover and the War Debts, 1919-33', 
Prologue 6 (1974), pp.137-40, discussed the extent to which 
Hoover's desire to follow a conciliatory policy was thwarted, 
first by Congress and public opinion, then by his electoral 
defeat. There are many British Cabinet papers on the war 
debts question. 
4. Robert A. Hecht, 'Great Britain and the Stimson Note of January 7 
1932', Pacific Historical Review 38 (1969), pp.177-191; and 
Richard N. Current, 'The Stimson Doctrine and the Hoover 
Doctrine', American Historical Review LIX (1954), pp.513-542. 
The United States was anxious that Great Britain should work 
with them. R.C. Lindsay, British Ambassador, Washington, to 
U.S. Secretary of State, 3 March 1932, Simon papers, F.O.800/286; 
Gerald E. Wheeler, 'Isolated Japan: Anglo-American Diplomatic 
Cooperation, 1927-1936', Pacific Historical Review 30 (1961), 
pp.165-178. It is, however, noticeable th~t by ~ate 193: the 
Foreign Office was beginning to feel that In.t?e:r handllng of 
the Far Eastern issue it was not worth sacrlflclng Japanese 
friendship, as it couid not be sure of U.S. friendship. Minute 




The torpedoing of the World Economic Conference 
, 
the attitude towards war debts, and th 
e withdrawal into isola-
ti . 1 omsm, tempered only by an . 
aggreSSlve economic internationalism 
that was to clash with British trade hopes, led to an intense 
feeling of irritation amongst the British Foreign Office officials,2 
affecting even Vansittart, who commented 
The U.S.A. [sic] will always disappoint us ••• 
we have done quite enough running after them 
and should do no more; advances must now co~e 
from them ••• our ••• relations with the U.S.A. 
[sic] ••• are as good as that unreliable country 
will or can allow them to be. 
He made it plain that, in his eyes at least, the era of 'running 
after' the Americans was over: it was time that the promotion of 
good AnglO-American relations became a two-wayeffort. 3 It was 
perhaps fortunate - for the American oil companies - that pledges 
had already been made to the United States Government which the 
Bri tish Government felt bound to honour; and that by the time 
British exasperation with the United States was at its height, a 
solution was already close in the Kuwait controversy. Something 
of the new sense of irritation can be seen in later oil negotiations. 
Whilst the Foreign Office was still anxious that Great Britain 
should not overtly discriminate against American interests, it was 
nonetheless prepared actively to assist British companies to a 
far greater extent than it had hitherto found acceptable. However, 
in view of the worsening situation in Europe, and the world economic 
1. D.G. Osborne, British Embassy, Washington, to Secretary of 




Foreign Office memorandum by Mr. Gore-Booth, 26 September 
1934, A8038/2280/45, F.O.371/17603. 
Minute by Sir R. Vansittart, 15 December 1933, on A9235/252/45, 
F.O.371/16612; minute by Vansittart, 5 February 19~4, o? . 
A785/785/45, F.O.371/17593, in which he expressed.hls op~nlon 
'that we have been too tender, not to say sub servlent, Wl th the 
U.S. for a long time past'; and Vansittart to Ronald Lindsay, 
24 September 1934, A9942/2280/45, F.O.371/17603. 
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depression, the Foreign Office, though no longer so active in 
promoting good Anglo-American relations , could not afford 
1 gratuitously to rupture them. 
The general diplomatic background of the period 1927-1934 
undoubtedly helps explain why American oil companies were to be 
successful in so much of the Arabian peninsula, despite the 
undoubted political pre-eminence there of Great Britain. However, 
the possible admittance of American interests was to promote 
serious interdepartmental controversy in Whitehall; both the 
Colonial Office and the India Office, the departments actually 
responsible for the conduct of British policy in the Persian 
Gulf area, were anxious to exclude American companies from the 
region, and it was only as a consequence of persistent and 
determined Foreign Office insistence that the door was opened 
to United states enterprise. 
Colonial Office policy2 towards the Persian Gulf shaikhdoms 
was thus almost the complete antithesis of that followed in 
Palestine and Iraq, where it had been at the instance of the 
Colonial Office, rather than the Foreign Office, that a concilia-
tory attitude had been adopted towards United states Government 
protests and support of its nationals. Instead, the Colonial 
Office chose to follow - or, rather, attempt to follow - the 
restrictive leasing policy in operation in Trinidad and other 
1. 
2. 
Thus for example even in June 1933, Sir John Simon could 
" " I I ti still speak of it being 'a time when frlend Y re a ons 
between ourselves and the Americans are of supreme importance'. 
Sir John Simon to Lord Derby, 13 June 1933, Simon papers, 
F.O.800/288. 
At the recommendation of the Masterton-Smith c~~ttee, th: 
Colonial Office assumed responsibility for polltlcal relations 
"th th P "an Gulf shaikhdoms on 1 March 1921, although 
Wl e erSl " b dministered by the Government 
these relations contlnued to e a " " 
of India's Political Resident at Bushire and Polltlcal Agents. 
See Appendix II, Section C. 
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Crown Colonies, by implementing the British control clause and 
, 
in negotiations with the interested ° compaDles, by attempting _ 
vainly - to impose the Admiralty clauses.1 This change in policy 
was probably due to a number of factors. One of the most 
significant was that, whereas in the mandated territories, Great 
Britain was bound by the terms of the mandate not to exercise 
her power so as to benefit her own nationals, in much of the 
Arabian peninsula her position was far stronger. First and 
foremost, she was not committed to Observe the 'open door'. 
Indeed, the Shaikhs of Bahrain and Kuwait were virtual dependents 
t Ot 02 d h d ° of Grea Brl aln ,an a, prlor to the First World War, pledged 
to grant oil concessions to no company or individual without the 
prior consent of His Majesty's Government. 3 Thus, in direct 
antithesis to the 9ituation pertaining in the mandated territories, 
the Colonial Office had clear powers on which it could base any 
demand for the exclusion of foreign interests from the oilfields 
of the Persian Gulf. Kuwait was of special significance, since 




This is discussed further in Appendix IV below. 
They had accepted this position in a series of treaties, by 
which they had agreed to abstain from entering into negotiations 
or making treaties of any sort with any other state or govern-
ment, to allow any other government to establish diplomati~ 
or consular agencies or to cede, sell, mortgage or otherwlse 
give for occupation ~ny part of their territory without the 
permission of the British Government. Agreement between 
Great Britain and the Shaikh of Bahrain, 22 December 1880, 
Hurewitz, I, p.194; Exclusive Agreement between Great. 
Bri tain and the Shaikh of Bahrai"'1, 13 March 1892," ~;rrewltz, _ i 
I p. 209 ° and Excl usi ve Agree1l1en t between the Shal.<:h of Kuwa __ t 
, , ° t· I D • 21B-9 • and Great Britain, 23 January 1899, Hurewl z~ 'LP 
t Wlo th the Shaikh of Kuwait, 27 october 1913, and Agreemen s 272 3 
the Shaikh of Bahrain, 14 May 1914, Hurewitz, I, pp. --. 
- 259 -
1914, and hence from the Red Line Agreement of 1928e 1 This made 
it possible for individual members of the Iraq Petroleum Company 
(IPC)2 consortium to hold concessions in Kuwait without being 
obliged to transfer them to the IPC. 
The way therefore seemed open for the Colonial Office to 
adopt the policy followed in the CroM! Colonies. This development 
seemed especially probable, since by this later period, those in 
charge of Middle Eastern affairs within the Office had, for the 
most part, gained -their experience in colonial administration, 
rather than specifically in Middle Eastern affairs. Their attitude 
was to be Jf great significance, for it was the Colonial Office 
which conducted most of the negotia-cions with the comp;"~llies 
involved - at least until 1 August 1933, on which date the India 
Office reassumed responsibility for Persian Gulf affairs. This 
was due to ,-=). combination of fortuitous circumstances, not least 
that the Eastern and Genecal Syndicate 3 , the company principally 
involved in 't.he negotiations, had no links \AJi+:2l. the Foreign Office 
or Petroleum Department - unlike Anglo-Persian. Hence, the 
1. The Red Line Agreement of the IPC, 31 July 1928, Hurewitz, 
II, pp.161-177. 
2. The Turkish Petroleum Company had changed its name to the 
Iraq Petroleum Company in 1927, and will be referred to as 
such throughout this chapter. 
3. The Eastern and General Syndicate was not a major oil company 
indeed it was not an oil company, as such, at all. It was 
incorp~rated in London in 1920, with an authorized capital 
of £50 300 to deal with concessions, options and general 
, , Th 
business in Arabia. Its principal shareholders were e 
Chartered and General Exploration and Finance Company Ltd., 
Allen and Hanburys Ltd. (pharmaceutical chemists), an~ 
Mr. B.M. Messa (an Aden merchant). This meant. that, In the 
event of a concession being obtained, the sy~dlcate was 
unlikely to be in a position to exploit it itself, b~t woul~ 
.' t to a larger establlshed oll have to dispose of ltS lnteres s , 
company. 
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Syndicate conducted its correspondence with His Majesty's 
Government through the Colonial Office, as did the Political 
Agents in Kuwait and Bahrain, and the Political Resident at 
Bushire. The Colonial Office thus became the major source of 
information within Whitehall on the company's intentions, and 
the Shaikh's opinions. Foreign Office involvement, though 
decisive, was less pervasive than in the cases of Palestine and 
Iraq, in large part because of the comparative simplicity of 
the international complications involved. 
In its attempts, first to exclude American interests 
altogether, and then to limit the extent of American involvement, 
the Colonial Office was strongly supported by the India Office 
and the Government of India. Their attitude was largely dictated 
by an attempt to retain Great Britain's traditional power and 
posi tion wi thin the Persian Gulf. Although the Gulf states, 
including Kuwait (but excluding Bahrain) had recognized the formal 
suzerainty of the Ottoman Sultan until 1918, they had in fact 
fallen increasingly under the influence and authority, of British 
India throughout the nineteenth century. British and Indian 
interests had been primarily maritime in nature, aimed at safe-
guarding the western approaches to India, and represented by 
the imposition of the so-called 'Maritime Truce' and a prolonged 
1 
campaign against endemic piracy and slavery. However, in the 
later nineteenth century, a determined stand wss taken against 
Russian and German attempts to expand their political influence 
into the Gulf. 2 In the face of these threats, the Government of 
1. J.B. Kelly 'The Legal and Historical Basis of the Bri~sh 
, 0 'st A tony's Papers 4 (Mlddle Position in the PerSlan Gulf, • n 
° 120 137- and General Treaty for Eastern Affalrs No.1), pp. - , G t B °ta°n 
Sl Trade between rea rl 1 Suppressing Piracy and the ave 
and the Arab tribes in the Persian Gulf, 8 January 1820, 
Hurewi tz, I, pp .88-90. 
2. Kazemzadeh, pp.3-20 and 62-98. 
I 
- 261 -
India extended its authority actually into the petty shaikhdoms 
along the Arabian littoral of the Gulf, securing promises that 
in effect prevented their rulers from receiving foreign consuls, 
alienating territory, or even conducting their own foreign 
relations except with the acquiescence of the British Government. 
These agreements were enforced by Indian appointed Political 
Agents, and emphasized by frequent displays of potential force. 
Wi th the breakup of the ottoman Empire in 1918, and the 
surrender of its formal suzerainty over the Gulf shaikhdoms, even 
this weak: threat to British hegemony was removed, and it was 
assumed in Whitehall that British pre-eminence in the Persian Gulf 
would continue unchallenged, not least because Russia and Germany 
were no longer able to rival British influence. In the Peace 
Handbooks drawn up by the Foreign Office for the Versailles Peace 
Conference, it was stated that 'it is imperative that ••• Great 
Britain should continue, as hitherto, to perform her especial 
duties and to retain complete ascendancy in the Persian Gulf,.1 
During the war, indeed, the India Office had extended its 
influence further into the hinterland of Arabia, subsidizing ibn 
Saud and, initially, attempting to bring him under its political 
control, although by 1927 Saud had asserted his complete 
independence. 2 There was, therefore, every reason for the India 
Office and the Government of India to believe that they could 
continue to view the Persian Gulf as completely under their control, 
although, with hindsight, George Rendel, head of the Eastern 




Foreign Office, Peace Handbooks: No.81 Persian Gulf, (London, 
1919 ), p. 78 • 
" h" between ibn Saud and Great Britain 
The changing relatlons lP " th f Saudi Arabia: 
is discussed in Gary Troeller , The ~l~ , ~ (London 1976). 
Britain and the Rise of the House 0 au, 
I 
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The Go;rerrunent of India found it difficul t 
to belle;re that any of the recent internal 
changes In the Middle East could be permanent • 
•••• they long hoped to be able to go 0 
. th n 
runnlng e Persian Gulf under a virtual 
Governor precariously established on aIm t 
h t · os os lIe Persian soil. When we at the Fo . Off · . . relgn lce lnslsted on the impracticability of 
this they were inclined ••• to think us 
defeatist. 1 
In this bid to retain dominance over the Gulf region, it was 
realized that foreign commercial interests, if established on a 
sufficiently large scale, could rapidly lead to the introduction 
of the foreign political influence India so feared. Having 
circumvented the threat of a massive German presence in Kuwait, 
the suggested Gulf terminus of the Baghdad Railway, the British 
had apparently little reason for concern. Apart from Bahrain's 
pearling industry, and KUwait's excellent harbour, there was little 
in the economically backward Gulf shaikhdoms 2 to attract Western 
capi tal until the advent of oil exploration _ and with it the 
representatives and wealth of some of the most powerful and feared 
multinational combines. The political influence and interference 
of American oil companies in Latin America, particularly during 
the turmoil of post-revolutionary Mexico, offered a frightening 
example of what might happen in the hitherto placid Gulf where 
3 British supremacy had only once been seriously challenged. Only 
by the sUbstitution of British for American capital could the worst 
effects of a Persian Gulf oil industry be averted. 
1. Sir George Rendel The Sword and the Olive: Recollections of 
. '. S . 1913-1954 (London 1957), p.62. Dlplomacy and the Forelgn ervlce '.
It is however interesting that as late as 1926, the Forelgn 
" . t .. the paramount Office supported the importance of maln alDlng 
. . . th P . an Gulf. Memorandum on position of Great Brltaln In e erSl .. f 
the Foreign Policy of His Majesty's Gover~ent, Wl~ ~Ol~s:i~ 
British commitments in relative order of lmportanc , p 
1926, D.B.F.P., Series 1A, Vol.1, p.861. 
2. Foreign Office, Peace Handbooks: No.90 Arabia (London, 1919), 
pp.33-38, 45-6 and 118. 
3. That is, by the German Baghdad Railway scheme. 
I 
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Until the later part of 1928, however, the question of 
American participation in the exploitation of Persian Gulf 
oi1fie1ds had not been mooted. Th·· t 1S 1S no to say that American 
oil companies and the state Department - had taken no interest 
in Persian Gulf oil. However, this interest was bound to be 
limited, for not only were conditions in much of Arabia so 
unstable as to render even negotiations for concessions, let 
alone geological surveys, uncertain, if not openly dangerous, 
but the state Department lacked regular and reliable information 
as a result of its limited representation in the Arabian peninsu1a. 1 
It was through the consuls at Aden and Muscat and, after 1919, 
the consul at Baghdad, that reports reached the State Department; 
this information was usually second-hand, and came either from 
the American missionaries (a constant source of information 
throughout the period); the interested parties themselves; or 
the (automatically suspect) British officials. 
However, the American State Department seemed to believe that 
there were distinct oil possibilities in Arabia2, and showed a 
willingness to collate information for reference to any potentially 
interested oil companies. This was done in the case of a report 
that the ruler of the Yemen was said to favour granting an oil 
. 3 




See Appendix II. 
Military Intelligence Report on Arabia for the period March . 
1920-December 1921, E.102, Washington Conference, R.G.43,~~~., 
and Addison Southard, Consul, Aden to U.S. Secretary of S , 
15 September 1920, 890B.6363/-, R.G.59, N.A. M72~/7~ Both of 
these refer to indications of oil on both the ASlatic and 
African sides of the Red Sea. British Government sources, 
. e since as late as 1931 however, were apparently less sanguln , d 1· ·b1 
th ·1 t ti 1 f Arabia was being dismisse as neg 19l e. e 01 po en a 0 . 20 J 1931 
Petroleum Department to Colonial Offlce, anuary , 
p.95 in Middle East No.32, C.O.935/3. 
1922-23 period in the 890B.6363 See various documents for the 
file, R.G.59, N.A., M722/7. 
I 
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explorer, Victor Cherruan, Socony sent representatives to the 
Yemen, although no concession resulted. 1 The same procedure, of 
seeking information and relaying it to Amerl"can " companles, was 
followed by the state Department in the case of the Hejaz (1922-3); 
at the time, of course, Sharif Hussain still ruled that area. 2 
So enthusiastic was the Department to promote American enterprise, 
that a suggestion was made that a representative should be sent 
to the Hejaz to report on conditions there, despite the fact that 
the United States had not recognized the Sharif's Government. 3 
As well as following up reports of possible openings for 
American oil companies, the State Department also showed a keen 
interest in all British oil activities in the Arabian peninsula, 
in particular the grant by ibn Saud in 1923 to the Eastern and 
General Syndicate of an oil concession in the Hasa province of 
Nejd. Its main concern was the standing of the Eastern and General 
Syndicate and, more particularly, whether it had any links with 
Anglo-Persian. Despite denials from both companies, most American 
consular officials seem to have assumed that such a link existed, 
if only because Anglo-Persian had shown so little interest in 
bta " " " 4 o lnlng the conceSSlon. However, although the Department made 
vigorous attempts to tap all possible sources of information 





890B.6363/4, 5 and 7, R.G.59, N.A. The Iman of Y~~n was 
probably more concerned to secure American recognltion, 
although the U.S. Government refused. See various documents 
in file 711.90J2 and also 890B.63/-, R.G.59, N.A. 
See file 890F.6363, R.G.59, N.A., M722/17. 
H E ert Near Eastern Division, 
Internal memorandum by C. Van • ng ~~2 R G.59 M722/17. 
to Mr. Bliss, 16 November 1922, 890F.04,· , 
No representative was actually sent. 
See various documents for 1923/4 on 890B.6363, R.G.59, N.A. 
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the British Government, nor do Department officials appear to 
have suspected that the British had brought official pressure 
to bear on ibn Saud in order to . th galn e concession for a British 
f . 1 lrm. 
Indeed, it does not seem that the Brl·tish Go vernment was 
particularly anxious to obtain oil concessions for its own 
nationals, although prepared to prevent (if possible) concessions 
falling into undesirable hands. 2 There seemed no particular reason 
for concern, however, in view of the prevalence of the opinion in 
British Government and oil circles that there were unlikely to be 
significant deposits of oil in Arabia. Even if there were, Great 
Britain had treaties with the Shaikhsof Kuwait, Bahrain and Qator, 
which gave her a legitimate method of ensuring British control of 
any oil deposits that might be found. In addition, until the late 
1920s, the British Government exercised considerable political 
influence, albeit of an informal nature, over ibn Saud. 
Whi tehall al so had the security of knowing that the two 
companies actively involved in pursuing Arabian concessions, Anglo-
Persian and the Eastern and General Syndicate, were both British. 
1. In fact, of course, the British Government had not given any 
support to Holmes. M.R.P. Dickson, Kuwait and her Neighbours 
(London, 1956), pp.267-278; and Shwadran, pp.301-2. 
2. The Anglo-Persian, having shown a sporadic interest in Kuwait 
from 1911 decided in 1925 not to press on with the matter, 
apparentl~ because of the difficulties raised by the British 
Government. Chisholm, pp.3-13, and p.90, Note 10. The 
trivial nature of the correspondence on the issue is shown by 
the fact that much of it, especially that conducted thro~gh 
the Colonial Office was weeded before reaching the publl~ 
Record Office. See'however Colonial Office to Angl~-perslan, 
29 March 1922 Chisholm, Note 10, p.90. Anglo-Perslan 
. '.... reeing terms wi th the experlenced such dlfflculties In ag ti 
Colonial Office that in 1925 it decided to let the ques o? 
of concessions ~or Kuwait and Bahrain drop. See A~g~~per~~~~ 
memoranda between H. Nichols and Sir John Cadman, c er , 
Chisholm, p.111. 
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Anglo-Persian had been interested in the region 
as early as 1917, 
and had applied formally for petroleum rights;n h ~ Ba rain and Kuwait, 
but as a consequence of the company's own belief that oil was 
unlikely to be found in commercial quantities, combined with half-
hearted British Government assistance , the negotiations were not 
brought to a satisfactory conclusion. 1 
In the early 1920s, the company began to show a renewed 
interest in Arabia, but found a new rival on the scene, the Eastern 
and General Syndicate, a little known company with no productive 
capacity or established markets. Whilst the Anglo-Persian conducted 
its negotiations through the Political Resident2', the Syndicate, 
having received a concession for the Hasa district in May 1923 from 
ibn Saud, continued the practice of nego-tiating directly with the 
3 
rulers. Benefiting in part from the Anglo-Persian's half-hearted 
attitude, and its unpopularity on the Persian GUlf4 , the Syndicate 
was finally successful in obtaining a concession from the Shaikh 






Chisholm, pp.3-13; and Petroleum Department to Foreign Office, 
5 November 1932, C.O.732/52/98026/122. 
Ibid. See also summary of despatches from the Political Resident 
to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, destroyed under 
statute, nos. 5537, 18976 and 25165 of 1924 in C.O.775/2. 
These negotiations were conducted on the spot by Major Frank 
Holmes (1874-1947), who had a long career of involvement in . 
gold and tin mining, and who had been involved in the formation 
of the Eastern and General Syndicate. 
Political Resident to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
24 October 1924, destroyed under statute, entry no.54996, C.O.775/2. 
Political Resident to Secretary of State for the Colonies, . 
12 December 1925 destroyed under statute, no.343 of 1926 ln 
C.O.775/2 For ~e text of the agreement, see Confiden~al 
Print M ~ No 32 pp 1-5, in C.O.935/1. For a very ~rlef 
, •• • , •. th ssion see Davls, discussion of the grantlng of e conce , 




Very little interest was shown within the Colonial 
Office in the progress of the negotiations, sl'nce no 
major policy 
decisions were required. The fa t th t th 
cae only two contenders 
for concessions were British doubtless explains why no stipulation 
was made that the 1925 Bahrain concession should contain the 
'British Control Clause'. 
The Syndicate, however, lacked the finances to exploit the 
Bahrain resources, and for the next three years little progress was 
made with the concession; nonetheless the company continued to 
press its application for a similar concession in Kuwait. Attempts 
by the Syndicate in the Spring of 1926 to interest other British 
groups, notably Anglo-Persian, in the Bahrain and Hasa concessions 
2 
were unsuccessful , and on 30 November 1927, therefore, the 
3 Syndicate signed two agreements with the Eastern Gulf Oil Company, 
under which the Gulf company was given the right to explore the 
territories covered by the Syndicate's concessions, including 
Bahrain, with the option of forming a British or Canadian company 
to work such territories. 4 The Syndicate also undertook to use 
its best endeavours to obtain a concession from the Shaikh of Kuwait 
5 'f and to assign it to the Eastern Gulf Oil Company, or a nOffilnee 0 
tha t company. 






Syndicate to Colonial Office, 19 December 1928, C.O.732/34/59115/25; 
attached documents, 890B.6363 G.O.C./2, R.G.59, N.A.; and 
Chisholm, pp.13-14. 
b 'd' f the Gulf Oil The Eastern Gulf Oil Company was a su Sl lary 0 
, ., member of the IPC by Corporation, WhlCh In 1928 became a " 
virtue of its membership in the American consortlum, the Near 
East Development Corporation. 
, 19 D emb r 1928 enclosing copies Syndicate to Colonial Offlce, ec e , 
of the agreements, C.O.732/34/59115/25. 
, 'ff' 17 october 1930, c.o. 732/45/79178/19. Syndlcate to Colonlal 0 lce, 
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No notification of the signature of th 
ese agreements was given 
to the Colonial Office at the time 1 , and 
as late as July 1928, 
S. Robinson of the Middle Eastern Deparbnent minuted that in the 
opinion of Sir A.T. Wilson2 there was no likelihood of the 
Americans showing any interest in the Bahrain concession3, a view 
which the Colonial Office was only too ready to accept. 4 Interes-
tingly, however, some consideration had been given to the means of 
warding off any American interest that might be shown following a 
despatch from the Political Resident on 2 April 1928, in which he 
had pointed out that under the terms of the concession, the company 
was not prevented from transferring the concession to an American 
th f ° ° 5 or 0 er orelgn concesslonary. Why he made this comment is not 
apparent but, alerted to the possible dangers, the Colonial Office 
instructed the Resident to advise the Shaikh that any future 
agreement granting, for example, a further extension of the explora-
tion licence, should include either a draft clause on the lines of 
6 the 'British Control Clause', or, failing that, a clause on the 
1. The Colonial Office did however know that the Syndicate was 
negotiating with groups other than Anglo-Persian, but did not 
appear curious. Minute by J.H. Hall, 28 February 1927, on 
C.O.732/26/49070. 
2. Sir A.T. Wilson, who had been Deputy Chief political Officer and 
Acting British Civil Commissioner in Mesopotamia 1915-20, 






Minute by Robinson, July 1928, on C.O.732/34/59115. 
t L d Monteagle, Foreign Office, J.H. Hall, Colonial Office, 0 or 
31 July 1928, C.O.732/34/59115/7. 
Political Resident to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
2 April 1928, C.O.732/34/59115/1. 
° th 'B °tish Control Clause' For a detailed discuSslon of e rl to ltd that the 
° I would have s lPU a e 
see Appendix IV. ThlS cause 0ti h ny registered 
° uld nl b held by a Brl s compa 
conceSSlon co 0 y e d °th °ts principal 
in Great Britain or a British colony, an Wl 1 ch 
o 0 ° the Dominions, and that su company 
place of buslness Wlthln ° ° controlled or managed by 
should not be directly or lndlrectly ° 
° f ° gn corpora lion. forelgners or any other orel 
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lines of Article XIII of the Mining Lease of the concession 1 
, 
which stipulated that the concession should not be transferred to 
a third party without the consent of the Resl" dent, h 
suc permission 
not to be unreasonably withheld. 2 
Thus, the Colonial Office was det " d to erIDlne resist American 
encroachment in the Persian Gulf to the utmost of its ability, 
despite being on weak ground legally. Having given approval to 
the grant and terms of the Syndicate's concession, the British 
Government had no authority to insist upon its amendment, a fact 
of which Colonial Office officials were well aware. 3 Nonetheless, 
they decided upon a policy of attempting to exclude American 
interests, without first consulting the Foreign Office, which was 
only informed of the current negotiations, by error, in June 1928. 4 
Foreign Office fears that the United States might protest at this 
5 infringement of the 'open door', were promptly dismissed by the 
Colonial Office, on the grounds that American interests were not 






Under the 1925 concession the company held first an exploration 
licence (for 2 years, with a possible extension for a further 
2 years), a prospecting licence (for the same period), and ~ 
mining lease (for 55 years). Each licence or lease was subJect 
to different conditions. 
Secretary of State for the Colonies to Political Resident, 
19 June 1928, C.O.732/34/59115/2. 
Minute by J.H. Hall, 1 July 1928, on C.O.732/34/59115. 
Correspondence and minutes, E3239/3239/91, F.O.~71/13017. 
The Colonial Office regarded the sending of coples of corres-
pondence to the Foreign Office as unfortunate. Minute by 
Robinson, n.d., but probably July 1928, on C.O.732/34/59115. 
Lord Monteagle, Foreign Office to J.H. Hall, Colonial Office, 
24 July 1928, ibid. 
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I do not see that the 'open door' 
principle can be held to apply to 
Bahrein. Providentially there is 
no mandate for Bahrein, and we are 
no more committed to that inconvenient 
principle in Bahrein than in (say) 
Persia or for that matter Trinidad. 1 
The complacency of the Colonial Office was, however, shattered in 
the October of 1928. Applying for an extension of their exploration 
licence for a further year,2 Syndicate representatives admitted 
in an interview at the Colonial Office on 17 October 1928 that, 
having failed to secure the financial support of other British 
companies, they were negotiating for American and Canadian capital. 3 
The Colonial Office had, of course, already taken steps to 
ensure that British control should be retained over any concession 
. h. 4 ln Ba raln; there remained, however, Kuwait, where the Eastern 
and General Syndicate was involved in negotiations with the Shaikh 
for a concession. 5 The Colonial Office moved quickly to ensure 
that it did not weaken its position by an oversight, as it had 
done in Bahrain. In November 1928 Major Holmes, the syndicate's 
representative in Kuwait, was informed by the Political Agent that 
His Majesty's Government would not agree to the grant of a con-






Hall to Monteagle, 31 July 1928, C.O.732/34/59115/7. 
Syndicate to Colonial Office, 22 October 1928, C.O.732/34/59115/11. 
Colonial Office to Board of Trade, 8 November 1928, enclosing 
memorandum of a meeting of 17 october 1928, C.O.732/34/59115/14. 
Secretary of State for the Colonies to the political Resident, 
19 June 1928, C.O.732/34/59115/2. 
A draft concession had been submitted to the Shaikh in July 
1928. For the text, see Chisholm, pp.121-125. 
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1 
control Clause. According to the Syndicate, the Shaikh of 
Kuwait had already signified to the Political Agent his willing-
ness to sign the draft concession it had presented to him, although 
no verification of this is possible from Colonial Office files.2 
What does emerge, however, is that the Colonial Office, in 
insisting upon the inclusion of the British Control Clause in any 
Kuwait concession, was acting in the light of information given 
to it by the Syndicate that the company's oil interests in the 
Persian Gulf were likely to be transferred to an American company, 
although this information was not relayed officially to the Office 
in writing until 19 December 1928. 3 The Petroleum Department's 
assertion in 1932, in a letter to the Foreign Office, that the 
decision to insist upon the British Control Clause was due simply 
to a realization that this matter had been overlooked in the 
Bahrain concession, and that ' ••• no question of American partici-
pation had, up to this time, arisen' 4, was therefore false, as a 
5 letter within the Board of Trade's files would have revealed. 
1. The Colonial Office correspondence on Kuwait oil, file 59191 
of 1928, has been destroyed. However, copies of the inter-
departmental correspondence with the Board of Trade and the 
India Office in November 1928, on the intention to insist on 
the inclusion in any agreement of a clause providing for the 
maintenance of British control were sent to the Foreign 
Office and are filed under references E5370/E5460/5370/91, 
F.O.371/13019. See also Eastern and General Syndicate to the 
Colonial Office, 17 October 1930, C.O.732/45/78178/19. 
2. Ibid. Although the Colonial Office correspondence on Kuwait 
oil for 1928 has been destroyed, by 12 September 1928, however, 
according to the summary of a letter from t?e Resident, H~lmes 
had left Kuwait without obtaining a conceSSlon• See the lndex 
sheet for file 59191 of 1928 in C.O.78815. 
3. Syndicate to colonial Office, 19 December 1928, c.O.732/34/ 
59115/25. 
4. Petroleum Department to Foreign Office, 5 November 1932. 
C.O.732/52/98026/122. 
5. Colonial Office to Board of Trade, 8 November 1928, 
C.O.732/34/59115/14. 
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Such knowledge might, or might not, have alt 
ered the Foreign 
Office's attitude towards the matter l'n 1928 h' 
, w lch was one of 
surprise that it should have been in.t::"rmed of th ' 
.i:V e lntricacies 
. 1 t' ti 1 of commerCla nego la ons. It would b 1 seem pro ab e, however, 
that in 1928-9, at any rate, the Foreign Office would have 
regarded the imposition of conditions upon a concession yet to 
be signed as rather different from a belated effort to alter an 
existing concession so as to exclude possible American interests, 
for in the Spring of 1929 it was felt that since "the Eastern 
and General Syndicate show a disposition to part with their 
concessions to American interests', the attempt to impose rigorous 
conditions on K~wait in the early stages of negotiations would be 
beneficial: 'the insertion of a British-control clause ab initio 
will eliminate difficulties such as we are experiencing in the 
case of Bahrein,.2 
In late 1928, therefore, Foreign Office involvement in the 
Bahrain and Kuwait negotiations was minimal, thus allowing the 
Colonial Office to insist upon the inclusion in both oil con-
cessions of as much of the British Control Clause as might be 
feasible. In Bahrain, it adopted the policy outlined in its 
letter of 19 June 1928 to the Political Resident, and sought to 
make the renewal of the syndicate's exploration licence dependent 
upon that company giving an undertaking to abide by the British 
3 Control Clause. th · ti the American company involved, By lS me, 




, '1 5370/91 of 1928 F.O.371/13019. See minutes and documents In fl e , 
Minute by C.E. Steel, 23 March 1929, on E1497/1497/91, 
F.O.371/13735. 
d ' t 23 November 1928, C.O.732/34/59115/1
0
• Colonial Office to Syn lca e, 
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not hold a concession in Bahrain . d In ependently of that company. 
It had therefore transferred its options to the Standard Oil 
Company of California (Socal).1 Th e Syndicate, predictably, 
repulsed Colonial Office attempts to force them into an acceptance 
of the British Control Clause, and argued that, since it had made 
the agreements with the American company in good faith, the 
Colonial Office could not force it to rescind them, but should be 
satisfied with the stipulation, imposed by the Syndicate, that 
only a British or Canadian company should take over the concession. 2 
Once the IPC, offered the concession by Gulf Oil, had refused it,3 
Colonial Office hopes that exploitation by the IPC could solve its 
4 dilemma were negated. 
For a short time, the Colonial Office explored the possibility 
that, since the exploration licence, which had expired on 2 December 
1928, had neither been renewed nor succeeded by a prospecting 
licence, the concession might be held to be null and void, and 
with it Gulf's options. This, officials hoped, would leave the 
IPC free to enter Bahrain. 5 This is in itself a demonstration of 
how determined the Colonial Office was to resist American involve-






Memorandum from the U.S. Embassy in London, 3 April 1929, 
E1697/281/91, F.O.371/13730 • 
Syndicate to Colonial Office, 19 December 1928, C.O.732/34/5~115/25 
and Memorandum on a meeting with representatives of the Syndlcate, 
28 December 1928, C.O.732/34/59115/27. 
Syndicate to Colonial Office, 8 April 1929, C.O.732/39/69035/23. 
Colonial Office to Board of Trade, 12 January 1929, C.O.732/34/ 
59115/27; and Colonial Office to Admiralty, 20 March 1929, 
C.O.732/39/69035/17. 
. t tives of the syndicate on 
Memorandum on meetings Wlth represen a of the Red Line 
28 December 1928 C.O.732/34/59115/27. Because abl-' 
, . would not have been e Agreement of 1928 the Anglo-Perslan 
, .. d endently of the IPC. to hold the Bahrain concesslon In ep 
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dubious. Not only had interdepartmental c d 
orrespon ence and 
Colonial Office consideration been largely responsible for the 
delay in the renewal of the exploration I" 
lcence, but the wording 
of the concession itself was ambiguous, and did 
not stipulate 
that there could be no delay between the expiry of one licence 
and the commencement of another. 1 Moreover, the Syndicate had 
paid the money due for the subsequent, year to the Bahrain 
Governmentfs account. Before the decision finally to drop this 
line of argument had been taken, the Colonial Office had come 
to the conclusion that in view of the circumstances it might be 
best to abandon the idea of opposing the introduction of American 
capital, and concentrate on obtaining as much of the British 
Control Clause as possible. 2 
Its reasons for so deciding were purely pragmatic. Apart 
from the weakness of its argument legally, the Office was swayed 
by the Petroleum Department's belief that it would be better for 
the oil to be produced by a foreign company than not at all, based 
on the strong reasoning that in view of the general lack of interest 
amongst the oil industry in Bahrain,3 together with the possibility 
of United states diplomatic representations, it would probably be 





Colonial Office to Admiralty, 20 March 1929, C.O.732/39/69035/17; 
Colonial Office to interested departments, 17 June 1929, 
C.O.732/39/69035/64-6; and report of a conference held at the 
Colonial Office, 7 June 1929, C.O.732/39/69035/68. It w~s at 
this conference that the decision was taken to drop the ldea of 
declaring the concession null and void. 
Colonial Office to Admiralty, 20 March 1929, C.O.732/39/69035/17. 
The Foreign Office, which was sent a copy of this l:tter, whilst 
supporting the Colonial Office's general point of Vl:W~ felt thtre
l " t" . t upon the Brltlsh Con 0 latter had no grounds on WhlCh 0 lnSlS 
Clause. '. Minute by Steel, 22 March 1929, on E1513/281/91, 
F.O.371/13730. 
In view of the world depression and slump in oil prices, this 
was especially relevant. 




was demonstrated only a month later, when the United States 
Embassy asked for a statement of British 1" po lCy towards the 
participation of American capital in the B " " 1 
rltish protectorates. 
Meanwhile the Syndicate, on behalf of its American associates 
, 
stated that 
••• there can be no valid reason or right 
for the exclusion of American interests in 
the way contemplated by these British 
nationality provisions, which were the 
result of afterthoughts in the premises. 2 
The sudden, if expected, intervention by the United States 
Government was to lead the Foreign Office to urge a conciliatory 
approach upon the other involved Departments. This was probably 
the most significant factor in persuading the Colonial Office to 
accept American involvement in Bahrain as a necessary evil. The 
Foreign Office was particularly anxious to avoid friction with 
the United States, in view of the worsening AnglO-American relations; 
moreover, it was aware that the new administration under President 
Hoover was likely to take a firm line on the control of raw materials. 3 
However, the Foreign Office had apparently overestimated the 
significance of American representations, for the State Department 
was little concerned by the issue - except after the event, when 
the case of Bahrain offered a precedent in the Kuwait negotiations. 
There is certainly no indication that State Department officials 
th "1 ' regarded the incident as in-any way presaging ano er Ol war, 
of the kind which had so exercised American politicians and officials 
during the early 1920s. The Near Eastern Division had in fact 
shown very little interest in the Bahrain concession until 6 February 




Memorandum left by the U.S. Charge d'Affaires, 3 April 1929, 
E1697/281/91, F.O.371/13 730. 
Syndicate to Colonial Office, 8 April 1929, C.O.732/39/690~5/2~. 
and Economic Di~,lomacy: 
Joseph Brandes, Herbert Ho~ver ~Q (p·tt burgh 1962). 




Deparbnent, drawing its attention to the Br1" t" h Col "al 1S Onl Office's 
attitude towards the Syndicate, explai~~ng the 
.1.LJ.. agreements between 
the Syndicate, and the two American comp~~~es, d 
u.J.J..J.. an sugges ting 
that the Colonial Office's unwillingness to see an American 
company operating in Bahrain was inspired by Anglo-Persian. 
The State Deparbnent was little perturbed, but it nonetheless 
requested the United States Embassy in London to raise the matter 
informally with the Foreign Office,2 and to assist Loomis and 
Harry Davis (an official of the Eastern Gulf Oil Company) whilst 
they were in London. 3 It is, however, significant that the 
informal representations were to include a request to be 
informed of the British Government's policy on the holding and 
operating by foreigners of petroleum concessions in territories 
such as Bahrain. 
Thereafter, Washington in effect lost interest in the issue, 
leaving it to Ray Atherton, the charge d'affaires in London, and 
a man much experienced in oil diplomacy, to continue representa-
tions, and to press for information. This was to cause much 
embarrassment to the Foreign Office, which was unable to reply 
until all the necessary interdepartmental negotiations had been 
4 





Francis Loomis, Socal, to Paul Culbertson, State Department, 
846B.6363/1, R.G.59, N.A. Loomis was not only an employee of 
Socal, but also an ex-Under Secretary of State; as such, his 
relationship with the State Department was usually cordial. 
U.S. Secretary of State to American Embassy, London, 28 March 
1929, For. ReI. 1929, III, pp.80-81. 
U.S. Secretary of State to American Embassy, London, 30 March 
1929, 846B.6363/6, R.G.59, N.A. 
File 281/91 of 1929, F.O.371/13730 • The Foreign Office was 
however very conscious of the fact that the U.S. Embassy was 
putting on pressure. See minutes on E2070/E2325/281/91, 
F.O.371/13730. The interdepartmental negotiations are discussed 
in greater detail below. See also U.S. Secretary of State to 
American Embassy London, 18 March 1929, 846B.6363/6; Atherton 
to U.S. secreta~ of State, 19 April 1929, ~46B.6363/5; and 
same to same, 9 May 1929, 846B.6363/7, all ln R.G.59, N.A • 
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was able to write to the United states Embassy, stating that 
His Majesty's Government was prepared in principle to consent 
to the participation of United states interests, but refusing to 
give any general statement of its policy on protectorates, on 
the grounds that it reserved the right to consider each case on 
. . t 1 ltS merl s. 
As far as the state Department was concerned, that closed 
the matter. It had responded to a request by a legitimate American 
company experiencing difficulties in dealing with another govern-
ment; difficulties, moreover, which appeared remarkably contrived. 
Having acted to safeguard the interests of American citizens, the 
state Department dropped out of the lengthy negotiations which 
followed. However, by raising the issue of general British 
policy towards the Persian Gulf 'protectorates', state Department 
officials had moved towards the assertion of the 'open door' in 
such territories - an implication that they were late to emphasize. 2 
The Foreign Office, meantime, had interpreted United states 
protests as more ominous than the routine protection of American 
interests abroad, and moved rapidly to avoid an outright confron-
tation between Great Britain and the United states. Hitherto they 
had left the matter almost entirely in the hands of the Indian and 
Colonial Offices, on the grounds that 
I.O. [siSl and C.O. [sic] can be trusted to 
guard jealously all encroachments on our vital 
interests in the Gulf. It remains for us to 
see that what C.O. [sic] eventually proposes 
does not embroil us with the U. S. [si~ on a 
shaky case. 3 
1. Atherton to U.S. Secretary of State, 30 May 1929, For. ReI. 1929, 
III, pp.81-2. 
2. Strictly Confidential Memorandum on the Bahrain Oil Concession 
by H.S. Villard, 5 October 1931, 846B.6363/23, R.G.59, N.A. 
3. Minute by Steel, 15 March 1929, on E1339/281/91, F.O.371/13730. 
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Following the representations of the United states charge on 
3 April 1929, however, the Foreign Office became actively involved 
in the decision-making process. There were, in effect, two 
questions to be decided; whether United states capital should 
be admitted; and, if so, on what conditions. On the first 
question, the Foreign Office was eventually able to win agreement 
from all interested departments that some participation by 
American capital was essential. Most Whitehall departments were 
fairly easily persuaded. The Colonial Office was apparently 
already reconciled to the idea that the concession would have to 
pass under United states control,1 and the Petroleum Department, 
which had always been less dogmatic about American partiCipation, 
on 9 April 1929 reaffirmed its willingness to agree to the 
introduction of American capital, subject to some degree of 
British control. 2 Even the Admiralty, swayed by a desire to 
encourage the development of any oilfields located in the 
o Ott 3 Persian Gulf, agreed in principle to forelgn adrni ance. The 
d Od 4 India Office and the Government of India remaine unconvlnce, 
worried lest strong foreign financial interests might secure control 
of a petty government like Bahrain, and also concerned lest the 
Americans use the case of Bahrain as a precedent in other Persian 
1. Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 20 March 1929, E1513/281/91, 
F.O.371/13730; and minute by Steel, 18 April 1929, on 
E1904/281/91, F.O.371/13730. 
2. Mines Department to Colonial Office, 9 April 1929, 
C.O.732/39/69035/24. 
3. Admiralty to Colonial Office, "3 May 1929, C.O.732/39/69035/37. 
4. India Office to Foreign Office, 15 April 1929, E1904/281/91, 
F.O.371/13730; and paraphrase of a telegram from the Viceroy 
of India to the Secretary of State for India, 12 May 1929, 
enclosed in C.O.732/39/69035/45. 
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Gulf states. Even after it had been decided at an interdepart-
mental meeting on 7 May 1929 that the attempt to prevent the 
Bahrain oil concession from passing to an American firm should be 
1 
abandoned, the India Office continued to follow an obstructive 
policy in the hope of at least imposing the strictest possible 
conditions upon the concession, only being persuaded otherwise 
by the strong insistence of the Foreign Office, which was apparently 
more aware of the legal weakness of the British position, as well 
as the diplomatic necessity of avoiding outright confrontation 
wi th the United States. 2 
There remained only the settlement of the actual degree of 
British control to be incorporated into the concession, which it 
had now been agreed was to be transferred to the Bahrain Petroleum 
Company (Bapco), a Canadian registered subsidiary of Socal. This 
question had already been considered in May and June 1929, as part 
of a general discussion within Whitehall concerning the possibility 
of revising and relaxing the current policy toward oil leases on 
Crown lands in Crown Colonies, so as to allow foreign partici-
pation. In the event, despite considerable discussion at an 
interdepartmental level, no firm decision was taken, largely due 
3 to the intransigence of the Service Departments. The content of 
these discussions, however, clearly affected the kind of restric-
tions which could be imposed upon American companies operating in 
the Persian Gulf. At the most basic level, the United States 
Government was hardly likely to tolerate more rigorous safeguards 
being imposed upon concessions in territories that were not British 
1. Minute by G.W. Rendel, 7 May 1929, on E2316/281/91, F.O.371/13730. 
2. Foreign Office to India Office, 9 May 1929, E2325/281/91; and 
India Office to Foreign Office, 16 May 1929, E2521/281/91, both 
in F.O.371/13730. 
3. Davis, British Oil Policy, pp.68-9 and 395-404; file 252/45, 
F.O.371/13540; file 466/45, F.O.371/16613; and Appendix IV. 
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possessions but merely British protectorates, than were in force 
in British colonies. The Foreign Office's attitude towards the 
general question of a leasing policy was in favour of a consider-
able relaxation of the restrictions, precisely because 
From the point of view of Anglo-American 
relations I think there can be no doubt 
that advantage lies on the side of abolishing 
the restrictions. The matter must of course 
be decided primarily in accordance with 
economic and strategic considerations but, so 
far as the latter are concerned, I should 
have thought we could through a preemption [Pic] clause safeguard our position in time 
of war without virtually barring American 
capital from the restricted regions. 1 
The Foreign Office was thus able to use the possible relaxation 
of existing restrictions to win a decision that, in the case of 
Bahrain, ' ••• the question could be dealt with on its merits , • 2 
On 7 June 1929, an interdepartmental conference drew up four 
conditions which it was decided should govern the admittance of 
American capital. The Foreign Office, arguing that in view of the 
weakness in the British case, the terms should not be onerous, 
and should certainly not render American financial control inopera-
tive, was largely responsible for the moderate nature (in the view 
of Departments such as the Admiralty and the India Office) of the 
conditions. These stipulated that the company which took over 
the concession was to be and remain a British company registered 
in Great Britain; that the Chairman, Managing Director, and between 
a third and a half of the directors should be British subjects; 
and that the local general manager, and the whole of the local 
staff, with certain exceptions, were to be British subjects, or 
subjects of the Shaikh of Bahrain. 3 
1. Minute by Craigie, May 1929, on A3407/252/45, F.O.371/13539. 
See also minutes and correspondence on A3408/A3492/A4591/252/45, 
F.O.371/13539. 
2. Minute by Rendel, 7 May 1929, E2316/281/91, F.O.371/13730. 
3. Report of an interdepartmental conference held at the Colonial 
Office on 7 June 1929, C.O.732/39/69035/68. 
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Thereafter, the Foreign Office left the detailed negotia-
tions of the conditions to the Colonial Office, only retaining 
a watching brief lest they be so harsh as to amount to the 
British Control Clause. 1 In the event, despite Foreign Office 
fears that the Indian and Colonial Offices were following a 
deliberately intransigent policy in the hope that negotiations 
with the company would fail,2 the Colonial Office was forced, 
reluctantly, to agree to far less stringent conditions than had 
ever been intended, in the face of company obstinacy and Foreign 
Office watchfulness. One major problem, of course, was how to 
compel the American company to accept these conditions. It 
became obvious that the argument that the concession had lapsed 
in the absence of an extension of the exploration licence was 
very unreliable. 3 The Foreign Office recommended that that 
argument should be dropped altogether, and that the Colonial 
Office should rely instead upon the reasoning that, should the 
company refuse to accept the conditions, the Shaikh would not 
be acting unreasonably in withholding his consent to the transfer 
of the concession. 4 This was, however, at best a weak argument, 
subject to pressure from the United States Government, and it 
is thus hardly surprising that in the negotiations which followed, 
the Colonial Office several times retracted from a so-called 
'final offer',5 the Foreign Office throughout urging moderation 
1. Correspondence in file 281/91, F.O.371/13730 and 13731. 
2. Minute by Steel, 14 August 1929, on E4039/281/91, 
F.O.371/13730. 
3. Colonial Office to interested departments, 17 June 1929, 
C.O.732/39/69035/64-6. 
4. Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 9 July 1929, C.O.732/39/69035/83. 
5. See various papers on C.O.732/39/69035/86a, 91a, 102, 124, 125 
and 181. 
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d .1. d an comproffilse, In accor ance with its general policy, ' ••• to 
interfere with the Americans as little as possible, and the more 
c.o. [SiC] are willing to give away the better we are pleased,.2 
The conditions, as eventually agreed, provided that the Bahrain 
Petroleum Company was to be and remain a British company 
registered in Canada, maintaining an office in Great Britain 
in charge of a British subject; that of five directors, one was 
to be a British subject, appointed in consultation with His 
Majesty's Government; that the company was to maintain a chief 
local representative in Bahrain, approved by His Majesty's 
Government; and that as many of the employees as was consistent 
with the efficient running of the undertaking in Bahrain were 
to be British subjects or subjects of the Shaikh of Bahrain. 3 
An attempt by the India Office and the Admiralty to include for 
His Majesty's Government a right of pre-emption over the company's 
oil in time of war was abandoned at the insistence of the Foreign 
Office. 4 
Although the British Government had done well to secure the 
incorporation of any such conditions in view of its weak legal 
position, nevertheless it had been forced to compromise on every 
point, and, as finally evolved, the conditions did little more 
than preserve the facade of the British nationality provisions. 
To a large extent, this was due to the' pressure of the Foreign 
Office, alarmed lest the incident be magnified into a major 
source of Anglo-American friction. As the ensuing correspondence 
1. Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 4 September 1929, 
C.O.732/39/69035/124. 
2. Minute by Steel on E3888/281/91, F.O.371/13730 • 
3. Indenture between the Shaikh of Bahrain and the Syndicate, 
enclosed in C.O.732/43/49035/41. 
4. Minutes and correspondence on E4242/281/91, F.O.371/13730~ 
and E4313/E4798/281/91, F.O.371/13731. 
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1 
over the next two years showed, it was still necessary for 
the Colonial Office, as the department responsible for the 
negotiations, to preserve its vigilance in order to ensure 
that the spirit of the conditions was not flouted. In 
particular, the Colonial Office objected to the frequent 
absences of Frank Holmes, the British Government-approved chief 
local representative, from Bahrain; this objection probably 
was due to the fact that these absences were largely occasioned 
by the negotiations taking place for a Kuwait concession. 2 In 
the interdepartmental correspondence which necessarily accom-
panied these discussions, the Foreign Office concern throughout 
was , ••• to see that the American interests involved were 
3 properly treated ••• ' and, provided such was the case, the 
Office did not object to obstacles being placed in the way of, 
for example, an extension of the area of the concession. 4 
It is noticeable that, despite the comparatively low-key 
nature of American diplomatic intervention in the case of 
Bahrain oil, the Foreign Office was immediately conscious of, 
and conciliatory towards, American susceptibilities, and was 
thus prepared to pressurize the other Whitehall Departments 





Correspondence in Confidential Print, Middle East No.32, 
C.O.935/3; and Middle East No.49, C.O.935/7. 
This opinion was shared by the Foreign Office, which was 
'inclined to feel that the unsatisfactory state of all 
these oil questions in the Gulf from His Majesty's 
Government's point of view is due in large measure to 
Holmes's activites'. G.W. Rendel, Foreign Office, to 
K.W. Blaxter, Colonial Office, E2671/167/91, F.O.371/16842. 
Minute by C.F.A. Warner, 18 September 1930, E4939/28/91, 
F.O.371/14454. 
Correspondence in file 28/91, F.O.371/14454; file 1420/91, 
F.O.371/16006; and file 167/91, F.O.371/16843. 
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British strategic interests. It had to do this in the face of 
Colonial Office opposition; a reversal of roles from the 
early 1920s. To some measure, Foreign Office policy was 
probably dictated by the common British belief that oil 
deposits in Arabia were only of minor significance, and, also 
of course, the dubious legality of any demand for the insertion 
of additional clauses into a concession it had already approved. 
1 The case of Kuwait was to be far more complex, and reveals far 
more critically Foreign Office susceptibilities in the early 
1930s to any possibility of worsening Anglo-American relations; 
for, although United States diplomatic representations were to 
be stronger, and more persistent, the British case for insisting 
upon the British Control Clause was far more justifiable, for 
in Kuwait no concession had been granted, and His Majesty's 
Government was thus able to invoke its Treaty with the Sha::"'kh 
of Kuwait stipulating that British Government consent was 
necessary before an oil concession was granted. 
Because of this, the Colonial Office had been able, with 
the tacit concurrence of the Foreign Office, to stipulate in 
2 November 1928 that any concession granted by the Shaikh of 
Kuwait should contain the British control Clause, confident 
that the British Government, by so doing, would be within its 
Treaty rights. Regardless of the Bahrain precedent, the Colonial 
Office had every intention of retaining the Kuwait oilfield for 
a British company. Hall's comment on Bahrain oil applied equally 
---.---~--~---~-~--. --'._----
1. For a brief discussion, see Davis, pp.404-114; for a more 
detailed narrative, see Chisholm. 
2. For a detailed discussion of t.1!e KJitTdi toil ne<jl1ti r l tL)ns b2f'~)rt:; Nove,~Lh~c 192:1, and especially the rival applicatlons 
of Anglo-Pers ian and t.~e Syndic"lte, see C,)i ~~hollTI, pp. 3-15. 
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to Kuwait,1 whilst the Foreign Office's reply to the request from 
the United states Embassy for a statement of His Majesty's 
Government's policy on American participation in commercial 
exploitation of British protectorates had been non-committal 
, 
and had refused to give any general statement of policy.2 The 
India Office and the Government of India, which had only agreed 
reluctantly, after considerable pressure, to accept American 
participation in Bahrain, were unlikely to follow that precedent 
in Kuwait, on the grounds that 
If we can surrender our general position in 
the Persian Gulf Koweit can go with it. If 
we cannot - and with our necessities both 
for air and for oil I cannot imagine that our 
answer to the question will be that we can 
sacrifice a position which has become a 
historical necessity - then Koweit is a very 
essential factor. 3 
On 7 June 1929, it had indeed been agreed in principle by an 
interdepartmental conference that it would be desirable to resist 
the introduction of American interests into Kuwait, if possible 
by interesting the Anglo-Persian there. 4 
Negotiations with that company in the next year, however, 
proved disappointing. Its geological survey of Kuwait had not 
been encouraging, and the British Government was informed by 





Hall, Colonial Office, to Lord Monteagle, Foreign Office, 
31 July 1928, C.O.732/34/59115/7. 
Foreign Office to U.S. Embassy, 29 May 1929, For. ReI. 1929, 
III, pp.81-2. 
Sir L. Haworth Political Resident, Bushire, to Secretary of 
State for Indi~, 14 October 1928, enclosed in J.G. Laithwaite, 
India Office, to C. Baxter, Foreign Office, 24 November 1928, 
E5643/3164/34, F.O.371/13070. 
Report of an interdepartmental conference held at the Colonial 
Office on 7 June 1929, C.O.732/39/69035/68. There is no 
record either in the minutes of the conference, or in Foreign 
Office'files, of any Foreign Office opposition to this policy. 
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t I f th K"t "1 o app y or e Uwal conceSSlon. Meanwhile, Major Frank 
Holmes continued to negotiate with the Shaikh of Kuwait, 2 and 
on 19 August 1930, the Syndicate submitted a draft of an oil 
concession to the Colonial Office for consideration. Despite 
the clear instructions given to the Syndicate that any concession 
must include the British Control Clause, this draft merely pro-
vided for the conditions which had been incorporated into the 
Bahrain concession, which would, of course, permit exploitation 
by a foreign company.3 The Resident, however, in a despatch 
commenting upon the draft, conveyed the very welcome information 
that the Shaikh of Kuwait was insistent that 
••• under no circumstances would he agree to 
the concession being transferred to an 
American company and that he himself was 
insistent that the nationality clause would 
be inserted and that the concessionaires 
should be British. 4 
Faced with the likelihood that neither Anglo-Persian nor 
the IPC, the only two major British companies operating in the 
Middle East, would take a positive interest in the Kuwait con-
cession, the Colonial Office found in this statement of the 
Shaikh's feelings a new and apparently insurmountable obstacle to 
American encroachments, which would allow the British Government 
to pose as a liberated guardian who could not impose its wishes 
against those of an independent ruler. The Resident, whose own 
1. Petroleum Department to Colonial Office, 28 October 1930, 
C.O.732/45j79178j22. For the text of the 1926 geological 
report on Kuwait, see Chisholm, pp.111-118. 
2. Oil concessions in Kuwait, destroyed under statute, file 
69096 of 1929, C.O.788j6. 
3. Syndicate to Colonial Office, 19 August 1930, C.O.732/45/7~178/1. 
Apparently these instructions had also been repeated to.MaJor 
Holmes by Political Agent Dickson on 6 August 1930. Chlsholm, p.17. 
4. Political Resident to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
1 September 1930, C.O.732/43j79178/7. 
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opinion,1. like that of the India Office and the Government of 
India,2 was strongly against any American capital being introduced 
into Kuwait, suggested that Whitehall might allow the Syndicate's 
negotiations to proceed,3 secure in the knowledge that the shaikh 
himself was adamant against American involvement in his state. 
This policy was accepted by all the interested departments. 4 Even 
the Foreign Office, on being informed of the shaikh's hostility 
towards American involvement in his state, decided not to intervene 
in order to ensure that the way was left open for American involve-
5 
ment, for it saw 
••• no reason why we should intervene to 
facilitate the eventual transfer of this 
concession to American interests, by 
arguing against the insertion of the 
'nationality clause' ••• There are, so far 
as I know, no special circs. ~icJ as 
caused our intervention in the case of 
the Bahrain oil concession. 6 
Even the usually vigilant American Department agreed that His 
Majesty's Government was on strong ground vis-a-vis any possible 
united States protest, in view of the sha~kh's insistence upon the 
. . t 11' ti h 7 conceSSlon gOlng 0 an a Brl s company. The Foreign Office 
did, however, suggest that some statement of the shaikh's opinion 
1. Political Resident to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
6 October 1930, C.O.730/43/79178/21. 
2. India Office to colonial Office, 1 December 1930, and enclosed 
correspondence with the Government of India, C.O.732/43/79178/32. 
3. Political Resident to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
9 November 1930, C.O.732/43/79178/32. 
4. Colonial Office to interested departments, 8 December 1930, 
and their replies, C.O.732/43/79178/33-5, 37-8 and 41. 
5. Minutes on E6630/4914j91, F.O.371/14484. 
6. Minute by C.F.A. Warner, 20 Nevember 1930, E6215/4914j91, 
F.O.371/14484. 
7. American Department minutes on E6630/4914/91, F.O.371/14484. 
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should be obtained in writing, as a final safeguard,1 although 
on the advice of the Colonial Office, the suggestion was dropped.2 
It was therefore only on the authority of th P IOt o e 0 l lcal Resident, 
but with no written undertaking, that the Syndicate were informed 
on 31 January 1931 that the Shaikh of Kuwait definitely refused 
to grant a concession to any concern that was not entirely British, 
and would insist upon the inclusion of the British Control Clause 
into any concession. His Majesty's Government, the Colonial 
Office added, was rtot prepared to advise the shaikh to alter his 
stance, and the Syndicate's proposals were therefore unacceptable. 3 
Despite this rebuff, the Syndicate continued to negotiate 
with the Shaikh of Kuwait,4 and in May 1931 presented him with 
yet another draft concession, which failed to incorporate the 
nationality provisions. 5 Shortly after this, both the Political 
Agent in Kuwait and the Political Resident returned home on leave; 
H. R.P. Dickson, the Political Agent, expressed his belief that, 
during his absence, Holmes would endeavour to persuade the shaikh 
to grant him a concession, a belief which Major Biscoe, the 
Political Resident, shared, but he did not feel Holmes would 
1. Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 3 December 1930, and 
attached minutes, E6215/4914/91, F.O.371/14484. 
2. Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 31 January 1931, C.O.732/431 
79178/43. The Foreign Office agreed after very little internal 
discussion. Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 10 February 1931, 
E510/325/91, F.O.371/15277, and thereafter the Foreign Office 
largely ignored the matter, on the grounds that 'we are not 
very directly interested, so long as nothing is done which is 
likely seriously to arouse the resentment of the Americans'. 
Minute by Warner, 11 August 1931, E4142/325/91, F.O.371/15277. 
3. Colonial Office to Syndicate, 31 January 1931, C.O.732/43/79178/44. 
4. In view of the fact that Holmes was in constant touch with the 
Shaikh of Kuwait he was unlikely to accept such a blanket 
statement of the'latter's views, especially since the shaikh 
had apparently realized that the Syndicate had American backing. 
Chisholm, pp.14-18. 
5. Political Agent, Kuwait, to political Resident, 21 May 1931, 
enclosed in C.O.732/50/89178/10. 
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~ 
succeed. However, Biscoe's confidence was not entirely justified. 
On 2 July 1931, the Shaikh of Kuwait wrote a letter to Frank 
Holmes, in which he placed the onus of insisting upon the 
Nationality Clause upon Great Britain, and stated his intention 
of abiding by the British Government's decision. 2 Although the 
Shaikh had forwarded this letter to the Acting Political Agent, 
Dr. Greenway, for approval before despatching it, the latter had 
neither seen its implications nor thought it necessary to refer 
the draft to the Acting Political Resident, who commented that 
' ••• it will presumably be difficult for His Majesty's Government 
to maintain vis-a-vis the Syndicate the attitude it has hitherto 
3 adopted'. 
The British Government thus found itself in a difficult 
situation, its apparently invincible position having been con-
siderably undermined. Initial reaction was cautious; the Colonial 
Office clearly believed that the Shaikh had written the letter 
simply to fob off Holmes, and sought to belittle the implications 
4 
and interpretations of the Shaikh's letter. Even the Foreign 
Office saw no reason to resist this interpretation, and assumed 
that 'We are not very directly interested, so long as nothing is 
done which is likely seriously to arouse the resentment of the 
1. Major Biscoe to Sir J. Shuck bur gh, Colonial Office, and 
enclosures, 26 May 1931, C.O.732/50/89178/10. 
2. Shaikh of Kuwait to Frank Holmes, 2 July 1931, C.O.732/50/89178/15; 
and Chisholm, pp.18-19. 
3. Acting Political Resident to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
7 July 1931, and enclosed correspondence, C.O.732/50/89178/15. 
4. Minutes on ibid.; and Colonial Office to Acting Political 
Resident, 14 September 1931, C.O.732/50/89178/35. It.is, of 
course, impossible to be sure W?y the Sha~h wrote thlS letter, 
but for a discussion of this pOlnt, see Chlsholm, pp.19-20. 
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l 
Americans'. Moreover, since no concession had yet been signed, 
the British Government was within its Treaty rights, if it chose 
to insist upon the British Control Clause being included, even in 
the face of the Shaikh's own wishes. However, its position, should 
the United States Government choose to protest, was considerably 
weakened; and meantime the Syndicate was quick to press home its 
advantage, by requesting a statement of British policy in view of 
the Shaikh's supposed willingness to waive the British nationality 
clause. 2 
It was only at this stage in the negotiations that the United 
States Department of State was requested to take an interest in 
the matter. As in the case of Bahrain, the Department was clearly 
not sufficiently impressed with the oil potential of Arabia to view 
the granting of concessions as a matter of national importance. From 
late 1930 a passing interest had been taken in the Kuwait negotia-
tions, including British opposition to Holmes' activities,3 but there 
seems to have been a general belief in the Department that the 
Kuwait concession, if obtained by the Eastern and General Syndicate, 
would be transferred to an American company subject only to the 
conditions imposed in Bahrain. 4 
However, in late 1931, the Eastern Gulf Oil Company approached 





Minute by Warner, 11 August 1931, on E4142/325/91, F.O.371/15277; 
and Minute by Warner, 15 August 1931, on E4231/325/91, F.O.371/15277. 
Syndicate to Colonial Office, 4 August 1931, C.O.732/50/89178/19. 
A. Sloan, Consul, Baghdad to U.S. Secretary of State, 14 March 
1931, 890B.6363/33; and same to same, 21 May 1931, 890B.6363/34, 
both in R.G.59, N.A. 
Memorandum by H. Ferrin on Persian Gulf Oil Operations, n.d. but 
September 1930, 890B.6363/32, R.G.59, N.A. 
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diplomatic assistance of the United states Government, pointing 
out that certain of the conditions that were being imposed were 
intended to prevent any possibility of American control and , 
claiming that 
The British Government has for three years 
prevented our obtaining the Koweit con-
cession. During all that period the Syndicate 
and we have exercised the utmost patience ••• 
We feel now that our efforts are exhaused ~icJ, 
and that unless we have the prompt assistance 
of the United States Government, the combined 
pressure of the British Government upon the 
Sheikh and activities of the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company in Koweit may shortly result in com-
pletely destroying any opportunity for us to 
obtain the Koweit concession. 
The insistence on the British Nationality clause, Gulf maintained, 
owed nothing to the Shaikh, but was solely at the instigation of 
British Government officials.1 The diplomatic assistance requested 
would, of course, have been fruitless whilst negotiations were 
conducted with the Shaikh of Kuwait, a ruler with whom the United 
States Government had no official relations; but, with the Shaikh's 
referral of the matter back to the British Government, United States 
Government intervention became feasible. 
In this new phase of diplomatic representations, an added 
complication was to be the influence used on behalf of Gulf by 
Andrew Mellon, an ex-Cabinet colleague of President Hoover and, 
from February 1932, United States Ambassador to Great Britain. 2 
Since the self-denying ordinance of the IPC, the Red Line Agreement, 
excLded Kuwait, the Gulf Oil Company, in which Mellon interests 
were involved, would be able to exploit Kuwait directly. 
1. 
2. 
F.A. Leovy, Eastern Gulf, to U.S. Secretary of State, 
27 November 1931, 890B.6363 G.O.C./1, R.G.59, N.A. 
The U.S. Secretary of State saw the representatives of Gulf 
at the request of Mellon. Internal memorandum by P.H. Alling, 
Near Eastern DiviSion, 30 November 1931, 890B.6363 G.O.C./2, 
R.G.59, N.A. 
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It was undoubtedly this direct pressure by a politically 
influential businessman which was the main factor in influencing 
the American Secretary of State to instigate informal representa-
tions to the Foreign Office, 1 although the Near Eastern Division 
also felt that the company had a good case. 2 However, although in 
effect the United States Government was simply reacting to a specific 
request by a particular company, their representations were yet 
again couched in general terms, referring to the right of United 
States citizens to participate in concessions in Kuwait on an 
equal basis with British interests: an interesting extension of 
th ' d' . .1 3 e open oor prlnclp e. Throughout December 1931, Atherton 
and Ambassador Dawes continued to press the matter, often at the 
4 instigation of the Gulf Company, although by now the United States 
Embassy was clearly suspicious of the continued delay in the 
Foreign Office reply, necessitated by the interdepartmental con-
SUltations required. 5 It therefore pointed out that the reciprocity 
1. U.S. Secretary of State to U.S. Charge, London, 3 December 1931, 
For. ReI. 1932, II, pp.1-2. This pressure, incidentally, was 
also applied by company representatives in London to the 
U.S. Charge there. Atherton to Wallace Murray, 10 December 1931, 
890B.6363 G.O.C./14, R.G.59, N.A. 
2. Wallace Murray to W.R. Castle, 1 December 1931, 890B.6363 G.O.C./3, 
R.G.59, N.A. 
3. U.S. Secretary of State to U.S. Charge, London, 3 December 1931, 
For. ReI. 1932, II, pp.1-2; and memorandum by Lancelot Oliphant 
of a conversation with the U.S. Charge, London, 4 December 1931, 
E60111325,91, F.O.371/15277. 
4. Ambassador Dawes to U.S. Secretary of State, 29 December 1931, 
For. ReI. 1932, II, pp.3-4; Wallace (Gulf) to U.S. Secretary 
of State, 27 January 1932, 890B.6363 G.O.C./18, R.G.59, N.A.; 
W.R. Castle to Wallace, 2 February 1932, 890B.6363 G~O.C./19, 
R.G.59, N.A.; U.S. Secretary of State to U.S. Charge, London to 
Secretary of State, 3 February 1932, For. ReI. 1932, II, p.6; and 
minutes and memoranda on E6181jE6237/325/91, F.O.371j15277. 
5. Memorandum by Oliphant of a conversation with Atherton, 1 February 
1932, E495/121j91, F.O.371/16001. 
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section of the United states Mining Lease Act of February 1920 
was still in force. 1 By February 1932, a new reason for speed was 
the appointment of Andrew Mellon as United states Ambassador to 
the Court of st. James, and the consequent desire on the part of 
American officials to settle the matter before his arrival in 
2 London. Meanwhile, rumours, relayed to the state Department by 
Gulf, that the continual delay in the British reply, ostensibly 
caused by the need to refer the issue to the Persian Gulf and 
conduct the necessary interdepartmental consultations, was in fact 
in order to give Anglo-Persian an opportunity to supersede the 
Syndicate,3 provided an added incentive to the Department to take 
further diplomatic action. Although at this stage, most state 
Department officials, notably Wallace Murray, saw little reason 
to treat the matter as a major international controversy, continual 
pressure from Gulf, together with Mellon's impending departure for 
London, led to a decision to abandon informal representations and 
4 take up the matter formally. Even at this stage, Murray at least 
seemed to feel that Gulf had little chance of getting the concession, 
for 
1. U.s. Ambassador, London to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
22 December 1931, For. ReI. 1932, II, pp.4-5. For a discussion 
of the U.S. Mining Lease Act see Chapter 2 above. 
2. Murray to Castle, 10 February 1932, 890B.6363 G.O.C./24, R.G.59, N.A. 
3. Wallace, Gulf, to U.S. Secretary of State, 18 March 1932, 
890B.6363 G.O.C./41, R.G.59, N.A. 
4. U.S. Secretary of State to Atherton, 26 March 1932, For. ReI. 1932, 
II, pp.11-13; and U.S. Charge, London, to Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs, 29 March 1932, E1549/121/91, F.O.371/16001. 
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it would be asking a great deal of the 
British Government to expect them to refrain 
from supporting the Government-controlled 
Anglo Persian r§ic] Oil Company in establish-
ing itself in British-controlled territory 
like the Shaikhdom of Kuwait in the close 
proximity of the Anglo Persian oil fields in 
South Persia. 1 
Moreover, the State Department, having reviewed the corres-
pondence on the matter, refused to be misled by Gulf's own 
representations on the issue; whilst clearly suspicious that 
Anglo-Persian was being given preferential treatment, it was aware 
that the Foreign Office might well be correct in insisting that 
the Anglo-Persian had been involved in Kuwait long before the 
Syndicate had made its first approaches to the Shaikh. Moreover, 
on reflection, P.H. Alling at least was prepared to concede that 
the Shaikh's famous letter of 2 July 1931 was rather ambiguous, 
whilst the Colonial Office's statements that the Shaikh insisted 
upon the British Nationality clause all dated from before 2 July 
1931. This low-key approach was also favoured by P.H. Villard, who 
maintained that the United States Government should not push the 
matter too vigorously at present, for ' ••• the British might consider 
it discourteous ••• and we might lose any good will which the Foreign 
Office may have toward us in this matter,.2 However, American 
representations were to be successful. After receiving the formal 
note from the United States Government, the Foreign Office moved 
quickly to bring the matter before the Cabinet,3 and on 9 April 1932, 
Sir John Simon was able, with Cabinet concurrence, finally to reply 
1. Internal Memorandum by Murray to U.S. Secretary of State, 
22 March 1932, Chisholm, pp.160-1. 
2. Internal Memoranda by Alling and Villard, 15 March 1932, 
890B.6363 G.O.C./39. 




to the United states charge. In his note, the Colonial Office 
policy to date was reversed, Simon assuring Atherton that, in 
this case, His Majesty's Government was prepared not to insist 
that the concession must have a clause confining it to British 
interests, if the Shaikh was willing to grant the concession without 
it. However, it was made plain that His Majesty's Government did 
not intend to advise the Shaikh to give prior or preferential 
treatment to the Syndicate. 1 
To date, the State Department had been little exercised by 
the matter, which had been treated on a very routine level, rather 
than as an example of British bad faith, or Colonial monopoly. 
However, in the interdepartmental negotiations in Whitehall, in 
which - eventually - the Foreign Office view prevailed, it is 
clearly apparent that fears of a major diplomatic controversy with 
the United States had led to the Foreign Office reversing its 
previous qualified support for the Colonial and Indian Offices' 
view, and insisting, especially after the United States commenced 
formal representations, on the British Government giving way, at 
least in principle, to American pressure. 
This task was by no means an easy one. Although informal 
representations were made to the Foreign Office in December 1931, 
it was not until April 1932 that that office was able to reply to 
the United States Embassy. This was despite the fact that as soon 
as the first informal conversations were held with Ray Atherton, 
and particularly after those representations were repeated per-
sistently during December 1931, the Foreign Office began to be 
seriously concerned at the implications of the Indian and Colonial 
1. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to U.S. Charge, London, 
9 April 1932, E1733/121/91, For. ReI. 1932, II, pp.14-16. 
This letter had been very carefully discussed and drafted. 
See E1733/121/91, F.O.371/16002. 
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policy in the Gulf, Craigie expressing his opinion that ' ••• the 
C.O. [SiC] and I.O. [Sic], if given their head, may cheerfully 
1 
land us in a new "war".' Clearly with memories of 1919-22 in mind, the 
American Department of the Foreign Office began to think very much 
in terms of the possibility of a new 'oil war',2 and, on the basis 
that 'it must be definitely understood that we cannot embark on a 
dog-fight with the USA [sic] about oil', began to adhere to the 
opinion that the British Government would find it difficult to impose 
stricter conditions in the case of Kuwait than in Bahrain. 3 This 
did not necessarily mean that the concession should go to Gulf as 
a matter of course; the Foreign Office was sympathetic to the 
argument that it would be desirable if Anglo-Persian were to show 
an interest in, and eventually obtain, the Kuwait concession. 4 
Foreign Office officials were, however, determined that there should 
be no grounds for suspicion that the British were deliberately 
excluding American interests, and therefore found the continued 
India Office insistence on the retention of the British Control 
Clause ' ••• most tiresome and unfortunate,.5 However, within Whitehall, 
the Foreign Office was alone in holding this view; even the usually 
sympathetic Petroleum Department was urging the claims of Anglo-
persian,6 whilst the India Office, Government of India, Colonial 
1. Minute by Craigie, 1 January 1932, on E6350/325/91, F.O.371/15277. 
2. Minute by P.M. Roberts, 30 December 1931, on ibid. 
3. Minute by Oliphant, on E6414/325/91, F.O.371/15277; 
Warner, 31 December 1931, ibid.; and Foreign Office 
Office, 22 January 1932, E261/121/91, F.O.371/16001. 
4. This is discussed in more detail below. 
Minute by 
to India 
5. Minute by Rendel, 14 January 1932, on E207j121/91, F.O.371j16001; 
Minute by Warner, 14 January 1932, on ibid.; and India Office 
to Foreign Office, 15 January 1932, E261/121j91, F.O.371/16001. 
6. F. Starling, Petroleum Department to C.F.A. Warner, Foreign 
Office, 7 January 1932, E121/121/91, F.O.371/16001. 
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Office and the Service Departments were all determined to retain 
the greatest possible degree of British control over any oil to 
be found in Kuwait. 
The Foreign Office, therefore, had to fight a long and deter-
mined battle against the other Departments, particularly the 
Colonial Office, and it was only when the United States commenced 
formal representations, providing the ideal excuse for taking the 
matter before Cabinet, that a decision in favour of conciliation 
was possible. During the intervening four months, the Colonial 
Office consistently attempted to delay any decision being taken 
on the reply to be made to the United States Embassy, not least 
to allow Anglo-Persian time in which to apply for a concession. 
Initially, the ostensible cause of the delay was the need to obtain 
the views of the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, even 
though the Colonial Office was well aware of his views, and of his 
interpretation of the Shaikh's intentions,1 whilst all further 
references to Bushire were answered by the end of January 1932. 2 
Moreover, as Major Harry G. Davis of Gulf Oil pointed out to the 
American Ambassador, the question of the interpretation to be 
placed upon the Shaikh's letter was largely immaterial to the central 
issue of whether the British Government was prepared to waive the 
British Control Clause. 3 By the beginning of 1932, the Foreign 
Office appeared both embarrassed and concerned by the long delay; 




Political Resident to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
29 October 1931 and 3 November 1931, C.O.732/50j89178/ 
nos.58 and 59. 
Political Resident to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
19 December 1931 and 15 January 1932, C.O.732/52/98026/2 and 7. 
Major Harry G. Davis to U.S. Ambassador, London, 28 December 
1931, Chisholm, p.133. 
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Office making it plain to the India Office that ' ••• at present 
it is essential so far as possible not to be obstructive to American 
. t t ,1 In eres s... , the India Office insisted that the Government of 
India should be consulted. 2 The Foreign Office had, therefore, 
in conversations with Ray Atherton on 27 January and 1 February 
1932, to assure him that, whilst it was pushing the matter to the 
utmost, and although negotiations with the Resident had been 
completed, it was still necessary to ascertain, through pending 
correspondence, the views of the Government of India. 3 
In fact, however, it was not until 3 February 1932 that the 
India Office telegraphed a specific request to the Government of 
India for their views on the question of waiving the British Control 
Clause; although in this telegram they did concede that, in view 
of the Foreign Office's strong views on the subject, it would 
probably be wise to shelve the attempt to shift the responsibility 
of decision on to the Shaikh, and accept in principle the admission 
of American capital.4 In a surprising volte-face, the Government 
of India not only agreed that the British Control Clause should be 
waived but, on the grounds that American influence had already been 
admitted into the Persian Gulf as a consequence of the Bahrain 
concession, argued that the further admission of American interests 
might well be to Great Britain's benefit, since American capital 
would make for stability and peace, whilst a conciliatory attitude 
on the part of His Majesty's Government might well secure American 





Minute by Oliphant to Vansittart, 18 January 1932; and Foreign 
Office to India Office, 22 January 1932, both on E261/121/91, 
F.O.371/16001. 
Correspondence and minutes on E495/E647/121/91, F.O.371/16001. 
Ray Atherton to U.S. Secretary of State, 3 February 1932, 
For. ReI. 1932, II, p.6. 
Secretary of State for India to Government of India, 3 February 
1932, enclosed in C.O.732/52/98026/23. 
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of the world. 1 
By now, therefore, the Foreign Office, India Office and 
Government of India were totally reconciled to the shelving of 
the British Control Clause, and it must have appeared as though 
the way were open for a conciliatory response to the United states 
Embassy. However, the Colonial Office still wished to retain the 
option of imposing the clause should Anglo-Persian fail to apply 
for a concession, a view strongly backed by the Service Depart-
2 
ments. So, although the Colonial Office largely abandoned its 
own insistence upon the British Control Clause, it still insisted 
upon the Admiralty being consulted;3 this was to lead to a 
prolonged argument between the Foreign Office and the Admiralty. 
At an interdepartmental meeting on 11 March, the two Departments 
had been unable to reach agreement, the Admiralty stressing the 
strategic value of a British controlled oil source in the Persian 
Gulf, particularly if the Russians occupied Persia, and the Foreign 
Office arguing that in that case United States political support 
4 
would be of more value. The Admiralty, however, refused to give 
way, emphasizing not only the strategic question, but also the 
difficulties of protecting Americans working in the Gulf; they 
continued to insist that at the very least over 50% of the capital 
must be British. 5 The Foreign Office by now were not only arguing 
1. Government of India to Secretary of State for India, 25 February 
1932, enclosed in C.O.732/52/98026/23. 
2. See C.O.732/52/98026/nos. 28, 30 and 31. 
3. Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 26 February 1932, 
C.O.732/52/98026/21. 
4. Record of a meeting held at the Foreign Office, 11 March 1932, 
E1347/121/91, F.O.371/16001. 
5. Admiralty to Foreign Office, 14 March 1932, E1348/121/91, 
F.O.371/16001; and correspondence and minutes on E1378/E1407/121/91, 
F.O.371/16001. 
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on general grounds of Anglo-American relations, but were also 
emphasizing the British Government's obligation to consider not only 
their own desiderata but also the Shaikh of Kuwait's best interests. 1 
, 
finally, however, the formal approach by the United States Embassy 
accelerated a course of action which Admiralty intransigence was 
already making likely,2 the referral of the matter to the Cabinet. 
In the Foreign Office memorandum, which had the concurrence 
of the Colonial Office, India Office and Petroleum Department, it 
was strongly argued that the British Government should meet the 
United States Government's request on the grounds that 
The Foreign Office have taken the view that 
a dog-in-the-manger attitude would be inde-
fensible both vis-a-vis of the Americans and 
from the standpoint of the obligation of His 
Majesty's Government to consult the Sheikh's 
best interests. 
It also objected strongly to the Admiralty's desire to demand that 
50% of the capital should be British, as being quite unacceptable 
to the Americans, and inconsistent with the general oil policy 
approved by the Committee of Imperial Defence, and awaiting the 
ratification of the Imperial Conference, which aimed at dropping 
the old policy of complete control in order to allow the British 
Government to claim reciprocity from other countries. 3 The Foreign 
Office also mentioned, in passing, that 'it should be remarked that 
it is not proved that oil exists in commercial quantities', and 
0t ° 4 that Anglo-Persian was showing an interest in the Kuwal conceSSlon. 





Memoranda by Warner, 19 and 23 March 1932, E1378/E1478/121/91, 
F.O.371/16001. 
Correspondence and minutes on E1549/E1558/121/91, F.O.371/16001. 
Davis, British Oil Policy, pp.395-417. 
Foreign Office Memorandum on the American wish to secure an 
oil concession in Kuwait, 2 April 1932, C.P.120(32), CAB.24/229. 
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however, that the British Control Clause should be waived, subject 
to certain conditions, which included a stipulation that at least 
50~ of the 01'1 should b f' d ~ e re 1ne on Kuwaiti or British territory, 
and be subject to the right of pre-emption by the British Govern-
mente The transfer of leases was also to be subject to British 
Government control, any admission of foreign interests being on a 
reciprocal basis; the company was to be registered in Britain, 
and a majority of its employees were to be subjects of Great 
Britain or Kuwait. In short, the facade of British control was 
to be maintained, with real Admiralty control of fuel oil should 
th d ' 1 e nee ar1se. 
The United states were informed of this decision that the 
British Control Clause would be waived on 9 AprIl 1932, and on 
10 May the Syndicate was informed, although it was also told that 
its present draft concession would require revision to satisfy 
the British Government. 2 Neither the Syndicate nor the American 
Embassy were, however, informed of the nature of the conditions 
which would be imposed, whilst it was also made plain that the 
Syndicate would not receive preferential treatment. This was 
essentially to leave the way open for a possible Anglo-Persian 
application for a concession in Kuwait, an alternative that had 
appeared increasingly likely throughout late 1931 and early 1932, 
and which was probably largely responsible for the Colonial Office 
and Petroleum Department accepting the Foreign Office insistence 
upon a conciliatory policy. 
It will be remembered that when the Eastern and General 
Syndicate had first raised the possibility of American involvement 
1. Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Acting Political 
Resident, 9 May 1932, C.O.732/52/98026/50. 
2. Colonial Office to Syndicate, 10 May 1932, C.O.732/52/98026/51. 
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of 1928/9, Anglo-Persian had made plain to the Colonial Office 
that they were not likely to apply for a concession in Kuwait 
on its own belief. It had, however, been urged upon Anglo-
Persian by the Petroleum Department that they should show an 
interest in Kuwait, since ' ••• we do not like to see any area 
which offers any promise going entirely into American hands,.1 
Whilst initially Anglo-Persian did not respond encouragingly, 2 
the company's initial pessimism about the possibilities of oil 
in the Persian Gulf had given way to a cautious optimism, and in 
August 1931, shortly after Dr. Greenway's disastrous faux ~ 
became known, the company asked for permission to send yet another 
geological party to Kuwait, to explore the possibilities of oil. 3 
Thus, even before United States diplomatic intervention forced 
the British Government to reconsider its policy of insisting upon 
the British Control Clause as a way of diverting the Syndicate, 
the Colonial Office had begun to adopt an alternative strategy, 
that of delaying negotiations with the Syndicate,4 so as to permit 
time for Anglo-Persian to make a formal application for a con-
cession. On 29 August 1931, therefore, it informed the Syndicate 
that before stating its policy in view of the Shaikh's letter to 
Frank Holmes, it would be necessary to consult the authorities in 
the Persian Gulf, and that the reply ' ••• cannot be expected for 
1. H.W. Cole, Petroleum Department, to Sir John Cadman, Anglo-
Persian, 18 October 1930, Chisholm, Note 40, p.127. 
2. Sir John Cadman, Anglo-Persian to H.W. Cole, 21 October 1930, 
Chisholm, Note 40, pp.127-8. It is, however, worth noting 
that Cadman enquired what terms the Syndicate was offering. 
3. Anglo-Persian to Petroleum Department, 25 August 1931, Chisholm, 
p.128. This is despite the discouraging conclusions of all 
geological surveys to date. Chisholm, pp.111-118. 
4. In a letter to the Acting political Resident, the Colonial 
Office suggested that the question of the Shaikh's intention 
in writing the letter should await the return of Biscoe. 
Colonial Office to Acting political Resident, 14 September 
1931, C.O.732/50/89178/35. 
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some considerable time,.l As was to be expected, Major Biscoe 
gave it as his opinion that the Shaikh , although pressed by 
his subjects to grant a concession to the Syndicate for financial 
reasons, still wished to exclude Americans from his state and 
would undoubtedly favour Anglo-Persian. 2 Therefore, within a 
month of its initial policy being weakened, if not destroyed, 
by the Shaikh's letter, the Colonial Office had been presented 
fortuitously with an alternative. 
Unfortunately, translating this potential alternative into 
a positive all-British oil concession in Kuwait was hindered by 
two factors; the Foreign Office's reluctance to invite further 
United States protests at anti-American discrimination, in view 
of their already renewed interest in Kuwait; and Anglo-Persian's 
dilatoriness and initial reluctance to apply for a concession. 
As recently as January 1931 Anglo-Persian had expressed its belief 
that the oil potential of the Arabian peninsula was negligible,3 
and although company officials had come to believe in August 1931 
that 'The prospects of the existence of petroleum in Kuweit 
territory are perhaps somewhat less remote than hitherto has 
appeared the case', its tone was still far from enthusiastic. 4 
Moreover, the geological survey, which at the time was the sole 
expressed intention of the company, would take several months, 
and did not commence until the middle of December,S by which time, 
as outlined above, the United States Government had already started 






Colonial Office to Syndicate, 29 August 1931, C.O.732/S0/89178/23. 
Political Resident to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
29 October 1931, and 3 November 1931, C.O.732/S0/89178/nos.S8 and S9. 
Petroleum Department to the Colonial Office, 20 January 1931, 
C.O.732/S0/89178/1. 
Anglo-Persian to Petroleum Department, 2S August 1931, enclosed 
C.O.732/S0/89178/27a. 
Anglo-Persian to Colonial Office, 28 January 1932, Chisholm, p.128. 
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Thus, although the Foreign Office was well aware of the 
desirability of Anglo-Persian securing the concession, and knew 
that there was a case for arguing that the British Government could 
legitimately allow the Shaikh to defer any decision until Anglo-
Persian had submitted its full proposals, it was also well aware 
that there was a very real chance that Anglo-Persian was not 
seriously interested in Kuwait, but was merely seeking to dis-
courage the Syndicate. In such a case, it was vital, in the 
opinion of Foreign Office officials, that nothing should be done 
to prevent the Shaikh granting a concession to the Syndicate, for 
' ••• it would be prejudicial to Anglo-American relations ••• to adopt 
a dog-in-the-manger policy,.1 They therefore saw it as imperative 
that the company should make up its mind as quickly as possible 
if it intended to pursue a concession, lest British Government 
policy invite United States accusation of bad faith. 2 
Events were quickly to show that this latter possibility was 
by no means remote. A major reason for delay in replying to 
United States representations, in the eyes of the Colonial Office 
at least, was that until a definite declaration was made that His 
Majesty's Government would agree to the waiving of the British 
Control Clause, no concession could be signed with the Syndicate, 
thus giving time for Anglo-Persian to make up its mind on whether 
to apply for a concession. However, at an early stage in the 
inter-governmental conversations, the United States began to be 
suspicious that the delay was in order to allow Anglo-Persian 
time to establish its position. As early as 29 December 1931, the 
1. 
2. 
Minute by Craigie, 1 January 1932, on E6350/325/91, F.O.371/15277; 
and minute by Warner, 31 December 1931, on E6414j325j91, 
F.O.371/15277. 
Memorandum of a meeting on 1 January 1932, by Warner, 2 January 
1932, on E6414/325/91, F.O.371/15277. 
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Counsellor of the United States Embassy, in conversation with 
Sir Lancelot Oliphant, had expressed the hope that whilst the 
Kuwait matter was under discussion between the Embassy and the 
Foreign Office, His Majesty's Government would not support an 
application from any purely British company or concern for an 
"I "" K "t 1 Ol conceSSlon In uwal. Foreign Office minutes would seem to 
indicate that, although it was anxious not to appear prejudiced 
in favour of Anglo-Persian, it regarded this request of Atherton 
as unreasonable. 2 
Here the matter rested, but in February 1932, Gulf informed 
the State Department that Anglo-Persian geologists were active 
in Kuwait, 3 and brought back to the fore the question of a possible 
Anglo-Persian concession. The State Department, therefore, became 
persuaded that the delay was intentional, in order to afford more 
time ' ••• in which to bring pressure upon the Shaikh of Kuwait to 
alter his attitude with consequent advantage to the Anglo-Persian 
Oil CompanY',4 an opinion Atherton already shared, and was not slow 
to bring to the Foreign Office's attention. 5 This was the first 
1. Verbal communication from Counsellor of the U.S. Embassy to 
Oliphant, 29 December 1931, E6414/325/91, F.O.371/15277. 
2. Minutes on ibid., especially that by Warner, 31 December 1931. 
It would appear, however, that either Oliphant had been very 
equivocal, or that Atherton had indulged in wishful thinking, 
as the State Department was apparently of the opinion that the 
Foreign Office supported this viewpoint. Internal memorandum 
by Wallace Murray to U.S. Secretary of State, 12 January 1932, 
890B.6363 G.O.C./17, R.G.59, N.A. 
3. Wallace, Gulf, to U.S. Secretary of State, 22 February 1932, 
890B.6363 G.O.C./25, R.G.59, N.A. 
4. U.S. Secretary of State to U.S. Charge, London, 25 February 
1932, For. ReI. 1932, II, p.7. 
5. U.S. Charge, London, to U.S. Secretary of State, 24 February 
1932, For. ReI. 1932, II, pp.6-7; same to same, 26 February 
1932, For. ReI. 1932, II, p.7; and same to same, 27 February 
1932, 890B.6363 G.O.C./36, R.G.59, N.A. 
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occasion on which the State Department began to suspect the 
integrity of the British Government, a suspicion increased when 
on 7 March 1932 it received a report from the American consul-
general in Baghdad, stating that he had been informed by an 
American missionary in Kuwait that the Shaikh had given an oil 
concession to Anglo-Persian. 1 Although this report was later 
2 qualified as just a rumour, Atherton had already informed 
Vansittart that the interested American company was concerned 
lest the long delay caused by diplomatic correspondence might 
result in Anglo-Persian being granted a concession. 3 It was thus 
apparent that the United states Government would not accept the 
grant of a concession to Anglo-Persian without protest. 
The Foreign Office thus found itself in a difficult position. 
It had already decided that United states attempts to prevent any 
concession being granted to a British company during diplomatic 
negotiations were unreasonable, whilst it appreciated that other 
departments regarded the grant of the concession to Anglo-Persian 
as strategically and politically desirable. It could not therefore 
accept American requests that Anglo-Persian activities in Kuwait 
should be suspended. Hence Oliphant's reply to Atherton, in the 
drafting of which the Colonial Office played a major part, referred 
for the first time to the activities of Anglo-Persian, and attempted 
to justify them. Assuring the Americans that these activities 
were confined to geological examination, Oliphant nonetheless 
pointed out that Anglo-Persian had been interested in Kuwait for 
1. Sloan, Baghdad, to U.S. Secretary of State, 7 March 1932, 
890B.6363 G.O.C./34, R.G.59, N.A.; and U.S. Secretary of 
State to U.S. Charge, London, 7 March 1932, For. ReI. 1932, 
II, p.8. 
2. Sloan, Baghdad, to U.S. Secretary of State, 19 March 1932, 
890B.6363 G.O.C./52, R.G.59, N.A. 
3. U.S. Charge, London, to U.S. Secretary of State, 11 March 
1932, For. ReI. 1932, II, p.8. 
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considerably longer than the Syndicate. 1 Although this letter 
also apologized for further delay being inevitable as a result 
of Cabinet deliberations, the American state Department, well 
aware of Mellon's impending departure for London, and genuinely 
concerned that Anglo-Persian was being given preferential treat-
ment, continued to press for an early reply.2 In the event, 
the Foreign Office reply of 9 April 1932, although meeting the 
United States Government on the British Nationality clause, made 
it plain that the Syndicate could not expect preferential treatment; 
a policy that other British Government departments would not have 
accepted. 
Thereafter, interest centred on the rival applications of the 
Syndicate and Anglo-Persian, and the draft concessions each offered. 3 
The State Department was clearly suspicious of Anglo-Persian 
activities, and would clearly not accept any concession going to 
that company that was not markedly better than the terms offered 
by the Eastern and General Syndicate. On the other hand, within 
Whitehall, most of the involved Departments would expect preferential 
treatment to be given to Anglo-Persian, with only the Foreign Office 
apparently insisting upon any decision being taken upon the merits 
of the case. 
The problem was exacerbated by the attitude of Anglo-Persian. 
Early in April 1932, Sir John Cadman had told the Foreign Office 




Draft of a letter to Atherton, C.O.732/52189026/26a; and 
Oliphant to Atherton, 14 March 1932, For. ReI. 1932, II, pp.9-10. 
Correspondence on 890B.6363 G.O.C./39, 41, 43, 45, 451 and 50, 
R.G.59, N.A.; and U.S. Embassy, London, to Foreign Office, 
29 March 1932, For. ReI. 1932, II, pp.11-13. 
d " " f these negotl"ations can be found in A detaile dlscusslon 0 
Chisholm. 
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were welcome to it,1 information that was apparently contradicted 
by what Cadman himself was telling the Colonial Office. 2 At 
about this time, the Abadan representative of Anglo-Persian 
informed the Shaikh of Kuwait that the company did not intend 
to apply for a concession at that tirne. 3 Later that same month, 
Sir A.T. Wilson, in a private letter to Dickson, casually stated 
that whilst Anglo-Persian did not wish to negotiate for a con-
cession at present, it would pay the Shaikh for an exclusive 
option to prospect and survey Kuwait territory for two years, 
with no undertaking on either side to grant or apply for a 
concession4 - a proposal that the Shaikh rejected. 5 The Political 
Resident was understandably annoyed both at the content and method 
of this communication,6 but by the time it reached London, the 
Colonial Office was already in receipt of a letter from Anglo-
Persian, stating that it was prepared to open formal negotiations. 7 
1. Minute by Oliphant of a conversation with Sir J. Cadman, 
11 April 1932, E1897/121/91, F.O.371/16002. 
2. Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 26 April 1932, E2064j121/91, 
F.O.371/16002. 
3. E.H.O. Elkington, Anglo-Persian, to Shaikh of Kuwait, 13 April 
1932, Chisholm, Note 50, p.154. This followed a geological 
survey in February to April 1932, which suggested that Kuwait 
as an oil proposition was definitely in the 'wild-cat' class, 
and that any oil found was likely to be the less profitable 
heavy crude. For the report, see Chisholm, pp.142-155. 
4. A.T. Wilson to Lieutenant-Colonel Dickson, 29 April 1932, 
enclosed in C.O.732/52/98019/11. Why Wilson made this proposal 
is unclear since the Anglo-Persian management at Abadan were 
extremely ~ceptical as to its acceptibility. Major Biscoe, 
Political Resident, to A.C.C. Parkinson, Colonial Office, 
31 May 1932, C.O.732/52198019/12. 
5. Chisholm, pp.21-2. 
6. Major Biscoe to A.C.C. Parkinson, 26 May 1932, C.O.732/52/98019/11. 
7. Anglo-Persian to Colonial Office, 3 May 1932, C.O.732/52/98026/45a. 
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With the discovery of oil in commercial quantities in Bahrain 
later that same month, the oil potential of Arabia began to 
be taken more seriously by all the interested companies, and 
rivalry for the Kuwait concession was bound to become more 
. t 1 In ense. Nearly a year after the failure of its first policy, 
the Colonial Office appeared to be achieving its second; although 
the Foreign Office was far from pleased, Rendel arguing that 
'From the international point of view it is very unfortunate that 
Sir J. Cadman should have reconsidered his original decision to 
withdraw from the field,.2 
Because Anglo-Persian was so late on to the scene, a draft 
concession was not in fact submitted to the Shaikh of Kuwait until 
13 August 1932, four years after the Syndicate first presented a 
draft concession to the Shaikh. 3 Once this draft had been sub-
mitted, the Syndicate was hastily informed that no action could 
be taken on its proposals until the Shaikh had had the opportunity 
of comparing the two concessions in the light of comments from the 
British and Indian Governments. 4 By this time, however, the 
Syndicate had in turn submitted a new draft, incorporating the 
Bahrain safeguards, whilst Major Holmes had been energetically 
pursuing negotiations in Kuwait. 5 The State Department, meantime, 
was content to allow the commercial negotiations to take their own 
path. 
1. Apparently the Shaikh told both companies that whichever of 
them gave him the better terms would succeed. Chisholm, p.23. 
A sign of Anglo-Persian's serious intention was that in mid 
August 1932 Chisholm was sent to Kuwait as resident Anglo-
Persian representative. Chisholm, pp.26-7. 
2. Memorandum by Rendel, 26 July 1932, E3589/121/91, F.O.371/16002. 
3. Anglo-Persian to Political Resident, 13 August. 1932, enclosed 
in C.O.732/52/98019/20. For the draft concesslon, see 
Chisholm, Note 63, pp.163-165. 
4. Colonial Office to Syndicate, 24 August 1932, C.O.732j52/98026j103. 
5. Syndicate to Colonial Office, 10 June 1932, C.O.732j52j98026j71: 
and Political Agent, Kuwait, to Political Resident, 10 May 1932, 
enclosed in C.O.732/52j98026/64. 
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Even before the Anglo-Persian draft had been received in 
London, disagreement had again broken out between the Admiralty 
and the Foreign Office, the former contending that clear 
preference should be given to Anglo-Persian,1 the Foreign Office 
maintaining that the British must tread very warily, since the 
Americans would clearly suspect them of being able to do what 
they lfred with the Shafrh; thus, any decision as between the 
two companies would have to be entirely fair, ' ••• since from 
the point of view of general policy the present would be a most 
inopportune moment at which to provoke another oil controversy 
with the United States of America',2 which was already suspicious 
at the prolonged delay. They therefore continued to keep a 
zealous eye on the progress of negotiations with the two companies, 
determined to ' ••• keep a close watch on the C.O. [sic] and 1.0. 
[SiC] ••• ' in order to avoid ' ••• another oil controversy with the 
U.S. [SiC] at this most inopportune moment,.3 Thus when the 
Colonial Office suggested that steps should be taken to prevent 
any further extension of the Syndicate's activities, the Foreign 
Office rejected this idea, since its general attitude was that 
'The Eastern & Genl [SiC] Syndicate are jackals - but they are 
jackals for [illegible] U.S. [sic] interests, & [SiC] our policy 
4 is in principle one of a fair field and no favour'. The one 
point on which all departments were able to agree was that, once 
both drafts had been received, the Petroleum Department should 
1. Admiralty to Colonial Office, 4 August 1932, C.0.732/52/98026j92. 
2. Record of a meeting at the Colonial Office, 15 September 1932, 
C.0.732j52j98026/39; and minute by Rendel, 26 July 1932, on 
E3589/121/91, F.0.371/16002. 
3. Minute by Craigie, 27 July 1932, E3589/121/91, F.0.371/16002. 
4. Minute by Rendel, 19 September 1932, on E4637/3372/91, 
F.O. 371/16007. 
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prepare a comparison of the terms for the consideration of the 
Shaikh,1 who had refused to consider the Anglo-Persian draft 
until informed that it had the British Government's 2 
approval. 
At this stage, however, the state Deparbnent again re-
entered the lists, prompted by considerable pressure from Gulf 
, 
which was convinced that the Shaikh was being urged to accep t 
the Anglo-Persian draft immediately. In early September 1932, 
therefore, American diplomatic representations were renewed, on 
the basis that the United States Government considered that the 
failure of His Majesty's Government to comment upon the Eastern 
and General Syndicate's terms had placed the latter in a dis-
d t °ti 3 a van ageous POSl on. The Embassy was informed that a comparison 
on commercial grounds between the two drafts was to be prepared 
by the Petroleum Deparbnent for the use of the Shaikh, with the 
question of British safeguards only being raised with the 
successful competitor. 4 However, it was apparent to the Foreign 
Office that the Americans would not accept the granting of a 
concession to Anglo-Persian on anything other than the soundest 
commercial grounds, whilst the other Whitehall Deparbnents were 





Record of a meeting at the Colonial Office, 5 August 1932, 
C.O.732/52/98026/39. The Foreign Office felt, however, that 
if His Majesty's Government was to support Anglo-Persian's 
concession, it would have to be considerably better. Memorandum 
by Warner, 6 August 1932, E3589/121/91, F.O.371/16002. 
Political Resident to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
25 August 1932, C.O.732/52/98019/27; and Anglo-Persian to 
Colonial Office, 29 August 1932, C.O.732/52/98019/21. 
Acting U.S. Secretary of State to U.S. Charge, London, , 
2 September 1932, For. ReI. 1932, II, pp.16-17; U.S. Charge, 
London, to U.S. Secretary of State, 7 September 193?, 
890B.6363 G.O.C.j198, R.G.59, N.A.; and U.S. Charge, London, 
to U.S. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 6 September 
1932, E4582/121/91, F.O.371/16002. 
, 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to U.S. Charge, London, 
16 September 1932, For. ReI. 1932, II, p.17. 
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1 
preference. Indeed, Gulf hoped that the State Department would 
force the British Government to recede from the position of 
advising the Shaikh on the clauses of the rl"val "2 concesSlons, 
although this the State Department refused to do, clearly 
feeling that, whilst it could not allow the British to close 
the door altogether, it had to recognize that Britain's pre-
eminent political position was bound to give Anglo-Persian an 
3 
advantage. However, as a month passed without the comparison 
being prepared, the State Department, urged on by Mellon, began 
to get concerned, and finally in October 1932 the United States 
Embassy conveyed this concern to the Foreign Office,4 urging the 
British to expedite the comparison, a request which Mellon 
5 
reiterated in early November. 
Thus, once again the Foreign Office had been placed in an 
embarrassing position by the dilatoriness of other departments; 
moreover, given Ambassador Mellon's personal involvement with 
Gulf, and the pressing nature of his conversations with Vansittart, 
it was plain that further delay might seriously affect Anglo-
American relations. The Foreign Office found itself in the 
position, caused solely by other Departments, that although it 
had been scrupulous to insist upon a fair field, it was now 






Minute by Rendel, 17 September 1932, on E4670j121/91, F.O.371/16002. 
Wallace, Gulf, to Murray, 22 September 1932, and attached minute 
by Alling, 890B.6363 G.O.C./148, R.G.59, N.A. 
Memorandum by Alling, 1 October 1932, 890B.6363 G.O.C.j153, 
R.G.59, N.A. 
U.S. Secretary of State to U.S. Charge, London, 4 Octo~er 1~32, 
For. ReI. 1932, II, p.19; Ambassador Mellon to U.S. secre~ary 
of State 18-0ctober 1932, For. ReI. 193~ II, p. 20; MemOt_'i~l'~'ln 
of a con~ersation between the U:5: A..'l\bassador and Sir R. Vans I ttart, 
17 October 1932, E5410/121j91, F.O.371/16002: and u.~. Embassy, 
London, to Foreign Office, 1 November 1932, enclosed In 890B.6363 
G.O.C./160, R.G.59, N.A. 
Conversations between U.S. Ambassador, London, and Sir R. 
Vansittart, 2 November 1932, E5764/121/91, F.O.371j16001. 
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fire solely in order to promote Anglo-Persian's interests, thus 
meaning that any concession granted to the Brit~sh 
...L. company, 
however superior in terms, would appear suspect to 1 the Americans. 
Sir R. Vansittart was especially angry, both as a result of his 
own desire to see close Anglo-American co-op eration , and, on a 
personal level, because he was the official who had to make 
excuses to Mellon. He was determined, therefore, to 'draw rank' 
on the other departments, both because ' ••• for reasons of con-
siderably higher policy I do not wish to have acrimonious disputes 
with the U.S.A. [SiC] at this moment',2 and, on a more bastc level, 
because 
Putting it at its lowest, we shouldn't wish 
to have a controversy with anyone out of 
which we should come as badly as this, in 
view of all the back history of the case 
that doesn't look well either. 3 
Finally, after very strong urging from the Foreign Office,4 
on 9 November 1932, the Petroleum Deparbuent completed its com-
parison, which suggested that on balance Anglo-Persian offered the 
best termse Not only did that company's draft offer the most 
advantageous proposals on the length of exploration period, working 
obligations and financial terms, but its draft also combined a 
stipulation that the concession might only be transferred to a 
British company. This conclusion was of course highly acceptable 
to the Colonial Office and other interested departments. Admiralty 
requirements were provided for by a suggestion that the successful 





Foreign Office minutes, 2 November 1932, on E5764/12l/91, 
F.O.371/16002. 
Minute by Vansittart, 2 November 1932, on ibid. 
Minute by Vansittart, 22 November 1932, on E6063/121/91, 
F.O.371j16003. 
Foreign Office to Petroleum Department, 3 November 1932, 
and Foreign Office to Petroleum Department, 7 November 1932, 




In the comparison, the Petroleum Department 
tended to assume that current practice followed by Anglo-Persian 
was inherently the best procedure; however the other departments, 
including of course the Foreign Office, lacked the technical 
expertise to challenge the conclusions. Two days after it 
received the memorandum, the Foreign Office informed Ambassador 
Mellon that the document embodying the result of the comparison 
was on its way to the British authorities in the Persian Gulf 
for communication to the Shaikh. 2 
This WOUld, however, appear to have been misleading, for 
whilst the document might have been sent out, it was only after 
a month of interdepartmental conSUltations that it was finally 
decided to send two 'personal and private' telegrams to the 
Political Resident, instructing him to communicate the Petroleum 
Department memorandum to the Shaikh of Kuwait. This delay was 
largely due to yet another wrangle between the Foreign Office and 
the Admiralty, the latter wishing to see British pressure brought 
strongly to bear upon the Shaikh of Kuwait to favour Anglo-Persian,3 
the former rejecting this as both ' ••• illogical, dishonest and 
unwise ••• ',4 and also impracticable; ' ••• there would be no hope 
1. Petroleum Department to Colonial Office, 9 November 1932, 
and Colonial Office minutes, c.o.732152/98026/123. Clearly, 
Anglo-Persian would also have found the conclusions acceptable. 
Chisholm was, in retrospect, to call the memorandum 'detailed 
and non-committal', and 'meticulous'. Chisholm, p.30. 
2. Vansittart to Mellon, 11 November 1932, E5855/121/91, 
F.O.371/16002. 
3. Admiralty to Foreign Office, 8 November 1932, E6063/121/91, 
F .0. 371/16003 • 
4. Minute by Rendel, 19 November 1932, on ibid. 
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of concealing from Holmes 
- & ~icJ from the Americans - that 
influence had been brought to bear on the Sheikh,.1 It was 
therefore decided to oppose the Admiralty on this matter, 2 and, 
when the Admiralty refused to give way, to refer the matter to 
the Middle East Official Sub-Committee of the Committee of 
Imperial Defence. 3 It was only as a consequence of this meeting, 
on 2 December 1932, that agreement was reached upon the instruc-
tions to be sent to the Political Resident. 4 At this meeting, 
Rendel, the Foreign Office representative, played a major part 
in drawing up the instructions. He was very insistent upon the 
importance of retaining the spirit of the 'open door' for 
In view of the present state of Anglo-
American relations, and of the numerous 
problems of world importance for the 
solution of which Anglo-American co-
operation was essential, the Foreign 
Office could not agree to any action 
likely to provoke an accusation of bad 
faith or sharp practice... 5 
Even then, the Admiralty in effect delayed the communication of 
6 those instructions for a further three weeks. Finally, however, 
the Colonial Office was able to relay them to the Political Resident 
7 on 22 December 1932. 
1. Minute by Warner, 18 November 1932, on ibid. 
2. Vansittart to Sir B.M. Eyres-Mansell, Admiralty, 24 November 
1932, E6063/121/91, F.O.371/16003. 
3. Minute by Rendel, 29 November 1932, on ibid. 
4. M.E.(O)81, CAB.51/6; minutes of the Middle East Official 
Sub Committee, 2 December 1932, M.E.(O), 21st meeting, 
CAB 51/2; and correspondence and minutes on E6549/E6563/121/91, 
F.O.371/16003. 
5. Minutes of the Middle East Official Sub Committee, 2 December 
1932, M.E.(O), 21st meeting, CAB 51/2. 
6. Admiralty to Foreign Office, 21 December 1932, E6801/121/91, 
F.O.371/16003. 
7. Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 22 December 1932, E6824/121/91, 
F.O.371/16003. 
- 317 -
The instructions reflected the common belief in Whitehall 
that, in view of the conclusions of the Petroleum Department's 
memorandum, the Shaikh's decision would almost certainly be in 
favour of the AnglO-Persian proposals; 1 and a determination that 
nevertheless everything possible should be done, within the limits 
of the British pledges to the United States, to influence the 
Shaikh. The Resident was informed that, in view of the American 
complications, the sections relating to British control, pre-
emption and refining should be omitted from the memorandum 
submitted to the Shaikh. Moreover, it was essential, lest the 
Shaikh favour the AnglO-Persian concession, that no hint of British 
pressure be made; thus, whilst the Resident and Political Agent, 
Kuwait, were perfectly at liberty to answer any questions the 
Shaikh might ask, they must not influence his choice. Nonetheless, 
the Resident was also instructed to inform the Shaikh orally that 
whilst the Syndicate intended to transfer the concession to a 
foreign company, a concession to Anglo-Persian would ensure British 
2 
control. It was obviously felt that this latter information 
would sway the Shaikh. 
The Colonial Office had every hope and desire that, following 
the Shaikh's receipt of the memorandum on 8 January 1933, and 
subsequent discussions with the Resident, a speedy decision would 
be made in favour of Anglo-persian. 3 The Foreign Office, also, 
1. 
2. 
A view the Foreign Office shared, Vansittart minuting that 
it seemed likely that 'his [Mellon's] company will come in a 
good but heated second'. Minute by R. Vansittart, 12 November 
1932, and other minutes on E5855/121/91, F.O.371/16002. 
Secretary of State for the Colonies to Political Resident, 
22 December 1932, C.O.732/52/98026/nos.178-179. Accor~ing to 
Chisholm however the Resident in a private conversation 
" trik th b t wi th him had told the Shaikh that he would see es 
bargain he could with whichever party he favoured. Chisholm, p.29. 
3. C.O.732/52/98026/190 and C.O.732/57j18119/13 and 14. 
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hoped for a speedy decision, in favour of either company, to 
ease the embarrassment of the situation vis-a-vis the Americans. 1 
However, they were to be disappointed. Even before the memorandum 
had been presented to the Shaikh the United States Embassy _ 
albeit entirely at the instigation of Ambassador Mellon _ presented 
a memorandum to the Foreign Office, pressing for information on 
the communication to the Shaikh of the comparison. 2 This unin-
structed intervention by Mellon caused considerable perturbation 
3 
within the State Department - more indeed, than in the Foreign 
4 Office, whose officials were acutely embarrassed by the delay _ 
but, the initiative having once been taken, pressure continued to 
be put upon the Foreign Office, this time with the prior knowledge 
5 
of the State Department. It was plain that the United states 
Government would not let the matter go by default. 
Delay, however, continued to be the hallmark of the negotia-
tions. Both companies were - mistakenly - informed by the Resident 








Verbal communication by U.S. Ambassador Mellon, 13 December 
1932, enclosed in U.S. Ambassador, London, to U.S. Secretary 
of State, 15 December 1932, For. ReI. 1932, II, p.27. It 
seems probable that Mellon was trying to sort out the matter 
before his Ambassadorial term of office carne to an end with 
the inauguration of the new Democratic administration. Minute 
by Rendel, 23 December 1932, on E6801/121/91, F.O.37l/16003. 
Minutes on 890B.6363 G.O.C./167 and 169, R.G.59, N.A. 
Minute by Vansittart, 13 December 1932, on E6636/12l/91, 
F.O.371/16003. 
Minute by Warner, 22 December 1932, E6801/12l/91~ F.O.37l/16003; 
and Acting U.S. Secretary of State to U.S. Charge, London, 
7 January 1933, Fo~. ReI. 1932, II, p.29. 
C.O.732/59/18119/6 and 13. The Political Resident authorized 
both companies to reopen negotiations on 14 January 1933. 
Chisholm, p.29. 
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forewarned to renew their bargaining. 1 The Shaikh, too, refused 
to hasten his decision, in part, the Political Agent believed, 
because whereas the memorandum clearly favoured Anglo-Persian, 
the Shaikh himself was beginning to move towards the Syndicate. 2 
He also saw, in the renewed negotiations, an ideal chance to 
'bid up' his royalties; much to the annoyance of the Foreign 
Office, which had apparently abandoned its earlier insistence 
upon the necessity of safeguarding the Shaikh's best interests. 3 
The Foreign Office was deeply perturbed that there had been 
a renewal of negotiations, hoping for a rapid end to ' ••• the 
very embarrassing period during which, though the Sheikh has a 
right to look to us for advice, H.M. [sic] Government must avoid 
all risk of being accused of weighting the balance in favour of 
4 
one or other company'. It was not necessarily hoping that the 
Syndicate would secure the concession; indeed, Foreign Office 
hopes were clearly pinned on the possibility of a 50/50 agreement 
between the two companies. 5 However, the longer matters dragged 
on, the more likely it was that the United States Government 
would renew representations. This became inevitable when Gulf 
secured the Petroleum Department memorandum, and sent it to the 
6 State Department. Already convinced that the prolonged delay 
1. In January 1933 Anglo-Persian presented a revised draft. 
Chisholm, pp.168-70. 
2. Political Agent, Kuwait, to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
11 February 1933, C.O.732/57/18119/16. There was, however, 
good reason for the Shaikh's refusal to be hurried; after 
being kept waiting five months for the promised British Govern-
ment memorandum, he was being pressed after only a month to 
make his decision. Chisholm, p.30. 
3. Minute by Rendel, 23 February 1933, on E987/12/91, F.O.371/16835. 
4. Minute by Warner, 3 February 1933, on E663/12/91, F.O.371/16835. 
5. Minutes on E913/12/91, F.O.371/16835. 
6. Wallace, Gulf, to Murray, 25 February 1933, 890B.6363 G.O.C./176, 
R.G.59, N.A. 
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had been intentional, the Near Eastern Division concurred with 
the company that the comments were clearly biased. 1 However, 
although it did continue with its informal representations,2 
surprisingly the United States Government thereafter played only 
a very small part in the negotiations. Undoubtedly, this was 
partially due to the State Department's belief that its standing 
legally was not very strong; but probably of far more significance 
was the entry into office in March 1933 of a new Democratic 
administration, in which Mellon had no political influence. Gulf 
therefore ceased to make requests for State Department assistance; 
indeed, it did not even inform the Department of the progress in 
negotiations, or the formation of, and eventual grant of the 
3 concession to, the Kuwait Oil Company. Moreover, by the Spring 
of 1933 the State Department, like the British Foreign Office, 
was increasingly convinced that the ultimate solution was likely 
to be a commercial compromise between the two companies. 4 
Nonetheless, the stance taken by the United States Government 
of insistence upon the 'open door w, was bound to influence the 
18 months of prolonged and complicated negotiations which followed. 
In these negotiations, the Colonial Office, on behalf of His 





Internal memorandum by P.H. Alling on the British Government's 
comparison of Drafts, 27 February 1933, 890B.6363 G.O.C./177, 
R.G.59, N.A. 
U.S. Secretary of State to U.S. Embassy, London, 28 February 
1933, 890B.6363 G.O.C./178, R.G.59, N.A. 
P. Knabenshue to U.S. Secretary of State, 8 January 1935, 
890B.6363 K.O.C./1; and Wallace Murray to Ray Atherton, 
21 January 1935, 890B.6363 K.O.C./2, both in R.G.59, N.A. 
Internal memorandum by P.H. Alling, 16 March 1933, 890B.6363 
G.O.C./183; P. Knabenshue to U.S. Secretary of State, 
11 August 1933, 890B.6363 G.O.C./185; and various documents 
in the 890B.6363 G.O.C. file, all in R.G.59, N.A. 
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feeling bound by the Foreign Office correspondence with the 
United States not to influence the Shaikh beyond proffering 
an explanation of the Petroleum Department's memorandum. 1 It 
was, however, prepared to instruct the Resident to hang fire 
on the Shaikh's decision, so as to permit Anglo-Persian to solve 
problems generated by their Persian concession,2 and to urge 
that company to submit far better terms than those offered by 
the Syndicate,3 thus allowing the British Government to advise 
the Shaikh legitimately to accept Anglo-Persian's draft. This 
would permit the two divergent policies operating within Whitehall, 
of honouring the Foreign Office pledge, yet ensuring that the 
eventual concession was held by Anglo-Persian, to be reconciled. 
The negotiations with the Shaikh were complicated by many 
factors, including lengthy correspondence on the possibility of 
the Shaikh visiting England as the guest of one or other of the 
two interested companies, the suspected intervention by ibn Saud 
on behalf of the Syndicate, and the new concessions offered by 
4 both companies in an effort to better each other's terms. The 
Shaikh was by mid 1933 clearly disposed towards the Syndicate, 





Mr. A.C. Parkinson, Colonial Office, to Lieutenant-Colonel 
Fowle, 2 March 1933, C.O.732/57/18119/40; and record of an 
interdepartmental meeting held on 3 March 1933, E1196/12/91, 
F.O.371/16835. 
U.S. Secretary of State for the Colonies to Acting Political 
Resident, 14 March 1933, C.O.732/57/18119/57. The Foreign 
Office were willing to agree to this, providing there was no 
overt departure from its commitments to the u.s. Government. 
Minute by Rendel, 21 March 1933, E1426/12/91, F.O.371/16836. 
Sir Samuel Wilson, Colonial Office, to A.C. Hearn, Anglo-
Persian, 15 March 1933, C.O.732/57/18119/58. 
See correspondence in C.O.732/57/18119 and C.O.732/57/18126. 
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the Political Agent hypothesized, that it would be to his 
advantage politically if the Americans gained influence in 
Kuwait, and seeing Dickson's enforced neutrality as a sign of 
1 
British weakness. Moreover, at this time the Shaikh had reason 
to be dissatisfied with the protection afforded by the British 
Government, since the latter seemed incapable of solving problems 
such as the question of the taxation of the Shaikh's date gardens 
in Iraq, and ibn Saud's land blockade of Kuwait; and since 
' ••• the Sheikh is well aware that our policy of maintaining the 
independence and furthering the prosperity of Koweit is actuated 
more by our own interest than by his,2, he was hardly likely to 
fear the withdrawal of British protection, whilst the opportunity 
of securing the political support of the United States Government 
was bound to be appealing. 
By now, possibly as a consequence of the change of adminis-
tration in the United States, the Foreign Office was far less 
nervous about American susceptibilities, and was quite prepared 
to follow a policy of allowing the Shaikh to postpone a decision 
that, it was becoming increasingly clear, would almost certainly 
. th. 3 be In favour of e Amerlcan group; though it also justified 
this policy on the grounds that, if His Majesty's Government 




See papers on C.O.732/57/18119j78, 89, 131, 137 and 1~3., 
This opinion was also apparently shared by Anglo-Perslan s 
'man on the spot', A.H.T. Chisholm. Chisholm to Anglo-
Persian, 16 January 1933, Chisholm, p.28. 
Minute by Rendel, 4 March 1933, E1196/12/91, F.O.371/16835. 
Minute by Rendel, 23 March 1933, on E1426/12/91,.F.O.371/16~36. 
However by now Anglo-Persian were clearly very lnterested In 
the pos~ibility of a 50-50 agreement. Sir John Cadman to 
Sir John Lloyd, (director, Anglo-Persian), 1 March 1933, 
Chisholm, Note 77, pp.176-7. 
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extremely angry if it went against them-
, an argument that they 
were quick to use against the Petroleum Department and the 
Admiralty, both of which were anxious to see Anglo-Persian 
obtain the concession, the Admiralty even arguing in favour 
of making some political concession to the Shaikh in order to 
1 
obtain his acceptance. In short, the Foreign Office was still 
determined to ensure that the British Government's actions were 
such that it was seen to abide by the letter of its pledges to 
the United States Government, but was apparently less concerned 
about the spirit of the agreement, if by a negative policy of delay, 
preference could be given to Anglo-Persian. 
There still seemed every chance, however, that the Shaikh, 
whether as the result of the unscrupulous behaviour of HOlmes,2 
or in order to win the political support of the United States, 
and break free of the complete control of the British and Indian 
Governments, would grant the concession to the Syndicate. This 
was despite the fact that the Colonial Office had managed to 
induce Anglo-Persian to offer what the Political Resident described 
as ' ••• quite exceptionally generous financial terms ••• ',3 and had 
therefore obtained the approval of even the Foreign Office to 
advising the Shaikh strongly, on this account, to give the concession 





Minute by Rendel, 21 March 1933, on E1426/12/91, F.O.37l/16836. 
Or so the British Government liked to believe. Correspondence 
on file 12/91, F.O.37l/16836 and 16837, especially minutes and 
correspondence on E2138/12/91, F.O.371/16836. 
Political Resident to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
28 March 1933, C.O.732/57/18119/78. 
Extract from the final record of a meeting held at the Colonial 
Office on 26 April 1933, C.O.732/57/18126/75 •. The Political 
Resident apparently did so when he saw the Shaikh o~ 13 May 
1933. However, this urging was apparently not particularly. 
successful, as the following day the Shaikh suspended negotia-
tions. Chisholm, p.34. 
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when, in mid May 1933, the Shaikh suspended oil negotiations. 1 
In the event, after the prolonged and at times rather bitter 
negotiations, the eventual solution was that first aired in 
December 1932, of co-operation between Anglo-Persian and Gulf 
in a joint concession. 2 The British Government had, however, 
taken very little part in these negotiations, and by the time 
that a tentative agreement was reached between the two companies, 
the departments involved had adopted the philosophical attitude 
that matters were virtually out of their hands,3 in view of the 
obligation imposed upon them, as in the case of the Iraq negotia-
tions, to work within the constraints of diplomatic correspondence 
with the United States. In the absence of effective State 
Department involvement, the Foreign Office, too, were able to 
adopt a 'watching brief', ensuring only that the letter of the 
undertakings to the Americans was observed by the Colonial Office 
and, after August 1933, the India Office. 4 In the changing Foreign 
Office mood of late 1933, no longer so conciliatory towards 
American interests, the same officials as had been urging a 
policy of safeguarding American susceptibilities at all costs, 
had begun to be more assertive of British interests, even Craigie 





Chisholm, p.35. This might have been because the Bri~sh 
Government was advising the Shaikh to give the conceSSlon to 
Anglo-Persian, although Chisholm also puts forward seve:al 
other possible reasons, including the fact that the Shaikh 
hoped the 2 rivals would decide to co-operate. 
Sir J. Cadman to Oliphant, 31 December 1932, E25/12/91, and 
other correspondence on file 12/91, F.O.371/16835; and 
minutes and correspondence on E6830t/121/91, F.O.371/16003. 
A.C.C. Parkinson, Colonial Office, to Political Resident, 
2 March 1933, C.O.732/57/18119/40. 
Minute by Rendel, 9 June 1933, E3015/12/91, F.O.371/16836; 
and minute by K.R. Johnstone, 22 June 1933, E3253/12191, 
F.O. 37t/1683 6. 
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rather unscrupulous American interests that our own people look 
like being pushed into a corner',l whilst Vansittart too was 
prepared to ' ••• take on the U.S. [Sic] Embassy ••• ' if need be. 2 
From being anxious at all costs to avoid possible American 
repercussions, the Foreign Office was now chafl"ng at' th 
... e 
unfortunate position in which we are in Koweit, where we are 
unable, owing to our pledges to the United States Government, 
to exert ourselves to defend our own best interests,.3 
However, although undoubtedly the Foreign Office would still 
have vastly preferred to see the Kuwait concession go to Anglo-
Persian or, failing this, the proposed Anglo-Persian/Gulf combi-
nation, it was still sufficiently concerned at the possibility of 
American protests to ensure that in any negotiations with the 
newly-formed Kuwait Oil Company over the required British safeguards, 
the terms imposed were not so onerous as to prevent a concession 
being signed. This might well have happened in view of the fact 
that the Admiralty wanted to bind the company to refine at least 
50% of the oil produced in Kuwait or any British territory nearby, 
and to erect a refinery capable of producing fuel oil to Admiralty 
specifications - on the grounds that 'we feel that it would be a 
thousand pities if negotiations with the Company were allowed to 





Minute by Craigie, 30 June 1933, and other minutes on 
E3446/12191, F.O.37~16837. 
Minute by Vansittart, 30 June 1933, on ibid. 
Minute by Warner, 28 June 1933, E3462/167/91, F.O.371j16842. 
Oliphant to Walton, India Office, 30 January 1934, E610/~6?/91, 
F.O.371/17807. The text of the agreement ?etween ~e Brltish 
Government and the Kuwait Oil Company as flnally slgned on 
1 March 1934 is reproduced in Chisholm, pp.189-191. 
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Office consent to the India Office's desire to inform the 
. Shaikh, in the event of negotiations with the Kuwait Oil 
Company breaking down, that any concession should go to 
interests that were at least partially British; when it was 
finally forced to agree, it insisted that the communication 
should be oral, rather than written, for whilst they 
••• saw no reason why we should be too 
complaisant to the Americans, ••• at the 
same time it was desirable to make every 
effort to avoid any statement which could 
be used against us by the U.S. [sic] 
Government and lead to further contro-
versy and difficulty. 1 
Nor, later that same year, would the Foreign Office give its 
support to a purely British company, Traders Ltd., politically 
supported by Lord Lloyd. The company involved was, in fact, 
apparently not very sound financially and commercially. In any 
event, by this stage (November/December 1934), the British 
Government was anxious to see the concession granted to the 
Kuwait Oil Company, and regarded themselves as committed to giving 
its consent to the grant of a concession to the Kuwait Oil Company 
if the Shaikh so wished. 2 Certainly, the eventual grant of a 
3 
concession to the company, on 23 December 1934, brought to an 
end what had been a frustrating and tiresome sequence of events 
for the British Government. 
To what extent the solution finally arrived at was in accord 




Minute by Rendel, 6 March 1934, E1201/160/91, F.O.37~17807, 
and further correspondence an the same reference. See also 
E1616/160/91, F.O.371/17808. 
E69721E7065/E7099/E7143/E7289/E7570/160/91, F.O.371/17809 and 
17810. Several documents relating to this incident are also 
reproduced by Chisholm, who discusses the incident fully. 
Chisholm, pp.53-76, 217-220 and 235-239. 
The text of the Concession Agreement, 23 December 1934, can 
be found in Chisholm, pp.242-249. 
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ascertain. A.H.!. Chisholm, the Anglo-Persian negotiator, 
hypothesized in a retrospective account written at the instiga-
tion of the Kuwait Government, that the Shaikh had from 1928 
worked for the solution eventually reached - a joint Anglo-
American enterprise - in order to secure United States,political 
support. In the absence of official Kuwaiti records, it is 
impossible to sUbstantiate this. Nor did the two other governments 
involved, those of Great Britain and the United States, have any 
accurate method of gauging the Shaikh's real feelings. They had, 
of course, to rely upon the opinion of their local representatives, 
which, on the whole, tended to reflect what the horne government 
was likely to want to hear. Apart from one expression of 
impatience with the Anglo-Persian,1 the Political Resident and 
the Political Agent strongly contended, at least in the initial 
stages, that the Shaikh favoured British interests, although, 
at a later date, they carne to fear that the Shaikh was turning 
towards the Syndicate. However, in all his communications to 
the Gulf Oil Company, many of which were relayed to the American 
State Department, Frank Holmes maintained that the Shaikh favoured 
American interests, and would have granted a concession to the 
Syndicate in 1928 had it not been for the interference of the 
British Government. 2 The American missionaries in Kuwait, and 
hence the United States consul in Baghdad, believed strongly that 
1. 
2. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Biscoe, Political Resident, to A.C.C. 
Parkinson Colonial Office, 26 May 1932, C.O.732/52/98019/32. 
Biscoe criticized Anglo-Persian for having, in th~ past~ . 
sought concessions simply to prevent other c?mpanles ;alnlng 
a foothold in what it saw as its 'sphere of lnfluence , the 
Persian Gulf. 
F.A. Leovy, Eastern Gulf, to the U.S. Secretary of state, 
27 November 1931, and attached papers, 890B.6363 G.O.C./l, 
R.G.59, N.A. 
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the Shaikh was opposed to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, and 
would welcome American involvement in his state. 1 Chisholm is 
probably accurate in asserting, however, that the Shaikh 
attempted to guide the negotiations to a far greater extent 
than the British Government would have desired. 
Elsewhere in the Arabian peninsula, events were never to 
reach the stage of direct diplom.atic confrontation between the 
British and American governments. However, the attitudes of 
both governments to the negotiations for oil concessions in 
Saudi Arabia, Muscat, and Qatar do throw light upon their general 
policies toward Arabian oil in the 1930s. Saudi Arabia was, 
of course, an unusual case in that by the 1930s neither government 
could claim political predominance,2 and, in effect, the negotia-
tions resolved themselves into an auction in which the Americans 
were prepared to make the higher bid. As a consequence, diplomatic 
interest in the negotiations tended to be low-key; the State 
Department, particularly, was much more exercised over the issue 
of whether to recognize the government of Saudi Arabia, a decision 
in which not only the commercial interests of the United States 
in that country, but also the stability - or otherwise - of the 
Saudi regime, particularly in the event of ibn Saud's death, had 
to be considered. 3 Moreover, this discussion was initiated by a 




Sloan, Baghdad to U.S. Secretary of State, 8 July 1932, 
890B.6363j43, R.G.59, N.A. 
In the Treaty of Jeddah, 20 May 1927, Great Britain had 
. . d d f King ibn Saud and recognlzed the absolute ln epen ence ~ 
had cancelled the 1915 Treaty. Hurewltz, II, pp.149-50. 
See various documents on 890F.01 file, R.G.59, N.A. 
- 329 -
from American oil companies, and was to result in formal recog-
nition by the President in February 1931. 1 The subsequent 
negotiation of a formal Treaty of commerce and navigation was not 
in fact concluded until 7 November 1933, by which time the Socal 
concession had already been signed. It would not appear from 
State Department files that the negotiations were in any way 
2 initiated by the oil company. 
The role of the State Department in the obtaining of an oil 
concession was largely insignificant. Admittedly, the State 
Department had ensured that K.S. Twitchell was included on a 
list of possible mining experts supplied to the Finance Minister 
of Hejaz and Nejd,3 but thereafter gave him no extraordinary 
assistance,4 although Twitchell kept Wallace Murray of the Near 
Eastern Division well informed of the progress of negotiations. 5 
It was after the concession had actually been signed that Twitchell 
and Socal began to press the State Department to initiate the 
official representation of the United States in Jeddah, a request 
denied until May 1939, when the United States Minister at Cairo 
6 
was also accredited to Saudi Arabia. 
1. Memorandum by Murray on the question of the recognition of 
Nejd, 14 January 1931, 890F.01/24; U.S. Secretary of State 
to U.S. Embassy, London, 1 May 1931, 890F.01/34A, both in 
R.G.59, N.A.; and entry for 9 February 1931, Stimson 
Diaries, Vol.15, p.81, Stimson papers, Yale. 
2. See various documents on 711.90F/2, R.G.59, N.A. 
3. As Saudi Arabia was then known. See various documents, 
filed in 890F.63Aj1, R.G.59, N.A. 
4. See correspondence on 890F.01/40A and 41, and 890F.6363 S.O. 
5. 
Co./4, R.G.59, N.A. 
See correspondence on the 890F.6363 S.O.Co. file; 846A.9111/51; 
890F.00j43; 890F.51/10; 890F.6363 Iraq Petroleum Co./1; and 
890B.6363/54, all in R.G.59, N.A. 
6. See in particular 890F.6363 S.0.Co./105-115; 
124.90B/1, all in R.G.59, N.A. 
124.90F/6~ and 
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Had negotiations for the Hasa1 concession taken place 
earlier, or had there been American rivals to Frank Holmes in 
1923, British Government interest in the negotiations might 
have been greater. Ibn Saud was by 1930 no longer, however, 
, , 
the protege of His Majesty's Government, and indeed was more 
likely to assert his independence by giving a concession to a 
non-British company. Moreover, the company finally involved 
as a rival to Socal, the IPC, included a sizeable foreign element. 
Thus, although the Foreign and Indian Offices were anxious to 
see the concession go to an at least partially British company, 
for 'If the Americans succeed in getting a firm footing there 
[Has;] the whole political situation in the Gulf may be drastically 
2 
affected', they were also aware that they had no unusual political 
influence on ibn Saud. They did, however, have the consolation 
that ' ••• we have no commitments to the Americans and, Saudi 
Arabia being an independent foreign country, we are free to back 
our own interests,.3 Sir A. Ryan, the British Minister, was 
therefore instructed not to give any support to Holmes, that 
'jackal' of American interests. It may have been of some con-
solation to the Foreign Office that Holmes failed to renew his 
1923 concession. 
In Muscat, no oil concession was actually granted, but the 
1930s were to witness an attempt by the State Department to use 




The concession was to cover not the whole of ibn Saud's 
domain, but just the Hasa area. 
Minute by G.W. Pendel, 28 March 1933, on E1498/487/25, 
F.O.37l/16870, and other documents in file 487/25, F.O.37lj 
16870 and 16871. 
Minute by Warner, 10 April 1933, E1825/487/25, F.O.371/16870. 
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interests would be able to exploit Muscat oil if they so wished. 
The United States Treaty with Muscat was signed in 1833, at 
which date the Sultan had also controlled the important port of 
Zanzibar. In the twentieth century, therefore, the importance 
of this treaty was much diminished, especially in view of the 
fact that no American consul was appointed to the Sultanate, 
United States interests there being safeguarded by the British 
Political Agent. In 1930, however, the Sultan requested, via 
the British Government, that the United States Government should 
give the necessary consent for an increase in the tariff rate 
1 
on imported goods. The State Department decided to use this 
as an opportunity to negotiate a new treaty, on the 'most favoured 
nation' basis. 2 It was hoped to insert into the commerce clause 
the words 'industry and the granting of concessions', specifically 
with the possibility of oil in mind. 3 Hence, the draft treaty 
sent by Stimson to Sir Ronald Lindsay, British Ambassador in 
Washington, included the provision that 
Any advantage of whatsoever kind which may 
be enjoyed in Muscat and Oman by nationals 
of any other country in respect of commerce" ••• 
and the prospecting for and utilization of 
natural resources shall be extended uncon-
ditionally to nationals of the United States 4 
of America, its territories and possessions. 
1. R.C. Lindsay, British Ambassador, Washington, to U.S. Secretary 
of State, 3 May 1930, 711.90A2/3, R.G.59, N.A. The consent of 
the U.S. was necessary since the 1833 Treaty required 5% to be 
the standard rate. 
2. Memorandum by Murray, 7 May 1930, 711.90A2/4; Memorandum from 
Treaty Division to Near Eastern Division, 711.90A2/5; and 
U.S. Secretary of State to British Ambassador, Washington, 
23 May 1930, 711.90A2/6, all in R.G.59, N.A. 
3. Memorandum by the Treaty Division on the Treaty with Muscat, 
22 September 1930, 711.90A2I13; and Memorandum from the 
Division of Near Eastern Affairs to Solicitor's Office, 
23 September 1930, 711.90A2/14, both in R.G.59, N.A. 
4. Draft Treaty, enclosed in U.S. Secretary of State to British 
Ambassador, Washington, 4 October 1930, 711.90A2/16, R.G.59, N.A. 
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It was not until almost a year later that the United states 
received a reply from the British, stating that the state Council 
of Muscat did not wish to negotiate such a treaty, but merely to 
modify the existing Treaty by a simple exchange of notes. 1 
Although this letter blamed the refusal on Muscat, the Americans 
clearly felt that the source of the difficulty was the British, 
who wished to retain their special rights. With the example of 
Bahrain before him, Murray pressed for the clarification of 
United States rights by a treaty and suggested, somewhat acidly, 
that if the British insisted upon retaining their special rights 
in Muscat, they should be willing to pay for them by providing 
the Sultan with the needed funds. 2 A reply was therefore sent, 
3 
urging the negotiation of a treaty, but to no avail. Interes-
tingly, given the concurrent dispute over Kuwait, the Foreign 
Office did not seem aware of, or concerned by, the State 
Department's manoeuvering to secure a sound basis for future oil 
negotiations,4 although the Political Resident in the Persian 
Gulf and the India Office referred explicitly to the possible oil 
5 
complications that might result from the desired Treaty. Clearly, 
in the face of the British refusal to negotiate a new treaty, 
state Department persistence was impossible, but a new tactic now 
presented itself: the possibility of commemorating the centennial 
of the old treaty 
1. D.G. Osborne, British Minister, Washington, to U.s. Secretary 
of State, 9 September 1931, 711.90A2/18, R.G.59, N.A. 
2. Memorandum by Murray to Castle, 30 September 1931, 711.90A2/19, 
R.G.59, N.A. 
3. W.R. Castle to D.G. Osborne, British Minister, Washington, 
10 October 1931, 711.90A2/20, R.G.59, N.A. 
4. File 4/91, F.O.371/15998. 
5. File 267/91, especially E2673/267/91, F.O.371/15276. 
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The treaty is now of little practical 
importance, but it does have a certain 
'nuisance value' in restraining the 
British political agents from attempting 
to discriminate against us in that area. 1 
This attitude was further urged on the Secretary of State by Murray 
a month later, this time with an explicit reference to oil: 
Within the past two years ••• American 
concerns have shown a prominent interest 
in the Persian Gulf and two American 
organizations have obtained important 
petroleum concessions in that area. It 
is quite probable that their interests 
may later include the territory of Muscat. 2 
After considering various alternatives, it was decided to send 
the Minister Resident and Consul General at Baghdad, Paul Knabenshue, 
to visit the Sultan. 3 During this visit, Knabenshue gained the 
impression that if an American company were to apply for permission 
to carry out a geological survey, it would be granted, although 
it is difficult to gauge whether the idea originated with Knabenshue, 
or the Sultan.4 However, there the matter seems to have rested, 
although at the time of the Sultan's visit to the United States in 
February 1938, it appeared that he had invited Socal to look into 
the petroleum possibilities of his territory.5 However, since 
these initiatives came to nothing, His Majesty's Government was 
not faced with the responsibility of responding to an application 
by an American company for an oil concession in Muscat. 
1. Memorandum by Wallace Murray on countries of the Arabian 
peninsula, 15 March 1933, 890B.00/198, R.G.59, N.A. 
2. Memorandum by Murray, 18 April 1933, 711.90A2/23, R.G.59, N.A. 
3. File 711.90A2/23-26A, R.G.59, N.A. 
4. p. Knabenshue to U.S. Secretary of State, 3 May 1934, 
890A.6363/2-, R.G.59, N.A. 
5. Memorandum to President Roosevelt, 19 February 1938, 
890A.00l/39A, R.G.59, N.A. 
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The case of Qatar was more akin to that of Bahrain and 
Kuwait, for the Shaikh of that territory had, in 1923, signed 
an agreement not to grant an oil concession without the approval 
of the British Government. Several issues were to be involved: 
the 'Red Line' Agreement of the IPC; the Anglo-Persian view 
that the Persian Gulf area was within its 'sphere of influence'; 
and the question of the boundary to be drawn between ibn Saud's 
territories and those of Qatar. By 1932, AnglO-Persian was 
becoming interested in the Qatar peninsula: and the Foreign 
Office at least anticipated United States protests should a 
monopolistic concession be granted to the British company.1 It 
was therefore anxious that His Majesty's Government should adopt 
in Qatar the same attitude as in Kuwait, of a fair field and no 
2 favour. Yet again it was to come up against the India Office, 
3 which was still jealously guarding British dominance in the Gulf, 






Viewing the Persian Gulf oil position as a 
whole, My Lords regard it as unfortunate 
that American interests should already have 
secured such a strong position on the fringes 
of what was formerly an exclusively British-
developed area and should now be seeking to 
extend their influence in that part of the 
area which is strategically the most important 
to British interests. 4 
Extracts from notes of a meeting held at the Colonial Office, 
15 September 1932, C.O.935/7, No.163, pp.152-3. 
File 3372/91 of 1932, F.O.371/16007. 
Thus, for example, the Political Resident resisted any thought 
of a U.S. consul being appointed in Bahrain, because of the 
power he would have as a consequence of American oil involvement. 
File 5255/91, F.O.371/16853. Moreover, the India Office opposed 
the desire of the Californian Arabian Standard Oil Company to 
survey its Saudi Arabian concession by air, because it would 
involve crossing the Persian Gulf states; thus the necessary 
British permission was withheld. File 150/91, F.O.371/17806. 
Admiralty to Foreign Office, 28 July 1932, E3836/3372/91, 
F.O. 371/16007. 
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The Foreign Office remained cautious, urging that if Anglo-Persian 
were to be encouraged to apply for a concession, it should be 
involved from the very beginning, to avoid accusations that, as 
in Kuwait, the British Government was delaying negotiations 
with the Americans to allow time for Anglo-Persian to become 
involved.~ Even when that company secured a two year option, 
the Foreign Office was anxious that it should actually carry out 
work on the concession, rather than use its option simply to 
exclude the Syndicate. 2 
In late ~933, the matter again came to the fore, as the 
Anglo-Persian option had either to be translated into a concession, 
or the field left open for another company. In the former case, 
under the terms of the Red Line Agreement, such a concession 
would have to be surrendered to the IPC, which included an American 
interest; this therefore seemed to provide the ideal solution. 
A problem would arise, however, if neither Anglo-Persian nor the 
IPC were interested, in which case there was bound to be a serious 
interdepartmental controversy in Whitehall. For, whilst 
The Foreign Office had always made it clear 
that they were anxious to walk very carefully 
in this part of the world, so as to avoid an 
oil war with American oil interests over what 
was on a long view a relatively unimportant 
area. 3 
most of the other departments concerned were determined to ensure 
that the spread of American influence in the Gulf was resisted 




Minute by Warner, 6 August ~932, E3836/3372/9~, F.O.37l/16007. 
Correspondence and minutes on E4637/E5442/3372/91, F.O.37l/16007; 
and file ~56/91, F.O.371j16840 and 16841. 
Note by J.G. Laithwaite of a conversation on 15 December 1933 
with G.W. Rendel, M.E.(O) 110, CAB.5l/7. 
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it should be made plain to the Shaikh that at all costs the 
concession must go to a company at least partially British. 1 
Given the backward character of the Trucial Coast, and the 
problems involved in protecting the lives and property of 
foreigners, the British had some grounds for moving carefully 
on the question of oil concessions, although, unfortunately, 
in view of Anglo-Persian's activities, they could hardly adopt 
the easy option of a blanket prohibition on surveying and 
prospecting. Nonetheless, Foreign Office fears of possible 
United States protest were at least alleviated by the option 
of utilizing this argument, although it continued to hope that 
Anglo-Persian would finally negotiate a concession for trans-
ference to the IPC,2 subject to stringent safeguards to protect 
British interests. 
By early 1934, an additional complication had arisen; 
namely, the territorial rivalries amongst the Arabian rulers, 
and, in particular, the desire of ibn Saud to establish hegemony 
over the Persian Gulf. He therefore hoped to assert his claims 
, 
to Qatar, by ensuring that any oil concession in that state 
was held by the same company as held the Saudi Arabian con-
cession - Socal. 3 This created additional difficulties for the 
British, for if Saud should succeed, British political pre-
dominance in the Gulf would be seriously undermined. Moreover, 
the prospect of an all-American concession having been raised, 
the grant of a concession even to the partially American IPC 
might not escape United States protest. 
1. Minutes of an interdepartmental meeting, 21 December 1933, 
E81/8~91, F.O.371/17798. 
2. Minute by Craigie, 26 January 1934, and other minutes on 
E496/81/91, F.O.371/17798. 
3. See various documents on M.E.(O)112, CAB.51/7. 
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The Government of India suggested that this latter com-
plication might be avoided by offering the Shaikh full 
protection against attack in return for the grant of the 
concession to Anglo-Persloan. 1 In th f th e eyes 0 e Government 
of India, at least, the possibility of a Saudi-dominated 
Persian Gulf far outweighed the threat of United States diplomatic 
protest; and although such blatant intervention might well 
arouse the anger of the State Department, even the Foreign Office 
decided that such a risk might be taken: 
Sir John Simon considers however that it 
should be possible to base a reasonably 
good answer to the United States Government 
upon the peculiar political situation in 
Qatar and upon the fact that the Iraq 
Petroleum Company is a company of inter-
national composition with United States 
participation, although he doubts whether 
the latter argument would in itself be 
accepted as valid by the United States 
Government. 2 
Meanwhile, the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee began to 
consider the question of whether the British Government should 
give a guarantee of protection to the Shaikh of Qatar - a 
guarantee that might involve the British Government in a conflict 
with ibn Saud. Whilst agreeing in principle that any oil con-
cession should go to a British company, the Chiefs of Staff were 
anxious to see a clear delineation of the nature of the commitment: 
and such a delineation was to be drastic, involving the limitation 
of the guarantee to unprovoked aggression; the exemption of 
endemic raiding; and the expression of the guarantee in general 
terms - probably to safeguard against it being used to force a 
solution of the disputed boundary between Saudi Arabia and Qatar. 
1. Government of India to Secretary of State for India, 20 January 
1934, Appendix F to Enclosure No.1, M.E.(O)110, CAB.51/7. 
2. Foreign Office to India Office, 7 February 1934, Enclosure 
No.2, ibid. 
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But most sweeping of all was a suggestion that th t e guaran ee 
should'be dependent upon oil being found. 1 However, this last 
suggestion was strongly opposed by the India Office, which 
continued to advocate a less qualified guarantee of protection. 2 
The matter was, therefore, referred to the Standing Official 
Sub-Committee for Middle East Questions, and on 23 February 
1934, a meeting was held to discuss the issue. 3 At this meeting 
the argument that it was safe to guarantee the Shaikh against 
major aggression, because the British Government would have to 
take action in any case, was accepted. However, there was less 
agreement on the possibility of making the guarantee dependent 
on oil being found, or exploited - not least because it was felt 
that if oil were not found, there was far less chance of the 
sort of aggression occurring which would activate the guarantee. 
Moreover, such a qualification, particularly if it were speci-
fically linked to an IPC concession, was likely to result in the 
company losing the Qatar oilfield. This qualification was 
therefore dropped, although at a later meeting it was decided 
to inform the Shaikh that His Majesty's Government regarded 
Anglo-Persian's exploration licence as the first stage of a 
concession; this meant that Anglo-Persian had an exclusive 
option on any concession, and thus, until that company had 
decided whether to proceed with its licence, the Shaikh could not 
4 





Report by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee, 16 February 1934, 
M.E.(O)110, CAB.51/7. 
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India, 20 February 
1934, C.P.49(34), CAB. 24/247. 
Report of the 29th meeting of the Standing Official Sub 
Committee, 23 February 1934, M.E.(O) 29th Meeting, CAB.51/3. 
31st Meeting of the Official Sub Committee, 12 April 1934, 
M.E.(O), 31st Meeting, CAB.51/3. 
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was little concerned with these discussions, its main interest 
being ' ••• the question of ensuring fair play for American 
interests ••• ', which it still regarded the American interest 
in the IPC as doing. 1 
Ironically, it was not until after this decision had been 
taken that the State Department became alerted to the oil 
potential of Qatar, which was first brought to its attention as 
a consequence of relationships between Saudi Arabia and Qatar. 
Since Knabenshue hypothesized that Saud's attempt to extend his 
overlordship to the Shaikh of Qatar might take the form of extending 
the boundaries of Socal's Hasa concession to include Qatar,2 
it meant that American interests, and, hence, the State Department, 
might be involved. Socal was, indeed, already aware of the 
problem, and was probably also conscious of Knabenshue's own 
personal view that the British were determined to monopolize as 
much as possible in the Persian Gulf by, amongst other tactics, 
opp·osing the extension of American oil company activities. Once 
alerted, Wallace Murray moved fast to find out the true line of 
3 the boundary, only to find that this was apparently impossible 
to determine, queries in London being met with reference to the 
Foreign Office letter to the United States Embassy on 24 April 
1934, in which had been set forth the British Government's claim 
to the 'blue line' boundary and a rebuttal of any claim by ibn 
. 4 Saud to territory in the British sphere of lnfluence. The State 
1. Minute by K.R. Johnstone, 20 January 1934, E448/189/91, 
F.O.37l/17810. 
2. P. Knabenshue to Murray, 27 June 1934, 790B.90F15/4, 
R.G.59, N.A. 
3. Murray to Atherton, 9 August 1934, 790B.90F15/4, 6 & 7, R.G.59, N.A. 
4. Memorandum by Alling, 2 November 1934, 890F.6363 S.O.Co/72, 
R.G.59, N.A. 
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Department did not choose the only option thus open to it, of 
giving ibn Saud moral support in claiming Qatar, 1 whilst Socal 
apparently decided not to fight the other American interests 
involved in the IPc,2 which eventually accepted the Qatar 
concession. Thus, what had initially threatened to be a highly 
contentious question, threatening yet another 'oil war', was 
solved without direct diplomatic communication between the British 
and American Governments. 
The protracted negotiations on the Bahrain, Qatar and 
especially the Kuwait concessions reveal very clearly the extent 
to which the wider issue of Anglo-American relations affected 
their eventual outcome. Although, in Bahrain, Great Britain was 
on weak ground in seeking to prevent American participation, in 
view of the fact that she had already exercised her prerogative 
of approving any concession, in Kuwait it should have been 
perfectly possible for the Colonial Office to insist upon the 
concession going to a British concern. That the American and 
British companies involved reached a commercial compromise, as 
was the case in Iraq, was fortunate, but a surrender had already 
been made to United States demands in the Foreign Office note of 
9 April 1933, whilst even a perfectly justifiable award of the 
concession to the Anglo-Persian would undoubtedly have resulted 
in further American protests. Moreover, the Foreign Office was 
determined to ensure, both in Kuwait and in Qatar, that any 
decision taken was not only fair, but actually could be seen to 




P. Knabenshue to Wallace Murray, 27 November 1934, 
790B.90F15/9, R.G.59, N.A. 
Leland B. Morris, Alexandria, Egypt, to U.S. Secretary of 
State, 17 April 1937, 890F.6363 S.O.Co./90, R.G.59, N.A. 
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The reasons for the surrender to American pressure were 
purely pragmatic, and took into account only the exigencies of 
British foreign policy. The long period of delay and uncer-
tainty, during which Gulf could have commenced operations in 
Kuwait, was far from being in the best interests of that 
impoverished state; nor were the British authorities in the 
Gulf and Whitehall best pleased when the Shaikh attempted to 
utilize the commercial rivalry to his own advantage, by obtaining 
the best royalty terms possible. Moreover, although there was 
good reason to believe that initially the Shaikh was hostile 
to American involvement in his state, when his opinion apparently 
altered, the attitude of the British Government did not change. 
It is, indeed, clearly apparent in examining the documents, 
that the decisions which permitted American involvement in the 
oil riches of the Persian Gulf were taken solely at the insti-
gation of the Foreign Office, and with only the interests of 
British diplomacy in mind: notably, what was seen as the over-
riding importance of maintaining and improving good Anglo-American 
relations. To the Foreign Office, so significant was this aspect 
of international relations, that it was even prepared to override 
what the India Office regarded as the vital necessity of retaining 
British hegemony over the Persian Gulf, and the Admiralty's 
obsession with controlling strategically placed sources of crude 
oil. Although the Foreign Office's American Department, parti-
cularly R.C. Craigie, was to the fore in pressing for such an 
order of priority, the belief that in dealing with the Persian 
Gulf concessions all possible steps should be taken to avoid 
Anglo-American controversy was shared by men such as Rendel, head 
of the Eastern Department, Oliphant and Vansittart. Although 
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decisions were rarely referred to the Foreign Secretary, or 
the Cabinet, at the permanent official level it is apparent that 
the retention of United States friendship was seen as critical. 
It is particularly striking that Foreign Office determination 
was such that it was prepared to resist the outright opposition 
of other departments, not only the Admiralty but, more signifi-
cantly, departments such as the India Office and Colonial Office , 
with far more experience of administration in the Gulf and in , 
the case of the India Office and the Government of India, 
accustomed to dictating policy there. An indication of the 
changing state of Anglo-American relations is the rapidity with 
which the Foreign Office acted to safeguard American interests, 
even before United States diplomatic representation; once the 
United States Embassy had begun its protests, the Foreign Office 
brought all the political pressure it could muster to bear upon 
the rest of Whitehall to ensure that these protests were met. 
This is markedly different from the situation prevailing in the 
early 1920s; at which point the flagrant abuses of diplomatic 
position in which Andrew Mellon indulged, so flagrant indeed 
that they alarmed and angered the State Department, would have 
drawn very cynical and caustic comments from Foreign Office 
officials. At the time, however, little comment was made upon 
this state of affairs, although at a later date Rendel commented 
that Mellon had abused his official position, and ' ••• let it be 
understood that Anglo-American political relations would seriously 
suffer unless we secured to United States interests a very widely 
"open door" in the Gulf ••• '. But even at this late date, by 
which time Anglo-American relations were definitely deteriorating, 
Rendel carefully discriminated between Mellon's own activities and 
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the fact that 'I do not think we can say that the United states 
Government as such did more than uphold the well-established 
American motto in the Middle East "Opportunity without responsi-
bOIOt" ,1 hO t l l Y ••• , w lIs another member of the Eastern Department, 
invited to comment upon possible British grievances with the 
United states, commented that 
I do not kno~ that we can really blame the 
U.S. Govt. [sic] for any support they may 
give to American oil interests in the Gulf 
nor do we seem to have come into conflict 
, 
with them recently •••••• it is inconvenient 
for us that American interests should have 
secured so large a foothold in the Gulf 
but we can hardly consider it as a grie~ance.2 
When one examines the role of the United States Government, 
especially the State Department, it becomes apparent that, on 
the surface at least, Foreign Office fears of another 'oil war' 
were perhaps a little exaggerated, for there does not appear 
to have been any great anxiety on the part of the state Department 
regarding the Persian Gulf oil concessions. Admittedly, whilst 
United States representations in the case of Bahrain were justi-
fiable, insofar as they sought to prevent Americans being 
deprived of rights and options acquired in good faith by the whim 
and caprice of the British Government, acting without unassailable 
legal authority, the justification for United States Government 
intervention, on a formal diplomatic level, in the Kuwait con-
cessions is a little less easy to comprehend. In Kuwait, unlike 
Iraq and Palestine, Great Britain was not pledged to prevent and 
forswear discrimination or monopoly; she was acting upon legal 
rights conferred upon her by the ruler of the state, and, initially, 
in accordance with his expressed wishes. Nor was she pledged to 
act towards the protectorates, as she was in the case of the 
1. Minute by Rendel, 6 November 1934, on A8038/2280I~5, F.O.371/17603. 
2. Minute by K.R. Johnstone, 22 October 1934, on ibid. 
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mandates, selflessly for the good of the native population. 
Americans had conflicting concessions in the state of Kuwait 
No 
which the State Department could seek to uphold, although 
attempts to prevent American interests being discriminated against 
were perhaps justifiable. However, on the whole, the incident 
was an unwarranted expansion of the 'open door' philosophy. 
What the incident did not represent, however, was a major 
, , 
cause celebre in Anglo-American relations, or a major anti-
British campaign on the part of the State Department. Interest-
ingly, in view of President Hoover's forceful views on raw 
materials monopolies, and his role in the earlier 'oil war', he 
does not appear to have been involved in the controversy; nor 
1 
was he apparently kept informed by Mellon. The Secretary of 
State was only involved as a matter of courtesy in response to 
requests by Mellon. The member of the State Department most 
concerned, Wallace Murray, was sympathetic to the British position. 
In effect, State Department representations in both cases were 
less the consequence of any great suspicion of British bad faith, 
as the response to the pleadings of the interested oil companies. 
There was certainly no attempt by the State Department actually 
to stimUlate American oil companies to investigate the potential 
of the Arabian peninsula, as there had been in Iraq. Indeed, 
the Department was frequently urged by the Gulf Oil Company to 
take far stronger action than it was in fact prepared to undertake. 
1. This is, of course, difficult to assert with certainty. But 
there is no record in State Department files of Presidential 
involvement nor could any evidence of it be traced in 
Hoover's o~ Presidential papers, wherein references to, or 
correspondence with, Andrew Mellon, were.most~y of a purely 
formal nature. See, in particular, Presldential Personal 
File, PPF 653, 'Mellon, Andrew', Hoover Papers, H.H.P.L. 
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The company even attempted to dictate the kind of note it thought 
should be sent to the British Government. Th t th ta a e S te Depart-
ment was not particularly exercised by the issue is shown by the 
fact that Gulf was usually billed for telegrams sent. Although, 
insofar as can be discovered from state Department files, they 
were unaware of the Kuwait oil agreement with the British 
Government, the officials of the Near Eastern Division tended 
to be sympathetic towards Great Britain's special position in 
the Persian Gulf. Moreover, there was no sign of any 'fight 
for oil' mentality amongst American government officials. It 
was only when the state Department obtained the Petroleum 
Department memorandum comparing the two drafts, that it began 
to suspect British intentions. However, the impending change 
of administration, and Mellon's consequent loss of political 
influ€nce, prevented the development of a major diplomatic con-
troversy. 
Thus, in Bahrain, and especially Kuwait, it was the urging 
of Gulf, and the intervention of Andrew Mellon, rather than any 
'oil war' outlook, or the exigencies of Anglo-American relations, 
that dictated United states policy. However, the weapon used by 
the United states, insistence upon the 'open door', had little 
validity in the Middle East outside the mandated territories. 
The couching of all United states Government representations to 
the Foreign Office in general terms led the latter to assume that 
the matter was regarded with far more seriousness within the 
state Department than was in fact the case. Thus, in its anxiety 
to promote good Anglo-American relations, the Foreign Office 
instigated the policy within Whitehall that resulted in American 
interests completely controlling the Bahrain oilfield, and, more 
• 50wo share in what was to become one of significantly, secur1ng a ~ 




American views of the exact meaning 
of equal opportunity are apt to be 
peculiar. There is an undoubted 
feeling that British and other foreign 
oil prospectors have had a long start 
and that American concerns ought to 
receive some preferential treatment 
enabling them to catch up. 1 
During the interwar period, the State Department ensured that 
American oil companies received that 'preferential treatment' in 
the Middle East, to such effect that by 1939 the Americans 
enjoyed a substantial stake in the Middle Eastern oilfields, 
especially in what we now know to be the highly lucrative oil-
fields of Arabia. For the most part, the United States achieved 
this by a rigid insistence upon the open door which she extended 
from its original limited Far Eastern application, first to the 
mandated territories, and then beyond that into the British 
protectorates of the Persian Gulf. 
Her maintenance of the open door principle was, however, 
strictly limited. As J.C. Clarke, head of the British Petroleum 
Department commented, in practice it 'only means an open door for 
Americans and closed doors for others ••• ,.2 In effect, once an 
American company had secured an interest in any oilfield, little 
concern was expressed as to whether the nationals of other 
countries had an opportunity to participate. This was clearly 
demonstrated by the State Department's refusal to criticize the 
terms of Sinclair's North Persian draft concession; whilst, in 
Iraq, Hoover's suggestion for an international conference was 
1. Despatch from R. Chilton, Washington D.C., to Foreign Office, 
31 January 1924, E1046/386/34, F.O.371/10143. 
2. J.C. Clarke to L. Oliphant, 2 August 1923, E7955J91/65, 
F.O.371/8994. 
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rejected by Millspaugh, on the grounds that other nationalities, 
such as the Italians and the Japanese, might then demand a share 
of the oil. 1 Nor were the Americans, in return for the oil con-
cessions they received, prepared to undertake political 
responsibilities in the Middle East. George Rendel, head of 
the Foreign Office's Eastern Department, summed it up thus: 
••• the u.s. Govt [sic] are always particularly 
faithful, in the Middle East, to the U.S. 
national motto: "Opportunity without res-
ponsibility". 2 
The American ability to create and exploit such opportunity was 
particularly striking, given that the United States was never 
at war with Turkey, and hence had no status in the negotiation 
of the peace treaties. Nor was she a member of the League of 
Nations, which in theory administered the mandate system. 
It has been demonstrated by many American historians that 
the United states, in the interwar period, was pursuing a policy 
f . . 3 o econOIDlC expans~on. In the Middle East, the door was force-
fully pushed open for American citizens, despite British 
opposition, to enter the oilfields of Iraq, Persia, Palestine, 
Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar. In order to achieve this, the 
American State Department was prepared to use all the means at 
its disposal, including the encouragement of Persian nationalism, 
the obstruction of the mandates, and the careful timing of 
diplomatic Notes to the British Government (this was especially 
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November 1921). In the 1930s the Department was less determined 
in its pursuit of Arabian oil, its diplomatic initiatives being 
largely in response to the requests of interested oil companies. 
It was, however, prepared to manipUlate its policy on the Muscat 
Treaty and customs duties in order to create the opportunity for 
American oil companies to obtain oil concessions in Muscat should 
they so wish. As a consequence of Department action, by 1939 a 
sizeable American presence had been created in an area vital to 
Britain's strategic interests, and one where, in 1918, she had 
appeared to reign supreme. The British had, moreover, surrendered 
what would have been an invaluable asset for the oil-starved 
British Empire. 
Previous studies of British oil policy in the Middle East 
have tended to concentrate upon the influence of Middle Eastern 
strategy and the overriding importance of oil:1 they have 
ignored the backdrop of Anglo-American relations, which also 
greatly affected the evolution of British policy towards the oil 
resources of the Middle East. What emerges very strongly from a 
detailed study of the British decision-making process whereby the 
Americans were admitted to participation in those resources, is 
that these decisions cannot be fully understood without an 
appreciation, firstly of British sensitivity to the state of 
Anglo·-American relations; and, secondly, of the power of the 
United states, despite her 'isolationism', to affect events in 
an area such as the Middle East, far removed from her own tradi-
tional sphere of influence. 
1. Mejcher, Imperial Quest; and Davis, British Oil PolicZ-
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A careful examination of the critical period towards the ~nd 
of 1921 in all three areas of AnglO-American oil controversy _ 
Palestine, Iraq and North Persia - reveals clearly how the United 
states influenced those decisions. It does not appear that the 
British, at least, regarded the solutions in these three areas as 
part of a comprehensive settlement, as DeNovo suggests,1 although 
decisions in one case tended to influence, or be somewhat arti-
ficially linked, to others. In North Persia, the Foreign Office 
decided to welcome a policy of commercial co-operation with the 
Americans, partly in order to make a virtue out of necessity, but 
also in the hope of enlisting United states support in an area 
vulnerable to Russian expansion. Elsewhere, the position was less 
clear-cut. It was largely at the instigation of the Colonial 
Office that the principle of American participation in the Iraqi 
and Palestinian oilfields was accepted. The change of policy on 
Palestine was directly motivated by a desire to placate the 
United states. Decisions taken in the sphere of Iraq, however, 
were more complex, and owed as much to the need for a speedy 
implementation of the mandate, and the efficient utilization of 
Iraq's natural resources, so as to minimize the cost to the British 
taxpayer, as with the desire to secure an Anglo-American rap-
prochement. Nonetheless, American participation in the Turkish 
Petroleum Company was still conceded as a consequence of United 
states insistence, which was effectively preventing the issue of 
the mandate; whilst American support was thought by some to be 
a factor in the anti-British feeling prevalent within Turkey and 
Iraq. In all the discussions on American participation, there 
was a tendency to accept it as ultimately inevitable. 
1. DeNovo, American Interests, p.285. 
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In a later era, the protracted negotiations for the Bahrain 
and especially the Kuwait concessions reveal very clearly the 
extent to which considerations of AnglO-American relations 
affected their eventual outcome. Despite the fact that, as 
P.M. Roberts of the Foreign Office acknowledged, 'Our policy in 
Arabia is that of the closed door' ,1 the Americans prevailed. 
In Kuwait, it should have been perfectly possible for the 
Colonial Office to insist upon the concession going to a British 
concern. That the American and British companies involved 
reached a commercial compromise, as was the case in Iraq, was 
fortunate, but a surrender had already been made to American 
demands in the Note ~f 9 April 1933. The reasons for this 
surrender were purely pragmatic, and took into account only the 
exigencies of British f~reign policy. 
A critical part of that policy was the cultivation of friend-
ship with the United states: so critical, in fact, that Whitehall 
was to ignore - or, more accurately, overcome - a legacy of 
irritation with the United states, caused by the reaction of that 
country to the Anglo-Persian Agreement; the tone and content of 
the Note of 20 November 1920 (which in typical Wilsonian fashion, 
addressed itself to the loftier ideal of the mandatory principle, 
rather than the sordid subject of oil); and the deliberate delay 
caused to the mandates for Palestine and Iraq, in order to achieve 
American participation in their oilfields. As a consequence of 
the 1919-1921 'oil war' the British were to misread state Department 
protests over the Persian Gulf concessions in the early 1930s. 
As has been demonstrated, the main reason for permitting the grant 
of concessions to American oil companies was to avoid AnglO-American 
1. Minute by P.M. Roberts, 2 December 1931, E5355/267j91, 
F.O.371/15276. 
- 352 -
controversy at a critical time. Thus, despite the apparent 
'isolationism' of the United states, her latent power was 
sufficient to so influence British Government policy in the 
1920s and 1930s as to achieve for United states nationals a 
substantial share in the vast Middle Eastern oil resources, 
despite the apparent British hegemony and predominance in 
that region after the First World War. 
Yet to be discussed, however, is why Great Britain conceded 
so much in order to placate a country which had apparently with-
drawn into isolationsim. A useful summary of the answer is 
provided in an important memorandum written for the Cabinet 
by R.L. Craigie, head of the American Department of the Foreign 
Office. Although written in 1928, most of its contents have 
relevance for the entire interwar period. 1 Craigie commenced 
by outlining the fluctuating course of Anglo-American relations 
since the end of the war. A rapid deterioration in relationships 
until 1920 was succeeded by a period of steady improvement 
during the years 1920-1923, during which time a number of con-
troversial issues were settled (including the Mesopotamian oil 
question). This led into two halycon years of good will, only 
to be followed, after 1925, by a steady decline in relationships; 
this decline, he maintained, had to be halted and reversed. 
Making the heretical statement that 'Except as a figure of 
speech, war is not unthinkable between the two countries', Craigie 
proceeded to outline the reasons which made good relations between 
the two countries so imperative. These included the size, wealth 
1. Memo by R.L. Craigie, 12 November 1928, C.P.344(28), 
CAB. 24/198. 
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and technical ability of the United states; the importance of 
good Anglo-American relations to the Dominions; trade; and 
above all finance, in which area 'good relations with the United 
states are for this country so valuable as to be almost essential'. 
Craigie pointed out that ' ••• the actual advantages which ~erican~ 
derive from good relations with Great Britain are patent only to 
a relatively small and thoughtful minority' and therefore the 
responsibility for maintaining good relationships had to be British. 
After pointing to what he saw as the natural tendency for Anglo-
American relations to deteriorate, Craigie nonetheless concluded 
that 'British co-operation with the United states can never be 
easy, but, within limits, it is far from being impossible'. 
There was, of course, an alternative: that of taking the 
United states at its word, as being isolationist, excluding her 
from European affairs, and proceeding to settle outstanding 
questions without regard to American desires or interests. 
Craigie's discussion of this alternative - in fact, as he concluded, 
no alternative at all - reveals clearly, not only that the United 
states was incapable of pursuing a completely isolationist policy 
vis-a-vis Europe, but also that her significance in European 
affairs was such that Great Britain in particular could not afford 
to ignore or antagonise her. As Craigie argued, the major out-
standing issues of the day, such as naval disarmament, belligerent 
rights, reparations and inter-allied debts - all of them vital to 
Great Britain - simply could not be solved without consideration 
of, and consultation with, the United states. 
The history of Middle Eastern oil concessions in the interwar 
period demonstrates clearly that American policymakers, far from 
pursuing a strict isolationism, were actively promoting economic 
expansion abroad by the mechanism of the open door. An examination 
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of the British decision making process which resulted in the opening 
of the Middle Eastern door to American oil companies reveals clearly 
that the pre-eminent position achieved in the Middle East ~y the 
United states was not fortuitous, nor simply the consequence of 
American expertise and economic power, but represented a conscious 
and deliberate attempt by the British to placate the United states 
by allowing her citizens free access to oilfields that were 
strategically vital to Great Britain. This was not the only issue 
on which Great Britain attempted to win the friendship of the 
United states: 
We, on our side, terminated the Japanese 
Alliance, to some extent at least hoping 
for closer relations with the United states; 
we took on an onerous debt settlement, and 
the Irish settlement, though of course 
reached irrespective of the United states, 
was at least of a nature to remove or minimise 
one previous source of friction. We have 
agreed to parity not only in battleships but 
in all smaller vessels, ••• 
To this could, of course, be added the oil controversy. The pro-
American Vansittart then proceeded to argue, from the vantage 
point of 1934, that British conciliation had, in fact, been to 
no avail: the Americans, far from reciprocating, were showing an 
increased tendency to cut even their already limited world 
responsibilities. He sadly concluded that his desire to see the 
United states and Great Britain together keeping the peace of the 
world was unlikely to be fulfilled, and that surrendering to 
United states pressure seemed a pointless exercise: 'In aging I 
have lost my wind for running after the United states Government. 
1 It is a futile paper-chase'. 
This same United states unwillingness to participate in the 
responsibilities, as opposed to the opportunities, of world power 
1. Vansittart to Ronald Lindsay, 24 September 1934, A9942/2280/45, 
F.O.371/17603. 
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was clearly apparent in the Middle East. Whilst demanding for 
her citizens full access to the petroleum resources, the United 
states refused to accept any formal responsibility for the 
maintenance of stability in Persia; rejected categorically 
any suggestions that she should assume mandatory responsibilities 
in the Middle East; and would not even lend her political support 
to the Anglo-American syndicates which sought oil concessions, 
having once ensured that American interests, in one guise or 
another, were guaranteed a share in those concessions. Whilst 
recognizing Great Britain's 'special position' in the Middle East 
to the extent of allowing her to assume political - and frequently 
economic - responsibility for its most disturbed and troublesome 
areas, the state Department refused to allow Great Britain to 
reap the rewards of her labours, in the guise of a secure oil 
supply for her fleet. 
In the event, the British desire to enlist the support of 
the United states in the maintenance of order, and as a bulwark 
against the Bolsheviks in the Middle East, by virtue of her 
commercial interests there, was to come to fruition, when the 
events of the Second World War and after threatened the vital 
1 American oil supply. However, by then the British power and 
influence in the Middle East - both political and economic - was 
in rapid decline. As was so often the case, whilst seeking to 
promote Anglo-American co-operation, Great Britain was in fact 
paving the way for her eventual replacement by the United States. 
In the words of Vansittart, it was 'a futile paper-chase'. 
1. See John A. DeNovo, 'The Culbertson Economic Mission and 
Anglo-American Tensions in the Middle East, 1944-1945', 
Journal of American History 63 (1976-7), pp.913-936; and 
Burton I. Kaufman, 'Mideast Multinational Oil, U.s. Foreign 
Policy and Antitrust: the 1950s', Journal of American History 
63 (1976-7), pp.937-959. 
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Appendix I 
The Oil Companies: Nomenclature and structure 
(1) Nomenclature of the oil companies 
Many of the major companies mentioned in this thesis changed 
their names, or composition, at least once in the course of 
the twentieth century. The policy of nomenclature followed 
in the text is described below. 
Anglo-Persian Oil Company 
In 1935 the name of this company was changed, at the request 
of Shah Reza Pahlevi, to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Since 
1954, following the Abadan crisis, it has been known as British 
Petroleum. Throughout the thesis, the name used is that employed 
at the time under discussion. 
Abbreviations 
Anglo-Persian, or APOC. 
Anglo-Iranian, or AIOC. 
Turkish Petroleum Company 
In 1927, the name of this company was changed to the Iraq 




Royal Dutch - Shell Group 
Before 1907, the Royal Dutch Company and the Shell Transport and 
Trading Company were entirely separate, legally, and are referred 
to as such, although from 1903 they co-operated informally in their 
markets East of Suez through the Asiatic Petroleum Company. 
After 1907, however, the two companies officially merged in a 
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60/40 partnership (Shell being the junior partner), operating 
through a gradually increasing network of subsidiary companies. 
Although the parent companies were ostensibly merely holding 
companies, in effect they controlled the policy of the whole group. 
Therefore, the term 'Royal Dutch-Shell' is used to denote the 
policy or action of the entire network of subsidiary companies, 
which in Shell publications are often referred to collectively 
as 'The Group'. When specific reference is made to the activities 
of one of the subsidiaries, it is of course referred to by name. 
Standard Oil 
When discussing the period before 1911, 'Standard Oil' is used 
to refer to the large number of companies brought together by 
various legal devices to form one large combine. After this 
date, however, the dissolution of the 'trust' forced the 
formation of several independent companies, and these must be 
regarded and treated as separate entities, referred to indi-
vidually by name. It should however be pointed out that in 
the 1920s many writers continued to use the term 'Standard 
Oil', either to denote just the old parent company, Standard 
Oil Company, (New Jersey), or in general terms, to imply that 
the Trust, although legally dissolved, continued to operate 
through voluntary and informal co-operation between the various 
companies. Except in citations from contemporary sources, 
which frequently employ the vague term 'Standard Oil', this 
thesis is careful to make plain which of the various Standard 
Oil companies is meant. 
Abbreviations 
Jersey Standard. Standard Oil Company (New Jersey). 
socony. Standard Oil Company of New York. 
Socal. Standard Oil Company (California). 
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(2) ~il Company Subsidiaries 
The major oil companies discussed in this thesis all operated 
through the medium of a large number of subsidiaries. Under-
neath will be found a list of the main subsidiaries, especially 
those operating in the Middle East, except where such sub-
sidiaries are so named as to make it easily apparent to which 
company they belonged. It should be stressed however that 
this is in no way a complete list. The year in which the 
subsidiary was formed is placed in brackets after the name. 
Anglo-Persian Oil Company 
D'Arcy Exploration 
Company Ltd. (1914): 
First Exploitation 
Company Ltd. (1903): 
Khanaquin Oil 
Company Ltd. (1925): 
North Persia Oils 
Ltd. (19 2 0 ) : 
British Petroleum 
Company Ltd. (1917): 
Consolidated Petroleum 
Company Ltd. (1928): 
Royal Dutch-Shell Company 
the prospecting company of APOC. 
formed to exploit APOC's rights 
in Persia. 
formed to take over oil bearing 
properties on the borders of 
Persia and Iraq. 
formed to acquire from APOC and 
Russo-Persian Naphtha Company 
a so-called government concession 
over the five northern provinces 
of Persia. 
Previously a German company. Dis-
tributors of oil in the U.K. 
After 1954, the name was used 
for the parent company. 
Joint APOC/Royal Dutch-Shell company 
formed to co-operate in distri-
bution throughout the Middle 
Eastern area. 
It should be emphasised that the Group controlled a very large 
number of subsidiaries, of which the undermentioned are only a 
small proportion. 
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Royal Dutch Company for the 
Working of Petroleum in 
the Netherlands East 
Indies (1890): 
Shell Transport and 




Company Ltd. (1907): 
Asiatic Petroleum 
Company Ltd. (1903): 
Roxana Petroleum 
Corporation (1917) 
Shell Company of 
California (1915) 











originally a production, 
refining and marketing company, 
after 1907 it became the 
Netherlands holding company. 
Originally a transport, refining 
and distributing company, it 
became after 1907 the English 
equivalent to the Royal Dutch 
Company, holding shares in the 
proportion of 40/60. 
The Dutch operating company, to 
which was transferred 60% of 
the assets of Shell and Royal 
Dutch. 
The English operating company to 
which was transferred 40% of 
the assets of the Royal Dutch 
and Shell. 
Originally a joint marketing 
company for Shell, Royal Dutch 
and the Rothschilds, it later 
became a production company. 
Companies operating in the 
United States of America. 
Rather than attempt to provide a comprehensive list of Jersey 
Standard subsidiaries, most of which operate solely within the 
United States, underneath will be found a description of the 
American oil companies involved in the Middle East, and their 
most important subsidiaries. 
Standard Oil Company 
(New Jersey) (1882): 
Anglo-American Oil 
Company Ltd. (1888): 
Specialised in refining and 
domestic marketing, though 
later became a vertically 
integrated company. After 1899, 
the central company in the 
Standard Oil combine. 
Importer and marketer of Standard 
Oil in the U.K., with its own 
fleet of tankers. After 1911 
disaffiliated from Jersey 
Standard, but continued to trade 
in their oil. 
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standard Oil Company of 
New York (1882): 
Vacuum Oil Company 
(1860s): 
standard Oil Company 
California :. 
Purchased by s.o. in 
1900. Given name in 
1906. 
The Bahrain Petroleum 
Company Ltd. (1932): 
California Arabian Standard 
Oil Company. (Later 
named the Arabian 
American Oil Company 
after Texas Company 
joined in 1936)(1933): 
The Texas Company (1902): 
Gulf Oil Corporation 
(1907) : 




Until 1911 its major functions were 
refining, transportation, and 
domestic and foreign marketing 
. , 
especlally in the Far East. After 
1911 attempted to integrate 
vertically. 
Originally an independent. Brought 
wi thin the Standard Oil combine 
. , 
lts major functions were refining, 
marketing, and dealing in speciality 
products. After 1931 it combined 
with Socony, and is thereafter 
referred to as the So cony-Vacuum 
Oil Corporation. 
Originally a purely domestic producer, 
but secured concessions in Bahrain 
and Saudi Arabia. 
Canadian subsidiary of Socal and later 
the Texas Company, to operate in 
Bahrain Island. 
Exploration, producing and refining 
in Saudi Arabia. 
Fully integrated independent company, 
with extensive marketing facilities 
abroad. After 1936 gradually 
combined with Socal to form the 
'Caltex' companies for producing 
and marketing outside the United States. 
Fully integrated independent company, 
associated with the Mellon interests. 
Formed by the merger of some of the 
larger field refiners and non-
integrated producers in the 
mid-Continent. Organised by 
Harry F. Sinclair. 
Compiled from Walter Skinner, The Oil and Petroleum Manual (from 
1928 The Oil and Petroleum Year Book) (London, annual, 1918- ); Ralp~ and Muriel Hidy, pioneering in Big Business: The History of 
the Standard nil Company (New Jersey) 1882-1911 (New York, 1~55\: 
and G.S. Gibb and E.H. Knowlton, The Resurgent Years: The Hlstory 
of the Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) 1(111-1927 (New York,l j '6). 
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Appendix II 
Notes on the administration of Middle Eastern policy in the British 
and united states Governments, 1918-1934 
The general organization and administration of international 
relations in the British and American governments is well documented 
and discussed elsewhere, and it is not therefore proposed to provide 
such a general outline here. However, certain specific aspects of 
the structure of Middle Eastern policy administration in both 
governments did influence the process of decision making in the 
matter of oil. The following are seen as particularly significant, 
and will be discussed in more detail below:-
(A) The internal organization of the United states state Department, 
and the nature and size of its Near Eastern Division. 
(B) The state Department's diplomatic and consular representation 
in the Middle East in the interwar period. 
(C) The allocation of departmental responsibility for British 
Middle Eastern policy between the Colonial Gffice, Foreign Office 
and India Office in the years following the First World War. 
Section A: The Department of State, and its Division of Near 
Eastern Affairs 
The political head of the Department of State, and the man 
usually in charge of the foreign policy of the United States of 
America, (depending to large degree upon the will of the President), 
was the Secretary of State. In the direction of general policy he 
was assisted primarily by the Under Secretary of State, who for most 
of this period was the able and widely experienced William Phillips. 
The Assistant Secretaries of State, whose number varied, were 
generally responsible for the direction of administration and 
personnel, but their terms of reference could be altered to meet 
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current needs. In 1933, for example, of the four Assistant 
Secretaries of State, one had specific responsibility for political 
legal questions and another for Latin American questions. 
For the detailed conduct of business, the Department was sub-
divided into a number of divisions, or offices, each under a Chief 
of Division, and, occasionally, an Assistant Chief. The Divisions 
fell into two separate categories, general branches usually 
concerned with general administration and questions of personnel, 
and geographic branches which were largely responsible for the 
evolution of policy and the direction of correspondence relating 
to one particular region. Amongst the former category were the 
Office of the Legal Adviser, the Office of the Economic Adviser, 
the Treaty Division, the Passport Division, the Division of Protocol 
and Conferences, the Office of the Historical Adviser, the Division 
of Current Information (to handle relations with the press), the 
Division of Communications and Records (for indexing, filing, etc., 
etc.), and various other divisions with responsibility for trans-
lation, accounts, visas for foreign service personnel, etc. 
Most of these divisions were, however, primarily concerned 
either with administration or with the provision of specialist 
information for members of the State Department or the Foreign 
Service on matters of law, economics, treaties, history, ~.~. 
The vast majority of correspondence from consular and diplomatic 
posts, or regarding the conduct of foreign policy, was directed in 
the first instance to the relevant geographical division, which was 
usually staffed in part by men with some experience in that particular 
geographical area. These divisions consisted of:-
Latin American Affairs (created 19 November 1909). 
Mexican Affairs (created 28 Jul~r 1915 and ended in 1937). 
Eastern European Affairs (created 13 August 1919 and ended in 1937). 
Far Eastern Affairs (created 20 March 1908). 
Western European Affairs (created 13 December 1909). 
Near Eastern Affairs (created 13 December 1909). 
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It was this last division which, in conjunction with the Office 
of the Economic Adviser, and to some extent the Division of 
Western European Affairs, had responsibility for Middle East oil 
in the interwar years. 
One point which must always be borne in mind when considering 
American foreign policy immediately after the First World War is 
the very recent adoption of a geographical approach to the organi-
zation of state Department business. Before 1908, when the growing 
importance of China had led to the creation of the first geographical 
division, (Far Eastern Affairs), the state Department had been 
somewhat amateurish in approach, and very badly organized. 1 In 
1918, therefore, the Near Eastern Division could draw upon only 
ten years of experience, during most of which period the Near and 
Middle East had been disrupted by war. This must have contributed 
to the apparent lack of any coherent American policy towards the 
Middle East in 1918 (other than the vague expression of 'self-
determination' and an emotionally based support for an independent 
Armenia). 
The Division of Near Eastern Affairs 
Compared with the rest of the geographical divisions of the 
state Department (excepting only that for Mexican Affairs) the 
Near Eastern Division was the smallest in personnel. Particularly 
in the later part of the interwar period, most of the officers 
comprising the Division had spent some time in the Near East (or 
were drafting officers with no consular or diplomatic service), 
but it was far from unusual for a man with no experience whatsoever 
of the Near or Middle East to be assigned to the Division, especially 
1. The Reminiscences of William Phillips (1951), pp.28-35, in the 
Oral History collection of columbia University. 
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in the years immediately following the First World War. Warren 
Robbins, Acting Chief of the Division in 1921, had obtained all 
his experience in Latin America. 
During the 1920s and 1930s, the personnel of the Division 
increased gradually from 3 to 9. This small body of men had to 
supervise and direct the conduct of diplomatic and consular 
relations, both political and economic, with Afghanistan, Albania, 
Bulgaria, Egypt, Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Ethiopia, Greece, Iraq, 
Palestine, Transjordan, Persia, Rumania, Saudi Arabia and the 
other countries of the Arabian Peninsula, Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, 
and Yugoslavia. By 1937 the Division had the added responsibility 
of handling u.S. relations with all of Africa excluding only the 
Union of South Africa and Algeria. 
The Near Eastern Division was far from being the only State 
Department Division to be involved in Middle East oil. Indeed, 
if anyone man were to be described as petroleum expert, it would 
have to be A.C. Millspaugh, of the Office of the Foreign Trade 
Adviser. Not only that Office, but the Office of the Solicitor, 
and the Division of Western European Affairs, took an interest in 
the various facets of the oil situation. Yet because of the size 
and complexity of these various divisions, the Near Eastern Division 
was the only one to be involved as an entity in the consideration 
of policy. As such, therefore, it occupied an important part in 
the conduct of oil diplomacy, particularly in the Persian Gulf 
controversies of the 1930s. 
The smallness of the Near Eastern Division, and the immense 
geographical spread of its area of responsibility, may be, in 
part at least, responsible for some of the aspects of oil policy 
formation discussed in the text; such as the tendency to rely 
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heavily on the interested oil companies for information" 
, the 
role of those companies in initiating, and to a large extent 
determining, the scope and nature of state Department action 
(this is especially true in the case of the Persian Gulf con-
cessions); and the disappointing nature of the state Department 
archives for research into policy formation. 1 Minutes on incoming 
correspondence were few and far between; and memoranda were more 
usually prepared as factual summaries of despatches received to 
date, rather than to express opinion. It is also difficult to 
discern to what extent members of the state Department endorsed 
the views of their diplomats, since occasionally even the most 
outrageously biased reports failed to elicit any reaction in 
Washington. 
This highlights another significant aspect of United states 
diplomacy; that the role of most of the Foreign Service Officers, 
especially in areas of only minor interest to the United States 
(such as the Middle East), was solely that of observer and 
reporter. Few of the American representatives in the Middle East 
played a direct role in policy making, at least whilst serving 
in the field. It was on the basis of their reports, however, 
that many State Department decisions were taken, and it is 
therefore necessary to appreciate the scope of American repre-
sentation in the Middle East. 
Section B: The Representation of the Department of State in the 
Middle East 
In 1918, official American representation in the Near and 
Middle East was in turmoil. Although never at war with Turkey, 
in 1917 the United States had broken off diplomatic relations, 
1. Although this problem was by no means confined to those records 
originating in the Near Eastern Division. 
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and hence had withdrawn the staff of her Embassy and consulates 
in the ottoman Empire. The consulates at Cairo, Aden, and 
Muscat, being outside the Empire, were ff t d 1 una ec e , a though that 
at Muscat was closed down in the course of the war, being almost 
valueless even in peacetime. Persia, being officially neutral, 
also continued diplomatic relations with the United states but , 
the tumultuous conditions in the whole of Persia, particularly 
the North, meant that those United states officials who remained 
in the country had to concentrate on the protection of American 
lives and property. 
Clearly, following the Armistice of Mudros, it was essential 
that the United states should take steps to re-establish her 
missions in a way that was in keeping with the rapidly changing 
circumstances of the post-war years. In general, however, the 
state Department was slow to respond to events, even to the 
establishment of a flourishing American oil industry in the region. 
Following the example of other Powers, the United states in 1919 
appointed a High Commissioner, Admiral Mark Bristol, to look after 
American interests in what had been the ottoman Empire pending the 
resumption of normal diplomatic relations with Turkey, which, in 
the case of the United states, was not until 1927. Initially, the 
High Commission was solely responsible for the entire area of the 
ex-ottoman Empire; this meant that for regions outside the immediate 
environs of Constantinople and Anatolia, such as Iraq, the inforrna-
tion relayed to the Department was sparse, and frequently based on 
rumour and complaint, rather than impartial observation. 
On 23 October 1919 a consul, Thomas Owens, was posted to 
Baghdad. An indication of the unimportance attached to this 
appointment by the Department is that no mention of there being a 
consular post in Iraq was made in the Register of the Department of 
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state until 1921, by which time Addison Southard had just been 
appointed first consul to Jerusalem. Since however the United 
States did not recognize the mandatory regime, nor the con-
tinuance of ottoman rule, in the two countries of Iraq and 
Palestine, it is perhaps hardly surprising that the State 
Department was slow to admit their at least partial recognition 
of the status quo. In the event, the Baghdad and Jerusalem 
consulates were listed in the Register, not under 'Great Britain' 
(as were Egypt and Aden), nor under 'Turkey', but under 'Iraq' 
and 'Palestine' respectively. 
By 1921, therefore, despite the outstanding question of 
recognition by the United States of the new Middle Eastern 
governments, the pattern of consular and diplomatic representation 
there had been established. Constantinople was to remain the 
major political reporting centre. The traditional areas of 
American interests were comparatively well represented; in Egypt, 
with its important missionary and cotton links, by missions at 
Cairo, Alexandria and Port Said; in Persia, by a very small 
diplomatic legation, and consulates in Teheran and, occasionally, 
Bushire and Tabriz, to protect the large number of American 
missionaries and their converts, and the very small amount of 
trade; and in Syria and the Lebanon, traditional centres of 
American educational and humanitarian work in the Middle East, 
by consuls and/or vice consuls in Aleppo, Beirut and Damascus. 
Thus, the periphery of the Middle East (those areas most 
accessible in the past to missionaries and trade) was fairly well 
covered by American diplomats and consuls. Beyond this fringe, 
however, in the areas of British mandatory and protective powers, 
American representation was much sparser. In sum, it amounted to 
consular posts in Jerusalem, Baghdad and Aden, with an occasional 
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consular agent in Basra, less than in the time of the Sublime 
Porte. Rarely did the number of full-time consular officials 
in any of these towns exceed two, at least until the late 1930s, 
when the Jerusalem consulate-general had a staff of five, 
presumably to look after American interests in an area of 
increasing tension. In 1932 foIl . I .. 
, oWlng raql lndependence, the 
consulate in Baghdad was raised to the status of Legation, and 
the consul in charge, A. Sloan, was given the rank of charge until 
such time as he could exchange posts with Paul Knabenshue in 
Jerusalem, who became the United States'first minister resident 
and consul general in Iraq. The new legation had a staff of only 
three Third Secretaries, all of whom doubled as vice-consuls. 
At first sight the almost impossibly large areas assigned to 
each consulate seem absurd, yet during the early 1920s there was 
some justification for this. Other than the diplomatic contro-
versy over Iraqi oil, which concerned the British, not the Iraqi, 
Government, the United States' main interest in the Middle East 
was to protect American citizens and their property. Until oil 
companies actually commenced operations in the Middle East in the 
late 1920s, most of the American citizens were missionaries and 
doctors, engaged in humanitarian work. In cases such as this, 
where no active competition was involved, the British had always 
been willing to protect American interests where possible 7 refusing 
on occasion to permit Americans to proceed into areas of danger 
where they could not guarantee such protection. 1 The prestige and 
power of the British in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian peninsula, 
1. John Randolph (Baghdad) to U.S. Secretary of State, 2 February 
1929, file 890B.00/98, R.G. 59, N.A., M722/7. There were some 
problems relating to such protection i~ 1929 (sicnif~cantly, 
perhaps, at a time when Persian Gulf 011 was the subJect of . 
dispute between Great Britain and the United States), but thls 
small contretemps soon blew over. See 890G.00/documents 99 
and ff., R.G.59, N.A. 
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and after 1918 in Iraq and Palestine, was such that they were 
far more likely to be Successful in t pro ecting American citizens 
than the Americans themselves. Th D 
e epartment of state was, 
therefore, content to keep only a very few men on the ground, in 
order to report upon British activities and local politics, and 
occasionally to offer protection and assistance to Americans. 
The consulate at Baghdad, with official responsibility for Iraq, 
the Arabian peninsula, (in common with the Aden consulate), and 
the Persian Gulf, was able to fulfil its duties quite adequately 
through an occasional trip by one of the consuls to the Persian 
Gulf, usually followed by reports very akin to a travelogue, and 
infrequent correspondence with missionaries scattered throughout 
the 1 area. 
With the corning of the oil concession hunters, this position 
changed. Britons and Americans were now in direct competition; 
and the point at issue was frequently the extent to which diplomatic 
pressure could be brought to bear upon an illiterate Shaikh, 
accustomed to following British advice, and with no American 
representative at his court. The total lack of u.S. representation 
in the Persian Gulf led to the peculiar characteristics of the oil 
negotiations in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, where Frank 
Holmes, as oil company representative, had to exert political 
pressure and persuasion upon the local rulers to counteract that 
of the British diplomatic officials, whilst the united States 
Government had to seek, at a diplomatic level, to obtain promises 
from the British Government that the latter would not use their 
pre-eminent position unfairly.2 Had the American Government been 
1. See, for example, A. Sloan (Baghdad) to the U.S. Secretary of 
State, 23 July 1931, 846B.00/1, R.G.59, N.A., and for earlier 
reports, 890B.00/86t, 841.3390G/-, 1, & 2, 790B.90G/8 and 
166.151/46, R.G.59, N.A. Interest in the Persian Gulf states 
in the early 1920s was virtually non-existent. 
? SQQ Chanter 6. 
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better represented in the Persian Gulf, the dispute might have 
remained on the local level. 
Even with the influx, on a comparatively large scale, of 
American oil drillers, and American oil companies with expensive 
property requiring protection, the state Department did not make 
any attempt to expand its representation in the Arabian peninsula. 
This may have been partly due to the extremely harsh climate of 
the region, but almost certainly, in large part at least, it was 
the result of the atmosphere of increasing financial stringency 
in the early 1930s which made even occasional trips to the Gulf 
by American consuls almost prohibitive. 1 The consul at Baghdad 
was thus almost entirely dependent upon missionary letters and 
the occasional passing visits of oil company men for his reports 
upon the situation in Gulf countries. 2 It might, of course, have 
proved difficult for the United states to obtain the necessary 
British permission to establish a consular post actually in 
Bahrain or Kuwait, but in Muscat or Bushire (Persia), their hands 
would have been free. No steps were taken, however, whilst in 
the case of Saudi Arabia, Socal's importunate pleas that a United 
states Minister be appointed to Jeddah were rejected, on the 
grounds that United States interests were insufficient to warrant 
3 such a move, until immediately prior to the Second World War. 
The United States thus moved into an era of vital oil interests 
with representation but little changed from that of the pre 1914 era. 
1. A trip by Paul Knabenshue was finally authorized in 1934, but 
for the great discussion that preceded this see the various 
documents on 711.90A2/23, R.G.59, N.A. 
2. 
3. 
See various correspondence in the bound files of the Iraq 
Legation. Confidential Correspondence of the American 
Legation in Baghdad, 1933, Baghdad, Vol.I, R.G.84, N.A. 
See also files 846B.6363 and 890B.6363, R.G.59, N.A. 
See files 890F.00, 890F.001, 890F.01, and 124.90B/1, R.G.59, N.A. 
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It may thus be surmised that the nature of United states 
consular and diplomatic representation in the Middle East was 
probably an important factor in the United states' Government's 
decision to pursue oil questions directly with the British 
Government rather than through local rulers, especially in the 
case of the Persian Gulf states. 
section C: The Allocation of Departmental Responsibility for 
British Middle Eastern Policy 
Great Britain had in 1914 a well established and compre-
hensive network of Embassies and Consulates throughout the Middle 
East, supplemented by the Government of India's system of Political 
Residents and Political Agents operating in 'spheres of influence' 
(such as the Persian Gulf). The India Office and the Eastern 
Department of the Foreign Office had, in addition, a long tradition 
of, and experience in, policy formation and implementation in the 
Near and Middle East. It is not, therefore, proposed to examine 
the nature, size and organization of Whitehall administration. 
However, a new structure of departmental responsibility was made 
necessary after 1918, in order to respond to the breakup of the 
Ottoman Empire, and Britain's assumption of the mandatory role in 
Iraq and Palestine. This was to lead to the formation of a new 
'Middle East Department' within the Colonial Office on 1 March 1921, 
and that Office's assumption, for the first time, of responsibilities 
within the Middle East region. This was to be of great significance 
in the history of Middle Eastern oil, and Anglo-American diplomatic 
disputes concerning it. 
Responsibility for British policy in the Middle East before 
1914 had traditionally been divided between the Foreign Office, 
whose interest lay in conducting H.M. Government's relations with 
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the ottoman Empire and Persia, and in safeguarding the Red Sea 
and the Suez Canal; and the Government of India, which exercised 
a virtual protectorate over the internationally insi~Lificant 
Arabian littoral of the Persian Gulf, through the Political 
Resident at Bushire and his Political Agents. 
While the fluid situation created in the Arabian peninsula 
and 'Turkey in Asia' following the Sublime Porte's declaration 
of war in November 1914 did not change this traditional alignment 
of responsibility, it rapidly revealed its incompatibility with 
the new Middle East. In an attempt to dominate the future rulers 
of Arabia, the Foreign Office, through the High Commission and 
the Arab Bureau in Cairo, supported the Arab Revolt and the 
concept of a post-war Sharifian (or Hashemite) 'Arab State, whilst 
the Government of India and the India Office subsidized Sharif 
Hussain's traditional rival, Ibn Saud. An added complication was 
the entry of the War Office into the region, with not only the 
Imperial forces in the Middle East, but also the military adminis-
tration of Occupied Enemy Territory, under its direct command. 
By 1918, all three departments were immediately responsible for 
the administration of ex-Ottoman territory. The Foreign Office 
continued to run Egypt, by now a protectorate, whilst the military 
administration of Palestine and Syria at the end of the war was 
under War Office direction. The India Office, meanwhile, through 
an imported Anglo-Indian bureaucracy, had controlled the Mesopotamian 
region since the capture of the Basra vilayet in 1914. 
The lack of any coherent direction in the Middle East was 
paralleled in London, where no single department was responsible 
for overall Middle Eastern policy. As a result of this prolifer-
ation of authorities, Great Britain emerged in 1918 with a number 
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of conflicting cOmmitments,1 the impact of whl'ch 
was to bedevil 
British policy in the Middle East throughout the . t ln erwar period. 
However, although it was already apparent in 1918 that central 
direction of Middle Eastern affairs was required from Whitehall, 
the Government continued to let the matter drift, probably in 
part because no single department was immediately suitable for 
the multifarious skills of administration, strategy and diplomacy 
that were required. The Foreign Office, War Office and India 
Office/Government of India, therefore, all continued with their 
separate policies. Clearly, in this confused sitUation, rival 
jurisdictions prohibited a coherent and consistent policy, and 
as a consequence embarrassing mistakes, of the kind which were 
to exacerbate the diplomatic problem of oil,2 could and did occur. 
By 1920, frustration at the delay and uncertainty surrounding 
the allocation and implementation of the mandates was demonstrated 
in outbreaks of violence throughout the Middle East, 3 whilst 
demands grew amongst sections of the British press for reduced 
expenditure in the Middle East, if not total withdrawal of all 
4 British troops. Meanwhile, by the San Remo Agreement of April 
1920, the mandates, albeit not ratified by the League of Nations, 
1. Notably the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, the Balfour 
Declaration of 1917, and the promises made to the Arabs in 
the bewildering and ambiguous MCMahon-Hussain correspondence. 
See Chapter 1. 
2. See Chapters 2 and 4. 
3. On 8 March 1920 the General Syrian Congress proclaimed the 
independence of Syria (including Palestine), and named Faisal 
King of Syria and his brother, Abdullah, King of Iraq. In 
April Arab attacks on Jews in Jerusalem created an explosive situa~on and after a long period of political unrest, by May 
an uprisi~g had begun in Iraq. See an excellent summary in 
'Report by the High Commissioner on the Development of Iraq 
1920-5' Confidential Print, Middle East No. 11, C.O.935/1, 
and 'A~ual Report of the Civil Administration in Palestine 
1920-1', enclosed in High Commissioner, Palestine to Secretary 
of State for the Colonies, 30 July 1921, C.O. 733/4/411441. 
4. Mejcher, Imperial Quest, pp.71-74. 
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had been allocated between Britain and France, and the British 
area of responsibility delimited. In this unsettled atmosphere, 
the Cabinet debate on a new structure of Whl"tehall 
responsibility 
began, but was plagued by disagreement between the departments 
involved, so that it was not until 31 December 1920 that a 
decision was finally taken that the Colonial Office should be 
responsible for the administration of the mandatory t t erri ories, 
the details of timetable and procedure to be worked out by an 
interdepartmental committee. 1 
As the decision stood, however, division of control would 
still have been endemic, with the Colonial Office responsible for 
Iraq and Palestine, the Foreign Office for Egypt, and relations 
with Persia, Turkey, Syria and the Hejaz, and the Government of 
India and the India Office for the Arabian peninsula, including 
relations with Ibn Saud and the Gulf protectorates. This problem 
clearly exercised the interdepartmental committee, appointed by 
the Prime Minister on 11 January 1921, and headed by Sir James 
Mas terton-Smith, later Permanent Under-Secretary of the Colonial 
Office. In their report, submitted to Winston Churchill on 
2 1 February 1921, they argued strongly that the new department 
should, subject to certain qualifications regarding the Kingdom 
of Hejaz, formulate policy for the whole of the Arabian peninsula. 
However, for financial reasons, they did not suggest any alterations 
in the system whereby policy toward the Arabian peninsula was 
conducted through the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, and 
his Political Agents; they were to be appointed as before by the 
1. For the Cabinet debate, see C.P.320, CAB 24/106, C.P.1402 and 
1434, CAB 24/107, C.P.1512, CAB 24/108 and Cabinet Conclusions, 
82nd Meeting, 31 December 1920, 4(a)(c)(d), CAB 23/23; Klieman, 
pp.87-90; and Helmut Mejcher, 'British Middle East Policy -
the Interdepartmental level 1917-1921', Journal of Contemporary 
History, 8 (London, 1973), pp.81-101. 
2. The report is given verbatim in Appendix I of Middle East No.1, 
C.O.935/1. See also various papers on the report, C.O.732/3/8389. 
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Government of India, but were to communicate directly with the 
Colonial Office on matters affecting the Arabian littoral. 
Henceforth, the control of the Government of India was to be 
confined to administrative and purely local matters, with the 
prior concurrence of the Colonial Office being obtained to 
anything of political significance, whilst the Colonial Office 
was to conduct all His Majesty's Government's relations with 
Ibn Saud. 
In summary, therefore, the Masterton-Smith committee recom-
mended that the Colonial Office should be responsible for both 
administration and policy in Iraq and Palestine; policy in other 
Arab areas within the British sphere of influence; the delimitation 
of boundaries between British mandates and the territories of 
independent Arab rulers; and accountability for all Imperial 
civil and military expenditure in the Middle East. Despite the 
protests of Lord Curzon, the Cabinet approved the report in 
principle,1 and on 1 March 1921 the new Middle East Department 
of the Colonial Office took up its new responsibilities. 
However, despite this wide assumption of responsibility, the 
Colonial Office was to remain critically dependent upon other 
Whitehall departments for vital information. The Eastern Depart-
ment of the Foreign Office retained considerable responsibility 
for Middle Eastern policy, conducting all relations with Syria, 
Persia, Egypt and Turkey, not to mention diplomatic controversies 
relating to the mandated territories themselves. 2 The Government 
of India, moreover, continued to administer Aden (as opposed to 
1. 
2. 
CQDclusions of a meeting held on 14 February 1921, Cab 7(21), 
attached to c.o. 732/3/8389. 
The Colonial Office handed over responsibility for relations 
with Iraq to the Foreign Office in 1932, whilst Transjordan 
and Palestine obtained independence in 1946 and 1948 respectively. 
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the Aden Protectorate), and appointed the British representatives 
in the Persian Gulf through h th 1 w om e Colonial Office worked. 
Unlike normal Colonial Off· t· lce prac lce, therefore, where consul-
tation with other home departments was k t t ep 0 a minimum, on the 
Middle East frequent interdepartmental communication was necessary, 
both on an informal level and, after 1930, through the Middle East 
Official Sub Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence. 
Meanwhile, within the Colonial Office, the Cabinet decision 
necessitated major changes, in particular the formation of an 
entirely new 'Middle East Department', under an Assistant Under-
Secretary, and staffed by officials drawn largely from other 
Whitehall departments, or with experience of the administration 
of Occupied Enemy Territory. Many of these officials were, 
however, only 'temporarily seconded' from their original departments, 
in order to emphasize the temporary nature of the new department, 
2 
and its limited personnel. This original staff represented an 
impressive range of talents and disciplines, many with first hand 
experience of the wartime Middle East. 3 However, the remarkable 
concentration within the department of men with detailed knowledge 
and experience of the area for which they were responsible was a 
rare quality in the interwar Colonial Office, and tended to die 
out even within the Middle East Department after 1924, from which 
date most of its staff were drawn from the permanent officials of 
the Colonial Office. It is possible that this bias towards colonial, 
rather than Middle Eastern, experience was partly responsible for 
the rigid attitude taken by the colonial Office towards American 
participation in the oil industry of the Persian Gulf. 
1. On 1 January 1934 the India Office resumed responsibility for 
the Persian Gulf states. 
2. See the various papers on C.O.732/3/9439. 'Temporarily seconded' 
officials included J.E. Shuck burgh (India Office), H.W. Young 
(Foreign Office), and R.V. Vernon (Treasury). 
3. Such as H.W. Young, R.W. Bullard, S.M. Campbell, G.L.M. Clauson, 
Lieutenant- olonel R. Meinertzhagen, and T.E. Lawrence. 
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Appendix III: The World Oil Industry 1918-1935 
The interwar years were a time of rapid change and development 
for the major oil companies, a new era for the oil industry having 
been inaugurated by the First World War. The vastly increased 
consumption of oil products, and the growing realization amongst 
the governments of the world that petroleum was of vast strategic, 
as well as economic significance, gave the major mUltinational 
companies a new role, and importance. In the years which followed, 
a dramatic rise in production, made possible both by the vast new 
oilfields discovered throughout the world, and by greatly improved 
scientific knowledge and method, changed the oil industry signifi-
cantly. In 1934, Sir Henri Deterding could look back on his early 
days with the Royal Dutch in 1896, and call it 'a world vastly 
1 different and, indeed, unrecognisable from the oil world of today'. 
The period under review in this appendix can be divided roughly 
into three. The first era, from 1918-1921, was a time of rapidly 
increasing demand for oil products, coupled with the possibility of 
a shortage of crude oil with which to meet it. The main problems 
were therefore ones of finding new sources of production, if possible 
near existing markets, and of developing a modern technology to meet 
the changing pattern of demand. The second period, from 1922 to 
1932, is dominated by the chronic overproduction which afflicted 
the United States oil industry, and its inevitable world wide effects, 
such as falling prices, cut throat competition, and price wars. 
Gradually, however, in the years after the depression, a new era 
began, dominated by static, if not falling demand, in which the 
oil companies and western governments, realising the inevitable 
consequences of competition, moved slowly but firmly towards a 
comprehensive policy of co-operation, both national and international. 
1. Sir Henri Deterding (as told to Sir Stanley Naylor), An Inter-
national Oilman (London, 1934), (hereafter Deterding), ~.~0. 
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Oil company policy in the interwar 0 perlod, however, not only 
responded to the particular stimulus of the crucial balance between 
supply and demand; it also still took into account factors first 
apparent before 1914. Different though the post-war oil industry 
was from its pre-war antecedents, it is vital to understand some-
thing of the inherited problems which faced the major companies, 
and how these problems - and, indeed, these companies _ had developed. 
The oil industry in 1919 was still comparatively young; it had 
been instituted by the first successful drilling of an oil well in 
Titusville, Pennsylvania, by Colonel E.H. Drake, on 28 August 1859. 1 
Although initially, in the mining boom which followed, small firms 
had proliferated, lack of capital and chaotic business conditions 
d f th t f b 0 2 hOI th rove many 0 em ou 0 uSlness, w l st e more successful 
inaugurated a drive towards co-operation and consolidation. The 
most well known of these, the Standard Oil combination led by 
John D. Rockefeller, had by the 1870s established a firm hold on 
the transportation and refining of crude oil, and hence the export 
of refined products, that was not to be challenged on a large scale, 




Petroleum had, of course, been known (through surface seepage) 
and used since antiquity, but with the decision to seek it by 
the drilling of wells, it became possible to obtain it in 
large enough amounts to support commercial exploitation. For 
an account of the circumstances leading up to the first drilling 
of a well specifically to find oil, see Harold F. Williamson 
and Arnold P. Daum, The American Petroleum Industry: The Age 
of Illumination 1859-1899 (Evanston, 1959), (hereafter Williamson 
and Daum, The Age of Illumination); pp.63-80; and Paul H. 
Giddens, The Early Petroleum Industry (New York, 1938), 
(hereafter Giddens),pp.30-61. 
Ibid., pp.62-196; and Williamson and Daum, The Age of 
Illumination, pp.79-114. 
Allan Nevins Study in Power: John D. Rockefeller, Industrialist 
and Philanth;opist 2 vols. (New York, 1953), (hereafh'l~ Nev: ns \, 
I, pp.77-94; Ralph and Muriel Hidy, Pioneerina in cia Business: 
The History of Standard Oil Company (New Jersey)1S82-1 Cl 11 
(New York, 1955), (hereafter Hidy and Hidy), pp.9-40: and 
Williamson and Daum The Age of Illumination, pp.343-368 and ff. 
A useful discussion'of Standard Oil policy and its implications 
be found in P.H. Frankel, Essentials of Petroleum: A ",oJ to --------~~~~~~ 
Oil Econorru: s (2nd edition London, ~l" C:" I • 
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Once refined into kerosene~(paraffin), the primary use of 
"I "11" 1 Ol was as an l UIDlnant. However, the domestic market was 
quickly saturated by the flush production of the early 1860s,2 
and from as early as 1861 export of both crude and refined oil 
became a vital part of the American oil industry. As production 
rose dramatically in the train of speculative booms and wild-
catting,3 so did the export drive, until in 1866 exports exceeded 
domestic consumption for the first time. 4 Apart from the Scottish 
shale industry, the American oil exporters faced no real compe-
tition, and soon their trade was world wide, although concentrated 
largely in Europe. With no control over the rate of production, 
Standard Oil developed the policy which it was to maintain through-
out the pre-war period, of using the export ma~ket as a means of 
balancing supply and demand within the United States (the major 
consumer of oil products), rather than attempting to regulate 
production in the United States itself. 
In 1883, however, the completion of the Baku-Batum railway 
gave the ten year old Russian petroleum industry an outlet on to 
the Black Sea, enabling it to challenge what had by now become 




Estimates of production in 1860 vary between 200,000 barrels 
and 500 000 barrels. By 1861, this had reached 2 million 
barrels: by 1862 approximately 3 million barrels. Williamson 
and Daum, The Age of Illumination, pp.103 and 117. 
In 1870-1 production surpassed 5 million barrels, by ~873"it 
reached nearly 10 million. Ibid., p.117. The dramatlc rlses 
in production of the 1860s and 1870s, and cons~qu~nt falls in 
prices were to become characteristic of the oll lndustry. 
Ibid., 'PP.135-163; and Giddens, pp.75-83. For a history of 
the domestic oil industry before 1914, see John Ise, The 
United states Oil Policy (New Haven, 1928), (hereafter Ise), 
pp.1-105 and passim. 
Williamson and Daum, The Age of Illumination, Table 13.1, p.322. 
Table 13.2, p.325 and Table 13.5, r· 3?? 
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the Standard Oil monopoly in the Far East and Europe. 1 At first 
the American company seemed able to meet the competition through 
a judicious mixture of co-operation and aggressive marketing 
techniques,2 following its usual policy of making agreements with 
the Russians when its supply of oil was short, and engaging in 
price cutting wars at times of overproduction in the United States. 
In 1888, however, the year in which the proportion of world oil 
produced by the United States sank to 53%, the company abandoned 
its traditional method of marketing through foreign agents who 
bought oil in the United States, and began instead to form foreign 
affiliates, before taking, for the first time, a more direct part 
3 in the export trade. 
In the 1890s the threat to Standard Oil supremacy was increased 
when two new companies emerged. Marcus Samuel, through the latter 
4 
day Shell, was able to launch a powerful attack upon the virtual 
Standard Oil monopoly in the Far East, through use of low cost 
5 
bulk transport. In 1890, meanwhile, a new company was formed in 
6 Holland, the Royal Dutch, which commenced production in the Dutch 







Ibid., pp.632-663. In 1899, Russia produced 51.9% of the 
world's oil. Nevins, II, pp.96-128. 
Hidy and Hidy, p.130. 
Ibid., pp.144-154. 
The Shell Transport and Trading Company did not operate.under 
that name until 1897. Before this, it was merely an adJunct 
of the general business of Marcus Samuel & Co., operated 
through the Tank Syndicate, and acted as a.transport an~ 
trading company for Rothschild's Russian o~l. For detalls, 
see Robert Henriques, Marcus Samuel, 1st VlSCOunt Bearsted: 
Founder of 'Shell Transport and Trading Company' 12 l !';'i 
(London, 1960), (hereafter Henriques). 
Ibid., pp.81-122. 
The full name was The Royal Dutch Company for the Working of 
Petroleum Wells in the Netherlands Indies. 
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the Company was able to undersell the Standard Oil Company, which 
was forced to recognize the undoubted d t 
a van ages of local pro-
duction.
1 
The Royal Dutch from the start followed the antithesis 
of Standard Oil policy, laying stress on producing its own oil, 
and above all relying on co-operation and merger rather than 
ruthless competition and take overs. 2 Despite attempts by the 
Standard Oil Company to buy both these ° 3 companles, they continued 
to prosper, and in the first decade of the twentieth century, the 
two companies combined, first informally through the Asiatic 
Petroleum Company, and then through the Royal Dutch-Shell network 
f b ° dO ° 4 o SU Sl 1ary compan1es. This continued to challenge Standard 
Oil on a wider scale, by a dynamic policy of expansion outside the 
\. 
Far East, into Europe, the Middle East, South America, and, even, 
into the traditional Standard Oil stronghold, the United States. 5 
By 1914, Deterding controlled virtually a world-wide organi-
sation, ensuring that he had local production wherever possible 
to supply any new markets. Attempts by Standard Oil to follow 
Deterding's policy of widespread production, in part as a conse-
quence of fear of an impending shortage of oil in the United 
States, were unsuccessful except in Roumania; whilst the discovery 





Hidy and Hidy, pp.261-268o 
For a discussion of Deterding's views and Royal Dutch policy, 
see Deterding, pp.45-79; P.H. Frankel, op.cit., pp.89-95; 
and Dr. F.C. Gerretson, History of the Royal Dutch, 4 vols., 
(Leiden, 1958), (hereafter Gerretson). 
Henriques, pp.140-3, 178-83, and 364-373; Gerretson, I, 
pp.280-286, and II, pp.40-79; and Hidy and Hidy, pp.263-265 & 502. 
In 1907, the alliance between Royal Dutch and Shell was turned 
into an amalgamation. Henriques, pp.306-495. 
5. Gerretson, III and IV; Deterding, pp.79-89 and 95-102: and 
Kendall Beaton, Enterprise in Oil: A History of Shell in the 
United States (New York, 1957), pp.56-14S, and passim. 
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1901 reinforced still further the Standard 'I 01 policy of relying 
almost entirely on American produced oil. 1 
By 1914, therefore, Royal Dutch-SheIl's world-wide organisation, 
based as far as possible upon the 'straight line',2 and Standard 
Oil's continuing reliance upon American production, together with 
its treatment of the export market as an adjunct of the domestic 
one, were already established patterns; patterns that were to 
play an important part in the companies' attitudes after 1919. 
Moreover, the first fifteen years of the twentieth century also 
witnessed several developments which were intensified after 1918, 
and were to prove crucial to the oil industry in the long term. 
Undoubtedly, the change in the pattern of demand was the most far 
reaching. After 1908, consumption of kerosene, hitherto petroleum's 
most important refined product, declined due to the competition of 
gas and electricity; however, the period after 1899 was to see 
the rapid growth of automobiles,3 particularly after their manu-
facture was revolutionized by Ford's application of mass production 
techniques to his Model T car. 4 This was to increase substantially 
demand for a hitherto little used fraction, gasoline. Oil fired 
1. Hidy and Hidy, pp.261-8 and 494-529. See also H.F. Williamson 
et.al., The American Petroleum Industry: The Age of Energy 
(Evanston, 1963), (hereafter Williamson et.al., The Age of 
Energy), pp.15-28. 
2. That is, that the company should perform as many as possible 
of the functions involved in the finding and producing of oil, 
and all subsequent operations up to its reaching the consumer, 
with the minimum of delay, implying that it must try to sell, 
insofar as was possible, in the markets nearest to its oil 
producing fields. Deterding, pp.49-52. 
3. For registrations of automobiles in the United States, by far 
the main market, and consumption of gasoline, see Bureau of 
the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States: 
Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington, 1960), p.462. 
4. Allan Nevins, Ford: The Times, the Man, the Company (New 
York, 1954). 
- 383 -
ships, which had immense strategic advantages,1 although little 
used in the world merchant marine, 2 became an important factor 
in the naval policies of many world governments. With the arrival 
of the industry in what has been called its 'age of energy',3 
new sources of demand had opened up which seemed to offer far 
more scope for the expansion of the oil business. 
Concurrently with the rapid growth in demand, new and important 
areas of production began to be discovered, offering great promise 
of ample future supplies. In 1901, the famous 'Spindletop Gusher' 
opened the massive Texas field, whilst the discovery of other new 
fields in Kansas, Cleveland, Oklahoma and California removed, at 
least in the short term, threats of a shortage of crude oil in the 
United states. Meanwhile, two entirely new regions were opened up 
for oil exploitation. 
The success of the D'Arcy concession in Persia, which was 
exploited after 1909 by the newly organised AnglO-Persian Oil 
Company Ltd. 4 demonstrated the importance of the Middle East as 
an oil producing region, although the obstruction of the Ottoman 
Government towards the would be concessionaires in Asiatic Turkey 
hindered its development. In 1901, moreover, Mexico gradually 
emerged as an oil region; a scramble developed amongst the oil 
companies for concessions in South America, which was regarded as 
the most promising area for new exploitation. The production of 
crude oil was becoming truly world-wide. 
1. For a summary of the reasons in favour of oil-fired ships, see 
Winston Churchill, The World Crisis, 5 vols., (London, 1923-




In 1919 of the entire world merchant marine, only 12.7% was 
, . I 
oil burning, either through steam or diese • 
Williamson et.al., The Age of Energy. 
The text of the concession can be found in Hurewitz, I, pp.249-25 1 • 
See also Stocking, pp.3-11; Mikdashi, pp.9-15; Longrigg, Oil, 
nn_14-18: and Longhurst, pp.17-20. 
- 384 -
In 1911, another event which was to have important reper-
cussions in determining company policy after 1918 took place. 
With the dissolution of the Standard Oil combine in that year,1 
the Standard Oil Company (New Jersey), although still the largest 
oil company in the United State~found itself left with heavy 
refining capacity, but very little producing or marketing ability, 
and thus very much dependent on independents. This led to a 
widespread search for company controlled prodUction, both at home 
2 
and abroad, to supply its massive refineries and meet its heavy 
world-wide marketing commitments. In view of the dynamic expansionist 
policy of Royal Dutch-Shell, conflict was inevitable; whilst in 
the United states the growing strength of the independents, and 
indeed the now dissolved Standard Oil companies, meant Jersey 
Standard now faced increasing challenge in its hitherto invul-
nerable stronghold. 
The outlook in 1914 was one of dynamism and expansion, both 
in demand and in company growth. Moreover, adequate supplies 
seemed secure, as new areas of potential production opened in 
South America and the Middle East, and new fields were discovered 
in the United States. Over-production, which was to pose such a 
serious problem to the oil industry in the 1920s, had been prevalent 
1. See Hidy and Hidy, pp.709-13; and Nevins, II, pp.356-387. 
2. A.S. Gibb and E.H. Knowlton, The Resurgent Years: The History 
of Standard Oil (New Jersey) 1911-1927 (New York, 1956), 
(hereafter Gibb and Knowlton), pp.76-108. Without government 
aid however coupled with being late in the field, the com~any was ~nsuccessful in Mexico, and met with very little 
success in the Dutch East Indies and Peru. Even after 7 years, 
in 1918, Jersey Standard produced less than 25% of the crude 
oil it processed. 
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in the United states throughout the previous 50 years;1 but 
whilst it did have some impact, demonstrated by bitter price 
wars of the 1890s and 1900s, as Standard Oil fought to find a 
market for surplus United States oil, American over-production 
had not the wide repercussions that it was to have in the interwar 
years. Nevertheless it did serve to emphasise the advantages of 
foreign production, where a field could be controlled by one 
company, and operated according to market demand, a policy the 
Anglo-Persian was following successfully in Persia. Royal Dutch-
Shell had already secured world-wide production to serve their 
marketing needs; but the lack of success distinguishing Standard 
Oil's attempts to obtain foreign production did not bode well for 
them in the future. With a pattern of bitter competition between 
two massive companies, Jersey Standard and Royal Dutch-Shell, and 
a new company, AnglO-Persian, still largely unproved but with the 
unique distinction of being controlled by the British Government, 
the stage was set for the interwar years; and the dynamism that 
the first 14 years of the century had demonstrated was to be 
greatly accelerated by the First World War, and was to lead, in 
the post-war period, to a situation of overgrowth. 
Although Lord Curzon's famous statement that 'The Allies 
floated to victory on a sea of oil',2 may be somewhat exaggerated, 
there can be no doubt that the First World War had a dramatic 
and long lasting effect upon the oil industry. The leading British 
petroleum newspaper stated that 'without a doubt the late war 
1. For the reasons leading to overproduction, see Note A at the 
end of this Appendix. 
2. Longhurst, p.54. 
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raised petroleum to a much higher level than it had occupied 
.1 1 preVlOUS y', and this is clearly apparent from the dramatic rise 
in imports of petroleum products into the United Kingdom during 
2 the war years. 
Despite the British Government's investment in the Anglo-
Persian Oil Company in 1914, supposedly to ensure a guaranteed 
source of supply for the British Navy, 3 it nonetheless found 
itself increasingly reliant upon the multinational companies which 
hitherto it had castigated as being foreign and hence unreliable. 
Although AnglO-Persian was to increase its output greatly in the 
war years,4 it could not possibly hope to fulfil all the needs 
of the British Admiralty;5 moreover the larger distance from 
Persia to the United Kingdom offset what were seen as the dis-
advantages of depending upon American oil. 
Despite its designation as 'foreign', the Royal Dutch-Shell 






'The Petroleum Industry's Growing Importance: A Retrospect 
of 1919', 10 January 1920, Petroleum Times III (1920), p.35. 
Great Britain's purchases of petroleum fuel oil rose from 
48 million gallons (approximately 1.37 million barrels) in 
1912 to 842,356,800 gallons in 1918 (approximately 24.07 
million barrels), the vast majority of which came from the 
United states and Mexico. 'Sources of Supplies of Petroleum', 
29 March 1919, The Economist LXXXVIII, p.513; and Petroleum 
Times I (1919), p.5. 
Marion Jack, 'The Purchase of the British Government's Shares 
in the British Petroleum Company, 1912-14', Past and Present 
39 (1968), pp.139-168; and Chapter 1 above. 
In the year ended 31 March 1914 Anglo-Pe~sian produced . 
273,635 long tons (1,915,445 barrels); In the year endlng 
31 March 1919 this figure had risen to 1,106,415 long tons 
(7,744,905 barrels). These figures of course refer to crude 
oil. Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Our Industry (2nd edn., 
London, 1949), p.343. 
By 1918, the imports of fuel oil, most of which went to the 
Admiralty, were over 24 million barrels. 
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during the war years. Its British subsidiary, Anglo-Saxon, 
behaved, according to Henriques, like 'a government service •••• 
with the interests of its shareholders totally subordinated to 
1 those of the Armed Forces'. Its ff t . d d e or s were In ee great; 
voluntarily relinquishing its fleet of tankers to the Admiralty 
at pre-war charter rates, it then willingly exceeded its con-
tractual obligations at great cost to itself. However, even the 
efforts of Shell were insufficient to meet the growing demands 
of the Allies, and American oil became of increased importance. 
Although the Americans were initially angered by British seizure 
of their tankers, many of these were soon released to carryon 
the vital petroleum trade, which was to be greatly stimulated by 
2 
the war demand. Although sales of kerosene declined, exports of 
fuel oil by American companies rose by over 130 per cent, and of 
gasoline by over 220 per cent, in the years up to 1917. With the 
declaration of war on Germany by the United States, supplies by 
American companies to the Allies became of increasing importance, 
especially since the declaration in April 1917 coincided with a 
time of grave shortage of fuel oil in the Allied countries, which 
threatened the immobilization of the British Grand Fleet. 3 Acting 
1. R. Henriques, Sir Robert Waley Cohen 1877-1952 (London, 1966), 
p.185. For a (possibly overfavourable) account of the part 
played by Shell in the war, see ibid., pp.184-243, and 
Henriques, Marcus Samuel, pp.591-677. Cohen and Henri Deterding 
were knighted after the war for their services, whilst in June 
1921, Sir Marcus Samuel was given a peerage. 
2. For the increase in 
see Table A below. 
oil industry during 
Energy, pp.261-294; 
exports and production during the war years, 
For a discussion of the role of the American 
the war, see Williamson et.al., The Age of 
and Gibb and Knowlton, pp.221-245. 
Ib "d 224-5 and Williamson et.al., The Age of Energy, 3. l., pp. ; __ 
p.272. 
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in co-operation with the United states federal government,1 the 
American industry stepped up production, so that in the years 
1917 and 1918, according to Williamson, they supplied 'the bulk 
of the petroleum needs of the Allies and the United states 
military and naval forces',2 even altering their manufacturing 
procedures in the large East Coast refineries in order to supply 
the high grade fuel oil demanded by the British Admiralty.3 
However, inter-company rivalries continued, especially over trade 
with the Far East. 4 
The 1914-18 war can be seen as an important turning point 
in the history of the oil industry. Its most important effect was 
to involve national governments to a far greater degree in what 
had hitherto largely been regarded as a purely commercial under-
taking. Above all, the war had brought to the realization of the 
governments of the world the vital necessity of oil products as a 
strategic resource. The trend already observable before the war 
in Great Britain, Germany and the Netherlands, for governments to 
protect what oil reserves they possessed, and support their 
nationals in the search for oil reserves abroad, was to be 
1. This co-operation initiated a new era in company/government 
relations. In March 1917, an advisory committee on petroleum 
was set up under the Council of National Defence, which was 
composed of oil businessmen, and helped organize allocations, 
production, etc. In July 1917 this was replaced by the 
National Petroleum War Service Committee, whilst the government 
in January 1918 set up the Oil Division in the Fuel Adminis-
tration. Gibb and Knowlton, pp.238-243; and G.D. Nash, 
United States Oil Policy 1890-1964 (Pittsburgh, 1968), (hereafter 
Nash), pp.24-28. 
2. Williamson et.al., The Age of Energy, ~.268. The America? oil 
was especially necessary since the Allles could not get Ol~ 
from Roumania, Galicia, or through the Black Sea from Russla. 
3. Gibb and Knowlton, p.225. 
4 Ib 'd P 274-276" and Williamson et.al., The Age of Enerc ', , . l., p. , 
pp. 276-279. 
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intensified and expanded. Franc t b t 
e, 00, egan 0 take a more 
aggressive attitude towards oil policy, whilst Great Britain 
had been shown that, in wartime, not even control of Persian 
oil could free her from dependence on American oil supplies. 
Meanwhile, in the United states, producers who had stepped up 
and co-ordinated production to meet Allied demands, had improved 
their image at home and abroad. In both countries, the close 
co-operation between government and businessmen, and indeed between 
the businessmen themselves, led to the continuation of informal 
assistance after the war, and increased understanding of the oil 
industry's problems among the bureaucracy of both nations. 
This government aid served to intensify an already frenetic 
struggle among the multinational companies to find new sources of 
production. Although the industry faced another rapid fluctuation 
in marketing demand, as the massive Allied war machine began to 
be dismantled, few oilmen saw the future in anything but rosy 
terms. Demand was rising, and seemed likely to continue to rise, 
as, freed from the restrictions of the war, private motoring 
1 
expanded. The conversion of marine transport to oil seemed likely 
to provide another lucrative market,2 whilst experiments in oil-
fired locomotives also promised well for the industry. All these 
developments seemed the more likely as coal production in the 
United Kingdom fell, and both the United Kingdom and the United 
states were faced with industrial troubles in the coal sector. 3 
The oil press was ebullient, reflecting clearly the optimism 




Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United 
States: Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington, 1960), p.462. 
In 1919 only 12.7% of the world merchant marine was oil 
burnlng, by 1921 this figure had risen to 23.9% and by 1929 
39.2%. Williamson et.al., The Age of Energy, p.455. 
See, for example, the editorial on 26 July 1920, Petroleum 
Times II, pp.101-2. 
------ ------------, 
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Petroleum Times in the early part of 1919 forecast an unprecedented 
boom in oil to meet the greatly increased world-wide demand, 
referring as late as 10 January 1920 to the potential of 'an almost 
limitless expansion of the industry,.1 To satisfy this massive 
demand, however, massive reserves of crude were essential. 
Immediately after the war, the outlook for production did not 
appear too gloomy, since belief was widespread that Bolshevism 
in Russia was a passing phenomenon, and would soon be OVercome 
by the British forces in the Baku area. 2 Meanwhile, optimistic 
reports as to the rapidity with which Roumanian fields, damaged 
during the war, could reopen were received. As a consequence, 
there was a speCUlative boom in oil shares on the London Stock 
Market. 
By mid 1920, however, the feeling of ebullience in the post 
war boom had faded, although the desperate search for new sources 
of production which it had begun continued. Never again during 
the interwar period was the oil industry to be without some major 
problem. The new feeling of anxiety within the industry was 
caused by two developments; the commercial depression of 1920 
not only had its effect on the sale of oil products but, coupled 
with the inevitable reaction after the frenzy of 1919, also 
depressed oil shares. 3 Meanwhile, the United States, having borne 
the brunt of world supply for 60 years, was now facing reports of 
1. Petroleum Times III, p.33; see also articles in February and 
October 1919, Petroleum Times I, p.87 and II, pp.349-50. 
2. See for example a report on 7 February 1920 of a possible 
Bolshevik takeover of the Grozny fields, suggesting only 
that the Reds might 'hold temporary sway there'. Petroleum 
Times III, pp.135-6. 
3. 29 January 1921, The Economist XCII, p.166. 
- 391 -
a very rapid exhaustion of its reserves. 1 The outcry that 
American oilfields would soon be exhausted reached its peak 
in 1919-20, and initiated an ugly quarrel as to whether the 
Britishvere 'cornering' the new sources of production, a 
suggestion the Petroleum Times called 'grotesque in the extreme,.2 
However, the assertion continued to be made in a series of books 
on the so-called 'oil war' published in the 1920s, and in American 
·1· 1 3 Ol Journa s. 
This criticism was made all the more pointed by the sUdden 
dampening of hopes in at least three other areas. The Bolshevik 
threat reasserted itself in the Baku area; British citizens fled 
the Grozny fields, and the future could no longer be viewed with 
optimism. Meanwhile, the Roumanian situation continued to pose 
difficulties, as lack of transport bottlenecked all the oil 
produced. Moreover, in Mexico salt water appeared in some of the 
wells, and political conditions also appeared uncertain, causing 
most companies to forswear further exploration and the exploitation 
of new areas. 
In such a situation, it is hardly surprising that any 
potential oilfield became the source of a struggle between the 




u.s. Geological Survey, 'The Oil Supply of the United states', 
Bulletin of the American Association of Petroleum Geologists 
VI (1922), pp.42-6; and,G: Otis Smith, 'Foreign Oil Supply 
for the U.S.', Petroleum l\ge 7 (1920), pp.157-8. In this 
article, Smith called for conservation at home, exploitation 
abroad. 
3 May 1919, Petroleum Times I, p.351; see also 2 August 1919, 
Petroleum Times II, pp.109-110; and 18 December 1920, The 
Economist XCI, pp.1072-3. 
Denny; Mohr; and Davenport and Cooke. For an example of oil 
journal opinion, see Petroleum Age 6 (1919), ~p~412-3 and 433. 
It is noticeable that Sir Auckland Geddes, Brltish Ambassador 
to the United States, thought it worthwhile to deny this charge 
in a leading American oil paper. Sir Auckland Geddes, 'Plan 
for British Oil "Corner" Denied", Petroleum Age 7 (1920), pp.40-1. 
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to secure their own producing properties abroad was immediate. 
Before the war, Standard Oil had been unsuccessful in securing 
foreign production anywhere, except Roumania, where war damage 
was making production difficult, and was involving the Company 
in bitter correspondence as to compensation. On the whole, 
American oilmen showed a contempt for the more pessimistic reports 
on the exhaustion of American oil reserves, as the debates at the 
conferences of the American Petroleum Institute showed;1 indeed, 
in 1925 the Institute produced its own report, by the so-called 
'Committee of Eleven' which sought to refute once and for all 
rumours of an impending oil famine. 2 Nevertheless, undoubtedly 
the opinion, if not prevalent, was at least considered, that unless 
American companies followed a policy of expansion abroad, it was 
possible that, having supplied the world with cheap oil products 
for so long, they would find themselves dependent upon others, at 
the time when control of oil reserves had become a matter of 
political, not merely commercial, concern. 3 Ill-considered boasts 
by British businessmen of Britain's growing control of the world's 
4 
reserves, coupled with efforts by both the governments of Great 
Britain and Holland to exclude American companies from their 
1. See, for example, the Presidential Address by Thomas A. 
O'Donnell, American Petroleum Institute, Proceedings of the 
Second Annual Meeting (Chicago, 1921), pp.4-7; and Petroleum 
Age 7 (1920), pp. 79 and 137. 
2. Williamson et.al., The Age of Energy, pp.317-8; and Henrietta 
M. Larson and Kenneth Wiggins Porter, The History of Humble 
Oil and Refining Company: A Study in Industrial Growth (New 
York, 1959), (hereafter Larson and Porter), pp.255 6. 
3 W C T I 'The Earth's Oil problem', Petroleum Age 7 • •• eag e, _ 
( 19 20 ), pp • 5 2-3. 
4. Speech by Mr. Pretyman, M.P., at the opening of Anglo-Persian's 
new refinery at Swansea, Petroleum Times I, pp.377-82: 
Sir E. Mackay Edgar, 'Britain's Hold on the World's Oil', 
Sperling's Journal (~919): an~ for rumours in the Oi~ press. . 
that the British Emplre was gOlng to adopt an aggresslve POllC'y 
towards the control of oil resources, Petroleum Times I, pp.1~c;-7. 
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territories, exacerbated American feelings of being the victim 
of a conspiracy. It became apparent that, to ensure their future 
supplies, American oil companies had to expand. Moreover, since 
American oil imports already exceeded exports,1 there was every 
reason for the United states government to encourage a policy of 
exploitation abroad, conservation at home, so as to ensure that 
the United states retained large reserves of a strategically vital 
mineral within its own control and borders. 
other factors also played a part in the American determination 
to secure foreign production. As Royal Dutch-Shell had discovered, 
it was economically sound to supply a market from the nearest 
source of supply, thus cutting down on transport costs. Moreover, 
Standard Oil could no longer afford to treat the foreign market 
as an adjunct to the American one. Growing competition, both at 
home and abroad, meant it was essential to secure markets permanently, 
thus entailing control of a secure source of production, instead 
of reliance upon the fluctuating fortunes of American wildcatters. 
Undoubtedly another impelling motive was the economic advantage 
in exploiting foreign fields. Since most were granted by State 
concession, one company controlled the entire field, which enabled 
it to regulate production according to market demand, a position 
completely different from that prevailing in American fields. 
Moreover, as the 1920s progressed, the growth of technological 
and geological knowledge made the exploitation of large fields 
abroad far cheaper per unit of output than the American fields. 2 
1. As early as 1919, Mexican oil imported into the u.S. exceeded 
U.S. oil exports by 47 million barrels. Petroleum Times III, 
pp.218-22. See also Table A. The significant figures are those 
relating to crude production; frequently oil exported into the 
United States was refined, and then imported, thus appearing 
in both import and export figures. 
2. Not least because careful, controlled production led to a larger 
ultimate recovery of the oil. See H.D. Wilde Jr. and F.H. Lahee, 
'Simple Principles of Efficient Oilfield Development', Bulletin 
of the American Association of Petroleum Geologists 17 (1933), 
Part 2. pp.981-1002. 
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There was, therefore, every reason for American companies to go 
on searching for foreign production even after the emergency of 
the early 1920s had passed. 
It is, however, in the period immediately following the First 
World War that the major oil companies began their urgent search 
for additional production overseas, so as to secure their competi-
tive position. This was particularly true of Jersey Standard, 
still the largest oil company in the world, but with a productive 
capacity far below that of its main rival, Royal Dutch-Shell. 
Far from increasing its comparative productive capacity, after 
1918 it was producing only 16% of the crude oil its refineries 
consumed. Whilst it devoted considerable attention to the securing 
of domestic production,1 it also sought foreign~oduction on a 
large scale, seeking concessions in the Middle East, Roumania, 
Poland, Mexico, Peru and Colombia for the most part, but also 
investigating the possibilities in France, Italy, Czechoslovakia, 
Spain, Egypt and Russia. 2 By such means, it was able by 1926 to 
produce 39% of its refineries' crude requirements. 3 
Of the ~ther major companies, Royal Dutch-Shell was in a far 
stronger position than Jersey Standard. Having acquired virtually 
world-wide production before the war, it had little need to engage 
in a frantic search for oil. Nevertheless, it did seek to con-




Gibb and Knowlton, pp.409-459. 
Ibid., pp.278-408. 
Henrietta M. Larson, Evelyn H. Knowlton and Charles S. Popple, 
New Horizons: The History of Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) 
1927-50 (New York, 1971), (hereafter Larson ~.~., New Horizons), 
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in part to compensate for the massive losses of Russian oil 
bearing territory, following the Russian Revolution. By aCquiring 
Lord Cowdray's Mexican Eagle, it strengthened its hold in the 
South Americas, a position further adVanced when Royal Dutch-
Shell's pioneering work resulted in a massive find in Venezuela, 
which country was by 1929 one of the three largest oil producing 
states in the world. In view of the well established international 
position of Royal Dutch-Shell, moves were made by the British 
Government to secure British control of the Group, although even-
tually this was to come to nothing. 1 
However, the British Government did of course already control, 
by virtue of a majority shareholding, the AnglO-Persian Oil Company. 
Despite having a secure position in Persia, with unit control of 
the oilfields, and a potential production capacity far above what 
its refineries could handle, AnglO-Persian began to look outside 
that country. It is hard to judge just how far its moves in the 
immediate post war years were the result of its own commercial 
policy, and how much at the prompting of the British Government. 
Having acquired British Petroleum as a marketing company, the 
Company was able to market its own products in Great Britain, 
whilst the refineries built at Llandarcy by 1922 and Grangemouth 
by 1924, enabled the shipment of crude to the United Kingdom. 2 
Anglo-Persian also acquired in 1919 the firms dealing in Scottish 
shale, an industry usually operated at a loss. Such a move could 
be seen either as the desperate acquisition of reserves at any price; 
1. Davis, British Oil Policy, ch. 4. 
2. AnglO-Persian also expanded its marketing operation into Europe 
after 1918, covering Scandinavia, Belgium, Denmark, France and 
Germany, and also into Australia and Far East. Longhurst, 
pp.179-181. 
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or it might have been due to the prompting of the British 
Government, desirous both to encourage a possible supply of 
oil within its own control, and to safeguard Scottish jobs. 
It would seem to accord well with British Government financial 
aid to companies wishing to explore for petroleum in the British 
Isles, where mineral rights were vested in the Crown. Such 
companies would have been encouraged by the great interest 
expressed in British oil prospects by petroleum technologists. 1 
Anglo-Persian did not confine its expansion to purely British 
operations, however. Apart from increasing its markets in Europe 
and elsewhere, it also began searching for foreign concessions 
throughout the Middle East (Kuwait, Qatar, Iraq), which it seemed 
to regard as its own special preserve; in parts of the Empire, 
such as Canada, Australia and Papua, with the encouragement of 
Dominion governments; and in other areas too, including Latin 
America (Argentina and Mexico) and Albania. 2 Anglo-Persian was 
clearly envisaging a role for itself as a leading international major. 
This combination of concern about potential shortage of oil 
supplies in the medium-term, and aggressive company policy directed 
at securing additional production whever possible, was, in the 
period 1919-21 to lead to bitter struggles between governments, 
and companies, in what has been called the 'oil war'. The question 
of why the full bitterness of the 'oil war' diminished after 1921 
has been examined in the text. However, given the continued 
anxiety of several oil companies to participate in Middle East 
1. This interest was particularly prevalent during the war. See, 
for example, William Forbes-Leslie, 'The Occurrence of Petroleum 
in England', Journal of the Institution of Petroleum Technologists 
III (1916-17), pp.152-183; W.H. Dalton, 'On the Oil Prospects of 
the British Isles', ibid., IV (1917-18), pp.37-50; and Cunningham 
Craig et.al., 'A New British Oil Industry', ibid., IV (1917-18), 
pp.110-134. These experts all seemed very optimistic as to the 
possibility of discovering oil. 
2. Longhurst, p.65. 
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production; the negotiations with governments that this entailed; 
and, of course, the struggle for Arabian concessions in the 1930s, 
it is necessary to look in some detail at conditions prevailing 
in the oil industry for the rest of the interwar period. 
Discoveries and exploitation in other parts of the world 
notwithstanding, in the 1920s the history of the world oil industry 
was still largely dominated by events in the United states, which 
accounted for about 70% of all world production and consumption,1 
and hence was extremely influential in controlling world oil prices. 2 
A series of major discoveries in the United states during the 
3 
1920s were to have a dramatic effect on the oil industry generally, 
and prices in particular. 4 For whilst this new production removed 
the immediate need to find new production elsewhere, and also 
raised grave doubts as to the lack of oil reserves in the United 
states, the vicious circle of overproduction and low prices that 
it engendered was to pose a major threat to the future of oil. 
It was in .the 1920s that much of California was opened up 
to the derrick,S and in this state particularly, town lot develop-
ment was to exacerbate problems already created by the attitude of 
United states law towards oil discovery. So small were some of 
1. See Table C below. Moreover, U.S. exports accounted throughout 
the 1920s for between 30-35% of foreign demand. Williamson 
et.al., The Age of Energy, p.509, Table 14.1. 
2. A good source for the fluctuations in supply and demand, oil 
stocks, and oil prices for this period is to consult the 
relevant volumes of The Economist. 
4. 
5. 
Beginning on a large scale in 1922, and continuing at regular 
intervals thereafter. See Petroleum Age 9 (1922); Ise, 
pp.105-126; and Gibb and Knowlton, pp.415-453. 
Larson and Porter, pp.248-253. 
P ticularly in the period 1922-3, flush production from ar .1 . California had a dramatic effect on mid-Continent Ol prlces. 
Ise, pp.105-112. 
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these 'town lot' leases that operators with one derrick and 
little else in the way of equipment or capital were able to 
commence production. With insufficient resources to permit long 
term investment or planning, these small producers frantically 
sought to produce as much oil as was feasible, selling it at the 
well head to one of the majors, or the large independents, and 
hence dispensing with the need to provide storage, transport or 
refining capacity. The net result of these vast numbers of small 
operators was an uncontrolled flood of oil which the major companies 
were incapable of handling. 
Despite a generally rising level of demand, massive stocks were 
built up, and prices were depressed dramatically. In such a 
situation, voluntary curtailment agreements and the bankruptcy of 
many of the smaller producers would for a short time halt the 
flood of oil, only to resume once the price of oil climbed once 
more. This vicious circle was to continue, and worsen, throughout 
the 1920s and beyond, with prices at times hitting a low of 5-10¢ 
1 per barrel in some areas. 
Overproduction was of course not a new phenomenon in the 
American oil industry. But in the 1920s it was compounded by 
developments which affected the entire world industry; the 
continuing problem was more the consequence of scientific and 
technological advances, although the 'flush production' from new 
fields contributed. Among these technological advances were the 
development of 'cracking' in major refineries; 2 the use of 
1. 
2. 
This discussion has largely been based on the periodic reports 
in relevant volumes of The Economist. 
That is, a technique of obtaining from less profitable fractions 
such as fuel oil, or kerosene, the most valuable product of all, 
gasoline. Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Ltd., Our Indus7-r', (2nd 
edn, London, 1949), pp.104-122; Dorsey Hager, Fundamentals of 
the Petroleum Industry (New York, 1939), pp.325-334. 
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geological and geophysical methods to discover new fields,1 and 
improved exploitation of those fields by use of such techniques 
as the rotary drill, air lift, and water drive. 2 
Exacerbating the problem created by overproduction in the 
United states, new sources of production elsewhere were being 
opened up. Whilst Mexican production continued to decrease, it 
was more than offset in other regions of the world. Russia 
followed a deliberate policy of a rapid increase in production, 
since petroleum was one major product available for export, thus 
improving the Soviet foreign trade position. 3 Even following 
the Depression after 1929, Russian production continued to increase. 4 
In Persia and Roumania, the oil industry maintained a steady growth. 
Moreover, two entirely new - and important - sources of production 
were opened up: Columbia, and Venezuela, the latter becoming the 
second largest world producer of crude petroleum by 1930. 
In most of these foreign fields, unit control would have 
allowed the operating company to regulate the flow of oil so as 
to match demand. And, indeed, to some extent this was done, 
notably by Royal Dutch-Shell in Venezuela, whilst AnglO-Persian 
could undoubtedly have far exceeded its production in Persia. 5 
1. See, for example, ibid., pp.129-157; 
in the Bulletin of the Association of 
Geologists 9 (1925) and 10 (1926). 
2. Hager, op.cit., pp.159-287. 
and a number of articles 
American Petroleum 
3. 24 March 1928, The Economist CVI, pp.581-2. 
4. This was despite attempts made by the major international oil 
companies between May 1932 and Spring 1933, to reach some 
agreement with the Russian government to curb exports. See 
The Economist CXIV CXV and CXVII. Such attempts tended 
ultimately to fail'because of the inability of the United 
States to control production. 
5. Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Ltd., Our Industry (2nd edn, London, 
1949), pp.54-55. 
- 400 -
But this restriction was simply in accordance with particular 
fluctuations of the companies' own market demands, and hence 
was to benefit their own profitability. Since most of the 
companies operating foreign fields did not have extensive 
production in the United States, there was little reason for 
them to damage their own profitability to assist the American 
oil producers - particularly when the latter showed so little 
inclination to assist themselves. 
It might at first sight appear that the chronic OVer-
production of the 1920s would have deterred American majors at 
least from pursuing their search for foreign concessions. But 
whilst it may have curtailed the frantic search for immediate 
production, in the long term the need for American oil companies 
to secure foreign reserves was still important. Although American 
overproduction enabled them to buy at low prices and fill storage, 
1 the vagaries of production left American majors exposed when in 
competition with other large oil companies, which had stable 
supplies, efficiently exploited, close to their markets. With 
the growth of Royal Dutch-Shell and Anglo-Persian - and, indeed, 
the increased rivalry between American oil companies for markets 
abroad - it was no longer feasible for the United States oil 
industry to use foreign markets as a release valve for American oil. 
Moreover, the pattern of the United States oil industry was 
changing. Although large scale oil exports continued, since 1918 
imports of oil into the United States had consistently exceeded 
1. Particularly since few large American oil companies cared to 
commit themselves too heavily to ownership of American oil 
wells, preferring to buy oil as needed, rather than be forced 
by American law to produce oil they were unable to sell. 
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exports, even in the years of chronic overproduction. 1 It was 
becoming apparent that the United states was likely to prove a 
net importer of oil; and that her share of the non-American 
2 
market was likely to drop. Given this, the instability of United 
states production, and the need to meet commitments demanding a 
guaranteed source of crude, the pressure was strong for American 
companies wishing to sell abroad, including majors such as Socony 
and Jersey Standard, but also large independents such as Texaco 
and Gulf, to look abroad for reserves to supply the expanding 
world market - even if such reserves were not immediately exploited. 3 
Although the problems of overproduction began to become 
apparent from 1922 onwards, in late 1925 and 1926, comparative 
stability returned to the industry.4 In 1927, however, the 
precarious balance between supply and demand was again overt~ned,5 
and the oil industry was swamped by a flood of oil, which led to 
the usual collapse of prices. Indeed, so great was the American 
production of crude, that it could not even be transported and 
stored, and hence wastage, on a vast scale, was inevitable. 
1. See Table A. But it should be noted that the figures there 
cited relate to crude petroleum only. When petroleum products 
are included, in Table B, exports still exceeded imports for 
most of the 1920s and 1930s. Much of the crude petroleum 
imported, of course, would be from South America and, after 
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30% of foreign demand, 
declined to under 20%. 
Table 14.2, p.509, and 
the 1920s U.S. exports supplied over 
during the 1930s this figure rapidly 
Williamson et.al., The Age of Energy, 
Table 20.2, p.720. 
Larson et.al., New Horizons, pp.109-148. 
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Gibb and Knowlton, pp.485-6. 
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This slump, occurring before the American industry had had 
time fully to reCOver from th t . 
e uncer alnty of the early 1920s, 
or to dispose of vast crude and gasoline stocks, had a devastating 
effect upon it, for it had no chance to recover before the 
Depression, and the concomitant fall in demand, exacerbated the 
atmosphere of crisis. In effect, the depression in the oil 
industry commenced in 1927, and was to result in a growing 
acceptance of the need for co-operation, both in the United states 
and in the international oil industry generally. However, this 
acceptance was slow to permeate to the United states Federal 
government, which was not to be fully convinced of the benefits 
of co-operation until the Depression of the 1930s had reached its peak. 
This was unfortunate, for although the problem was world-wide, 
the settlement of the American problem was the most important 
priority. The American industry still accounted for, and controlled, 
the world oil industry, with nearly 70% of the world's production 
still concentrated in the United states. Unless American producers 
could be persuaded to curtail their wasteful habits, there was 
little hope of co-operative efforts by the large multinational com-
panies on an international scale proving successful. However, 
whilst the larger American companies recognized the need for 
1 planning, conservation and control, to allow implementation of 
reserve extension, and a policy of matching production to consump-
tion,2 it was not so easy to achieve this. For whilst in foreign 
fields curtailment could usually be enforced with ease, since only 
1. 
2. 
A notable example was the Humble Oil and Refining Company, one 
of Jersey Standard's main domestic subsidiaries, ~hi~h advocated 
and attempted to implement unit control of u.s. ollflelds. 
Larson and Porter, p.262. 
Address by Axtell J. Byles, Vice President, The. Americ~ Petroleuf' 
Insti tute, Proceedings of the Ninth Annual Mee~0i. (ChlCa?O, 1928), 
pp.4-6. It is significant that the A.P.T., whlch In earll~r 
years had been bitterly opposed to any form of Government 2nter-
ference, had now changed its opinion. 
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one or at most a few companies operated there, in the United states 
curtailment involved agreement between a large 
number of companies 
and one-man operators, agreement which unless backed by the Federal 
Government was unlikely to be successful in the I t 1 o~ e~. 
So, although various attempts were made in the following years 
voluntarily to restrict production, in some cases with the backing 
of State governors and even the use of the state militia in 
Oklahoma and Texas, to shut down wells in order to force up prices, 2 
these agreements were all too shortlived, and were flouted as soon 
as new production elsewhere threatened the abstainers, 3 or higher 
prices prevailed. So, although there was a drop in crude oil pro-
duction in the periods 1929 and then 1930-1932, in part as a 
consequence of voluntary restriction,4 in both 1930 and 1933 flush 
production in Texas destroyed voluntary restriction,5 and totally 
undermined oil prices, already weak because of falling demand. It 
was apparent that only federal action could help restore order to 
the United States oil industry. 
Until such action was taken, the only hope of effective 
restriction of the glut of oil was by attempts to limit inter-
national production. Probably the best known - and, in the short 
1. Especially since such argument would technically be a 
violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, on which grounds 





Ibid., pp.112-125; and Williamson et.al., The Age of Energy, 
pp.321-338, and 542-544. 
As, for example, in 1930, when the disastrous flooding of the 
market by oil from the massive Texas field destroyed voluntary 
restriction in Oklahoma. Larson and Porter, pp.297-347 and 
449-476. 
See the periodic reports in The Economist CX-CXVI. 
Larson and Porter, pp.321-476. 
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term at least, the most successfulwattempt was initiated on 
17 September 1928, during a meeting of Deterding, Cadman and 
Teagle - the famous Achnacarry or 'As-Is' agreement. This 
included, amongst its provisions, agreement that companies should 
accept the same proportion of business . In the future as they 
currently held, share facilities where . posslble, draw supplies 
for markets from the nearest producing area, and handle excess 
local production by shutting in oil wells. 1 However, there was 
little chance of real success whilst the United states and Russia 
remained outside the orbit of restriction. Attempts by Jersey 
Standard to stimulate voluntary curtailment in the United states 
were to fail by 1931,2 and since the United states still supplied 
over 60% of the world's oil, this meant that in practice, 
co-operation between the international majors became concentrated 
on the sharing of distributing and marketing facilities so as to 
minimize wasteful competition,3 a practice that European oilmen 





For details of the Achnacarry Agreement and other attempts at 
international co-operation, see Christopher Tugendhat, Oil: 
The Biggest Business (London, 1968), pp.99-104; Larson et.al., 
New Horizons, pp.60 and 308-9; and Williamson ~t.al., The Age 
of Energy, pp.506-534. 
Standard Oil (New Jersey) set up in December 1928 the Standard 
Oil Export Corporation (comprising Jersey Standard and five 
major subsidiaries) and in 1929 the Export Petroleum Corporation 
(comprising the Standard Oil Export Corporation and 16 other 
companies). Both these corporations urged members to follow 
the group line on prices, export quotas, etc. Although forced 
by the anti-trust laws to limit itself to the export trade only, 
the Export Petroleum Corporation failed. Ibid., pp.530-1. 
For example, Burmah-Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Company 
of India Ltd., registered 6 January 1928, and, a more extensive 
attempt at co-operation, the Consolidated Petroleum Company Ltd., 
registered on 17 October 1928 to acquire all installations and 
distributing facilities of Anglo-persian and Asiatic Petroleum 
Company (a Royal Dutch-Shell subsidiary) in Africa, Egypt, the 
Sudan, Palestine, Syria, the Red Sea and Ceylon. 
See for example Sir Henri Deterding, 'Common Sense in the Oil 
" dO f th Industry', American Petroleum Institute, pro~ee lngs ~ e 
Tenth Meeting of the American Petroleum Institute (Chlcago, 1930), 
pp,11-13. 
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this limited success, taken together with the steady development 
of joint ownership of Middle East concessions, helped promote an 
atmosphere of co-operation in the international oil industry. 
After 1933, the oil industry returned slowly to a more normal 
state of affairs, though still afflicted with a surplus of oil, 
and low prices. To some extent, of course, this was due to the 
general improvement in the world economy, as the worst effects 
of the Depression passed. But it also owed a great deal to the 
widening acceptance of a belief that measures to eliminate waste 
and encourage conservation were essential when dealing with a 
natural resource as vital as oil: a view that the worsening 
international situation and increasing possibility of war could 
only reinforce. This view had, of course, become more acceptable 
amongst oilmen in the late 1920s, even converting that bastion 
of free enterprise and resister of Government interference, the 
American Petroleum Institute; but despite support by state 
legislatures, presidents, and the Federal Oil Conservation Board 
1 for voluntary restriction in output, the peculiar nature of the 
American oil industry meant that only compulsion could guarantee 
that such anti-waste measures were widely implemented. This was 
to corne in the 1930s, especially during the Roosevelt administration. 
Hitherto, state measures, aimed at conserving oil, and restricting 
h ti 2 h ful they ffil· ght be production throug prora on, owever success , 
not only could be undone by the change of mind of a single operator, 
1. 
2. 
As witness the setting up of the Interstate Oil Compact 
Commission in 1929, and the 1930 report of the Federal Oil 
Conservation Board. See Williamson et.al., The /V1e of Ener~;>', 
pp.336-7. 
That is by deciding upon the amount by which production was 
to be r~duced, and sharing out that reduction on.a pro-rat~ 
basis between the various fields, and operators In those flelds. 
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but could only succeed whilst operators did not see their own 
reductions outweighed by production elsewhere.1 
During the New 
Deal, however, the National Industrial Recovery Administration 
was able to implement a nationwide code for the oil industry, 
which permitted restriction of production to a level more in 
accord wi th the reduced needs of the American economy. 2 Whil s t 
this did not prove completely successful, a much more effective 
act passed in 1935, The Connally Act, authorized the Interior 
Department to design measures that would restrict foreign and 
interstate shipments of 'hot oil' (i.e., oil over the state 
allowance).3 In the same year, several oil producing states, 
many of which had already adopted effective state conservation 
laws, entered, with the consent of Congress, into an interstate 
compact to encourage conservation and the elimination of waste. 4 
Moreover, the imposition of a tariff, and a restriction on 
oil imports into the United states, together with a greater demand 
for petroleum products, went a long way to balanCing supply and 
demand. More long term planning was possible again, and whilst 
at home American companies sought to obtain block leases that 
would allow the retention of reserves, eventually to be worked 
more efficiently by wider well spacing, use of better techniques 
and technology,5 abroad American companies continued to expand 
1. Larson and Porter, pp.297-326 and 446-487; and Williamson 




Nash, pp.128-141; Williamson et.al., The Age of Enerc:v, 
pp.537-548; and The Economist CXVI and CXVII. 
Williamson et.al., The Age of Energy, pp.537 and 546-561; 
Nash, pp.145-6; and Larson and Porter, pp.479-486. 
Marquis James, The Texaco story: 
1902-1952 (New York, 1953), pp.57 
The Age of Energy, pp.550-1; and 
The First Fifty Years 
G2; Williamson et.al., 
Larson and Porter, pp.485-6. 
5. Ibid., p.262. 
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their interest in a wide range of foreign fields. 1 Thus, whil s t 
the international majors, and larger American independents were 
not necessarily anxious actually to "'0 k fO I 
w r new le ds, concession 
hunting continued apace. 
It was in a framework of overproduction and uncertainty, 
therefore, that negotiations for Arabian concessions were under-
taken, and the factors herein described may help to explain why 
American companies were apparently more anxious to obtain con-
cessions than companies such as Anglo-Persian, which already had 
easily controlled and regulated productive capacity beyond their 
immediate needs; and yet why, having obtained the concessions 
and proved the existence of oil, the new concessionaires proved 
so unwilling to begin commercial production. 
Note A 
American Law relating to oil production 
One of the most consistent features of the world oil situation 
throughout the period dealt with in this appendix, was the chronic 
overproduction endemic in the American petroleum industry. To 
understand why this was so, and why no successful effort was made 
until the 1930s to overcome the problem, it is essential first to 
comprehend the effects of American laws relating to petroleum. 
Subsoil Ownership 
Whereas in most countries, all mineral rights are vested in 
the State, which controls the granting of concessions to commercial 
companies, in United States law the owner of the surface also owns 
the subsoil (including any minerals), and has the sole right to 
1. For example, by the end of the 1930s, Jersey Standard had 
interests in Iraq and other areas of the Middle East, Venezuela, 
Argentina, Bolivia, Mexico, Peru, Colombia, the Dutch East . 
I d o H y Italy and Rournania. Larson et.al., New Hor1zons, n les, ungar, , 
pp. 109-149 • 
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lease mineral rights to an oil company. This has certain 
implications, of great significance for overproduction in the 
1920s. A landowner might, if he so desired, subdivide his 
property and lease it to several operators. Moreover, owing 
to the nature of land development in the United states, an oil 
pool rarely lay under the property of only one landowner, whilst 
in areas of townlot development (such as the Los Angeles basin), 
the number of separate landowners, and hence leases, were legion. 
It was virtually impossible, therefore, for anyone company, no 
matter how large, to control the exploitation of an entire field. 
Moreover, landowners could stipulate rapid development, and even 
the number of wells to be drilled, thus ensuring that companies, 
whatever the state of the market, were forced to produce oil at 
a ruinous and wasteful rate; they could also require the lessees 
to drill 'offset wells' under the Law of Capture (see below). 
The large number of landowners also encouraged the proliferation 
of small producing companies, owning only one or a few leases; 
and it was these small producers who were responsible for most 
of the overproduction of the 1920s. 
The Law of Capture 
In view of the situation outlined above, the fugitive nature 
of oil presented a serious legal problem. Since oil naturally 
migrates towards the area of least pressure, a well drilled on 
. th dra1' n the entire oil reservoir, inc I uding one lease might 1n eory 
that oil originally located under other leases. Other than 
dividing the oil produced amongst the lessees, according to area 
way of determining the quantity of oil belonging held, there was no 
to each operator. It was therefore decided to apply to oil the 
'law of capture', originally devised to determine the ownership of 
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game animals; that is, the oil was declared to belong to the 
man on whose land it was 'captured', or produced. Thus, once one 
well had been drilled on one lease for the p ot t· , r ec lon of their 
royalties, landowners could insist that 'offset wells' should be 
drilled, so that each well near the boundary of the leases 
adjoining theirs was paralleled by one within their property. 
This all too often led to the ridiculous situation such as 
prevailed in Spindletop, Texas, where the derricks virtually 
touched each other. Moreover, any attempt to prevent rapid 
exploitation of a new field in a time of overproduction could be 
destroyed by only one operator deciding to drill a well. 
The Sherman Anti-Trust Act 
Originally passed in 1890, the Sherman Law was directed against 
the extremely powerful 'trusts' which had come into being since the 
Civil War, of which the first, and perhaps the best known, was the 
mighty Standard Oil Combine. By this act, any combination tending 
towards monopoly, or restraint of trade, was declared illegal. 
Whilst this law was to prove efficacious as a weapon in 'trust-
busting', it was also to have a less beneficial effect on the oil 
industry of the 1920s. Any combination of producers, pipeline 
operators, refiners or exporters to limit the amount of oil produced 
or handled, was too often seen as an attempt to maintain prices by 
illegal restraint of trade. It was impossible, therefore, to make 
a curtailment agreement binding on any company or operator; thus, 
all too often, such agreements failed because one operator, or 
lessor, refused to be bound by it. Not until the Federal Government 
itself sponsored such agreements in the 1930s, was it possible for 
oil companies to co-operate in preventing waste, and low prices, 
without fear of legal action. 
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The inevitable result of all this legislation was to make 
effective action against overproduction virtually impossible. 
With no way of preventing new wells being drilled, the only sure 
way to curtail production was to allow prices to plummet way 
below the 'break-even' point. Even then, the slightest rise in 
prices was often sufficient to inaugurate a new orgy of drilling 
and a flood of unwanted oil. Not even firm action by governors 
of some states could do much to improve the national situation, 
until under Roosevelt the Federal Government was prepared to 
intervene. 
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I t d - . Productlor 
r.n
por 
s an Exports of Crude Petrole~ --, 
(In thousands of United states barrels) 
Production Imports Estimated Exports Proved Reserves 
265,763 17,247 2,970 5,400,000 
355,928 37,736 4,901 6,200,000 
378,367 52,822 6,019 6,700,000 
442,929 106,175 9,295 7,200,000 
472,183 125,364 9,627 7,800,000 
557,531 127,308 10,805 7,600,000 
732,407 82,015 17,534 7,600,000 
713,940 77,775 16,239 7,500,000 
763,743 61,824 13,337 8,500,000 
770,874 60,382 15,407 8,800,000 
901,129 58,383 15,844 10,500,000 
901,474 79,767 18,966 11,000,000 
1,007,323 78,933 26,401 13,200,000 
898,011 62,129 23,705 13,600,000 
851,081 47,250 25,535 13,000,000 
785,159 44,682 27,393 12,300,000 
905,656 31,893 36,584 12,000,000 
908,065 35,558 41,127 12,177,000 
996,596 32,239 51,430 12,400,000 
1,099,687 32,327 50,313 13,063,400 
1,279,160 27,484 67,234 15,507,268 
1,214,355 26,412 77,254 17,348,14( 
1,264,962 33,095 72,076 ~S,4q1,012 
Bureau of the Census, Historical statistics ~f ~e. 
United states. Colonial Times to 1,-:lsr,. A ~~- -:' ~ stlcal 

























uni ted states Imports and Exports of Crude Petroleum 
and Refined Petroleum Products 1920-1939 
(in thousands of United states barrels) 
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Table C: Production of Crude Petroleum 1880-1935: World and 
united states Total for Selected Years 
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f the Census statistical Abstract o , ~l 19')C::: (Washington, D.C., anDUd , . L , 
1935, p.706; and 1938, , .739. 
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Appendix IV 
British Colonial Oil Policy 
Before 1918, there was already existing 
within the Empire, 
and hence under the direct administration of th 
e Colonial ~fice, 
a well established oil industry. Admittedly, out of an already 
small production within the British Em· 1 plre, by far the largest 
proportion was derived from India,2 nd th 
a was erefore outside the 
control of the Colonial Office. N th 1 one e ess, indications of oil 
were known to exist in many places throughout th e colonies, and 
Trinidad's oil production had already h d reac e proportions that 
were significant to its economy. The Colonial Office's anxiety 
to preserve the industry is apparent during the 1930s, when it 
made vigorous attempts to foster and protect it through a policy 
of preference buying by Government departrnents. 3 
The particular significance of the West Indian oil industry 
is that the regulations drawn up during its development reveal 
Colonial Office thinking on policy to be followed towards oil 
resources within British possessions. Circumstances were never 
to permit a unified leasing policy to be followed throughout the 
1. 
2. 
In 1918, out of a total world oil production of 71,689,000 
long tons, the British Empire produced only 1,836,000. 
Imperial Mineral Resources Bureau, The Mineral Industry of 
the British Empire and Foreign Countries: Petroleum and 
Allied Products (1913-1919) (London, 1924), p.12. 
In 1918, India produced 1,146,340 tons, whilst Trinidad, 
second largest producer in the Empire, produced 291,489 tons, 
exporting over half. The British Empire was however ~ery 
insignificant as an importer of oil into the u~ted Kin?dom. 
In 1918, of 1,384,495,000 Imperial gallons of 011 and o~l 
products imported into the U.K., only 162,611~000 Imp~rlal 
gallons carne from British possessions. Imperlal Institute, 
Monographs on Mineral Resources with Special Reference to the 
British Empire: Petroleum (London, 1921), pp.16, 23 and 36. 
See for example the minutes of the 15th, 16th, 18th and 19th 
ti' . f th 0' il Board (a sub-cornrni ttee of the Committee mee ngs 0 e, 6 1933 
of Imperial Defence), 9 May 1932, 27 J:UY 1932, January 
and 17 February 1933,- CAB 50/1, and 011 Board Papers Nos. 75, 
78 and 79, CAB 50/4. 
. 1 Emplre. 
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However, an eXamination of the Trim· dad 
oil industry 
regulations reveals two significant factors for a study of the 
post-war Middle East; firstly th t th -
, a e Admiralty had reason 
to expect that the Colonial Office would, where 
practicable, show 
consideration for its particular needs for fuel 01..1. 
, and, secondly, 
that the policy of British control which the ColOnial Office 
attempted to impose in the case of Bahrain and Kuwait was very 
similar to that actually adopted in Trinidad, modified only 
insofar as was necessary to deal with states that were only British 
protectorates, not British colonies. 
Although an oil industry in its modern sense had been in 
existence in the United states since 1859, its strategic value was 
not apparent until tests revealed oil's SUperiority OVer coal as 
a fuel for warships. By 1904, the British Admiralty had already 
started to use fuel oil, urged on by the 'oil maniac' Lord Fisher, 
and a drive began to secure the supplies that an oil-driven navy 
would need in time of war. The epitome of this movement for a 
secure oil supply was the purchase by the Treasury in 1914 of a 
controlling interest in the AnglO-Persian Oil Company, as yet a 
small company with a highly localized production. 
Although this dramatic and unprecedented coup was the result 
of desperate need for oil, the Admiralty had since 1904 been turning 
its thoughts consistently to the more orthodox method of ensuring 
that they could obtain supplies from within the Empire, and, more 
particularly, that where such resources existed, the rights should 
1. Despite considerable interdepartmental ~scussion on the issue 
in the early 1920s and again in the per1.od 1929-30, a unified 
leasing policy was'never adopted during the interwar years; 
. f th S rvice Departments on the in part because the V1.ews 0 e l' 1 Off' 
one hand, and the Petroleum Department and. ~e Co. oma. 1.ce 
th th at variance Davis, Brl.tl.sh 01.1 Poll.cy, on e 0 er, were • 
pp.68-9 and 395-404. 
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if possible be reserved to the British Government of . 
securlng 
priority of supply for government requirements at reasonable prices. 
In order to ensure that the developing oil industry of Trinidad 
and Barbados, geographically susceptible to United states influence 
, 
should not become dominated by American concerns, in particular the 
stand Oil Company, it was decided early in 1904 to appoint a joint 
committee at the Colonial Office, prinCipally representing the 
Colonial Office and the Admiralty, but with a representative from 
the India Office, to maintain close contact between the two depart-
ments.
1 
This committee reported in June 1904,2 and its recommendations 
show clearly the line of thinking adopted by the Colonial Office and 
the Admiralty. Its chief recommendation was that steps should be 
taken to give the Imperial Government a legislative priority of 
supply. It was also thought essential to ensure that the oil produced 
should be refined on the spot, so that an adequate supply of oil of 
the correct specification should be available. 3 
This committee also recommended certain policies which mining 
ordinances in the various Crown Colonies implemented,4 and which a 
. 5 draft model oil mining ordinance drawn up in 1916 lncluded. This 
policy can be divided into two sections, the 'Admiralty clauses', 






Memorandum by W. st. D. Jenkins of the Admiralty, relative to 
the reservation of oil fuel for His Majesty's Navy, January 
1913, Confidential Print, Miscellaneous No.284, C.O. 855/22. 
1 Committee appointed to discuss Draft report of the Departmenta 
d t the oil supplies of Barbados certain questions with regar 0 
and Trinidad, appended ibid. 
Ibid., pp.2 and 7. 
A list of mining ordinances in Crown Colonies can be found in 
ibid., p.5. 
14 January 1916, Confidential Model Oil Mining Ordinances, 
Print, Miscellaneous No.319, C.O. 885/24. 
;a;sa 
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produced, whether from Crown lands or private lands; and the 
so-called 'British control' or 'British Nationall"ty' clause, which 
was only applicable to leases on Crown lands, or ex-Crown lands 
alienated after 1904 (in which case , the Crown retained the mineral 
rights). All private lands bestowed the mineral rights upon the 
owner of the subsoil, and the Colonial Government could not there-
fore impose conditions upon the granting of leases. 
The 'Admiralty clauses' were designed to ensure that in times 
of war, the navy would be guaranteed a secure supply of fuel oil 
from all Crown Colonies, whether it be produced from Crown or 
private lands, and were based upon the assumption that if, in 
wartime, Great Britain controlled the sea routes and the territories 
from which the oil was produced, the nationality of the producing 
company was immaterial. The safeguards that were thought to be 
sufficient were, therefore, that no oil should be exported without 
1 the previous consent of the Governor; that as soon as a lessee's 
output of crude oil of a quality suitable for refining reached a 
specific quantity, the Governor might require the lessee to erect 
a refinery capable of processing at least fifty per cent of the 
output, and so treating the oil as to produce fuel oil that would 
"f" ti 2 meet Admiralty specl lca on; that the Governor should have the 
right of pre-emption of all oil won under a lease, and might require 
the lessee to produce fuel oil of Admiralty specification, upon 
" " 3 payment of a falr prlce; and that in the event of war, the Governor 
might take sole charge of land and plant, and the lessee should 
4 
conform to all instructions issued by the Governor. In negotiations 
1. Article 52, ibid. 
2. Article 39, ibid. 
Articles 40 and 42, ibid. 
4. 
cl "t d in footnotes 9-12 t " I 44 "b" d All the arti es Cl e Ar lC e ,1 1 • " 
are based on the 1912 Trinidad Ordinance. 
SUI.: . 
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concerning the conditions to be imposed upon the Bahrain and Kuwai t 
concessionaires, the Admiralty attempted, in vain, to secure at least 
some of the 'Admiralty clauses'. 
The 'British control' clause was designed to circumvent the 
growth of foreign influence through an industry where capital 
investment was necessarily large, and hence the degree of potential 
political influence that could be exercised upon the host government 
by the concessionaire was considerable. This policy was thus appli-
cable equally to the British protectorates on the littoral of the 
jealously guarded Persian Gulf. The clause stipulated that no lease 
should be granted, or assigned to, or held by any company which was 
not and did not remain a British company registered in Great Britain 
or a British colony, and having its principal place of business 
within the Dominions; that the Chairman and Managing Director of 
the company, and a majority of the other directors, should be British 
subjects; that the local manager or his equivalent, and a pre-
scribed portion of the local staff employed by any lessee should be 
British subjects; and that neither the lessee nor the premises 
prescribed by the lease should become at any time directly or 
indirectly controlled or managed by foreigners or any other foreign 
t o 1 The 'BrlOtlOsh control' clause, or modified versions corpora lone 
of it, were to play an important role in the negotiations for oil 
concessions in Bahrain and Kuwait. 
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